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Statement of Problem 
 The Japanese immigration to America began in 1868 at the beginning of the Meiji 
Restoration (Meiji Ishin, 明治維新).  In general, the history of Japanese immigration 
consists of two phases: 1868 to 1907, and 1908 to 1924.  In other words, ending the 
Japanese labor migration to the United States, the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–
19081 marked the turning point in the nature of Japanese immigration from temporary 
laborers to permanent residents.2  Their motives for immigration have not been 
thoroughly explored, partly because Japan is now a country that is receiving immigrants 
rather than sending them.  Nevertheless, Japan was not a wealthy country for several 
decades after the Meiji Restoration.  In order to pursue the national policy called fukoku 
kyōhei (富国強兵, enrich the nation and strengthen the military) and to be the itto-koku   
                                                
* Following the Japanese practice, all names are presented with surname first then given name. 
 
1 Under the agreement, Japan agreed not to issue passports valid for the continental 
United States to laborers.  On the other hand, the United States allowed Japan to issue passports 
for the United States to “laborers who have already been in America and to the parents, wives, 
and children of laborers already resident there," according to Alexander DeConde, et al., 
Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, Volume 2, E–N (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
2002), 208.   
 
2 Yuji Ichioka, The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–
1924 (New York: Free Press, 1988), 3–4.  Ichioka argued that years between 1885 and 1907 as 
the initial phase and years between 1908 and 1924 as the subsequent phase. 
 
 2
(一等国, “first-rank nation”), the new Meiji government carried out a series of reforms 
that radically changed the Japanese society.  Japan then was chaotic due to the rapid
transition from a feudal system to a modernizing nation through social, economic, 
administrative, military, legal, and educational reform programs.  The leaders of Japan 
tenaciously tried to be equal with the West after the conclusions of “unequal treaties.”  
Consequently, these reform programs created not only serious unemployment and trade 
problems but also severe poverty differences between cities and villages.3   
 Japan after 1868 was one of the major countries that had encouraged emigration 
until the 1960s, when Japan experienced rapid economic growth because the Korean War 
(1950–1953) gave a tremendous economic boost to the Japan’s postwar recovery.4  
Suffering from the drastic socioeconomic changes following the Meiji Restoration, many 
Japanese left for Hawaii, Americas, Australia, and Manchuria in order to improve their 
standard of living, first by accumulating wealth as dekasegi-nin (出稼ぎ人, emigrant or 
sojourn laborer) and later by establishing themselves in stable settlements as permanent 
residents.  The displaced samurai carried out the first organized emigration to the United 
States as early as 1869.  Especially after the 1880s, inspired by the amount of remittanc  
made by the immigrants, the Japanese government with the help of influential 
intellectuals promoted the Japanese overseas emigration for the nation’s economic 
development.  In other words, the Japanese overseas emigration not only facilitated 
industrialization and commercial activity but also alleviated socioeconomic problems 
                                                
 3 Peter Francis Kornicki, Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History, 1868–
1912 (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 43; Keiji Ohara, J panese Trade and Industry in 
the Meiji-Taisho Era (Tokyo: Obunsha, 1957), 226. 
 
 4 Stephen S. Large, Showa Japan: Political, Economic and Social History 1926–1989, 
vol. 3, 1952–1973 (London: Routledge, 1998), 16. 
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caused in the process of modernization following the opening of Japan.  In fact, a large-
scale overseas emigration contributed to the development of Japan’s maritime industry as 
Sasaki Seiji and Nishimukai Yoshiaki pointed out.5  Meanwhile, the demand for cheap 
labor enabled the Japanese mass immigration first in Hawaii and then in the United 
States.6   
The influx of the Japanese immigrants in a short period eventually instigated the 
anti-Japanese sentiment both in Hawaii and in the United States; however, the sentim nt 
was more severe in the mainland United States due to the rise of the organized 
exclusionist movement.  Focusing on the period between 1868 and 1926, this study 
explores the “pushes” (forces that caused the people to leave Japan) and “pulls” (things 
that attracted the people to go to Hawaii and the United States) with an emphasis on 
socioeconomic and cultural aspects. 
 My contribution to this area of study will be to explore why great numbers of 
Japanese decided to immigrate to America instead of neighboring regions such a 
Manchuria and how the development of the nation attributed to the interests of 
immigrants, government, and industries between 1868 and 1926.  Better economic 
opportunities would not fully explain their determination.  So, what really “pushed” the 
Japanese people to America?  Utilizing sources that represent the Japanese poi t of view, 
I will examine what caused the Japanese mass immigration to America, what were the 
governmental policies?  What were the consequences?     
                                                
5 Yoshiaki Nishimukai, “Transportation of Japanese Emigrants in the Pre-Wa  Period,” 
Keizai Keiei Kenkyū: Nenpō (Annual report on economics and business administration) 18, no. 1 
(December 1967): 67–119. 
 




 Until now, scholarly works on the Japanese immigration generally have been 
published mainly focusing on the Japanese immigrants’ experiences in America.  
Initially, missionaries and journalists wrote about Japan.  For the most part, Japanese 
immigration history was written by Japanese American scholars who had access to 
valuable primary sources including experiences of their parents and grandparents being 
the early Japanese immigrants in America.  On the other hand, studies mostly done in the 
United States seemed to lack primary sources on the Japanese side of story.  Today, it has 
become easier to fly to Japan for research or to obtain primary sources through online; 
however, back then, due to the limitation on transportation and a language barrier, it 
required a tremendous amount of time, money, and effort to pursue research on the 
Japanese socioeconomic condition during the Meiji and Taisho periods (大正時代).7  As 
a result, for the past 100 years, many studies on the Japanese immigration have done on 
“pulls” based on the American-centered view that tended to emphasize economic 
motivations.8  
 In particular, the crucial period between 1868 and 1900 has remained not fully 
explored by scholars for several reasons.  First of all, many Japanese American scholars 
examined the lives of immigrants exclusively drawing from their family experiences.  
                                                
7 During the Meiji and Taisho periods, most government documents were written in old 
form of characters.  Therefore, many kanji (漢字, Chinese characters used in Japanese writing) 
were not simplified like today. 
 
8 U.S. Congress, Senate, Reports of the Immigration Commission, Immigrants in 
Industries, Part 25: Japanese and Other Immigrant Races in the Pacific Coast and Rocky 
Mountain States, vol. I: Japanese and East Indians, 61 t Cong., 2d sess., Document No. 633, 
June 15, 1910 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1911), 9; Iyenaga and Satō, 
Japan and California Problem, 50–51; Eliot Grinnell Mears, Resident Orientals on the American 
Pacific Coast (Chicago: University Press, 1928; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1978), 47; Lucie
Cheng and Edna Bonacich, Labor Immigration under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the United 
States before World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 268. 
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Here is another problem: these first generations of immigrants were usually the poor 
peasantry or the unemployed samurai who did not realize what was really happening at 
home.  Once leaving Japan, they were not fully aware of drastic political and 
socioeconomic changes brought about by the Meiji Restoration that indeed cause
numbers of subsequent problems.  As a result, scholarly works done by Japanese 
American scholars tended to offer great details on the social and economic experiences of 
the Japanese in America, while not fully explaining the causes for immigration in terms 
of cultural and intellectual development during the Meiji and Taisho periods. 
 The other problem is that not many Japanese scholars have worked on the 
comprehensive Japanese immigration history.  As I pursued research, I found
considerably few accounts on the Japanese immigration to Hawaii and the United Stat s 
by the Japanese scholars.  Unlike other Asian groups, the Japanese immigration to 
America did not increase after the end of World War II.  While other Asian countries 
suffered postwar poverty in addition to the outbreak of Communist Revolution in China 
and the war in Korea, Japan was able to carry out the postwar recovery at an 
extraordinary speed through becoming a close U.S. Cold War ally.  In fact, there were 
about ten million unemployed, including demobilized soldiers immediately after the war.  
However, utilizing excess labor force and improvements in heavy industry, Japan was 
capable of being the U.S. ally.9  During the Korean War (1950–1953), the U.S. special 
procurement amounted to $600 million in 1951 and more than $800 million in 1952 and 
1953.10  Accordingly, Japan’s rapid economic growth created many job opportunities 
                                                






within the country.  Therefore, immigration became a less significant pr c ice to 
overcome the poverty in rural areas because there was a good labor market in the 
industrial sectors.  Since the 1960s, Japan indeed became a prosperous country that 
received immigrants instead of sending them out.  In consequence, the immigration 
history turned to be a minor field of study.   
 Furthermore, the Japanese American scholars after the end of World War II 
shifted their interest to the experiences of the second-generation Japanese Americans by 
examining how they were more “American” than previously thought.  This change in 
trend took place partly because of their unforgettable wartime internment experiences 
that made them to emphasize their “Americanism” in every aspect.  Evidently, man  
Chinese and Koreans continued to create their ethnic enclaves in many regio s of 
America; however, the Japanese community tended to promote the prompt assimilation.  
Particularly, the Japanese immigrant (Issei 一世, first generation) parents, denied U.S. 
citizenship, focused on providing their children an access to the high-quality educational 
institutes because they believed only higher education would facilitate their Nis  (二世, 
second generation) children to assimilate into the mainstream society.11  The scholars 
began to spend more time and effort on researching how the Japanese Americans have 
tried to assimilate into the mainstream society throughout time. 
 Indeed, Japan transformed in various aspects when political power shifted from 
the feudal Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji government in which oligarchs played a 
                                                
 11 Issei are the Japanese people who immigrated to America.  Nisei are ch ld n of 
Japanese immigrants who were born, raised, and educated in America.  The word consists of Ni 
(second) + sei (generation).  The grandchildren of Issei are Sansei (三世, third generation); san 
(third) + sei (generation).  The great-grandchildren of Issei are Yonsei (四世, fourth generation); 
yon (fourth) + sei (generation). 
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central role.  So many radical changes took place within a short period, and the majority 
of scholars considered political, economic, and social changes as more important rese rch 
subjects than the immigration history.  Owning to the great efforts of Japanese American 
scholars, what “pulled” the Japanese to America has been clearly examined; how ver, 
what “pushed” them out of Japan has remained unclear and needs further exploration.  
The examination and analysis of the Japanese primary sources of the period will eveal 
“pushes” for immigration from the Japanese point of view.  Through analyzing source  
generally missing from the history of Japanese immigration to Hawaii nd the United 
States, I would like to explore the causes and effects of the Japanese immigration with an 
emphasis on “pushes” between 1868 and 1926, a period of rapid transformation. 
 
The Historiographical Context of Japanese Immigration to America 
There exists a vast literature on the early Japanese American experiences.  Until 
the 1920s, most accounts on Japanese were produced by missionaries or journalists and 
there was virtually no study on Japanese Americans.12  In the 1920s, numbers of anti-
Japanese pamphlets were published by members of the Japanese Exclusion League and 
politicians in California. Yamato Ichihashi’s Japanese in the United States: A Critical 
Study of the Problems of Japanese Immigrants and Their Children (1932) was a scholarly 
account to countermeasure the anti-Japanese sentiment in California.13  I  general, social 
scientists dominated the area of study before the emergence of new social hitory of the 
                                                
12 Sidney L. Gulick, The American Japanese Problem: A Study of the Racial Relations of 
the East and the West (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1914); idem, A erican Democracy 
and Asiatic Citizenship (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1918). 
 
13 Yamato Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States; (Stanford University: Stanford 
University Press, 1932). 
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late 1960s and 1970s, examining whether the Japanese Americans were assimilating nto 
mainstream society or not.  Dominating the writing about Japanese Americans in the 
post-World War II decades, they tended to portray Japanese Americans as victim  rather 
than as actors.  Hilary Conroy’s The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898 (1953), 
Roger Daniels’s The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California 
and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion (1969), Yukiko Kimura’s Issei Japanese 
Immigrants in Hawaii (1988), Yuji Ichioka’s The Issei: The World of the First 
Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–1824 (1988), Gary Y. Okihiro’s Cane Fires: The 
Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865–1945 (1992), Patsy Sumie Saiki’s Early 
Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii (1993) described the experiences of the early Japanese 
immigrants and their struggle for the establishment of Japanese communities in Hawaii 
and mainland United States.14   
In order to write about the first generation Japanese Americans, Kazuo Itō’s 
Hokubei Hyakunenzakura (A History of Japanese Immigrants in North America) (1969) 
and Zoku Hokubei Hyakunenzakura (A Sequel to A History of Japanese Immigrants in 
North America) (1972) are indispensable to examine the experiences of the Issei 
immigrants.15  Offering valuable first-hand accounts, these sequential volumes 
                                                
 14 Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1953); Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement 
in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1962); Yukiko Kimura, Issei: Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1988); Ichioka, The Issei; Gary Y. Okihiro, Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in 
Hawaii, 1865–1945 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Patsy Sumie Saiki, E rly 
Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii (Honolulu: Japanese Cultural Center of Hawaii, 1993). 
 
 15 Kazuo Itō, Hokubei Hyakunenzakura (A History of Japanese Immigrants in North 
America) (Tokyo: Hokubei Hyakunenzakura Jikkō Iinkai, 1969); Kazuo Itō, Zoku Hokubei 
Hyakunenzakura (A Sequel to A History of Japanese Immigrants in North America) (Seattle: 
Hokubei Hyakunenzakura Jikkō Iinkai, 1972). 
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significantly contributed to the development of the field of Japanese American studies.  
Based on personal records and a great number of interviews, Itō vividly delineated the 
lives of the Issei immigrants including miners, railroad workers, farmers, merchants, 
restaurant and hotel owners, missionaries, the yakuza (Japanese gambler/gangster and 
later organized crime syndicates) and prostitutes.16  Itō paid great attention to the role of 
Japanese language schools in shaping the Nisei’s cultural identity.  Additionally, Itō 
included many events that affected the Issei community in the Pacific Northwest as well 
as information of numbers of social organizations such as the Fukuin-kai (福音会, 
Gospel Society), Fujin Home (婦人ホーム, Women’s Home), and Salvation Army, 
which facilitated Issei adaptation to new environment and life on foreign soil.  Then, 
published in 1972, Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa’s East Across the Pacific 
illustrated the influence of family and community organizations that facilit ted the 
growth of the Japanese town in Seattle in the prewar years.17  
Born in Aichi prefecture in 1878, Yamato Ichihashi was one of the first able 
scholars of Japanese ancestry in the United States.  Placing emphasis on hitorical and 
sociological perspectives, Ichihashi wrote a classic account of the early history of the 
Issei in the United States as well as his interment experiences during World War II.  
Teaching Japanese studies and Japanese American experiences at Stanford University, 
                                                
16 Yakuza means the combination number of 8 (ya) – 9 (ku) – 3 (za).  The term yakuza 
comes from a Japanese gambling game called Oicho-kabu, which is similar to Blackjack.  While 
Blackjack’s best sum of cards is 21, Oicho-kabu’s best sum of cards is 19.  Therefore, 20—the 
sum of 8-9-3 is “worthless” in the game of Oicho-kabu.  Accordingly, the yakuza means 
“gangster,” “gambler,” and “good-for-nothing,” according to “yakuza” in Kodansha 
Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 8 (Tokyo; New York: Kodansha, 1983), 208. 
 
 17 Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa, eds., East across the Pacific: Historical and 
Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation (Sa ta Barbara: American 
Bibliographical Center-Clio Press, 1972). 
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his influential study of the Japanese American community defended the Issei from the 
rising anti-Japanese movement.  As one of the first respected Japanese American 
scholars, Ichihashi attempted to establish better relations between Japan and the U ited 
States.18   
Meanwhile, heavily drawing from primary sources in the archives of Hawaii nd 
in Japanese official documents, Hilary Conroy’s The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–
1898 (1953) addressed its shortage of labor in sugar plantations and its effort to secure 
laborers from Japan led to the mass immigration of the Japanese into Hawaii as early as 
1868.  Conroy demonstrated that the immigration problem was the core of the Japan-
Hawaii relations.19   
A renowned scholar of immigration and Asian American studies, Roger Daniels 
offered a definitive history of the anti-Japanese movement in California between 1905 
and 1924.  According to Daniels, not only economic competition but also feelings of 
racial superiority and purity stimulated the anti-Japanese movement in Californi .20  
Daniels examined how the Japanese exclusion affected the course of the development of 
the Japanese American community in the United States. 
Focusing on the social aspects of the early immigrants in Hawaii, both Kimura 
and Saiki illustrated how the Japanese immigrants emphasized teaching their children to 
                                                
 18 Yuji Ichioka, “‘Attorney for the Defense’: Yamato Ichihashi and Japanese 
Immigration,” The Pacific Historical Review 55, no. 2 (May 1986): 192–225; Brian Niiya, ed., 
Japanese American History: An A-to-Z Reference from 1868 to the Present (New York: Facts on 
File, 1993), 169. 
 
 19 Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898. 
 
 20 Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice. 
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admire, respect, and emulate their Japanese heritage.21  Ichioka provided a historical 
study of the comprehensive Issei experiences in the mainland United States focusing on 
their thoughts and actions as well as the roles played by the Japanese Associations and 
Japanese American newspapers in their community.22  Meanwhile, tracing anti-Japanese 
movement in Hawaii, a revisionist historian Gary Y. Okihiro argued that Hawaii’s anti-
Japanese movement was “systematic and endemic to capitalism in Hawaii” that lasted 
from 1865 (when the Japanese were first utilized as laborers) to World War II.23 
However, there are not enough well-established studies on the motivation of the 
Japanese immigration to the United States that illustrate both Japanese and American 
viewpoints.  When the Japanese immigration began, Japan was middle of the political 
transformation from the Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji oligarchy.  Therefore, it is 
quite difficult to obtain the complete data regarding the issues of Japanese overseas 
emigration in the early years of Meiji.  One of the first articles dealing with an account of 
Japanese immigration on the American side was Yosaburo Yoshida’s “Sources and 
Causes of Japanese Emigration” (1909), a classic account of the history of Japanese 
immigration examining causes in terms of increase of population, economic pressure, and 
inducement.24  Demonstrating that the devastating economic conditions made the 
Japanese leave their homeland, Masakazu Iwata’s “The Japanese Immigrants in 
California Agriculture” (1962) examined the contributions made by the Japanese 
                                                
 21 Kimura, Issei: Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii; Saiki, Early Japanese Immigrants in 
Hawaii. 
 
 22 Ichioka, The Issei, 18. 
 
 23 Okihiro, Cane Fires, xiii, 18. 
 
 24 Yosaburō Yoshida, “Sources and Causes of Japanese Emigration,” An als of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 34, no. 2 (September 1909): 157–167. 
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immigrants to the agricultural development in California before World War II.25  
However, most scholars agree that drastic socioeconomic change such as rapid
modernization and adoption of the Western cultural values and practices stimulated not 
only farmers but also the samurai class to immigrate to America.26  For example, Mikiso 
Hane’s Peasants, Rebels and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan (1982) 
demonstrated how Japan’s modernization affected the peasantry, particularly second or 
third sons of farmers who did not inherit land.27  
Literature published after the 1990s tended to focus on the socioeconomic causes 
of Japanese immigration.  Yūzō Murayama’s article entitled “Information and Emigrants: 
Interprefectural Differences of Japanese Emigration to the Pacific Northwest, 1880–
1915” (1991), depicted the socioeconomic motives for immigration and addressed 
differences by prefectures.28  Meanwhile, carefully tracing the footsteps of emigrants 
through examining unexplored part of diplomatic and modern Japanese history, Jōji 
Suzuki’s Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin (Japanese Emigration of Laborers) (1992) offered a 
survey of history of Japanese emigration.29  Examining the Japanese immigration from 
the late Tokugawa period to pre-war era, Suzuki declared that Japanese immigration was 
                                                
 25 Masakazu Iwata, “The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture,” Agricultural 
History 36, no. 1 (January 1962): 25–37. 
 
26 Hisashi Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin (The Opening of the American 
West and the Japanese) (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1997), 43. 
 
 27 Mikisō Hane, Peasants, Rebels and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1982). 
 
 28 Yuzō Murayama, “Information and Emigrants: Interprefectural Differences of Japanese 
Emigration to the Pacific Northwest, 1880–1915,” The Journal of Economic History 51, no. 1 
(March 1991): 125–147. 
 




based on dekasegi who sought to supplement family income.  Also published in 1992, 
Masaaki Kodama’s Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (An Introduction to the History of 
Japanese Immigration) contributed to the study of immigration from socioeconomic 
perspectives by providing numbers of local statistic records that revealed the conditions 
in rural areas of Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, and Kumamoto prefectures that had the highest 
rates of immigration.  Utilizing a great number of primary sources and consideri g the 
trend of the international relations, Kodama focused on analyzing the changing causes of 
emigration.30  The Imin Kenkyūkai (Society of Immigration Study) published a 
comprehensive study of Japan’s immigration in 1994 entitled Nihon no Imin Kenkyū—
Dōkō to Mokuroku (An Immigration Study of Japan—Tendency and Catalog).31  Based 
on the immigration study up to 1992, this literature examined the countries that sent out 
immigrants, countries that received immigrants, and connections between the diplomatic 
relations and immigration. 
On the other hand, the study on the emigration companies in Japan has not been 
explored thoroughly.  Alan T. Moriyama was one of the first scholars to examine the 
reality of the emigration companies.  Moriyama’s Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration 
Companies and Hawaii, 1894–1908 (1985) looked into the emergence of major 
emigration companies and their role in stimulating the Japanese emigration to Hawaii.32 
 
                                                
 30 Masaaki Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (An Introduction to the History of 
Japanese Immigration) (Hiroshima: Keisuisha, 1992). 
 
 31 Imin Kenkyūkai. Nihon no Imin Kenkyū: Dōkō to Mokuroku (An Immigration Study of 
Japan: A Tendency and Catalog). Tokyo: Nichigai Associates, 1994. 
 
 32 Alan T. Moriyama, Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii, 1894–
1908 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). 
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 Research Methodology 
 There were in fact several intertwined causes that “pushed” the Japanese to go 
overseas.  Drawing attention to the motivation of the massive Japanese immigration, such 
as socioeconomic conditions in both rural and urban areas and the goals of the 
government, business, and intellectual leaders in the late Tokugawa period to the Taisho 
period, I illustrate the struggle and development of the early Japanese immigrant 
community.  First, in order to estimate the poverty level in the early Meiji period, I 
heavily relied on the National Diet Library that has over two thousand materials rel ted to 
Japanese immigration, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that managed immigration.  
Particularly, the Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy) was 
crucial for estimating a trend of emigration pattern and for understanding the Japanese 
government’s view on immigration issues.33   
For this study, I explored “pushes” by demonstrating the impact of the opening of 
Japan, the Meiji Restoration, and the modernization policies on the rural population and 
the shizoku (士族, former samurai class).  The development of the nation’s maritime 
industry indeed contributed to facilitating the large-scale transportation of immigrants.34  
Therefore, focusing on the history of Mitsubishi that initially emerged as a shipping firm, 
I traced the relations between Mitsubishi and the government that not only enabled 
overseas emigration but also upgraded national prestige by pursuing the fukoku kyōhei 
policy.  Exploring various Japanese newspapers of the time, I sought to demonstrate tha  
                                                
33 Gaimushō hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy), 45 
vols. (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Ryōfukai, 1938–1963). 
 
34 Yoshiaki Nishimukai, “Senzen no Imin Yusō to Waga Kuni no Kaiunngyō · Horon: 
Tokuni Hawai Imin Yusō ni Kanren site” (Transportation of Japanese Emigrants to Hawaii in the 
Pre-War Period). Keizai Keiei Kenkyū: Nenpō (Annual report on economics and business 
administration) 19, no. 1 (December 1968): 147–167. 
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Mitsubishi was the powerful agent of implanting the national consciousness and that the 
rise of the Japanese nationalism attributed to Mitsubishi.  
 Simultaneously, the emigration companies and agents actively stimulated 
overseas emigration primarily for their interests.  Looking into the relations between the 
executives of emigration companies and politicians, I examined how these companies 
exploited the Japanese emigrants by fraudulent practices and why the government did not 
impose strict regulations on these companies.  Unlike some European immigration th t 
was family-based and intended permanent settlement, the Japanese immigration took 
place as dekasegi (temporary emigration), mostly consisting of bachelors.  Under such 
environment, the initial immigrant community had corrupt public morals and the yakuza, 
operating gambling and prostitution, found a way to thrive in Hawaii and in the United 
States.  The early Japanese community encountered a numbers of social problems and 
such “social evils” attributed to the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in America to some 
degree.  Despite facing such problems, the Japanese community changed its course of 
development when a great number of “picture brides” entered through the systemof 
“picture marriage”35 and facilitated the establishment of families.   
                                                
35 Utilized for finding brides for Japanese laborers in Hawaii, it was based on the 
Japanese custom of arranged marriage called omiai kekkon (お見合い結婚) with slight 
modifications.  A man sent his picture and a memo describing his occupation, property, and brief 
living condition in the United States to a matchmaker or his family in Japan, and the  he or she 
chose a bride and sent back her picture to the man.  Otherwise, a man in America asked his 
parents to find a bride for him.  Once his parents and a girl’s parents agreed their children’s 
partner appropriate in terms of “character, social standing, family relations, genealogy, health and 
education,” the man in America sent his pictures to a girl, and in exchange received her picture.  
In fact, the exchange of pictures was not always necessary because frequently brides and grooms 
were from the same villages or towns and thus already knew each other.  If both agreed to marry, 
bride’s name was added to the groom’s family registry that legally completed their marriage.  
Then, the “picture brides” would come to Hawaii or the United States to join their husbands. The 
basis of the arranged marriage was mostly kinship and economic ties and interpersonal relations 
in a community. 
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At the same time, I examined “pulls”—primarily the labor shortage in Hawaii and 
the United States based on statistics.  Simultaneously, the practice of “picture marriage” 
served as both “push” and “pull”: socioeconomic motives and “ideal” life became a 
“push” while the shortage of women became a “pull” for stabilizing community.   
 While conducting the research, the primary sources from the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs were critical to figure out the number of immigrants who left for America 
as well as their social status in Japan, level of education and income, and regional 
varieties.  I frequently utilized tables that reflected the transition in number and gender.  
In order to get the accurate number of immigrants as well as a tendency of immigration 
patterns, the Census of the United States and Congressional Records provided important 
information.  Published by Consulate-General of Japan, Documental History of Law 
Cases Affecting Japanese in the United States 1916–1924 ( 5) was a valuable account 
for exploring numbers of laws and policies that specifically targeted Japanese d 
Japanese Americans.36   
 In addition, the Japanese newspapers such as Kanpō (Official Gazette), Asahi 
Shimbun (Osaka and Tokyo) Nichi Nichi Shimbun (Tokyo), Kokumin Shimbun (Tokyo), 
Hōchi Shimbun (Tokyo), and Jiji Shinpō (Tokyo) provided indispensable accounts on 
how the Japanese perceived the overseas immigration.  Meanwhile, San Francisco-based 
Japanese American newspapers such as Nichibei Shimbun (Japanese American News) 
and Shin Sekai (New World) offered useful information that delineated the lives of early 
Japanese immigrants and their community development.37  The contents of ethnic 
                                                
 36 Consulate-General of Japan, Documental History of Law Cases Affecting Japanese in 
the United States, 1916–1924. 2 vols. (San Francisco: Consulate-General of Japan, 1925). 
 




newspapers tended to reflect the issues that the Japanese in American were encountering 
at that time.  Despite the devastating San Francisco earthquake of 1906 that destroye  
considerable amount of the historical record on Japanese Americans, the Japanese 
American Research Project (JARP) tried to recover their history through collecting the 
personal papers, newsletters, manuscripts, photographs, and works of art of the early 
Japanese immigrants on the West Coast.   The great endeavor of the JARP enabled 
scholars to gain an insight into the history of the Japanese in America.  Numbers of 
digital archives were essential to conduct research in effective manner.  The digital 
archives of the National Archives of Japan, National Diet Library, and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs were crucial for obtaining the Japanese primary sources and government 
papers.  In addition, the Library of Congress’s Chronicling America and the Digital 
Archives of the Kobe University provided an access to thousands of valuable newspaper 
articles and editorials of the period I examined.  For the works of Fukuzawa Yukichi,38 
Keiō University Library offered digitalized version of his publications, which allowed me 
to save a tremendous amount of time.  Modern technology facilitated my research by 
offering access to numbers of indispensable primary sources that supported my argu ent. 
 In Chapter II, I will examine the socioeconomic conditions of late Tokugawa 
period to early Meiji period that created precondition for initiating Japanese overseas 
                                                
(New World) (San Francisco), 1984–1942. 
 
38 Yukichi Fukuzawa, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An Outline of a Theory of Civilization) 
(Tokyo: Keiō 1875); idem, Fukuzawa Yukichi Senshū (Selected Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi). 14 
vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1980–1981); idem, Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū (The Complete 
Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi). 22 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1958–1964); idem, Gakumon 
no Susume (An Encouragement of Learning), 2d ed. (Tokyo: Fukuzawa Yukichi, 1880); idem, 
Kaei Tsūgo (English Vocabulary and Idioms) (Edo: Okadaya Kashichi, 1860); idem, Nihon 
Fujin-ron, Kōhen (On Japanese Womanhood, Part II) (Tokyo: Ishihara Hanjirō, 1885); idem, 
Seiyō Jijō (Conditions in the West) (Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku Shuppankyoku, 1873); Seiyō Tabi Annai 
(A Travel Guide to the West), 2 vols., 2d ed. (Tokyo: Keiō G juku Shuppankyoku, 1873). 
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emigration.  Tracing the drastic socioeconomic changes in the period, both internal and 
external pressure led to the emergence of the mass Japanese emigration, and two 
castaways—Nakahama Manjirō and Hamada Hikozō—who lived certain years in the 
United States both directly or indirectly encouraged the elite Japanese to go to America.  
In addition, Japan’s rapid modernization and the national policy of fuk ku kyōhei resulted 
in promoting the Japanese emigration as a means of obtaining foreign currencies and 
advanced technology.   
In Chapter III, I explore the various causes of the Japanese overseas emigration.  
After examining the first group of emigrants to Hawaii called Gannen-mono (literary 
Meiji’s “First Year People”), I pay closer attention to the socioeconomic background in 
Japan, including topics such as “Conscription and Draft Evasion,” “Labor Demand on 
Sugar Plantations in Hawaii,” and “Overpopulation Problem and Kaigai Hatten (Japanese 
Overseas Development).”  The severe labor shortage in the burgeoning sugar ind stry 
“pulled” the Japanese to Hawaii in numbers.  Meanwhile, the socioeconomic changes 
caused by the Meiji Restoration such as the Matsukata Deflation (financial reform that 
produced many landless peasants), Conscription Law, overpopulation problem, and 
Kaigai Hatten “pushed” many rural Japanese to go to Hawaii in order to make a living or 
to support their own families.   
In Chapter IV, dividing the Japanese immigration to Hawaii into four periods, I 
analyze the characteristic of each period and their distinct cultural development in 
Hawaii.  The Japanese government played an active role in initiating the first organized 
emigration to Hawaii during the kanyaku imin jidai (government-contracted immigration 
period, 1885–1894).  The urbanization caused the rural economy stagnated and “pushed” 
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the farmers in Hiroshima and Yamaguchi to Hawaii.  During the shiyaku imin jidai (self-
contracted immigration period, 1894–1899), the emergence of the emigration businesses 
further facilitated the emigration process; however, the imbalanced gender ratio among 
the Japanese emigrants resulted in the prevalence of illegal and immoral activities.  
During the jiyū imin jidai (free immigration period, 1900–1907), higher wages offered in 
the mainland United States “pulled” Japanese in Japan and in Hawaii.  Establishing 
families by bringing their wives or “picture brides,” the yobiyose imin jidai (summoned 
immigration period, 1907–1924) marked a turning point in the history of Japanese 
immigration—from dekasegi (temporary laborers) to permanent residents.  Interestingly, 
the Japanese emigrants before the yobiyose imin jidai strongly preserved their Japanese 
cultural identity and considered themselves subjects of Japan who worked in remote areas 
for supporting the national development to be equal to the West as well as for impr ving 
their standards of living.  
 In Chapter V, I examine the relationship of Japanese immigration with the rise of 
modern Japanese industry—Mitsubishi zaibatsu in particular.  The development of the 
overseas emigration and Japan’s maritime industry took place simultaneously, and the 
Japanese government actively encouraged immigration, which in turn stimulated the 
development of shipbuilding that was intended to get Japan into modern sea power.  In 
cooperation with private firms, the Meiji government facilitated the national policy of 
fukoku kyōhei that required enormous funds by promoting a large-scale emigration.  
Supporting Japan’s colonial development and implanting the Japanese nationalism, 
Mitsubishi played a crucial role in achieving the governmental goals in many aspects.  In 
return, Mitsubishi came to dominate many sectors of industry by obtaining enormous 
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government subsidies.  Simultaneously, the Japanese overseas emigration created 
competition between shipping companies and consequently boosted the development of 
the maritime and domestic shipbuilding industries. 
In Chapter VI, I deal with two types of publications that encouraged emigration; 
one appealed to the elite/educated class and the other to the masses.  In order to 
encourage the elite Japanese to go to the United States for studying, the government 
utilized the prominent Meiji intellectuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, the founder of Keio 
University and the advocate of Western liberalism and Japanese colonialism by the name 
of overseas development.  On the other hand, many guidebooks to America facilitated al 
classes of Japanese to go to America and to accumulate wealth not only for their wn 
interests but also for contributing to the development of their nation.  While the Meiji 
intellectuals directly or indirectly inspired the elite and the masses for emigration, various 
guidebooks to America directly appealed to the masses by providing them practical 
information for emigration.  Especially, in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-
Japanese Wars, the Japanese leaders skillfully instilled a strong sense of nationalism into 
the Japanese subjects.  In this context, the Japanese overseas emigration was a part of the 
highly articulated justification of Japanese colonialism to equalize with the West by 
repealing the unequal treaties.  Japan’s nationalism that accompanied the nation-state 
building crashed with the American nativism, and the relations between two nations 
would significantly deteriorate after the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924 that 
completely shut down the Japanese immigration to the United States.     
The subsequent Chapter VII focuses on the mediums that involved in the 
transportation of the Japanese emigrants.  As the demand for emigration increased in the 
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post-Sino-Japanese War period, various emigration companies and agents emerged that 
assisted the emigrants to find jobs in Hawaii and arranged their passage by collecting 
high commissions.  Additionally, this chapter deals with the labor-contracting system 
also known as “boss system” that managed the Japanese laborers arrived in the Un ted 
States by finding jobs, providing an interpreter, remitting money to Japan, and so forth.  
The emigration companies prospered before the Contract Labor Law became effective in 
Hawaii in 1900 due to the U.S. annexation of Hawaii.  Afterwards, the labor contractors 
dominated the supply of Japanese laborers to the American industries up until the signing 
of the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908 that ended the Japanese labor immigration 
to the United States.  The emigration companies and labor contractors exploited the toil 
of the Japanese emigrants; however, the emigrants, seeking for accumulating we lth 
mostly for their families, were attracted to the United States and some of th m even 
attempted entering the United States through illegal methods. 
This study illustrates that with the restoration period, the government with the 
help of certain individuals created a climate, which made immigration possible partly 
because of economic circumstances of the emigrants but partly because of the national 
policy and attitude towards the West that made the United States the place to go as 
opposed to China.  In other words, examining the development of overseas emigration 
that intertwined with the national policies, the Japanese immigration was a byproduct of 











SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE LATE TOKUGAWA  
TO EARLY MEIJI JAPAN 
 
 Tracing the historical development of Japan is inevitable to examine the causes of 
Japanese immigration to the United States.  Japan in the nineteenth century underwent 
numbers of drastic changes due to both external and internal pressures.  Besides, Manjirō 
and Hikozō, former castaways, played a crucial role in the process of Japan’s 
modernization even before the arrival of Commodore Perry.  On the other hand, rapid 
modernization strained socioeconomic structure of Tokugawa Japan.  Finally, the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868 that politically transformed Japan from feudal society to modernizing 
nation initiated the first Japanese mass emigration to Hawaii in 1868 and the United 
States in 1869.  This chapter examines key events and figures that set the foundation for 
the coming of the Japanese immigration to the United States. 
 
External Pressure 
Analysis of Japan’s mid-nineteenth century socioeconomic background from 
various aspects is essential to discuss the causes of Japanese mass immigration to the 
United States.   Banning the Japanese from going abroad, the distinctive seclusion policy 
of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which lasted more than two hundred years, contributed to 
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shaping Japan’s unique political system and cultural identity.1  B  the mid-nineteenth 
century, the system of the Tokugawa Shogunate seemed fragile, yet it managed to sustain 
its authority until the unexpected arrival of Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794–1858) 
with four warships in Uraga (浦賀) in 1853.2  The following year, Perry returned with 
seven warships and further demanded the opening of Japan.  Stunned by the 
overwhelming U.S. naval power, the Tokugawa Shogunate had no choice but to meet the 
U.S. demands by signing the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Peace and Amity (日米和親条約) also 
known as the Treaty of Kanagawa (神奈川条約) on March 31, 1854.3  The treaty put an 
end to Japan’s seclusion policy. 
 Arriving in Japan in 1856, Townsend Harris (1804–1878), an American merchant 
and the U.S. Consul General of Japan, was the first U.S. Ambassador who convinced the 
Japanese officials to open commercial relations with the United States.  Observing how 
the British used force to open China, the Japanese officials considered it was better to 
open its door voluntarily than by coercion.  Then, the United States and the Tokugawa 
Shogunate signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (日米修好通商条約) commonly 
                                                
 1 Under the seclusion policy, no foreigner could enter Japan and no Japanese could l ave 
the country.  Anyone who violated this prohibition was sentenced to death.  Japanese generally 
believed the policy would protect Japanese culture and its independence.  Therefore, only limited 
contact with the Dutch was allowed at the trading post of Dejima (出島) in Nagasaki Bay.  
Dejima is a small artificial island constructed in 1634.  The Dutch was indeed Japan’s only 
Western trading partners in the past two-hundred years of seclusion.   
 
 2 Matthew Calbraith Perry was the U.S. Special Envoy and Commander in Chief of naval 
force in the East Indian Seas.  Uraga became a district of Yokosuka in Kanagawa prefecture in 
1943. 
 
 3 The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Peace and Amity is also known as the Treatyof Kanagawa, 
which allowed the U.S. ships to enter two Japanese ports, Shimoda (下田) in Shizuoka and 
Hakodate (函館) in Hokkaido.  Furthermore, the weakened Tokugawa Shogunate had to sign 
similar “unequal treaties” with England France, Holland, and Russia. 
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known as Harris Treaty in the Ryōsen-ji, a Buddhist temple in Shimoda on July 29, 1858, 
which went into effect on July 4, 1859.4   
 Among the most important agreements between the United States and Japanese 
governments were: exchange of diplomatic agents; opening of the ports of Kanagaw 
(present-day Yokohama) and Nagasaki on July 4, 1859, Niigata on January 1, 1860, and 
Hyogo (present-day Kobe) on January 1, 1863 for foreign trade; ability of the United 
States citizens to live and trade in the cities of Edo (present-day Tokyo) from January 1, 
1862 and Osaka from January 1, 1863; fixed low import/export duties, and 
extraterritoriality for the United States citizens that exempted th m from the Japanese 
jurisdiction system.5  Shortly after that, Japan had to sign similar treaties with the Great 
Britain, France, Holland, and Russia in October.  Due to its nature, the Treaty of Amity 
and Commerce became known as one of the “unequal treaties.”6 
 Signing of the “unequal treaties” with the West radically changed th course of 
the development of feudal Japan in many ways.7  It revealed the Tokugawa Shogunate’s 
weakening political structure and the possibility of the colonization of Japan by the West 
like India and China.  Significantly, the capitulation of the Tokugawa Shogunate to the 
demands of the United States made the Shogunate look terribly powerless and helpless, 
                                                
 4 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “A Guide to the United S ates’ 
History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, 1776–2008: Japan.
http://history.state.gov/countries/japan (accessed April 3, 2009).  To summarize, Townsend 
Harris demanded the opening of more ports, extraterritorial rights, and fixed tariffs on trade. 
 
 5 The Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States and Japan, 1858, in 
Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, vol. 7, ed. David Hunter 
Miller (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), 947–973. 
 
 6 Janet Hunter, Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 240. 
 
 7 Harry D. Harootunian, Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political Consciousness in 
Tokugawa Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 32–38.   
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deserving no respect.8   
 The Treaty of Amity and Commerce was officially ratified in 1860 through the 
visit of the first official Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States dispatched by 
the Tokugawa Shogunate.9  The Shogunate decided to utilize the Kanrin Maru (咸臨丸, a 
modern screw-driven steam warship), a used ship purchased from the Dutch, for the first
diplomatic mission in order to show the world that Japan had acquired the latest naval 
ship and navigation technologies only six years after the opening of Japan.10  On January 
19, 1860, commanded by Katsu Kaishū (勝 海舟, 1823–1899) who was a naval officer 
and statesman from the late Tokugawa to Meiji periods, the Kanrin Maru left Uraga for 
San Francisco, conveying members of Japanese delegation including the legendary 
Nakahama Manjirō (中濱 万次郎, 1827–1898) and the most famous advocate of 
Westernization, Fukuzawa Yukichi.   
                                                
 8 Yōji Yamaguchi, A Student’s Guide to Japanese American Genealogy. Oryx American 
Family Tree Series (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1996), 17. 
 
 9 Payson J. Treat, The Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 
1853–1865 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1917), 58–66; Lester H. Brune and Richard Dean 
Burns, Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations (New York: Routledge, 2003), 190.  
Consisting of seventy-seven officials that included two ambassadors, Japan’s first mission arrived 
at San Francisco on May 17, 1860.  After a week of social sessions in California, the mission 
went to Washington by steamer.  During the tour, they displayed Japanese culture including tea, 
silk products, and lacquerware. 
 
 10 Shigeyuki Itō, “Jon Manjirō to Gaikōkan toshiteno Rekishiteki Yakuwari: Nichibeikan 
no Saisho no Sūjiku” (John Manjiro and His Historical Role as Japanese Diplomat: The First 
Pivot of Japan and the U.S. Relations), Kyushu Sangyō University Keieigaku Ronshū (Business 
Review) 18, no. 4 (2008): 46.  The Kanrin Maru was the first warship that crossed the Pacific 
Ocean under the command of Japanese Captain Katsu Kaishū and Admiral Kimura Yoshitake.  
Assisted by the U.S. Navy Lieutenant and the Captain of U.S.S. Fenimore Cooper, John Mercer 
Brooke (1826–1906) and his crew who were shipwrecked in Edo, the Kanrin Maru accompanied 
the U.S.S. Powhatan because it was the first voyage across the Pacific Ocean commanded by th  
Japanese officers and crew.  Therefore, it was more like a Japanese navigation practice.   
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 To begin with his background, born in 1827 as the second son of an impoverished 
family in a small fishing village called Nakanohama in Tosa-han (土佐藩, han means 
feudal domain), Manjirō was naturally to become a fisherman.13  According to the 
institution of feudal Japan, one had no freedom to choose his own occupations.  For 
instance, a fisherman’s son was to become a fisherman, and a farmer’s son was t 
become a farmer, a samurai’s son was to become a samurai, and so forth.  Since his fath r 
had passed away when Manjirō was, nine years old, his mother Shiho somehow managed 
to support her family.  At the age of ten, Manjirō began to work for his living.14  In 
January 1841, Manjirō went to Usaura harbor to work for Denzō, a fisherman.  Then, on 
January 5, Manjirō was shipwrecked with four other fishermen due to a severe storm.15  
They were stranded on a remote uninhibited volcanic island in the Pacific called 
Torishima (鳥島, literally meaning “Bird Island”) for nearly six months during which 
they sustained their lives by eating albatross, shellfish, and seaweed, and drinking 
rainwater.16  Living on the uninhibited island, they especially suffered from the lack of 
                                                
 13 Shōryō Kawada and John Manjiro, Drifting Toward the Southeast: The Story of Five 
Japanese Castaways told in 1852 by John Manjiro, Illustrated by Kawada Shoryo and John 
Manjiro, trans. Junya Nagakuni and Junji Kitadai (New Bedford, MA: Spinner Publishing Inc, 
2003), 24. Nakanohama is the present-day Tosashimizu in Kochi prefecture, locat d n the south 
coast of Shikoku.  Shikoku is the smallest of the four main islands of Japan. 
 
 14 “Jon Manjirō den” (Biography of John Manjiro), Tosa no Jinbutsu Den (The Person 
Biography of Tosa), http://www17.ocn.ne.jp/~tosa/john/john.htm (accessed July 7, 2009). 
 
 15 According to Rosenbach Museum & Library, Nakahama Manjirō’s Hyōsen Kiryaku, 
30, these four fishermen were Toraemon, Denzō and his brothers, Jūsuke and Goemon. 
 
 16 Rosenbach Museum & Library, Nakahama Manjirō’s Hyōsen Kiryaku, 18.  Located 
600 kilometers south of Tokyo, Torishima is the island of the Izu Islands, Hachijō Subprefecture 
of Tokyo.  During the Meiji period, some Japanese settled in Torishima for gthering albatross’s 
guano.  Yet, after the major volcanic eruption between August 13 and August 15 in 1902 that 
killed 150 inhabitants, nobody ever lived in Torishima, according to “Inhabitants of Island All 




drinking water.  In the circumstances, they had no choice but to substitute their urin  for 
water in order to avoid death of dehydration.17  As the turn of the seasons, Manjirō and 
other survivors nearly starved to death because albatrosses had migrated away from 
Torishima.  Fortunately, on June 27, 1841, they were found and rescued by William H. 
Whitfield (1804–1886), a New Englander who commanded an American whaler named 
John Howland.18  When rescued, Manjirō was barely fourteen years old. 
 Captain Whitefield decided to take Manjirō and other fishermen to Hawaii, being 
too dangerous to sail near the Japanese coastal region because Japanese coastguards 
would relentlessly attack foreign ships according to the exclusion edict of 1825.19  
Furthermore, during the period of seclusion, any Japanese who left the country would be 
punished by death.  While sailing to Hawaii, due to his honesty, diligence, and 
willingness to learn English and whaling, Manjirō became popular among the crew and 
received the name “John,” derived from Captain Whitfield’s whaler, John Howland.   
 Manjirō, induced by Captain Whitfield who foresaw that Manjirō would be an 
“indispensable” cabin boy, decided to go to America out of curiosity whereas other 
fishermen stayed in Honolulu.20  In May 1843, Manjirō arrived in Captain Whitfield’s 
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 17 Kawada and Manjiro, Drifting Toward the Southeast, trans. Nagakuni and Kitadai, 27. 
 
 18 Rosenbach Museum & Library, Nakahama Manjirō’s Hyōsen Kiryaku, 18.  
 
 19 Tokugawa Shogunate issued the Exclusion Edict of 1825 (異国船打払令) that ordered 
to expel any foreign ships that approached Japanese coastal region and that tried to land on Japan.  
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hometown, Fairhaven, Massachusetts, that flourished with whaling and maritime 
industries.21  While staying in Massachusetts with Captain Whitfield and his wife for 
three years, he attended Sunday school of the Unitarian Church and studied under Eben 
Akin.  Captain Whitfield sent Manjirō to the advanced school of Lewis Bartlett, in which 
his children attended.22   Manjirō learned both reading and writing English, mathematics, 
navigation, and shipbuilding.  In this period, the concepts of American freedom and 
American democracy greatly inspired Manjirō.23  Manjirō’s information about America 
later inspired the young samurai who believed modernization as a way of the survival of 
Japan in the face of Western imperialism. 
 Although six years had passed since he left Japan, Manjirō had never forgotten his 
homeland and finally decided to return to Japan.  In 1849, after hearing about California’s 
gold rush, Manjirō left for Sacramento by ship and worked in a gold mine for nearly 
seventy days to make some money for return trip.24  Then, he went to Hawaii to take four 
other shipwrecked fishermen back to Japan with him.  However, Manjirō found out that 
Jūsuke had passed away, and Toraemon had a family to support.  Therefore, only Denzō 
and Goemon returned to Japan with Manjirō.  Afraid of directly entering Japan due to the 
relentless execution of foreigners in Japan and the repatriated Japanese with foreign 
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influences, they determined to go to the Ryukyu Kingdom first for their safety.25   
 Arriving in the Ryukyu Kingdom in February 1851, their interrogation had lasted 
for five months.  Thereafter, sent to Kagoshima, they had to undergo another two months 
of interrogation.  Finally, transferred to the magistrate’s office in Nagasaki, another ten 
months of interrogation waited them.26  Before allowed entry, Manjirō and other 
returnees, without exception, had to prove that they had not converted to Christianity by 
performing fumie (踏み絵, literary Step-on Picture, “the practice of desecration, which 
was mandatory for returned castaways”) because the Tokugawa Shogunate had banned 
Christianity during the years between 1613 and 1873 as a means of expelling foreign 
influences in Japan.27  Therefore, performing fumie by treading on a bronze plate with a 
sacred Christian image, they were found not guilty.28  Finally allowed to leave, it took a 
half month for Manjirō, Denzō, and Goemon to walk from Nagasaki to Tosa.  However, 
the Tosa-han restrained them for two and a half months.   
 However, the investigation took longer than expected and encountered difficulty 
one after another because Manjirō had nearly forgotten Japanese after ten years of living 
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 26 Itō, “Jon Manjirō to Gaikōkan toshiteno Rekishiteki Yakuwari: Nichibeikan no 
Saishono Sūjiku,” 43.  
 
 27 Kawada and Manjiro, Drifting Toward the Southeast, trans. Nagakuni and Kitadai, 
132; Rosenbach Museum & Library, Nakahama Manjirō’s Hyōsen Kiryaku, 112. 
 
 28 Itō, “Jon Manjirō to Gaikōkan toshiteno Rekishiteki Yakuwari: Nichibeikan no 
Saishono Sūjiku,” 43. 
 
 31
abroad.29  Then, the magistrate of the vessel, Yoshida Tōyō (吉田 東洋, 1816–1862)30 
ordered Kawada Shōryō (河田 小龍, 1824–1898) to make a thorough investigation of 
Manjirō.  Since Kawada had learned painting and the Dutch language in Nagasaki, 
Yoshida thought it would be possible for him to investigate Manjirō who could not read, 
write, and barely speak Japanese after years of living abroad.31  Therefore, Kawada made 
good use of drawings to communicate with Manjirō.  Manjirō described things he saw in 
America such as railroads, steamships, Morse code, and voting system, which Kawada 
recorded in Hyōson Kiryaku (漂巽紀略, 1852).   
 Manjirō enlightened Kawada on the advanced civilization in America, and 
Kawada began to realize that the opening of Japan was crucial for catching up with the 
West.  Kawada also advocated that Japan should buy foreign ships and learn navigation 
so that Japan could benefit from the foreign trade for the enrichment of the country.32  
Utilizing numbers of drawings that introduced Manjirō’s experiences in America, 
Kawada and Manjirō’s Hyōson Kiryaku helped motivate the Imperial loyalists such as 
Sakamoto Ryōma (坂本 龍馬, 1836–1867) to act towards the opening of the country and 
to catch up with the West.  In 1852, after one and a half years of interrogation per d, 
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Manjirō was finally able to go back to his hometown in Tosa-han on October 5.33   
 Officials could see that Manjirō had a great potential for the future of the country.  
Receiving a samurai rank from Tosa-han soon after his return, Manjirō began to engage 
in teaching English and things American to young Tosa samurai at the castle.34  In fact, 
considering what he had learned in America, Manjirō could have been executed for the 
violation of the rigid Tokugawa seclusion policy that aimed at excluding foreign 
influences in Japan.  Nevertheless, Manjirō was spared because the Shogunate needed 
Manjirō’s knowledge about America and its people as well as English skill in order t 
deal with Commodore Perry.  Therefore, the Shogunate summoned Manjirō to Edo, eight 
days after the departure of Commodore Perry in 1853.35  Manjirō explained to the 
Shogunate in detail that the United States was a modern and generous country which 
desired to establish friendly relations with Japan and which did not intend to invade Japan.  
Manjirō emphasized the “desirability of making friends with the great land across the sea.”  
Taking Manjirō’s words seriously, the Shogunate decided to open Japan to American 
vessels.36  Greatly contributing to the establishment of U.S.-Japan relations, Manjirō 
received a higher samurai rank and became a retainer of the Tokugawa Shogun.  Being 
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samurai, Manjirō was allowed to carry two swords with him.  In addition, as a privilege 
of samurai, Manjirō adopted a surname of “Nakahama” derived from his hometown in 
Tosa-han.37 
 Appointed as an instructor, Manjirō taught whaling techniques, ship engineering 
and scientific navigation methods at the Naval Training School in Edo established by the 
Tokugawa Shogunate.38  The seamen sailing on Kanrin Maru during the first Japanese 
mission to the United States were indeed trained at the School.  Many officials and 
students eagerly sought after Manjirō because he always delivered an interesting lecture 
on America including science and technology.  Moreover, by 1857 he completed his 
translation of Nathaniel Bowditch’s twenty-two volumes of The New American Practical 
Navigator known as the “seaman’s bible” into Japanese.39  Manjirō contributed to the 
development of the whaling industry in Japan.40   
 Meanwhile, Manjirō taught English to young samurai and intellectuals who 
realized the importance of acquiring English skills, and Fukuzawa Yukichi who would 
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publish the first English-Japanese dictionary was one of his students.41  I  addition, 
Manjirō wrote Eibei Taiwa Shokei (英米対話捷径, “A Shortcut to Anglo-American 
Conversation”) in 1859, which was the first English text published in Japan.  In Eibei 
Taiwa Shokei, Manjirō introduced the English alphabet, numbers, a song of the alphabet, 
daily conversation, weather, chat, and correspondence.42   
 Manjirō played a remarkably important role in the achievement of the first 
Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States in 1860.  Although hired as an 
interpreter, Manjirō became a de facto captain of the Kanrin Maru because Admiral 
Kimura and Captain Katsu, who had no experience of ocean navigation, were down with 
seasickness right after boarding.  As Captain Brooke recalled, the Japanese crew of the 
Karin Maru, despite years of instruction in navigation by the Dutch, were not ready for 
setting out on a long cruise.43  Thus, Manjirō had to serve not only as an interpreter but 
also as a practical Japanese diplomat during the 1860 mission.  With the help of Captain
Brooke and his crew, Manjirō virtually navigated the Kanrin Maru to San Francisco by 
making good use of his ocean navigation experience as a whaler.44  La gely indebted to 
Manjirō’s efforts, the Japanese could accomplish the1860 diplomatic mission to the 
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United States.   
 After the Meiji Restoration, Manjirō took a position as a professor of English at 
the Tokyo Kaisei Gakkō (開成学校) in 1869.  Kaisei Gakkō served as a strong advocate 
of the Western learning, which was crucial for accelerating Japan’s modernization.  
Originally established by the Tokugawa Shogunate as the Bansho Torishirabejo (蕃書調
所, literary Institute for the Study of Barbarian Books) in Edo in 1857 and then as the 
Kaiseijo (開成所, literary, Institute for Development) in 1863, the Kaisei Gakkō (since 
1868) taught “all fields of Western learning including languages, natural science, and 
military studies.”45  In 1877, the Tokyo Kaisei Gakkō affiliated the Tokyo Medical 
School (東京医学校, Tokyo igakko) and became known as the University of Tokyo (東
京大学, Tokyo daigaku).46   
 All his life, Manjirō continued to teach his students all that he had learned and 
experienced in the United States including American traditions of freedom and 
democracy as well as Western science and technology.  The information brought by 
Manjirō had a significant influence on his students who became known as the founders of 
modern Japan such as Katsu Kaishū, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Sakamoto Ryōma, Enomoto 
Takeaki (榎本 武揚, 1836–1908), and Iwasaki Yatarō (岩崎 弥太郎, 1835–1885).47  
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Since Iwasaki Yatarō and his company were powerful agents to the Japanese overseas 
development, I will discuss their contribution in Chapter V. 
 Sakamoto Ryōma from the Tosa-han was considered as one of the most important 
leaders of the sonnō jōi (尊王攘夷, literary “revere the emperor and expel the 
barbarians”) movement in the late Tokugawa period.  Financially supported by the 
Satsuma-han, Sakamoto and the Tosa rōnin (浪人, masterless samurai) established the 
private navy and the trading company in Nagasaki in 1865 named Kameyamashachu (亀
山社中) which later became Kaientai (海援隊, Naval Auxiliary Force) under the control 
of Tosa-han after April 1867.48  Facilitated the anti-Shogunate trading operations and 
learning of navigation, the Kaientai was virtually the first “commercial-military 
enterprise” in Japan.49  Significantly, the Kaientai accepted various classes of Japanese 
including the lower-ranked samurai, rōnin (masterless samurai), village headmen, and 
villagers, into the association and treated them equally regardless of their domains.  In 
addition, the Kaientai played a crucial role in the establishment of the astonishing 
Satsuma-Chōshū Alliance of 1866.50  However, soon after the assassination of Sakamoto 
in Kyoto on December 10, 1867 along with a leader of the Rikuentai (陸援隊, Army 
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Auxiliary Force ) Nakaoka Shintarō (中岡 慎太郎, 1838–1867) who also strived for the 
conclusion of the Satsuma-Chōshū Alliance, the Kaientai lost the cooperative spirit and 
finally dissolved on June 17, 1868 by order of the Tosa-han.51  After the dissolution of 
the Kaientai, Tosa-han continued the shipping business by the name of the Tsukumo 
Shōkai (九十九商会), appointing Iwasaki Yatarō as a head of a company that became a 
foundation of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu.  Initially, enlightened by Manjirō and Kawada’s 
view, Sakamoto contributed to the development of maritime industry in Japan and 
encouraged the causes of the Meiji Restoration.  In fact, the development of maritime 
industry resulted in accelerating the nation’s modernization but also paved the way for 
the rise of Mitsubishi.  
 Many of the key figures of the early Meiji period were Manjirō’s students 
inspired by his ideas.  His students interpreted the modernization as a means of survival 
of the nation.  Owing to Manjirō’s dedication to the education of the young Japanese for 
the development and defense of the country, his students rose to be the center of the new 
government and industries.  Without doubt, the nation’s development in navigation 
technology may be attributed to Manjirō who introduced modern science and technology 
that he had acquired in the United States.  Simultaneously, the development of the 
nation’s shipping industry and the subsequent establishment of the regular long-distace 
overseas routes enabled the mass transportation of the Japanese laborers to Ameicas. 
 Although the story of Manjirō has not been taught at school or in textbooks unlike 
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that of Sakamoto Ryōma, he was indeed the first Japanese who introduced the United 
States and the Western culture to the Japanese people and who acted as a mediator 
between the governments of Japan and the United States as a nongovernmental diplomat.  
Initially, because some Tokugawa officials suspected Manjirō of being an American spy 
dispatched by the Perry Expedition, Manjirō was not appointed as an official diplomat 
during the treaty negotiation.52  However, utilizing his English language skills and 
knowledge about America, Manjirō did play more critical role than any officials of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate did in dealing with the opening of Japan to the United States in 
1854 in peaceful manner.53  Therefore, culturally the creation of modern Japan was 
largely indebted to Manjirō who had initiated the modernization process in the long-
isolated feudal Japan. 
 On November 12, 1898, Manjirō died in Kyōbashi, Tokyo, ending his eventful 
life at the age of seventy-five.  Upon his death, the Kokumin Shimbun recollected the life 
of Manjirō and mourned for the death of Manjirō.54  In fact, two of the U.S. Presidents 
had previously acknowledged the cultural role of Manjirō in the U.S.-Japan relations.  
First, John Calvin Coolidge, Jr. (1872–1929, in office: 1923–1929), later acknowledged 
that “when John Manjirō returned to Japan, it was as if America had sent its first 
ambassador to Japan.  Our envoy Perry could enjoy so cordial a reception because John 
                                                
 52 Dodge, Islands and Empires, 309. 
 
 53 Itō, “Jon Manjiro to Gaikōkan toshiteno Rekishiteki Yakuwari: Nichibeikan no 
Saishono Sūjiku,” 45. 
 
 54 Kokumin Shimbun (National News) (Tokyo), November 15, 1898, in Yasumasa 
Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 10-kan, Tōyō Mondai Tananki (A Meiji 
Chronicle through Newspaper Sources, Vol. 10, Period of Crisis in the East) (Tokyo: Meiji 
Hennen Shi Ryōfukai, 1965), 314. 
 
 39
Manjirō had made Japan’s central authorities understand the true face of America.”55  
President Coolidge deeply valued the distinct role played by Manjirō who facilitated the 
establishment of the U.S.-Japan relations as well as to expand the American whaling 
industry in the far eastern Pacific.  Then in 1933, ninety years after Manjirō’s arrival in 
America, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945, in office: 1933–1945), wrote a letter to 
Manjirō’s eldest son, Tōichirō (東一郎): 
 “When Viscount Ishii (the Japanese Ambassador) was here in Washington he 
told me that you are living in Tokio and we talked about your distinguished father…  You 
may not know that I am the grandson of Mr. Warren Delano of Fairhaven, who was part 
owner of the ship of Captain Whitfield which brought your father to Fairhaven.  Your 
father lived, as I remember it, at the house of Mr. Tripp, which was directly across the 
street from my grandfather’s house, and when I was a boy I well remember my 
grandfather telling me all about the little Japanese boy who went to school in Fairhaven 
and who went to church from time to time with the Delano family.  I myself usd to visit 
Fairhaven … The name of Nakahama will always be remembered by my famil  and I 
hope that if you or any of your family come to the United States that you will cometo see 
us.”56  
  
On the other hand, Ambassador Ishii paid his respect to Captain Whitfield during his visit 
to the United States in 1918: 
Captain Whitfield was a harbinger of great events among nations.  And, there, in 
Fairhaven, is the old sword of an ancient Japanese Samurai, centuries old, symbol of the 
gratitude of modern Japan for the part Captain Whitfield played, through Manjiro 
Nakahama, in opening the door to a new life among the peoples of earth.57 
 
Manjirō’s unique experiences in America obviously stimulated the young Japanese 
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students and later emigrants to go to America who had an ambition to achieve a great 
success as well as to contribute to accelerate the nation
advanced technology or by remitting
 
Hamada Hikozō (Joseph Heco)
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Western science” sought to carry out the modernization of Japan while preserving 
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Japan’s “cultural traditions and beliefs.”60   
 Born into a wealthy farmer’s family in Harima province (播磨国, present-day 
Hyogo prefecture) in 1837, Hikozō attended a local Terakoya (寺子屋, literally “temple 
school”) for learning how to read and write.  In fact, it was very rare to see a on of a 
farmer attending Terakoya because Terakoya was traditionally designed to educate 
children of the samurai and wealthy merchant class.  When Hikozō was thirteen years old, 
his stepfather Kichizaburō took him to Edo to see the sights.  While returning from Edo 
to Harima province by a junk named Eiriki Maru (栄力丸), Hikozō and sixteen other 
passengers were shipwrecked in the Pacific due to a heavy storm, and drifted for ifty 
days.61  Captain W. F. Jennings of a New England freighter, Auckland, found and rescued 
Hikozō and others on the way from Hong Kong to San Francisco.62  Instead of taking 
them back to Japan, Captain took them to San Francisco in February 1851.63  Like 
Captain Whitfield who rescued Manjirō in 1841, Captain Jennings hesitated to sail near 
the Japanese coastal region due to the Tokugawa Shogunate’s Exclusion Edict of 1825 
that authorized indiscriminate bombardment of foreign vessels approaching or lading on 
Japan.64 
 In 1852, after a year of stay in San Francisco, Hikozō and his group were to leave 
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San Francisco for Japan via Hong Kong where they were supposed to join Commodore 
Matthew Perry who planned to urge Japan to open the country for facilitating the 
establishment of U.S.-Japan relations for trade.65  However, while waiting for Perry in 
Hong Kong on the way home, an Irish-American master-at-arms, Thomas Troy offered 
Hikozō and two other Japanese, Tora and Kame, to return to San Francisco and to learn 
English from him; therefore, then they went back to San Francisco with Troy at his 
expense in June 1853.66  Troy introduced Hikozō to a banker and Collector of Customs in 
San Francisco, Beverly C. Sanders (1807–1883), who was a devout Catholic.  Sanders 
accepted Hikozō and took good care of him as his benefactor.  Hikozō became a friend of 
Eugene M. Van Reed (1835–1873), a Dutch-American, and taught him Japanese.67  In 
1859, following Hikozō, Van Reed went to Japan, worked for the U.S. Consul in Japan, 
became a trader, and provided weapons for Satsuma-han during the Boshin Civil War.68  
Later appointed as the Consul General of Hawaii, Van Reed was responsible for 
conveying the first group of Japanese emigrants (Gannen-mono) to Hawaii in 1868. 
 When Sanders retired from the Customs Office, he moved to Baltimore, Mayland, 
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with his family and Hikozō.  Recommended by Sanders, Hikozō attended the Catholic 
school and Catholic Church in Baltimore.   In the late 1854, Hikozō was baptized at the 
Cathedral of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, adopting a Christian name 
“Joseph Heco.”69  After returning to California, Hikozō served as a secretary to Senator 
William M. Gwin (1805–1885) of California in 1857.  In 1858, strongly urged by his 
benefactor, Sanders, Hikozō became the first Japanese to be naturalized as a United 
States citizen.70   
As a Japanese American, Hikozō often encountered racial discrimination and 
realized that his U.S. citizenship would not guarantee his “social equality.”71  Mistreated 
by the mainstream American society, Hikozō seriously began to think about going back 
to Japan because he had a longing for his home.  In those days, treated as a foreigner all 
the time despite his citizenship, it was hard for a Japanese American to live in the United 
States among the white Americans because of racial discrimination.72 
Therefore, then twenty-one years old Hikozō decided to join Ambassador 
Townsend Harris in Shanghai and had returned to Japan on the U.S.S. Mississippi when 
the U.S. Consulate General was established at Kanagawa in 1859, following the signing 
of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce on July 29, 1858.73  Since then, appointed as an 
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official interpreter for the U.S. Consul E. M. Dorr of California, Hikozō had served for 
the U.S. Consulate General before the establishment of his own import-export business in 
Yokohama in 1862.74  Hikozō initially believed that he could become an ordinary 
Japanese; however, being American by nationality and a convert to Christianity, he 
Japanese treated him as a foreigner.  Only allowed to live in the Yokohama kyoryūchi (横
浜居留地, foreign concession in Yokohama), his life in Japan turned out to be more 
restrictive.75  Treated as foreigner in the United States and Japan, Hikozō felt a strong 
sense of cultural diaspora. 
The jōi (anti-foreign) samurai’s assassination of Denkichi, who was Hikozō’s 
friend and former castaway now working for the British legation as an interpre r, gave 
him a great shock.76  In his Narrative of A Japanese (1863), Hikozō expressed his 
uneasiness regarding the recent action of the jōi samurai: 
September 16th. For the past six or eight months I had been frequently warned by th  
native authorities of Kanagawa and Yokohama to be careful of myself.  They cautioned 
me not to ride out on the Tōkaidō, or to any place at all distant from the Foreign 
Settlement, inasmuch as it was a well-associated fact that several rōnin deemed me 
worthy of their attention, and were on the outlook for me to cut me down.  There 
warnings had of late waxed far too frequent for my comfort.77 
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Hikozō left for America for a short period in 1861–62 in order to guard himself from the 
jōi samurai who tried to kill foreigners and the Japanese associated with foreigners.  
Considering Hikozō as posing a threat to the Japanese cultural identity, the jōi samurai 
were ready to assassinate Hikozō.  Simultaneously, he aimed to improve his status by 
getting the “post of U.S. Naval store-keeper” so that he would be treated equal with other 
American officials.78  During his second trip to the United States, Hikozō met Abraham 
Lincoln and shook hands with him at the White House on March 12, 1862.  Obviously, 
Hikozō was the first and only Japanese who personally met Lincoln.79  When he knew 
that he could not get the post, he determined to go back to Japan.   
 While serving as a young American diplomat, Hikozō first negotiated with the 
Tokugawa Shogunate for the location for the establishment of the U.S. Consulate.  Then, 
requested by the Kanagawa magistrate, Hikozō made efforts to arrange with Captain 
Brook and the Tokugawa Shogunate the first Japanese mission to the United States in 
1860.  Then, Hikozō engaged in settling the aftermath of the Namamugi Incident of 1862 
(生麦事件, also known as the “Richardson Affair”) in which 28-year-old Charles Lennox 
Richardson (British merchant) was killed and two other British residing in Yokohama 
were wounded by two Satsuma samurai on the Tōkaidō (東海道, literary “East Sea Road,” 
a main road of the Tokugawa period connecting Edo to Kyoto) on September 14, 1862.80  
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The Satsuma samurai argued that they attacked these British because they did neither 
dismount nor show respect when they encountered a procession of Shimazu Hisamitsu 
(島津 久光, 1817–1887) who was the father of daimyo (大名, feudal lord) Shimazu 
Tadayoshi (島津 忠義, 1840–1897) of Satsuma.81  Then, the resentful British, making a 
false show of power, blamed everything on the Japanese and demanded of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate an official apology and indemnity of $440,000 in Mexican silver for 
compensating the Namamugi Incident, which was equivalent to one-third of the 
Shogunate’s annual revenue.82  Fukuzawa Yukichi, assisted by Sugita Gentan and 
Takabatake Gorō, was responsible for translating the British official document into 
Japanese for the Shogunate.83  In order to avoid a confrontation with the powerful British 
navy that continued to threaten to bombard Edo, the Rōju (老中, senior councilor) 
Ogasawara Nagamichi (小笠原 長行, 1822–1891), who was the highest-ranking official 
of the Shogunate, consented to the terms demanded by the British Charge d’affaires, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward St. John Neale without the Shogunate’s approval.84  The 
British, seeking to interrupt the Russian southward expansion into East Asia, were 
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desperate to display their sphere of influence over Japan in order to thwart Russia’s 
ambition, and they deemed that they achieved their goal.  
 Being elated at the successful negotiation with the Shogunate, the British Fleet of 
seven warships left Yokohama for the Satsuma province.  Since the Shogunate easily 
submitted to the British, Neale expected the Satsuma-han would do the same, and thus 
the British did not expect to engage in a battle with the Satsuma-han at first.  In addition, 
the British were not ready for war against Satsuma since its navy was busy at the Second 
Opium War in China.  Nevertheless, contrary to Neale’s estimation, the Sa suma-han 
refused the British demands for an apology, the indemnity of £25,000 for compensating 
the families of the victims, and the execution of the two samurai before the Bri ish 
officers.85  The Satsuma-han’s refusal eventually led to the outbreak of the Anglo-
Satsuma War in August 15–17, 1863.  In order to extort the indemnity as well as to arret 
and execute the samurai who attacked the British subjects,86 the Navy’s seven warships 
began the indiscriminate bombardment of Kagoshima (the capital of Satsuma) on August
15, 1863 that destroyed the most of the city and the castle.87   
 After one and a half days, the British Fleet withdrew from Kagoshima and left for 
Yokohama due to the lack of ammunition and coal as well as high casualties, including 
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the death of Captain Josling and Commander Wilmot of the flagship Euryalis.88  On the 
other hand, Satsuma-han had fewer casualties, but the city was nearly destroye .  
Satsuma-han already knew that the British Fleet would arrive at Kagoshima Bay; 
therefore, they were able to prepare for warfare in advance, with the help of a female spy 
named Omura (おむら), who was a popular geisha (芸者, female entertainer) in Edo.  
Omura decided to be a Rashamen (羅紗綿, mistress of foreigner)89 in order to spy on the 
British naval operations in Japan for her boyfriend from Satsuma-han.  Volunteering to 
be the Rashamen of Vice-Admiral Augustus Leopold Kuper (1809–1885), Omura lived 
with him at the British legation in Yokohama where she could get the British 
information.90 
 According to the Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai’s study, Fukuzawa Yukichi, who was the 
official interpreter of the Tokugawa Shogunate and pro-western liberal, was greatly 
responsible for the outbreak of the Anglo-Satsuma War due to his mistranslation of the 
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official protest by the British minister.91  Comparing the original document and the 
translated documents, while the British demanded the arrest and execution of the samurai 
who killed Richardson, Fukuzawa unbelievably interpreted that the British deman d the 
execution of daimyo Shimazu Hisamitsu.92  For the samurai who pledged their loyalty to 
daimyo, sacrifice of their master could never be an acceptable option.  Notwithstanding 
having the odds against the British Fleet, the Satsuma-han determined to fight against 
them.  The militarily inferior Satsuma-han strategically attacked th British Fleet and 
compelled the British to retreat.  Simultaneously, Satsuma-han, accepting their defeat, 
agreed to pay indemnity of £25,000 to the British.93 
 The Anglo-Satsuma War resulted in the establishment of closer relations between 
Great Britain and Satsuma-han.  Because of this warfare, the Shimazu His mitsu realized 
that it was “already impossible to expel foreigners.”94  This warfare caused “the sudden 
change of front of Satsuma, from leadership in the anti-foreign faction to an appreciation 
of the strength of the foreigners and the futility of trying to expel them.”95  
Simultaneously, the Satsuma-han began to consider the British the “ideal partner” for 
overthrowing the Shogunate and strengthening the nation by building a modern 
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military.96  Since then, the British switched its support from the Shogunate to the 
Satsuma-han, and the Satsuma-han secretly sent the young samurais to England for study 
in order to raise the future leaders.  In this way, cooperating with the British, the 
Satsuma-han rose to be the core of the anti-Shogunate force after the Anglo-Satsuma War.   
 Hikozō again served as a crucial interpreter during the trial of the Maria Luz 
Incident of 1872, in which the Meiji government endeavored to rescue coolies from a 
Peruvian cargo ship.  Summoned by a member of the Ministry of Finance, Shibusawa 
Eiichi (渋沢 栄一, 1840–1931)97, Hikozō was informed that the Governor of Kanagawa, 
Ōe Taku (大江 卓, 1847–1921) who was only twenty-five years old, needed Hikozō’s 
help for the prosecution of the case.  Since Japan and Peru had no diplomatic relations, 
“the case in question had to come before a Japanese court” and “to be conducted by 
Counsel, in English.”98  Governor Ōe was not familiar with English language but desired 
to understand the court process.  Therefore, he requested Hikozō to accompany him as an 
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interpreter during a period of the trial.99  Owing to Hikozō’s assistance, the trial ended 
with Japan’s victory that improved the country’s international recognition as a sovereign 
nation.   
 Being an American citizen, Hikozō had to live in the Yokohama kyoryūchi 
(foreign concession).100  Although naturalized as an American citizen, Hikozō always 
wanted his mother country to develop into a modern nation and rise to be a world power.  
Acknowledging the current state of international affairs, Hikozō insisted that it was 
important for Japan to treat the Westerners in polite manner in order to maintain Jap n’s 
sovereignty from the imperialists.101 In addition, making good use of his fluency in 
English and Japanese, Hikozō sought to be a cultural bridge between the United States 
and Japan. 
 From the cultural point of view, Hikozō’s major contribution was the 
establishment of the first Japanese newspaper.  Known as the “real father of Japanese 
journalism,” Hikozō played a leading role in revolutionizing the Japanese media in the 
late Tokugawa to the early Meiji periods.102  Shocked at a disparity between the United 
States and Japan, Hikozō insisted that modernization of the nation required a reform of 
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public awareness and that the publication of newspaper would facilitate the task.103   In 
1863, Hikozō began to record his remarkable experiences in the United States in his 
Hyōryū Ki (漂流記, “An Account of a Castaway”).104  Coming from a small fishing 
village, Hikozō never had a chance to learn how to read and write in Japanese.  Ther fore, 
in order to publish his Hyōryū Ki, Hikozō needed a help from a well-educated Japanese 
Kishida Ginkō (岸田 吟香, 1833–1905).  While going to Dr. James Curtis Hepburn 
(1815–1911) for his eye treatment, Kishida became a friend of Hikozō and learned 
English from Hikozō.105  Coming to Japan in 1859, Dr. Hepburn was an American 
missionary and physician who compiled a Japanese-English dictionary, A Japanese and 
English Dictionary; with an English and Japanese Index106 with Kishida’s assistance.  
Hepburn popularized the transliteration of Japanese Hebon-shiki Romaji (ヘボン式ロー
マ字, literary “Hepburn Romanization System) in his third edition of the dictionary 
published by Maruzen in 1886.  According to the Mainichi Shimbun on October 29, 1886, 
                                                
 103 Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai, Sonotoki Rekishiga Ugoita, No. 242 Shimbun Tanjō, February 1, 
2006. 
 
 104 Hikozō Hamada, Hyōryū Ki, 1863. 
 
 105 William De Lange, A History of Japanese Journalism: Japan’s Press Club as the Last 
Obstacle to a Mature Press (Richmond: Japan Library, 1998), 21–22; Kisaburō Kawabe, The 
Press and Politics in Japan: A Study of the Relation between the Newspaper and the Political
Development of Modern Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), 41; “Kishida 
Ginko,” Portraits of Modern Japanese Historical Figures, National Diet Library, Japan, 
http://ndl.go.jp/portrait/datas/258.html?c=0 (accessed December 6, 2009).  Founding a periodical 
called Yokohama Shinpō Moshihogusa with Eugene Van Reed, Kishida contributed to developing 
the nation’s journalism and newspaper industry. 
 
 106 James Curtis Hepburn, A.M., M.D., A Japanese and English Dictionary; with an 
English and Japanese Index (Yokohama: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1867).  It was 




the number of reservations for the copies of the dictionary reached 18,000.107  In addition, 
Hepburn translated the Bible into Japanese, founded Meiji Gakuin University (明治学院
大学, Meiji Gakuin daigaku), and became the first president of the university in 1889.108   
 In addition, cooperating with Kishida and Homma Kiyoo (本間 清雄, also known 
as Senzō, 1843–1923), Hikozō published the first Japanese newspaper called Shinbunshi 
(新聞誌, “Newspaper”) in March 1864 which were all handwritten and given free of 
charge.  In May 1865, Shinbunshi changed its title to Kaigai Shimbun (海外新聞, 
“Overseas News”).  Utilizing the block printing for the first time, Kaigai Shimbun, 
translated current international news and “local price current for imports and exports” 
into Japanese.109  Simply translating the English-language newspapers obtained from the 
foreign merchant ships or foreign concessions in Yokohama, the Kaigai Shimbun hardly 
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carried news about the Japanese domestic affairs.110  In short, the Kaigai Shimbun was a 
foreign newspaper printed in Japanese; therefore, it was hard to have a larg  circulation 
with such unfamiliar contents.  Only a certain group of educated samurai was interested 
in reading Kaigai Shimbun.111  In fact, Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the most prominent 
advocates of English learning, was a regular subscriber of the Kaigai Shimbun.112  
Despite Hikozō’s effort to utilize newspaper as a means of accelerating the process of 
modernization, not many Japanese were interested in reading the Kaigai Shimbun.  Due 
to the insufficient number of subscribers, the Kaigai Shimbun operated at a loss.  
According to the analysis of Van Reed, an old friend of Hikozō, newspapers failed to 
circulate in Japan because not many Japanese knew about the existence of newspapers, 
editors pretending to be scholars wrote articles with difficult Chinese characters, and 
newspaper provided outdated information due to delay in publishing.113  Therefore, the 
publication of this biweekly newspaper discontinued in 1866, and Hikozō moved to 
Nagasaki in 1867 for starting his own business.114  Although it was short-lived, Kaigai 
                                                
 110 James L. Huffman, Creating a Public: People and Press in Meiji Japan (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 30; De Lange, A History of Japanese Journalism, 22. 
 
 111 Kawabe, The Press and Politics in Japan, 39. 
 
 112 Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai, Sonotoki Rekishiga Ugoita, No. 242 Shimbun Tanjō, February 1, 
2006. 
 
 113 “Nihon Shimbun no Ganso Hikozō no Na o Anji shita ‘Moshihogusa’ Jogen” (An 
Introduction to Moshihogusa, which Implied the Name of the Founder of the Japanese 
Newspaper, Hikozo), Yokohama Shinpō Moshihogusa (Yokohama), April 2, 1968, in Nakayama, 
ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki, 51.  
 
 114 Heco and Murdoch, The Narrative of a Japanese, vol. 2, 53.  Lasting for two years 
with twenty-six issues, Kaigai Shimbun had very few regular subscribers.  In fact, even in 1875, 
only one in a thousand Japanese read newspapers regularly, according to Chōya Shimbun (Tokyo), 
March 2, 1875, in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 2-kan, 
Minron Bokko-ki (A Meiji Chronicle through Newspaper Sources, Vol. 2, Era of the Rise of 
People’s Argument) (Tokyo: Meiji Hennen Shi Ryōfukai, 1965), 293. 
 
 55
Shimbun contributed to broadening intellectual horizons of the elite Japanese to overseas.  
To some extent, it even stimulated the young Japanese to go to America.115 
 Furthermore, in the Bakumatsu period (幕末, last days of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate), Hikozō became a strong advocate of democracy about which he had learned 
and experienced during his nine-year stay in the United States.  Deeply impressed by 
Hikozō’s ideals of democracy, young Chōshū samurai such as Itō  Hirobumi (伊藤 博文, 
1841–1909) and Kido Takayoshi (木戸 孝允, 1833–1877) went to Nagasaki to consult 
Hikozō “who had as much experience and knowledge of the West as virtually any other 
Japanese.”116  Itō  and Kido who would become the key figures of the Meiji Restoration 
of 1868, sought to learn the government, constitution, and social and political institutions 
of the United States from Hikozō for the establishment of a Western-modeled 
government in Japan.117  Simultaneously, Hikozō’s old friend, Eugene Van Reed started 
to supply weapons to the Satsuma-han.118   
 Believing in American ideals, Hikozō taught the concept of democracy to the 
young ambitious Japanese who later became founding fathers of modern Japan.  Having a 
high regard for Hikozō because of well acquaintance with a foreign economic system, 
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Inoue Kaoru (井上 馨, 1836–1915) asked Hikozō to work for the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance in the 1870s.119  Therefore, Hikozō decided to move from Nagasaki to Tokyo.  
Consulting his American friend who was a banking expert, Hikozō c ntributed to the 
1872 National Bank Act (国立銀行法), based on the American National Bank system.120   
Simultaneously, utilizing his great knowledge about the Western culture and 
fluency in English language, Hikozō rose to be a successful Japanese American 
businessman.  Particularly, Hikozō had a tremendous influence upon the elite Japanese.  
In fact, inspired by Hikozō’s way of life, some of them went to America for study and 
later became the pioneers of Japanese immigration to the United States.  On December 12, 
1897, Hikozō had a heart trouble that ended his life.  Upon his death, Jiji Shinpō paid a 
tribute to memory of Hikozō who had contributed to the prosperity of the nation.”121  
Unable to be re-naturalized as a Japanese citizen, Hikozō, as an American citizen, was 
buried in the Aoyama Reien (青山霊園, Aoyama Municipal Cemetery) in Tokyo that has 
a designated section for foreigners in Japan.122 
 Considering what Manjirō and Hikozō had accomplished for their country, it is no 
exaggeration to say that they were the inspirations of the founding fathers of modern 
Japan.  Manjirō and Hikozō were probably the only two people who had a good 
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command of English in those days.  Not only Japan but also the United States had 
benefitted from the castaway bilinguals who acted as mediators between the governments 
of Japan and the United States.  In addition, they helped the people of two different 
cultures understand each other and led to the establishment of friendly relations for 
decades.  Evidently, because Hikozō and Van Reed became friends while Hikozō was in 
San Francisco and helped Van Reed to arrange a group of people, the first Japanese 
immigration to Hawaii took place as early as 1868.  Although treated as foreigne s or 
foreign spies, Manjirō and Hikozō never stopped working for the improvement of Japan.  
Their spirits inspired the young samurai and intellectuals who played a leading role in the 
course of modernization. 
 Meanwhile, one of the well-known members of the Japanese Embassy to the 
United States in 1860, Fukuzawa Yukichi was a prominent writer, translator, educator, 
political theorist, and founder of the Keiō Gijuku (慶應義塾) whose numbers of 
influential publications and public speech promoted travel and immigration to the United 
States in many aspects.123  Fukuzawa was the most famous advocate of Western 
liberalism who was the first Japanese to translate the Declaration of Indepe ence and 
the United States Constitution.  Observing and then introducing Western civilization to 
the Japanese, Fukuzawa played an extremely important role in encouraging the Japan’s
overseas development and immigration.  Moreover, Fukuzawa was responsible for the 
rise of Japanese imperialism/nationalism.  Therefore, I am going to examine the 
significance and achievement of Fukuzawa in Chapter VI in detail.   
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While dealing with the foreign threat, the Tokugawa Shogunate had 
simultaneously encountered numerous and devastating domestic problems that would 
eventually attribute to the collapse of the Shogunate.  Since the early nineteenth century, 
the beginnings of industrialization, the commercialization of agriculture, the growth of 
inter-regional trade, and the increase of household incomes had created serious social 
changes in Japan.124  The Tokugawa Shogunate had instituted the social class system 
called shinōkōshō (士農工商) with the samurai at the highest; however, a thriving 
commercial economy had stimulated the rise of wealthy commoners.125   The “affluent 
lifestyle and cultural pretensions” of wealthy commoners “challenged th  social and 
political dominance of the samurai.”126 
Among the four classes, the lower-ranked samurai suffered extreme poverty 
toward the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate.  In order to maintain their feudal domains’ 
economy, the samurai had to accept a large pay cut as well as confiscation of 
properties.127  Some of the samurai engaged in a second job, usually handcraft work, 
simply to survive.  Although considering this kind of work undignified for the samurai, 
they repaired wooden clogs, umbrellas, household utensils, and lanterns.128  Some of the 
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impoverished samurai sold things, including swords and armor.129  In some extreme cases, 
the distressed samurai practiced banditry or sold their daughters in order to secure the 
minimum standard of living.130  In addition, samurai families married their daughters to 
wealthy merchant families to dodge financial problems.  The decline of hereditary and 
feudal privileges became apparent and the samurai’s discontent with the Tokugawa 
Shogunate grew more extensive and predominant.   
Furthermore, severe famines caused by bad weather extending over a long peri d 
of time incited numerous peasant uprisings (hyakushō ikki, 百姓一揆) as well as urban 
riots (uchikowashi, 打ちこわし, literary house-smashing) throughout Japan.  For 
example, in 1866 alone, there were 106 peasant uprisings taking place in rural areas, and 
urban riots numbered thirty-five.131  Suffering from the heavy taxation and rapid price 
increases, the rural populace including poor peasants, tenant farmers, and agricultural 
wage earners rose up against tax collectors, moneylenders, and wealthy landowners who 
had filled their pockets through the exploitation of the poor.132  However, their demand 
for tax reduction, lower rice prices, and the return of their mortgaged property was 
rejected; therefore, they “burned tax records, pillaged storehouses, ransacked privat  
homes, carried away bags of rice and casks of miso(bean paste), smashed furniture and 
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trampled on clothing, and even dug up the family graveyards of those whom they 
despised the most.”133 
Eventually, the rioters advocated yonaoshi (世直し, literary “world renewal”) 
through popular violent movements called yonaoshi ikki (世直し一揆) for reforming the 
devastating society.134  Frequently breaking out in the Tōhoku (東北, literary “North 
East) and Kantō (関東) regions, the social disorder and popular unrest further contributed 
to weakening the fundamental political structure of the late Tokugawa Shogunate.135 
As a result of the greater degree of internal and external pressure, the Tokugawa 
Shogunate finally determined to end the seclusion policy following the conclusion of the 
U.S.-Japan Treaty of Amity and Friendship in March 1854.  However, the Shogunate 
encountered another difficulty because a powerful Tairō (大老, Chief Councilor), Ii 
Naosuke (井伊 直弼, 1815–1860), signed the treaties without obtaining an imperial 
approval from Emperor Kōmei (孝明天皇, 1831–1867, r. 1846–1867).136  In 
consequence, a large-scale political crisis occurred that led Japan into the Bakumatsu 
period (1853–1867) when a series of major events took place.137  Immediately, the 
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signing of treaties without approval incited the anti-foreign movement throughout the 
country with the slogan, sonnō jōi (“revere the emperor and expel the barbarians”).138  
The daimyo of Mito-han, Tokugawa Nariaki (徳川 斉昭, 1800–1860) became an 
influential advocate of sonnō jōi movement and facilitated the rise of the Japanese 
nationalism.  Meanwhile, numbers of t zama daimyō (外様大名, nonhereditary feudal 
lords or “outside daimyo”) criticized the Shogun for not performing his duty as a 
legitimate ruler of Japan.  Traditionally, the duty of Shogun was to subdue barbarians, not 
to be subdued by barbarians.139  The sense of humiliation due to the forced opening of 
Japan diverted into the daimyo’s suspicion and distrust of the Shogunate.140   
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In order to establish a national policy for expelling the foreigners, Nariaki argued 
that the direct involvement of Emperor Kōmei was essential.  Nariaki gained tremendous 
support from tozama daimyō who sought to involve in the central government.  However, 
Ii aimed to reinforce the Shogunate’s centralized power by appointing Tokugawa 
Iemochi (徳川 家茂, 1846–1866) as a successor and favored to open Japan to the West.  
Then, Ii carried out the Ansei no Taigoku (安政の大獄, “Ansei Purge”) between the mid-
1858 and the end of 1859 for forcibly eliminating the anti-foreign factions and the 
Hitotsubashi faction that recommended Tokugawa Yoshinobu as a successor.141  Ii’s 
scheme for restoring the Shogunate’s control shortly ended with his assassination on 
March 24, 1860 by a group of rōnin from Mito-han except one from Satsuma-han, known 
as Sakuradamongai no Hen (桜田門外の変, Sakuradamon Incident).  Importantly, these 
assassins were not anti-Shogunate but anti-Ii and his faction.142  However, with his death, 
the nation deteriorated in confusion and violence and the Shogunate further weakened its 
authority. 
Meanwhile, powerful daimyo including Satsuma, Chōs ū, Tosa, and Saga had 
already realized the superiority of Western military power and the Shogunate’s inability 
to expel the foreign power by force.  Rather than expelling Westerners, they decided to 
learn how to build up and organize the military and weapons from them and to establish 
the emperor-centered government with their direct influence on politics.  Meanwhile, 
accepting the Emperor Kōmei’s policy of expelling the Westerners and promising to 
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close the country within ten years, the Shogunate made a preemptive move to the tozama 
daimyo.   In 1862, the Shogunate arranged a political alliance through the marriage 
between the Emperor Kōmei’s half-sister, Princess Kazunomiya (和宮親子内親王, 
1846–1877) and the Shogun Iemochi to achieve Kōbu Gattai (公武合体, literary “Union 
of Court and Shogunate”)143 for restoring the declining authority of the Shogunate 
following the opening of Japan.   
The extreme xenophobic Chōshū-han was discontented with this marriage and 
Chōshū samurai launched an attack on Kyoto in 1864.  In response, the Shogunate 
launched suppressions against Chōshū in 1864 and then in 1866 (長州征伐).  Satsuma 
sided with the Shogunate to suppress Chōshū in 1864; however, Satsuma determined to 
make a military alliance with Chōshū in March 1866 despite their long history of rivalry 
because both were unhappy with the way the Shogunate subdued the han.144  Afterwards, 
Satsuma and Chōshū steadily prepared for the coming of the second Chōshū suppression.  
For instance, Satsuma helped Chōs ū to purchase foreign-made rifles and weapons.145  
As a consequence of losing a powerful support from the Satsuma-han, the second Chōshū 
suppression ended in failure.  After Iemochi’s death in the second Chōshū suppression, 
Yoshinobu finally became the fifteenth Tokugawa Shogun in 1866.  Eventually, the 
Chōshū suppression backfired on the Shogunate financially and exposed its declining 
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military power and leadership.146 
Thereafter, having no hope on the Tokugawa Shogunate, the sonnō jōi supporters 
consisting of Satsuma and Chōs ū forces focused on the recovery of national status by 
strengthening the nation, which eventually led to the replacement of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate to a new Meiji government.  In 1868, the Meiji Restoration was carried out as 
a result of disruption of the Japanese social system following the opening of Japan.  In 
the same year, the Charter Oath was promulgated that denounced the Japanese traditions 
and customs and encouraged the adoption of Western culture and practices for the 
establishment of “a modern nation-state.”147   
 Significantly, the Meiji Restoration had a tremendous impact on the samurai class 
regarding their political and social status in the new government.  Due to a political 
process of the Meiji Restoration that abolished the samurai class, a great number of 
samurai became unemployed.  Especially, those han (藩, feudal domains) that had 
supported the Tokugawa Shogunate to fight against the Imperial force during the Boshin 
Civil War (戊辰戦争, literary “War of the Year of the Dragon”) found themselves in 
awkward position.148  For example, the honorable Aizu samurai, who were loyal to their 
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Shogunate until the very last moment, now became fugitives as a consequence of the 
change of government.149   
 Due to its extraordinary loyalty to the Shogunate, Aizu-han (会津藩) became the 
most severe victim of the Meiji Restoration.  In the Bakumatsu period, owing to their 
extraordinary loyalty to the Shogunate, the ninth Aizu daimyō Matsudaira Katamori (松
平 容保, 1836−1893), who was a distant cousin of the Shogun, had been appointed as the 
newly established Kyoto Shugoshoku (京都守護職, military governor of Kyoto) between 
1862 and 1867 in order to maintain the peace and public order in Kyoto.150  Kyoto 
Shugoshoku’s main duty was to drive out the anti-foreign Chōs ū forces that utilize 
terrorism to advocate sonnō jōi.151   
 In order to bolster up the declining authority of the Tokugawa Shogunate, 
Matsudaira Katamori upheld the policy of Kōbu Gattai, which virtually promoted the 
closer cooperation of Court and Shogunate.  Realizing that the Aizu-han alone could not 
fulfill the duty, Matsudaira utilized a military unit called Shinsengumi (新選組, literary 
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“Newly Select League”) between 1863 and 1869 as a special police force in order to 
suppress the imperial loyalists and extreme anti-foreign forces that continuously 
committed crimes and violence in Kyoto.152  Under the protection of Matsudaira, Kondo 
Isami (近藤 勇, 1834–1868) headed the Shinsengumi, which was a group of swordsmen 
mostly consisting of the rōnin (浪人, “masterless samurai”) who patrolled the city of 
Kyoto.153  Initially organized in a small dōjō (道場, literary “place of the way” where the 
Japanese train martial arts) in Edo’s Tama Region, the Shinsengumi recruited many rōnin 
on their way to Kyoto.  Matsudaira envisioned that the creation of the Shinsengumi would 
possibly help “restore Tokugawa control of the imperial institution.”154  People in Kyoto 
were afraid of the Shinsengumi because its members exercised their privilege of Kirisute 
Gomen (切捨御免), a right to cut down commoners if necessary, which was authorized 
by the Imperial Court on August 21, 1863.155 
Due to their harsh rule, accompanied with terrors of the S insengumi, many han 
(domains) consequently became hostile to Aizu-han.  Especially, the Chōshū- an had an 
old score to settle with Aizu-han.  Therefore, when the imperial forces call d the Kan-gun 
(官軍, mainly consisting of Satsuma and Chōs ū forces that made a military alliance in 
1866 for the restoration of emperor) gained control in the Boshin Civil War and 
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established the new government under the 122nd Emperor Meiji (明治天皇, 1852–1912, 
r. 1968–1912), Aizu-han found itself in serious straits.  The new Meiji government 
treated Aizu-han more cruelly and severely than other han that had been loyal to the 
Shogunate called the Zoku-gun (賊軍, literary “rebel forces”).  Made up of young 
samurai from Satsuma-han (薩摩藩) and Chōshū-han (長州藩), the new Meiji leaders 
accused daimyō Matsudaira Katamori and his Aizu-han samurai of being “traitors.”156  
For the newly established Meiji government, Matsudaira Katamori and Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu were indeed sworn “enemies of the state”; however, the Meiji leaders decided 
not to execute them, fearing the consequences.  Although Satsuma and Chōshū had 
initially passed a death sentence to Matsudaira, he was not executed but was sentenced to 
life imprisonment.157  After being confined to Myōkokuji (妙国寺, Myokoku Temple) for 
a month, he was under house arrest and finally pardoned in 1872.  The leaders of Satsuma 
and Chōshū were afraid of massive martyrdom following the execution of Matsudaira or 
Yoshinobu as well as the unification of defeated daimyo, who had supported the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, to rebel against the newly established government.158  The fragile 
new government sought to avoid any catastrophic events before the establishment of the 
firm governmental foundation.  Under the existing conditions, the Meiji leaders began to 
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consider the samurai class as an obstacle and even a threat to Japan’s rapid and effective 
modernization.   
 Furthermore, the Conscription Law of 1873, which made the existence of samurai 
meaningless, appeared to pave the way for the Japanese mass immigration.  Then, the 
peasants who had devoted all their energies to farming and agricultural labor were 
strongly against the new military obligation imposed on them.  Simultaneously, the 
samurai, losing their traditional military status to the peasantry, were ext mely distressed 
because they had no place to fit in the new system.  The samurai class, which had ranked 
highest in the feudal society for centuries, was severely affected by the political reforms 
of the Meiji government.  According to Harry D. Harootunian’s study published in 1960, 
the samurai numbered roughly 1,800,000 and there were about 400,000 samurai 
households at the beginning stage of the Meiji Restoration.159  In consequence, a great 
number of samurais consisting of 5 to 6 percent of the entire Japanese population became 
unemployed.   
The Meiji government, depriving the military duty of samurai and passing it to 
commoners, sought to phase out the feudal stipends called k roku (家禄) which 
amounted to one-third of the national annual expenditure.160  For example, karoku 
amounted to 33.9 percent in 1871, 37.8 percent in 1872, and 35.4 percent in 1873.161  
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Therefore, in 1876, the government decided to commutate the feudal stipends for 
government bonds and eventually to dissolve the samurai class through the program 
called Chitsuroku Shobun (秩禄処分, commutation of feudal stipends).  This program 
saved the government enormous expenditure and reduced itsfinancial burden.162  The 
enactment of the Conscription Law and Chitsuroku Shobun, which socially and 
economically shut out the samurai from the new institutions, resulted in “pushing” te 
distressed samurai to emigrate overseas. 
 
Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony 
 Under the circumstances, the first Japanese mass immigration to the mainland 
United States took place in February of 1869 by some former samurai and their families.  
Being “political refugees,” these people from Aizu-han were indeed the first to attempt 
establishing a Japanese agricultural settlement in northern California.163  After the 
collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate, cooperating with John Henry Schnell (1843–?), 
Aizu-han secretly arranged mass emigration for overcoming the difficulties in the 
aftermath of the Meiji Restoration.164  Schnell, a German merchant, was the oyatoi 
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gaikokujin (お雇い外国人, literary “hired foreigner”)165 who served the ninth daimyō of 
Aizu-han, Matsudaira Katamori as a military instructor and weapon procurer, and later 
married Jou, a daughter of the Aizu-han retainer.166  Given the Japanese name Hiramatsu 
Buhei (平松 武兵衛) derived from the inversion of the Chinese characters of the 
daimyo’s surname (松平), Schnell was a blue-eyed samurai who was allowed to live in 
the jōka machi (castle town) of Wakamatsu, to hire retainers, and to carry swords.167    
 Schnell and his Japanese family with a group of forty people including samurai, 
farmers, carpenters, plasterers, and a doctor from Aizu-Wakamatsu and one samurai from 
Shonai-han named Nishikawa Tomoki (西川 友喜) left Yokohama on April 30 and 
arrived in San Francisco on May 20, 1869.168  They took a passage on board the S. S. 
China owned by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company that had started passenger and 
mail service from California to Japan as well as to China in 1867.  Then, the group left 
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San Francisco for Sacramento by boat, and then traveled to Placerville by wagons.  The 
group finally arrived at Placerville on June 9, 1869.169  Financially aided by the Aizu 
daimyo Matsudaira, Schnell was able to buy 600 acres of land with a house at Gold Hill 
in Coloma, El Dorado County, immediately after their arrival.170  Schnell purchased the 
land and a house for only five-thousand dollars from Charles M. Graner who was a 
businessman in San Francisco and manager of a hotel in which Schnell had stayed.171   
After the land purchase, Schnell established the first settlement of the Japanese in the 
mainland United States known as the Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony.   
 Urged by Schnell, the Japanese colonists had brought tea plants, bamboo shoots, 
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mulberry trees, and silkworm cocoons to establish a settlement based on agriculture.172  
Schnell’s Japanese wife looked after the female workers of the colony.173  Initially, 
Matsudaira Katamori and his son Kataharu (容大) were supposed to join the party of 
Schnell before long; however, it never came off because the people of Aizu-han under the 
leadership of Kataharu had already migrated from Aizu to Shimokita Hanto (下北半島, 
literary “Shimokita Peninsula,” located in the northernmost tip of Honshu or mainland) in 
1870 as a part of relegation policy, aiming at eradicating clan of Tokugawa influence.174 
 Initially, the Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony seemed quite successful.  
According to an article published in the San Francisco Call in 1870 after the 
Horticultural Fair in San Francisco in June:   
“Herr Schnell of the Japanese Colony in Gold Hill, El Dorado County makes a fine
display of Japanese plants, grown from imported shrubs and seeds.  Amongst his articles 
are fine healthy tea plants, which were planted on March 14, 1870 last.  Theseplant  are 
about four inches high and are vigorous and healthy.  He also exhibited samples of ric  
plants and a specimen of the Japanese pepper tree.”175 
 
The colony cultivated tea and silk, but it constantly struggled with an insufficient water 
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supply, as well as social problems and financial difficulties.176  The former samurai from 
Aizu-han worked diligently and the tea trees grew well at first, yet it ended in failure 
within a few years due to the shortage of funds, draught, and the outbreak of an 
epidemic.177  In addition, the colonists did not get along well together with Schnell, and 
many got homesick and steeped in liquor.178  All these factors attributed to the failure of 
the Wakamatsu colony.  
 In April 1871, Schnell and his family left for Japan promising to raise funds for 
maintaining the colony; however, he never returned.  What was worse, Schnell had 
stealthily sold the greater part the Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony’s estate to he El 
Dorado County government before leaving for Japan.179  The colonists somehow 
managed to persist for eight more years before finally disbanding in 1879.  Tragically, the 
colonists left no record of their experiences in California and very little is known about 
the fate of the rest of colonists.  Only Okei (おけい, –1871) and Sakurai Matsunosuke     
(桜井 松之助, –1901) were taken custody of a wealthy Francis Veerkamp family after 
the disbandment of the colony, while Masumizu Kuninosuke (増水 国之助, –1915) 
married a black woman named Carrie Wilson and continued to engage in agriculture and 
also worked as a miner.180  Virtually nothing has been heard of the Schnell family since 
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its disappearance in 1871.  Thereafter, only person who observed Schnell in Genève in 
1885 was Kawashima Tadanosuke (川島 忠之助), according to the Fukushima Minyū 
Shimbun.181  Kawashima was a novelist who translated a French novel Le tour du monde 
en quatre-vingts jours (Around the World in Eighty Days) published by Jules Verne in 
1873.182 
 As an agricultural colony, Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony was disastrous 
failure.  It had historical significance like the Gannen-mono in Hawaii who left Japan in 
1868.  As Van Sant points out, it was the first organized mass immigration of the 
Japanese to the mainland United States.183  Leaving the country as “political refugees,” 
they were true pioneers of the Japanese immigration to the United States in the midst of 
the political, social, and economic changes taking place in Japan. 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
 There were several causes identified for the initiation of Japanese mass 
emigration to the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Arrival of 
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Commodore Matthew Perry and subsequent opening of Japan promoted going to 
overseas for acquiring advanced science and technology.  Moreover, Manjirō and Hikozō 
played an important role in promoting Westernization for strengthening Japan.  In 
addition, information they provided either directly or indirectly motivated the Japanese 
students to go abroad for studying.  Meanwhile, the political revolution that abolished the 
Shogunate created a greater number of displaced samurai in the new system.  Wakamatsu 
Colony was the first attempt of the samurai to establish themselves in the mainland 












ROAD TO MASS IMMIGRATION—“PUSHES” AND “PULLS” 
 
 The first organized Japanese emigration to Hawaii, taking place in 1868 right 
after the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate, had a significant influence on th  course 
of the development of Japanese in international affairs.  The first group of emigrants to 
Hawaii known as Gannen-mono (元年者, literary “First Year People”) faced problems 
and newly established Meiji government determined to protect its subjects wherever they 
were and whatever it might cost.  The attitude of the Meiji defined the future 
development of Japanese maritime policy.  Meanwhile, the Japanese demand for 
emigration continued to grow among the young males who sought to evade draft.  At the 
same time, the labor shortage in Hawaiian plantations and overpopulation problem in 
Japan facilitated the both governments of Japan and Hawaii to authorize Japanese 
immigration to Hawaii for labor.  
 
Beginning of the Emigration to Hawaii—Gannen-mono  
 
 The first mass Japanese emigration to Hawaii initiated in 1868 when the 
Tokugawa Shogunate issued 180 passports at the strong request of Eugene M. Van Reed 
who represented the Hawaiian Kingdom.1  The first destination was Hawaii because 
                                                




while Japan was experiencing social and economic problems such as overpopulation, 
poverty, and a high rate of unemployment, Hawaii was encountering a shortage of 
laborers caused by the Europeans arriving with diseases that decimated a large number of 
the native population.2  Having no immunity to measles, whooping cough, influenza, 
smallpox, tuberculosis, and venereal diseases, Hawaii’s native population decline  to a 
serious level as seen in Table 3.1.3   
 
 
Table 3.1: Change in the Native Hawaiian Population, 1832–1910 
 
Year Population Index (%) 
1832 130,313 100 
1836 108,579 83.3 
1850 84,165 64.6 
1853 71,019 54.5 
1860 67,084 51.5 
1866 58,765 45.1 
1872 56,896 43.7 
1878 57,985 44.5 
1884 44,232 33.9 
1890 34,436 26.4 
1896 31,019 23.8 
1900 29,787 22.9 
1910 26,041 20.0 
1920 23,723 18.2 
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Sources: United Japanese Society of Hawaii, and James H. Okahata, A History of Japanese in 
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According to the United Japanese Society of Hawaii and James H. Okahata’s A 
History of Japanese in Hawaii (1971), 130,313 people lived in Hawaii in 1832.  That was 
reduced to 58,765 in 1866.4  As Table 3.1 shows, the native Hawaiian population had 
sharply decreased within an eighty-year-period.  In response to the drastic population 
decrease, the Hawaiian government had attempted to promote labor immigration to 
Hawaii.  In so doing, the government enacted the Master and Servant Act in 1850 that 
alleviated the shortage of labor by allowing the contract labor system.5  The Act enabled 
the subsequent establishment of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society in the same 
year in order to bring immigrants who would work on the vast sugar plantations.6  As a 
result, 180 Chinese laborers arrived in 1852.7  Then, the Hawaiian government 
established the Bureau of Immigration in 1864 to encourage further labor migration as 
well as to increase the population of Hawaii through the assimilation of immigrants to the 
local population.8  Investing a large national expenditure and putting a great deal of effort 
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into the joint venture, the Hawaiian government recruited the number of Chinese people 
increased to 18,000 by 1884 and over 11,000 Portuguese arrived before 1890.9  
Nevertheless, these labor forces were not sufficient for the operation of the burgeoning 
sugar industry in Hawaii. 
In fact, the Hawaiian government and planters initially sought to attract 
immigrants either from Europe or from America.  However, as Alex Ladenson points out 
in his article published in 1940, few Europeans and Americans preferred to work in 
Hawaii for several reasons.  First of all, they could not earn much money as plantation 
laborers, and they knew that they could find better opportunities and jobs in America or 
Australia.  Then, the impoverished immigrants could not afford costly passages to 
Hawaii.  Finally, they were virtually uninformed about the advantage in going t  
Hawaii.10  In the circumstances, the Hawaiian government began to consider the 
recruitment of Japanese laborers as alternative to European and American laborers to 
alleviate the shortage of agricultural labor.11  
Then, Robert Crichton Wyllie (1796–1865), foreign minister of Hawaii, asked 
Eugene M. Van Reed, an experienced American trader in Japan and a close friend of
Hikozō, whether the recruitment of Japanese laborers for sugar plantations in Hawaii was 
possible.  After Van Reed gave a positive report to Wyllie, Hawaii’s Bureau of 
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Immigration provided him $1,925 for his mission to recruit laborers.12  In 1865, 
appointed as the Hawaiian Consul in Kanagawa, Van Reed, with the help of an American 
minister residing in Japan, General Robert B. Van Valkenburgh, negotiated a tr aty with 
the Tokugawa Shogunate in the late 1866 to the early 1867.13  After the negotiation, Van 
Reed succeeded in making an interim friendship agreement with Japan in August 1867.  
The agreement had no solid provisions other than providing friendship and trade between 
Hawaii and Japan.  The Tokugawa Shogunate did not recognize Van Reed as an official 
diplomat because he was engaged in commercial activities.14  Therefore, the Shogunate 
did not allow Van Reed to sign the treaty based on the shogunal policy.15  Despite, Van 
Reed continued to work closely with the Shogunate officials in order to get passports for 
the emigrants whom he would convey to Hawaii.16  
Based on the agreement of 1867, Van Reed initiated the first organized 
emigration on April 25, 1868, recruiting 153 Japanese near Edo and Yokohama, age 
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between 13 and 46.17  Since Van Reed was not fluent in Japanese, he hired a merchant of 
Yokohama named Kimura Hanbei (木村 半兵衛) as a recruiting agent.18  Kimura 
succeeded in recruiting nearly 400 Japanese, including city people and those “who had 
been picked out of the streets of Yokohama, sick, exhausted, and filthy, and without 
clothing to cover decency.”19  According to A History of Japanese in Hawaii: 
Most of them were unfit for hard labor on the sugar plantations of Hawaii.  They were 
failures in life, rough-and-rowdy adventurers addicted to drink and gambling, quick to get 
into brawls.  These were unemployed down-and-outers or loafers who had drifte to 
Yokohama at the time of recruitment.  Some of them, not being the first-born in families 
engaged in some kind of business, had been thrown on their own resources, to find work 
elsewhere, and ready to join any adventure that promised quick returns.  They were going 
to a new world to make a fortune and return to Japan within three years in honor and 
glory.20   
 
Among them were few ex-farmers who sold their land in hope of starting new life in 
Yokohama.  Van Reed hired an American physician named Dr. David J. Lee to choose 
180 Japanese who seemed suitable for the sugar plantation labor in Hawaii.21  Dr. Lee 
selected young men without skin diseases.  There were eighteen men aged betwe n 10 
and 19; 102 men aged between 20 and 30; twenty-two men aged between 30 and 40; and 
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three men at age 40 or 41.22   
 In fact, a change of government took place just before the departure of the Scioto. 
Expecting to obtain 350 passports from the newly established Meiji government, Van 
Reed returned with 180 passports issued by the Tokugawa Shogunate.23  Nevertheless, 
the new government, having no diplomatic relations with Hawaii, refused to issue new 
passports unless one of Japan’s treaty nations guaranteed the return passages of the 
laborers at the end of the three-year-contract period.24  Then, Van Reed requested $4,000 
from the Meiji government, which he had spent for recruiting laborers in compensation 
for releasing laborers.  The new Meiji government, considering emigration nothing better 
than slavery, denied the validity of Tokugawa passports and restricted the Japanese 
emigration to Hawaii.25  Seeking to improve the national image for repealing unequal 
treaties with the West, the Japanese government officials were concerned that there 
would be no way to protect their citizens in case of emergency.  In addition, the 
government did not trust Van Reed at all because he was a weapon broker and previously 
had closer relations with the Shogunate.26   
While negotiating with the Meiji government for an agreement, Van Reed 
proceeded with the arrangement for the shipping of Japanese laborers to Hawaii.  During 
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the course of negotiation, 170 out of 350 Japanese laborers whom he had secured decided 
not to go to Hawaii.27  Finally, before obtaining new passports from the Meiji 
government, Van Reed decided to carry out his original plan to convey the Japanese 
laborers to the sugar plantations in Hawaii regardless of the governmental prohibition.28  
In short, contrary to the government’s effort, the poverty in the country in the wake of th  
Meiji Restoration and its subsequent policies “pushed” the poor and displaced Japanese 
to go to Hawaii in hope of making money and return home in a short period. 
On May 17, the Scioto (British vessel of 855 tons) left Yokohama for Hawaii, 
carrying 147 men and six women, arriving in Honolulu on June 19, 1868.29  They were 
called Gannen-mono because they left Japan in the first year of the Meiji’s 
enthronement.30  Mainly consisting of “samurai, cooks, sake brewers, potters, printers, 
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tailors, wood workers, a hairdresser and a 13-year-old heavy drinker nicknamed ‘Ichi the 
Viper.’”  Virtually none of the Gannen-mono had farming background.31  Seeking better 
opportunities in a new world, a few samurai including Makino Tomisaburō (Sendai-han), 
Aoyagi Tokichi and Higuchi Ryōsuke (Takamatsu-han), and Hattori En’uemon (Owari-
han) determined to go to Hawaii.  Van Reed hired Makino to be a supervisor of the 
affairs of the group.32  Employed by Van Reed, Dr. Lee accompanied the group and took 
good care of the Japanese immigrants who got sick.33  Nevertheless, since the voyage by 
a sailing ship took thirty-three days and encountered a severe storm, many Japanese who 
were not used to a long voyage got seasick, and one person died of illness before setting 
foot on Hawaii.34  Van Reed’s newspaper, Yokohama Shinpō Moshihogusa reported on 
August 27, 1868 that Kozu Wakichi (小頭 和吉) died twenty-one days after leaving 
Yokohama.35  According to the diary of a stowaway, Sakuma Yonekichi (佐久間 米吉), 
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Kozu was buried at sea.36  Once arrived in Hawaii, the Gannen-mono were supposed to 
work on a three-year contract with salary of four-dollars a month (26 days) for males and 
three-dollars for female laborers, and food, shelter, medical care as well as round-trip fare 
were to be paid by the employers.37  
 The Hawaiians gave the Gannen-mono hearty welcome upon their arrival at 
Honolulu.  The Hawaiian Gazette reported on the Gannen-mono: 
“At first glance these Japanese looked like good people.  They were brimming 
with vigor and zest.  These people from the Empire of Japan did not appear to have
visited foreign countries before and strolled through the streets as if they were enjoying 
the novelty of it all very much… 
“In spite of their shabby clothing, they did not appear to be timid in the least.  On 
the whole they created a favorable impression and were greeted warmly by white 
residents and natives alike.  It is hoped that they will turn out to be amiable and useful 
workers…”38 
 
Makino, reporting to Van Reed that the Gannen-mono were treated well, described 
Hawaii as ideal place to live.  However, their happy days would not last long once the 
plantation labor started.  Working in the harsh environment for minimum twelve hours a 
day, there was virtually no distinction between the Gannen-mono and slaves.39  
Particularly, they had hard time communicating with lunas (foremen or overseers of 
plantations, usually Portuguese or Spanish) due to language differences, and 
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miscommunication often resulted in harsh punishment.40  According to a report submitted 
by Takada and Sekiguchi who visited Hawaii, the Gannen-mono’s life in Hawaii, except 
for a few successful people, was not desirable.41  The Meiji government, informed about 
the terrible mistreatment of the Gannen-mono by the planters, had to rescue them in order 
not to harm Japan’s reputation, and afterwards determined to prohibit emigration strictly 
for nearly twenty years. 
One of the reasons for their failure was that they were mostly ex-samurais and 
city dwellers who were generally not familiar with labor-intensive agricultural work.  In 
reality, their working conditions were more severe than what Van Reed and Kimura 
Hanbei had promised earlier.  Moreover, most of them could not physically bear the 
intense heat in Hawaii.42   
 What upset them most was that they did not get the medical care from employers 
as they were promised.  For example, in Waialua Plantation, sick laborers had to pay for 
their food and medical care while they could not work.43  Due to the lack of sufficient 
medical care, many Japanese laborers lost their lives.  Some discontented Japanese 
laborers refused to work by pretending to be ill, and then lunas frequently abused them 
by whipping in order to fulfill quota.44  Meanwhile, due to a severe depression, one 
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Japanese laborer committed suicide.45 
 What was worse, the Japanese laborers could not make enough money with their 
low wages since the cost of living in Hawaii was too expensive.  Therefore, disillusioned 
with their status quo, the Gannen-mono wished to return to Japan as soon as possible, 
even before their contracts ended.46  In response to their subjects’ urgent request for 
rescue, the new Meiji government needed to take prompt measures.  However, they were 
too busy at the Boshin Civil War to deal with the problems of overseas Japanese who left 
the country without official permission.  
 Finally, in September 1869, the Meiji government dispatched the Special Envoy 
to Hawaii to recall the Japanese citizens.47  Led by Ueno Kagenori (上野 景範, 1845–
1888), a 25-year-old Japanese delegate, the Special Envoy left Yokohama for Hawaii in 
order to investigate the problems caused by the unauthorized employment of the Japanese 
arranged by Van Reed.48. Accompanied by his aide Miwa Hoichi (三輪 輔一), Ueno’s 
mission was to negotiate the treatment of the Japanese laborers in Hawaii who claimed to 
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suffer inhumane treatment and violations of labor contracts in the sugar plantations.49  
The Foreign Ministry of Japan dispatched Ueno to rescue the fellow countrymen because 
Ueno was fluent in several foreign languages including English and Chinese.50  Th  
Foreign Minister ordered Ueno to accomplish the following: 
 “You are hereby directed to proceed to the Hawaiian Islands on a special mission 
to bring back the Japanese who had been sent to work in the said Islandsby the American, 
Van Reed… 
 “You are being dispatched to Hawaii (also) to investigate the criminality of acts 
against the Japanese by holding hearings in the Islands; to determine if and how wages 
and allowances have been paid to the Japanese workers; and also to appoint one of them 
as manager to confer with government authorities there in all matters pertaining to their 
welfare.”51  
 
Arriving in Honolulu on December 27, Ueno was ready to take all the Gannen-
mono with him on the assumption that they were treated like slaves.  Ueno made two 
clear proposals for the resolution to the Gannen-mono problems to the Foreign Minister 
of Hawaii.  The first was to send back all Japanese laborers at the Japanese government’s 
expense.  The second was to send back those who were inappropriate for labor in the 
sugar plantations while the rest of Japanese laborers would fulfill their contra ts and then 
return to Japan at the Hawaiian government’s expenses.52  Furthermore, Ueno implied 
that the resolution to the problems would lead to the establishment of the Japan-Hawaii 
relations, which the Hawaiian government had longed for.53  After the negotiation, the 
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minimum wage of the Gannen-mono was raised from four dollars a month to fifteen 
dollars a month.  Additionally, the Hawaiian government allowed the Japanese laborers 
to remain in Hawaii even after their contracts ended.  In fact, by the time Ueno arrived, 
most dekasegi laborers appeared to be used to the local living, and only forty people out 
of 153 returned to Japan with him.54  Among the emigrants who decided to stay, some 
remained in Hawaii, married native Hawaiian women, and became the “true pioneers” of 
the Japanese American community, or moved to the mainland U.S. for more 
opportunities.  Although Ueno succeeded in solving some problems regarding the 
treatment of the Japanese laborers, other fundamental problems remained unsolved and 
plantation’s harsh working conditions continued to distress the Gannen-mono.   
Nevertheless, contrary to the government’s expectation, considerable numbers of 
Japanese determined not to return Japan.  According to the Nihon Gaikō Bunsho 
(Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy), Tomisaburo, a Gannen-mono, represented in 
December 1871 that sixty dekasegi laborers desired to move into the mainland.55  After 
all, forty-six laborers applied for the permission to move to the mainland for acquiring 
new skills.56  Therefore, only twelve or thirteen people desired to return to Japan when 
their contracts ended.57  Encountering different culture and civilization in Hawaii, the 
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Gannen-mono actually experienced bunmei kaika (文明開化, “civilization and 
enlightenment”) earlier than people in Japan did.  Like Nakahama Manjirō who studied in 
New England, the Gannen-mono working in Hawaii for three years acquired English 
language skills and desired to improve themselves by acquiring skills such as forging, 
textile, carpentry, dye-work, leatherwork, medical practice, watch making, shipwrighting, 
seamanship, and rifle production.58  Therefore, initially aiming to recall the Gannen-
mono from Hawaii, the Japanese government came to support their objectives so that they 
would eventually contribute to national development once they returned to Japan.59   
Largely due to the efforts of the U.S. Minister to Japan Charles E. De Long, the 
Kingdom of Hawaii and the Empire of Japan signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce 
(日布修好通商条約 nichibei shūkō tsūshō jōyaku) on August 19, 187160, which 
officially allowed Japanese labor emigration to Hawaii.  According to the Article V of the 
Treaty, “The Japanese Government will place no restrictions whatever upon the 
employment by Hawaiian subjects of Japanese in any lawful capacity.  Japanese in the 
employ of foreigners may obtain Government passports to go abroad, on application to 
the Governor of any open port.”61  Nevertheless, virtually no labor emigration took place 
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until 1885 because the Meiji government remained conservative toward sending out 
Japanese subjects overseas.  The government not only required the Hawaiian employers 
to defray the passages of emigrants but also limited a period of labor contract to one year 
in October 1872 following the Maria Luz Incident that took place in July.  By reducing 
the contract period from three years to one year, the Japanese government sought to 
protect its subjects from the slavery-like treatment in the plantations in Hawaii.  Then, the 
Hawaiian employers concluded that it would be unprofitable to bring in Japanese laborers 
at their expenses for one-year-period of labor.62 
The Japanese scholars of immigration agree that the Maria Luz Incident played a 
significant role in putting a brake on the Japanese immigration to Hawaii.  To summarize 
the remarkable event, in July 1872 the diplomatic incident took place between Japan and 
Peru over the Peruvian cargo ship Maria Luz, carrying more than two hundred Chinese 
coolies (苦力) who were destined for eight-year labor contract, that arrived at the Port of 
Yokohama for repairing storm damage.63  Escaping from Maria Luz, a coolie complained 
how they were taken against their will and inhumanely treated, and asked for the 
protection of the rest of coolies on the cargo ship.64  Then, the acting British consul 
Robert Grant Watson personally inspected the cargo and found out the first escapee’s 
queue having been cut off, which demonstrated the actual abuse against coolies had taken 
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place.65  According to the letter to the Japanese government on August 3, 1870, Watson 
asserted that Maria Luz was “engaged in the transport of coolies from the coast of China 
to Peru.”  Watson strongly urged the Japanese government to interrogate the Peruvian 
Captain.66  
Supported by the United Kingdom and the United States that had already 
abolished the institution of slavery, the Japanese government decided to take a legal 
action against Peruvian Captain Ricardo Heriera and the company that owned Maria 
Luz.67  Governor of Kanagawa, Ōe Taku prosecuted the case.  First, Ōe prohibited Maria 
Luz from leaving port of Yokohama, released 231 coolies from the cargo ship, and sent 
them back to China on September 13, 1872.68  Then, Ōe tried Captain Heriera and found 
him guilty; however, he decided not to punish Captain Heriera.69  Ōe’s decision, based on 
humanitarianism, was internationally praised by the powerful nations of the West.   
In response to the Japanese government taking a firm stand, the Peruvian 
government censured the human traffic in Japan and protested that Japan’s action was 
unjust and unacceptable in June 1873.70  Consequently, the Maria Luz Incident developed 
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into an international problem.  The Japanese government, seeking to demonstrate its 
jurisdiction internationally, could not afford to lose the case.  In 1873, as recommended 
by the U.S. Minister C. E. De Long, Japan and Peru determined to appoint the Russian 
tsar Alexander II to be an arbitrator.  In order to follow the case that would be conducted 
in English, Ōe sought to hire Hikozō as his interpreter because he did not have a good 
command of English.71  On June 13, 1875, the Russian tsar judged in favor of Japan 
based on humanitarian grounds.72 
The Meiji Japan then was trying to promote the national prestige and eventually 
to equalize with the West by repealing unequal treaties.  Challenging the 
extraterritoriality provisions of the unequal treaties, Japan obtained the diplomatic victory 
over the Maria Luz Incident.  This historically significant incident contributed not only to 
decrease the coolie trade but also to emancipate prostitutes in Japan in October 2, 1872 
through the proclamation of Dajōkan Fukoku dai 295-gō (政官布告第 295号, Meiji 
Council of State’s Ordinance No. 295).73  It not only emancipated bonded persons but 
also prohibited buying and selling human beings for any kind of service.74  Promulgated 
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two months after the closure of the case, the S ōgi Kaihō Rei (娼妓解放令, Ordinance 
Liberating Prostitute) was more often known as Gyūba Kirihodoki Rei (牛馬きりほどき
令, Cattle Release Act) because “it characterized the plight of these womn as akin to 
farm animals being expected to pay off debts.”75  In order to upgrade the national prestige, 
the Meiji leaders could not afford to let the imperial subjects be treated like Chin se 
coolies or African slaves.76  Unfortunately, the Ordinance Liberating Prostitutes was not 
promulgated on humanitarian grounds; therefore, it brought about no social changes to 
prostitutes after all.  Emancipating prostitutes on the pretext that Japan was  civilized 
nation, the government did not have a concrete policy to protect ex-prostitutes.  In fact,
many of them, having no families to depend upon, went back to prostitution businesses, 
this time with a license issued by the government, for sustaining their own lives.77   
The Japanese government demonstrated its adoption of international laws through 
the rescue of the Gannen-mono in Hawaii and the Chinese coolies on the Peruvian cargo 
ship, as Edstrom pointed out in Turning Points in Japanese History.78  Having 
jurisdiction over a non-treaty nation’s subject, the Maria Luz Incident helped Japan to 
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“achieve a respected place in the Western state system.”  Nevertheless, distre sed by 
solving the problems for the overseas Japanese, the Meiji government further res ricted 
the Japanese emigration to Hawaii.  Simultaneously, the Meiji leaders considered it was 
simply undesirable for modernizing Japan to waste time and energy to deal with issues 
like the treatment of overseas Japanese emigrants.  They feared that the lowly emigrants 
would ruin Japan’s rising national reputation and place obstacles on Japan’s road to a 
world power.  The government aimed to divert the interests of the shizoku (former 
samurai class) and the impoverished Japanese population from the emigration to Hawaii 
to the colonization of Hokkaido.79   
In July 1869, the Meiji government established the Kaitakushi (開拓使, 
“Colonization Board”) in order to alleviate the overpopulation and the massive 
unemployment problems, especially the displaced shizoku80 who belonged to clans that 
fought for the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin Civil War (January 1868–May 
1869).  Siding with the Shogunate, shizoku had to live in poverty because the Meiji 
government confiscated most of their lands and properties.  In fact, there were four 
uprisings by the discontented shizoku between 1873 and 1878, especially after the Taitō 
Kinshi Rei (帯刀禁止令, “Prohibition of Carrying a Sword”) in March 1876 that 
prohibited the shizoku to carry swords with them, which was the symbol of the samurai 
privilege.81  Significantly, prefectures such as Saga, Kumamoto, Fukuoka, and 
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Yamaguchi where the uprisings took place appeared to be the prefectures that sent ou the 
most immigrants.  The Meiji government launched a program called shizoku jusan (士族
授産, the government aid to samurai) for the first twenty years of Meiji that aimed to 
“rehabilitate” shizoku into new society by providing them employment and helping them 
setting up their own business.  This program also sought to promote the fukoku kyōhei 
policy by turning shizoku into a labor force.  Therefore, shizoku jusan succeeded in 
stimulating the nation’s economic development; however, it did not save them from 
financial difficulties.82   
The Dajōkan Nisshi (Gazette of the Council of States) announced as early as July 
23, 1869 that the Meiji government began to accept applications for the emigration to 
Hokkaido (北海道).83  By August of the year, 1,362 shizoku households applied for the 
emigration for reestablishing themselves in the undeveloped northern island.84  However, 
the emigration was not always voluntary conducted.  In fact, the Meiji government 
coerced many shizoku in the Tohoku region where the Tokugawa loyalists concentrated 
to colonize Hokkaido.85  Enomoto Takeaki, a former samurai of the Tokugawa clan who 
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led the last Tokugawa resistance to the Imperial Forces during the Boshin Civil War and 
learned English from Nakahama Manjirō, was the first advocate of the reclamation of 
Hokkaido (also known as Ezochi).  Concerned about the people of the Tokugawa clan 
after the reduction of its immense property, Enomoto suggested that through the 
utilization of the extensive land of Hokkaido, the Tokugawa clan could be sustained 
without causing a financial burden on the new government.86  Sponsored by the Meiji 
government, the Kaitakushi actively promoted the reclamation and colonization of 
Hokkaido where virtually only native Ainu people lived.87  Moreover, after the Satsuma 
Rebellion of 1877,88 the government further concentrated on the colonization venture by 
annually subsidizing ¥500,000.  Since the samurai had the privilege to borrow money 
from the government, nearly two thousand samurai families emigrated to Hokkaido.89  In 
the process of colonization of Hokkaido, the emigrants from mainland Japan continued to 
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take extensive reclaimed lands of the Ainu by force for facilitating the nation’s economic 
growth.90 
The colonization of Hokkaido became a model for Japan’s colonial expansionism 
called kaigai hatten (海外発展, literary “overseas development”).  In consequence of the 
influx of Japanese emigrants and numbers of death from disease and starvation, the native 
Ainu population in Hokkaido constantly decreased.  According to Louise Young’s 
Japan’s Total Empire (1998), the Ainu comprised 95 percent of Hokkaido’s total 
population in 1837.  That declined to 22 percent in 1897.91  Especially, before the 
legalization of labor migration in 1884, the Meiji government had continued to 
recommend the emigration to Hokkaido rather than overseas emigration for solving the 
domestic problems and fostering its economy development.  As Barbara Rose points out, 
the government also aimed to facilitate the rapid assimilation of the Ainu into the 
Japanese population by restraining their language and culture and by forcing them to 
speak Japanese.  Due to the assimilation policy, considerable numbers of Ainu began to 
wear Japanese clothes, speak Japanese, and volunteered to serve in the war by the e rly 
1895.92  Simultaneously, the government encouraged the development of modern/western 
farming methods, roads, railroads, and abundant natural resources available in Hokkaido 
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including timber, mineral, coal, and fishing.93  As a result, exploited by emigrants from 
mainland Japan, the Ainu lost their land and were reduced to poverty.94  Comparing the 
Dawes Act of 1887 and the Hokkaido Former Aborigine Protection Act of 1899, Tomita 
Torao suggests in his article (1989) that what white Americans had done to the Native 
Americans was nearly identical to what the mainland Japanese had done to the Ainu 
people regarding the policy of forced assimilation and unfair land distribution.95   
Considering a series of policies in the Meiji period, the government was heavily 
involved in the management of the colonization venture.  For example, in order to 
stimulate the colonization of Hokkaido, the Kaitakushi gave subsidies for emigrants.  
Young illustrates that “Hokkaido became the first venture for the use of emigration as a 
tool of expansion.”96  Additionally, the former Tokugawa loyalist and Meiji statesman, 
Enomoto Takeaki consistently promoted the development of Hokkaido through diverting 
the excess labor forces in mainland Japan.97 
 
Conscription and Draft Evasion 
While the Meiji government struggled to obtain international recognition of 
Japan’s leadership in Asia, a great number of the Japanese people constantly desired to 
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emigrate for many reasons.  Besides socioeconomic causes, the Conscription Law of 
1873 became another major catalyst for promoting the massive overseas emigration, 
particularly among the young males who sought to evade the draft.  Promulgated on 
January 10, the Law required all Japanese males at age twenty and over and at le st five-
feet tall to serve three years in the regular army and four years in the reserves in order to 
build a modern Japanese military.98  In addition to the heads of family, heirs, adopted 
sons, or convicts, those who were physically unfit, handicapped people, government 
employees, cadets, university students, medical students, and students studying overseas 
were exempt from the draft.99  In some cases, men intentionally committed a crime or 
married into the family of his bride in order to avoid the enlistment.100 
Moreover, the wealthy families could buy exemptions for their sons by paying 
¥270 as daininryō (代人料, literary “substitute fee”) to hire someone else in exchange of 
their sons’ three years of service.101  This system of exemption called daininsei (代人制, 
“substitute system”) left the enlistment duty for the lower classes, mostly second or third 
sons of farmers.  The government, seeking to raise funds for modernizing its military, 
allowed the exemption in exchange of money.  In those days, some young males 
extremely feared conscription because it was figuratively called ketsuzei (血税, “blood-
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tax”) in the Imperial Rescript on Conscription issued on November 28, 1872.102  
Borrowing the translation of the Imperial Rescript done by Yasuma Tanaka and Gotarō 
Ogawa in Conscription System in Japan (1921): 
Everything in the universe has its tax to pay.  The tax a people have to pay is for the 
national use.  A people must then serve their country with a whole heart.  The “blood-tax,” 
so-called among the Western peoples, means their living blood offered to their country.  
When a country is threatened with dangers, her people must of course suffer from them.  
Whole hearted service to one’s own country is therefore the basis of preventing 
calamity…103 
 
Although the government did not mean to collect their living blood, some men 
misinterpreted that their blood would be sold to foreigners, be used to dye military caps 
and blankets, or be used to produce red wine.104  Therefore, they presumed that they 
would not be able to return alive once drafted into the military.  Such misunderstanding 
resulted in numbers of riots against the conscription called ketsuzei ikki (血税一揆, 
literary “blood tax” riots).  Mainly led by the peasantry as early as March 1873, there 
were nineteen ketsuzei ikki, and all riots except two took place in western Japan just in 
1873.  The riots in Hōjō-ken (May 26–June 2), Tottori-ken (June 19–23), and Sanuki 
(June 27–July 6) were the three most devastating riots ever took place in the history of 
Japan.105  Furthermore, the misinterpretation of ketsuzei caused a tragedy in Hyogo 
prefecture in 1876.  A son of a merchant named Umekichi, his wife, and his mother 
                                                
 102 “Chōheirei no Shosho” (Imperial Rescript on Conscription), in Yasumasa Nakayama, 
ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki, 519. 
 
 103 Yasuma Tanaka and Gotarō Ogawa, Conscription System in Japan (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1921), 4. 
 
 104 Taiheiyō Sensō Kenkyūkai, “Dainippon Teikoku” ga yoku wakaru hon: 20 pointo de 
rikai suru Meiji Ishin kara Taiheiyō Sensō made (A Book for Understanding the Imperial Japan: 
20 points to understand from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 
2006), 223. 
 
105 “ketsuzei ikki,” Nihon Daihyakka Zensho (Encyclopedia Nipponica), 1998. CD format. 
 
 102
committed suicide by hanging themselves when Umekichi received the draft notice.  His 
mother and wife tried to persuade his father to buy an exemption for Umekichi; however, 
he did not allow it.  In his desire, Umekichi prefer death rather than having hard time 
during the military service, and his wife and mother determined to die with him.106  In 
1877, those who escaped and intentionally injured themselves numbered 30,977, 
according to the annual report of the Japanese Department of War.107  These cases 
demonstrated the psychological impact of the conscription on the young males.   
In response to a growing number of draft dodgers, the government revised the 
Conscription Law in 1879, 1883, and 1889 that imposed restrictions on the draft 
exemption.   Meanwhile, the revision in 1879 extended a temporary exemption from the 
military service to university students and those who lived overseas.108  Therefore, the 
young draft dodgers hoped to stay abroad until they turned thirty-seven years old when 
they became no longer a subject of conscription.  As Moriyama pointed out, greater 
numbers of the heads of families and first sons left for Hawaii as dekasegi laborers and 
let second sons be the heirs in order to save them from the conscription.  In this way, a 
family could save two sons cleverly.109  There were approximately 320,000 males subject 
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to enlistment; however, about 287,000 of them skillfully evaded the conscription in 
1879.110  Secretary Fujita Yoshiro (藤田好郎) in the Japanese consulate in San Francisco 
reported that “there were about 4,000 Japanese residing in the Pacific Coastal regions in 
the 1880s, and most of them appeared to be draft dodgers who engaged in domestic work 
and went to school in the daytime.”111  It indicated that in the 1880s, most Japanese in the 
West Coast were dekasegi-shosei (student laborers).  
In order to increase the enlistment, the government restricted the number of 
exemptions including daininsei in 1883.  Then, the revision of 1889 deprived all 
exemptions from conscription except for very limited numbers of temporary exemption.  
Thereafter, only the disabled people became exempted from enlistment.112  If a person 
who was subject to conscription dodged the draft unlawfully, one could be sentenced to 
less than a year of imprisonment, fined at least three yen, and drafted without 
exception.113  Nevertheless, the young men strived to evade the conscription by 
pretending to be the disabled people or transferring their domiciles to either Hokkaido or 
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Okinawa, in which the Conscription Law was not effective until 1896 and 1898 
respectively.114  Seeking to utilize the young men in Hokkaido and Okinawa for the 
development of the regions, the Japanese government did not coerced conscription until 
much later.  Meanwhile, traditional Japanese considered that going to an unknown land 
was more frightening than engaging in a combat in the enemy’s land.  Not knowing about 
the United States, they imagined “giants and cannibalistic tribes inhabited ther .”115  In 
general, the conservative Japanese tended to remain in Japan whereas the young 
enthusiastic Japanese including some yakuza sought overseas emigration to get rich in a 
short period.  
Analyzing the dates and locations of the submission of applications for the 
temporary exemption, Kodama tried to examines relations between the immigration and 
the draft evasion.  As Kodama argued, the Article 21 of the revision of Conscription Law 
in 1889 allowed those who studying abroad to be temporary exempt from enlistment up 
to twenty-six years old and maximum for seven years if they filed an applic tion for 
temporary exemption.116  Stretching the meaning of the Article 21, the Japanese emigrant 
laborers began to apply for temporary exemption from enlistment.  Taking three most 
immigrant producing prefectures of Hiroshima Fukuoka, and Yamaguchi as exampls, 
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the number of applicants for the temporary exemption continued to grow, especially after 
the First Sino-Japanese War as shown in Table 3.2. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Extension of Temporary Exemption from Conscription in  
Hiroshima, Fukuoka, and Yamaguchi Prefectures, 1898–1912 
 
Year 
Hiroshima Fukuoka Yamaguchi 
Number Index (%) Number Index (%) Number Index (%) 
1898 3,062 100.0 2,267 100.0 1,768 100.0 
1900 4,126 134.7 2,858 126.1 2,846 160.9 
1902 4,279 139.7 3,227 142.3 3,099 175.3 
1904 5,706 186.3 3,538 156.1 4,251 240.4 
1906 7,306 238.6 4,239 187.0 5,041 285.1 
1908 8,624 281.6 5,104 225.1 5,570 315.0 
1910 9,868 322.3 5,393 237.9 6,063 342.9 
1912 10,047 328.1 5,538 244.3 6,026 340.8 
 
Source: Masaaki Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (An Introduction to the History of 




The applicants reached its peak in 1911 numbering more than three times as many 
as the figures recorded in 1898.117  According to Kodama, the impoverished counties in 
Hiroshima such as Age, Saeki, and Asa, tended to record higher numbers of the extension 
of temporary exemption.  These three counties indeed had the largest numbers of 
residents living abroad.118  While the upper class Japanese began to feel a sense of duty 
toward the conscription by the turn of the century, the sons of the lower-class families 
who suffered family deficit felt less sense of duty to the conscription duty, and thus they 
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were attracted to America where they could earn significantly higher wages.  For the 
rural families, the remittance and savings of the emigrants were essential for sustaining 
their lives as well as paying off their debt.  According to Takao Kitamura who studied the 
motivation, working conditions, and marriage and family problems of the Japanese Iss i 
immigrants, Ōta Kyūgo from Fukuoka prefecture was one of those who left the country 
for evading conscription.  In 1916, after taking the physical exam for conscription, Ōta 
left Japan for Hawaii and worked for one dollar a day in the sugar plantation in Maui 
where his parents had already worked.  In the post-World War I period, sugar plantation 
laborers earned as much as five to six dollars a day.119   
Nevertheless, not all young Japanese left Japan for merely dodging draft.  Some 
left Japan in hope of contributing to the enrichment of the country, particularly after the 
Sangoku Kanshō (三国干渉, Tripartite Intervention—Russia, France, and Germany 
forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula in China which Japan gained according to 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the First Sino-Japanese War.)120  Significantly, the 
returning of the Liaodong Peninsula by coercion was a great humiliation and disgrace for 
Japan, and the Tripartite Intervention resulted in stimulating the sense of duty and 
nationalism among the Japanese people.  It was the burgeoning racial conscious ess and 
nationalism installed from above that mobilized the Japanese toward the accelerated 
process of ukoku kyōhei and to be the itto-koku.  In response to the Tripartite 
Intervention, Terao Tōru (寺尾亨, 1859–1925), an intellectual, doctor of law,  and 
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advocate of pan-Asianism, described that “current world is the racial contest.”121  
Ironically, so-called pan-Asianism that advocated the liberation of Asia from the Western 
colonial rules unfortunately became propaganda to justify the Japan’s territorial 
expansion in Asia. 
 
Labor Demand on Sugar Plantations in Hawaii 
Meanwhile, in Hawaii the production of sugar boosted the Hawaiian economy 
toward the end of the nineteenth century.  According to the report of the U.S. Bureau of 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce in 1917, Hawaii produced 722 tons of sugar in 1860 
and increased to 13,000 tons in 1876, a 1,800 percent increase.122  Therefore, the 
Hawaiian government was desperate to secure labor by any means.  The signing of the 
Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States th  
removed duties on sugar further stimulated the sugar industry in Hawaii.123  The 
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production of sugar continued to increase and reached 31,792 tons in 1880.124  Table 3.3 
illustrates how the production of sugar in Hawaii increased after the Reciprocity Treaty.  
The Treaty guaranteed a duty-free market for the Hawaiian sugar, and the Uni ed States 
gained special economic privileges in Hawaii.   
 
 
Table 3.3: Production of Sugar in Hawaii, 1860–1885 
 
Year 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 
Ton 572 7,659 9,392 12,540 31,792 85,695 
Growth Rate Index 100.0 1339.0 1642.0 2192.3 5558.4 149816.4 
 
Source: Based on Shichiro Watanabe, Hawai Rekishi (History of Hawaii) (Tokyo: Otani Kyōzai 




In order to attract emigrants to Hawaii following the booming of the sugar 
industry, the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom allocated the enormous funds for 
recruiting laborers from all over the world, including the United States, China, Portugal, 
Norway, Germany, Italy, India, Malaysia, and Australia.  Accordingly, the Legislature 
decided to spend $100,000 from 1880 to 1882; $500,000 from 1882 to 1884; and 
$390,000 from 1884 to 1886 for encouraging the labor migration.125   
Owing to the Legislature’s eager attempt to recruit laborers, a considerable 
number of Chinese began to enter Hawaii in the initial stage.  As early as 1852, a small 
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group of Chinese laborers arrived in Hawaii.126  The number of Chinese in Hawaii grew 
from 1,200 in 1866 to 2,000 in 1872, and reached as many as 18,000 by 1884, which 
comprised over 20 percent of the entire Hawaiian population.127  Although these Chinese 
were great labor force due to their diligence and higher availability at lower wages, they 
were not always considered beneficial to the Hawaiian industries.128  For example, they 
brought diseases such as smallpox, leprosy, and introduced the smoking of opium into 
Hawaii.129  Particularly, the habit of smoking opium provoked strong antipathy among 
the Hawaiian people toward the Chinese immigrants.  In addition, as soon as their 
contracts ended, they tended to move to cities and set up businesses.  Furthermore, the 
Hawaiian complained that the Chinese immigrants, forming ethnic community, tended 
not to assimilate into the local population.130  Therefore, the Hawaiians viewed the 
Chinese laborers posing a threat to the native population in social and economic terms.131  
These facts inevitably led to a rise of anti-Chinese sentiment in Hawaii and eve tually 
prohibited the entry of the Chinese without passports into Hawaii after 1886.132  
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Therefore, the Hawaiian government, aiming to replace Chinese laborers, was desperate 
to attract cheap and decent laborers to operate the vast sugar plantations—the core of 
Hawaiian economy.   
The recruitment of the Japanese laborers appeared to be the best solution for the 
problems that Hawaii had encountered; a shortage of labor and sharp decrease in native 
population.  In fact, there were some decisive reasons for the Hawaiian government to 
favor the Japanese laborers, according to Kodama’s study.  First, it became quite difficult 
for the Hawaiian government to recruit laborers from China largely due to a strng anti-
Chinese sentiment and partly due to the U.S. enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882.  In 1886, the Hawaiian Cabinet enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act in order to stop 
the influx of Chinese via the United States, which shut off the planters’ access to Chinese 
laborers.  Second, the Hawaiian government could not afford to recruit more laborers 
from Portugal.  The Hawaiian society favored Portuguese laborers; however, it cost too 
much to bring Portuguese laborers accompanied by their families.  Third, the government 
had to give up recruiting laborers from Polynesia because of the strong objections from 
Britain, France, and Germany.  Fourth, the government failed to bring laborers frm India 
due to the British colonial regulations and from Indonesia due to the Dutch objection.133   
Judging from these limitations, the recruitment of Japanese laborers seemed the 
only option available for the Hawaiian government to meet the rapidly growing labor 
demands on sugar plantations.  In fact, Japan then was the only country in Asia that was 
not under the colonial rule.  Moreover, bringing laborers from Japan was much cheaper, 
and they would work honestly for lower wages.  Furthermore, the Hawaiian employers, 
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based on their observation of the Gannen-mono, believed that the Japanese would be 
easily assimilated into the Hawaiian population.134  In addition, “after years of struggling 
against strikes and other turbulent factions among the Chinese,” the employers desired to 
replace the Chinese plantation laborers with the Japanese with relatively low wages.135   
 In 1881, the Hawaiian King David Kalakaua (b. 1838–1891, r. 1874–1891) and 
his entourage arrived in Tokyo on March 4 during a tour around the world, and entreated 
Emperor Meiji to send immigrants to Hawaii in order to relieve the shortage of laborers 
on the sugar plantations.  King Kalakaua even offered his niece, Princess Kaiulani (1875–
1899) to be a fiancée of a Japan’s Prince Higashifushimi Yoshihito (東伏見宮依仁親王, 
1867–1922) for the formation of a royal alliance between the Hawaiian Kingdom and 
Japan.136  The following year, the Hawaiian government dispatched John Makini Kapena 
(1842–1884) as special envoy to Japan to ask the Japanese government permission to 
carry out the large-scale Japanese labor emigration to Hawaii.137  The Hawaiian 
government appointed Kapena because he had been a member of the King’s Cabinet as 
well as a great governor of Maui.  Arriving in Tokyo, Kapena made a speech at a dinner 
for promoting the closer relationship between the Hawaiian Kingdom and Japan: 
“His Majesty [Kalakaua] believes that the Japanese and Hawaiians spring from one 
cognate race and this enhances his love for you.  He hopes that our people will more and 
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more be brought closer together in a common brotherhood.  Hawaii holds out her loving 
hand and heart to Japan and desires that Your People may come and cast in their lots with 
ours and repeople our Island Home — with a race which is sent to us by His Imperial 
Majesty, Your government and people may blend with ours and produce a new and 
vigorous nation making our land the garden spot of the Eastern Pacific, as your beautiful 
and glorious county is of the Western.”138 
 
During his meeting with Inoue Kaoru, Kapena delivered terms and conditions for 
Japanese immigration offered by the Hawaiian government.  According to the 
ambassador, the government indicated that the Japanese migrants in Hawaii would be 
granted the status of citizen, be paid transportation costs, and have no restriction  when 
making a labor contract.139  It seemed quite reasonable, but the Japanese government 
declined the offer due to the previous troublesome experience of the issue of Gannen-
mono.   
Meanwhile in Japan, not only samurais, but also many farmers suffered heavy 
burdens in the post-Restoration era.  The transition from the feudal system to 
modernization resulted in the devastation of national finances and caused a crisis in the 
economy.  In order to reduce the internal financial pressure, the Meiji government 
launched the Land Tax Reform in 1873 that conceded the right of private land ownership 
for the first time and drastically changed the traditional land taxation system.140  Under 
the traditional system, farmers paid their taxes in the form of crops based on their actual 
crop yield.  However, according to the Land Tax Reform, taxpayers paid their taxes in 
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cash based on the cash value of their land.141  The Meiji government was able to secure 
steady tax revenue by obliging landowners to pay the tax fixed at 3 percent of their land 
value, instead of crop yield.  While the government successfully increased revenue for 
pursuing industrialization, the new radical tax system imposed a heavy burden on the 
rural population, particularly the rice-growing prefectures.   
In order to decrease the national debt and to establish a strong financial base, the 
government imposed higher land taxes for increasing regular tax revenues.  In 1875, 88.3 
percent of the revenue came from the land tax, 88.1 percent in 1876, and 83.9 percent in 
1877.142  Consequently, the heavy land taxation resulted in a large number of uprisings by 
the distressed peasantry against the government that included the Ise Bodo (伊勢暴動, 
Ise Riot) in 1876.143  Fearing further serious unrests, the government lowered the 3 
percent fixed land tax to 2.5 percent in January 1877.144  Furthermore, due to the last 
samurai uprising of Satsuma Rebellion (1877), the total amount of paper money issued in 
1881 amounted to over ¥150,000,000, while the national specie reserves were only 
¥7,000,000.  The overprinting of money caused serious inflation, and the price of rice 
doubled within five years between 1876 and 1881.145   
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 The Finance Minister, Matsukata Masayoshi (松方 正義, 1835–1924) introduced 
a financial policy in 1881 called “Matsukata Deflation” (1881–1884).146  Aiming at 
withdrawal of inconvertible notes and increase of revenue by imposing higher taxes, the 
“Matsukata Deflation” drastically dropped the price of rice in a short period.  By 1884, 
the decline had lowered the price of rice below the 1874 level, which undercut farmers’ 
ability to survive economically.  Subsequently, a series of peasant uprisings resulted.  
Due to the “Matsukata Deflation,” a great number of farmers lost their landsbecause they 
failed to pay their land taxes, and thus became unemployed or tenant farmers if possible.  
As a result, 40 percent of farmers became tenant farmers by 1892.147  Moreover, in the 
years between 1884 and 1886, 18.9 percent of the land in Hiroshima was sold.148  Selling 
their lands was the only way for them to pay their land taxes.  As the farmers continued 
to sell their lands, a class of large landowners emerged.  According to the report of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1888, 55 percent of farmers owned less than 
eight tan of land, and approximately 2,000,000 farming households owned less than five 
tan of land.  It was said that 70 percent of farmers in Hiroshima, 66 percent in Okayama, 
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and 61 percent in Yamaguchi were petty farmers in 1888.149  Meanwhile, in Yamaguchi 
prefecture, the price of one-koku of salt sharply dropped from ¥1.68 in 1880 to ¥0.91 in 
1884, and simultaneously the price of sake dropped from ¥17.13 to ¥14.21.150   
 A great number of businesses that had depended on governmental support folded 
subsequently.151  Between the years 1883 and 1890, more than 367,000 peasants lost their 
lands because they could not pay land taxes.152  In addition, mechanization of farming 
resulted in creating excess tenant farmers.  Most of the unemployed and the landless went 
to cities in search of jobs, but they had very slight chances of finding work because Japan 
at that time was still undergoing the process of industrialization.153  The rapid increase of 
impoverished population caused a number of serious social problems.  Suffering extreme 
poverty, some became beggars, and others committed burglary.154  In order to sustain a 
minimum standard of living, the poor faming households often sold their daughters to 
brothels.155  The Land Tax Reform of 1873 and other programs of industrialization 
displaced a great number of rural Japanese women who left “home for work almost s 
commonly as men, and this pattern became increasingly widespread as the Meiji 
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government accelerated modern capitalistic development.”156  Under the circumstances, 
overseas emigration attracted both displaced rural men and women who sought to pay off 
their family debts and hoped to establish themselves in Japan someday.  
 According to Japanese tradition and later by the Meiji Civil Code, the eldest son  
had rights to inherit their houses; however, second or third sons had to find their own 
ways to make a living.  Marrying into a family with only daughters, a practice of 
becoming muko-yōshi (婿養子, adopted son-in-law), was one of the options they had for 
establishing their own households.  If they were farmers, keeping the land was especially 
crucial.  Therefore, many second or third sons decided to emigrate to survive.  These 
farmers, having nothing to lose, were ready to take any kinds of job to survive.  They did 
not care whether it was in domestic or foreign lands so long as they could get jobs.  
Clearly, emigration seemed quite attractive to many rural Japanese.   
 In the devastating situation, before the plan for emigration to Hawaii putting in o 
effect, considerable numbers of rural Japanese determined to migrate to Hokkaido, 
especially after 1882.157  For instance, following a severe storm and flood damage in 
1884, 674 people from Yamaguchi prefectures migrated to Hokkaido in 1894, and 935 
people in 1895.158  Kumamoto prefecture also suffered from the natural disaster of 1884 
that caused 30 to 40 percent of a crop failure.159  Additionally, there were crop failures in 
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1897, 1902, 1905, and 1910 in Japan.160 
Witnessing the devastating aftermath of the “Matsukata Deflation” followed by a 
serious natural disaster, the Japanese government finally came to realize that emigration 
was an option that could facilitate the emergence from the post-restoration turbulent 
period.  In April 1884, Curtis P. Iaukea, who was King Kalakaua’s Grand Chamberlain, 
met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Inoue Kaoru, for further negotiations to 
send migrants to Hawaii.  The terms offered by Iaukea were: 
1. The Hawaiian government would pay for transportation costs of farm laborers, 
domestic servants, and their wives and children.  However, the Hawaiian 
government agent would decide who to migrate. 
2. It is not necessary for the migrants to sign contracts before their passage.  In 
addition, they would not have any obligation for signing contracts after arriving 
in Hawaii.  The government would set the wage of immigrants and guarantee 
jobs at that wage. 
3. The government would provide food and shelter for migrants until they could 
find jobs or make a living. 
4. In addition, if the migrants wished, the government would guarantee to find jobs 
for their wives.161   
 
Although Inoue was against concluding a treaty with Hawaii, he expressed no oppositin 
to the terms offered by the Hawaiian government.  Inoue envisioned that Japanese m ss 
emigration to Hawaii would stimulate the export of Japanese goods and become a surce 
of foreign exchange.162  Then, accompanied by Iaukea, Robert Walker Irwin (1844–
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1925)163 who was the Hawaii’s Consul General in Japan and a close friend of Inoue 
visited Hawaii and met two Gannen-mono sill residing in Hawaii, Miura Tōkichi (三浦 
藤吉) and Yoshida Katsuzaburō (吉田 勝三郎).  After listening to the experiences of 
Miura and Yoshida, Irwin returned to Japan with 15-year-old Ozawa Itoko (小沢イト子
) who was a daughter of a Gannen-mono named Ozawa Kintarō (小沢 金太郎) and the 
second Nisei (second-generation Japanese) born in Hawaii.164  Convinced by the 
Hawaiian government’s eagerness to obtain laborers with the help of Irwin (now 
appointed as Special Commissioner and Special Agent of the Hawaiian Bureau of 
Immigration), both governments of Japan and Hawaii finally reached an agreement on 
June 30, 1884.165 
 Indeed, the Meiji government determined to encourage emigration not only as a 
means of alleviating poverty and poor standard of living in rural areas by providing 
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employment but also as a way of securing foreign currency through remittances from 
Japanese in Hawaii that could be used for enriching and militarily strengthening the 
country.  Moreover, the government expected the returnees to bring back the expertis  of 
modern farming method as well as science and technology that could facilitate the 
modernization of the country.166  The government, finding emigration beneficial to 
Japan’s economic and technological development, finally allowed the labor migration to 
Hawaii.167   
 In consequence, soon after the governments of Japan and the Kingdom of Hawaii 
signed an agreement in 1884, the number of migrants to Hokkaido came to decline 
sharply.  The recruitment for emigration to Hawaii began in 1885.  The impoverished 
rural Japanese preferred the emigration to Hawaii because their passage wa paid by the 
employers in the name of the Hawaiian government, and they could earn much higher 
wages.   
 
Overpopulation Problem and Kaigai Hatten 
Significantly, after the 1890s the Meiji leaders began to view the Japanese 
overseas emigration within a context of Japan’s colonial expansion called k igai hatten 
“rather than in terms of family economics or personal opportunities.”168  Following the 
opening of Japan, the influx of Western ideas and values facilitated the development f 
“colonialist thought” among the Meiji intellectuals who were sympathizers of Malthusian 
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theory of population.169  They argued that in order to prevent the coming of the nation’s 
overpopulation problem as well as to facilitate Japanese “overseas development,” the 
Japanese should immigrate overseas.170  Represented in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s editorials in 
Jiji Shinpō (時事新報, “Current Events”), the Meiji intellectuals strongly advocated the 
imitation of the Western model of colonizing Asian countries.171  Stimulated by the 
theory that promoted modernization and imperialism such as “D tsua Nyūō,” the 
Japanese in the Meiji period began to have a prejudice against Asian countries.  Although 
initiated by the intellectuals, their biased view of Asia eventually spread to all classes of 
Japanese that would continue until the end of World War II.   
 Gaining popularity after the 1890s, this “colonialist thought” became basis for the 
establishment of the Shokumin Kyōkai (殖民協会, Colonization Society) by a former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and sympathizer of the shizoku, Enomoto Takeaki in 1893 
that promoted the Japanese labor emigration and settlement.172  Concerned about the 
growing population problem in rural Japan, Enomoto advocated the “overseas 
development of Japanese ‘colonies’ through emigration.”173  Furthermore, Enomoto 
argued that the emigration business would boost the shipping industry, promote export, 
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and stimulate industry and commerce.174   In fact, the second president of the Nippon 
Yusen Kaisha (日本郵船会社, Japan Mail Steamship Company), Yoshikawa Taijirō was 
a member of the Shokumin Kyōkai.175  As Kumei Teruko pointed out, by nationalizing the 
emigration venture, the Shokumin Kyōkai aimed to pursue the policy of fukoku kyōhei 
through the economic expansion and the reinforcement of military strength.176  
Consequently, “colonialist thought” and the development of shipping industry and 
overseas routes led to the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in August 1894 when 
Japan’s interest in Korea came into conflict with China’s interest.177  Within a few 
decades after the Meiji Restoration, adopting Western values and practices, Japan had 
drastically changed its nature in political, social, and economic arena as well as its 
cultural values.  Seeking to rise to be a world power, the Meiji government had 
constantly absorbed knowledge of Western weaponry and institutions; therefore, Japan 
was able to transform from a feudal society into a modern nation. 
 Simultaneously, the growing problems of overpopulation and unemployment, 
particularly after the First Sino-Japanese War, resulted in “pushing” numero s rural 
Japanese for overseas emigration.178  In fact, the overseas emigration played an important 
role in alleviating the government’s main concern with such socioeconomic problems 
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that tended to occur in the initial process of modernization.  The increase in agricultural 
output, industrialization, economic development, improvement in standards of living due 
to the higher income level and public health had contributed to the rapid population 
growth after the Meiji Restoration.179  In 1872, Japanese had a population of 34,800,000.  
It increased to 46,130,000 in 1904, and finally reached 50,000,000 in 1912.180  In 1936, in 
less than seventy years after the Meiji Restoration, the population of Japan had double, 
recording 69,250,000.   
 Notably, the population growth rate between 1872 and 1936 marked on average 1 
percent annually.181  Table 3.4 shows that the population growth rate marked 1.05 percent 
in 1884 when the Japanese government lifted a ban on overseas emigration.182  Therefore, 
it was no exaggeration to say that the Japanese concern on immigration had largely 
centered on the population problem, which “pushed” considerable numbers of Japanese 
to leave their country.183  
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Table 3.4: Population Estimates of Japan, 1872–1885 
 
Year 
Population (1,000) Population Increase (1,000) Population 





1872  34,806 17,666 17,140 – – – 
1873  34,985 17,755 17,230 179 174 0.51 
1874  35,154 17,835 17,319 169 167 0.48 
1875  35,316 17,913 17,403 162 245 0.46 
1876  35,555 18,030 17,525 239 323 0.68 
1877  35,870 18,187 17,683 315 304 0.89 
1878  36,166 18,327 17,839 296 307 0.83 
1879  36,464 18,472 17,992 298 196 0.82 
1880  36,649 18,559 18,090 185 326 0.51 
1881  36,965 18,712 18,253 316 304 0.86 
1882  37,259 18,854 18,405 294 320 0.80 
1883  37,569 19,006 18,563 310 409 0.83 
1884  37,962 19,199 18,763 393 360 1.05 
1885  38,313 19,368 18,945 351 241 0.92 
 
Source: Naikaku Tōkei-kyoku (Cabinet Statistical Bureau), Meiji Gonen iko Waga Kuni no Jinko 
(Japanese Population after 1872) (Tokyo: Tokyo Tōkei Kyōkai, 1930).  The table illustrates the 
estimated population at the beginning of the year, including the Japanese in Okinawa, Ogasawara, 
Chishima in addition to Japanese in forty-seven prefectures.  It also inc uded the soldiers and 




 The population of Japan has transformed throughout the significant historical 
events as the Figure 3.1 shows.  As an economic and demographic historian Kitō Hiroshi 
(2002) points out, due to the introduction of rice cultivation in the Yayoi Period (300 BC 
to 300 AD), the population had constantly increased and by the beginning of the Heian 
Period, it numbered ten times as many as the Yayoi Period.  Next, from the fifteenth 
century and up until the mid-eighteenth century, the population rapidly increased due to 
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the development of the market economy.  As a result, the population tripled in the first 
one hundred years of the Tokugawa Period.184  According to another economic and 
demographic historian Hayami Akira and Kitō’s study in 2002, “after 1600 the 
population of Japan increased by at least 2.6 times, if not 3.9 times over a 120-year 
period.”185   
On the other hand, as Kitō’s study (2000) points out, the population of Japan 
stagnated during the latter half of the Tokugawa Period.  The causes of the stagnation, 
according to Kitō, were famine, natural disaster, epidemic, late marriage, culling, and 
abortion.186  The number of famines, epidemics, and natural disaster marked as many as 
seventy times during the last 125 years of the Tokugawa Period.187  Meanwhile, a British 
economist Angus Maddison explained that the low fertility and the improvement in life 
expectancy caused the stagnation of population growth.188  Then, as clearly shown in the 
Figure 3.1, the Japanese population began to grow at a significant pace from the time of 
                                                
 184 Hiroshi Kitō, Kankyō Senshinkoku Edo (Environmentally Advanced Nation, Edo) 
(Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 2002).  
 
 185 Akira Hayami and Hiroshi Kitō, “The Population of Tokugawa Japan,” in Emergence 
of Economic Society in Japan, 1600–1859, eds. Akira Hayami, Osamu Saito, and Ronald P. Toby 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 18. 
 
 186 Hiroshi Kitō, “Bakumatsu · Meiji Shoki no Jinko Seicho” (Population Growth of Late 
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 Following the Meiji Restoration, the government carried out a series of 
socioeconomic reforms for modernizing the nation that shifted the center of economy 
from agricultural sector to industrial sector.  Under the policy called shokusan kōgyō (殖
産興業, literary “increase production and promote industry) along with fukoku kyōhei, 
the Meiji government promoted industry, increase in production, and the development of 
capitalist institution for Japan’s modernization against the Western imperialists.191  
Especially, the Land Tax Reform of 1873 produced a great number of displaced farmers 
in western Japan.  Therefore, due to the influx of migrants from western Japan, eastern
Japan experienced a drastic population growth in the early Meiji period, particularly in 
the regions in which textile, sericulture (raising of silkworms for the production of raw 
silk), and silk industries flourished.  Women’s labor became crucial for the developm nt 
of the light industry in the late nineteenth century.192  Accounting for 60 to 90 percent of 
labor force in textile industry, Japanese women contributed to producing about 60 percent 
of foreign exchange in addition to 40 percent of the gross national product.193  According 
to Hōchi Shimbun on September 27, 1895, Japan’s revenue from the export of raw silk 
and silk goods amounted to ¥90,000,000.194  On the other hand, rice-growing regions in 
western Japan marked the lower population growth.  According to Hayami, seven out of 
                                                
191 Haruzō Tamagawa, Kindai Nihon no Nōsōn to Nōmin (Farm Villages and Farmers in 
Modern Japan) (Tokyo: Seiji Kōronsha, 1969), 164. 
 
192 The young Japanese women worked as construction laborers and coal miners, 
according to Yuji Ichioka, The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 
1885–1924 (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 47–48. 
 
193 Masanori Nakamura, Nihon no Rekishi 29: Rōdōsha to Nōmin (History of Japan, vol. 
29: Laborers and Farmers) (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 1977), 101. 
 
 194 “Kiito Kinu-Orimono: Yushutsu Kyusenman-yen” (Export of Law Silk and Silk 
Goods amounted to ¥90,000,000), Hōchi Shimbun (News) (Tokyo), September 27, 1895, in 
Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 9-kan, Nisshin Sensō, 300. 
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eight provinces that marked over 18 percent population increase between the years 1872 
and 1885 were “centers of sericulture” in eastern Japan.195   
 Japan’s industrialization in the late nineteenth century through the national policy 
of shokusan kōgyō resulted in demographic transition and the transfer of excess labor 
forces from the traditional [agricultural] sectors to the modern [industrial] sectors.  While 
eastern Japan could consume more labor forces in manufacturing industry, western Japan 
that showed strong association with agricultural production could not handle the excess 
labor forces.  It was the major reason why western Japan, southwestern Japan in 
particular, sent out more immigrants than eastern Japan during the Meiji period. 
 In order to facilitate the modernization of industry and governmental institutions, 
the Japanese government encouraged the hiring of foreign experts called oy toi 
gaikokujin (hired foreigners) during the Bakumatsu and Meiji periods.  The oyatoi 
gaikokujin, serving as teachers, managers, engineers, technical advisors, administrators, 
and skilled workers, contributed to establishing “an infrastructure similar to tha  in the 
West.”196  John Henry Schnell, a Prussian weapon broker, instructor, and the founder of 
the Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony, was an example of the yatoi gaikokujin who 
served for the Aizu-han to strengthen its troops during the Bakumatsu period towards the 
Boshin Civil War.   
 Working for the Japanese government and the prefectural governments, the oyatoi 
gaikokujin played leading roles in initiating new industries essential for accelerating the 
process of ukoku kyōhei such as cotton spinning, “railroad, telegraph, iron shipbuilding, 
                                                
 195 Akira Hayami, “Population Changes,” in The Japanese Economy in the Tokugawa 
Era, 1600–1868, ed. Michael Smitka (New York: Garland Publishing Company, 1998), 97–98. 
 
 196 Chūshichi Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 1825–1995 (Oxford: 
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armory, mint and coalmining.”197  In order to secure the centralization of administrative 
power, the Japanese government promulgated the Dajōkan Fukoku dai 22-gō (Meiji 
Council of State’s Ordinance No. 22) in August 1868, requiring the prefectural 
governments to get permission from the Foreign Office for the employment of the oyatoi 
gaikokujin.198  The newly established government feared certain prefectures might 
become too powerful to keep them under its control.  According to the Shimbun Zasshi, 
there were 214 oyatoi gaikokujin hired by the government in April 1872, including:199  
 British 119 India 2 
 French 50 Dutch 2 
 American 16 Italian 1 
 Chinese 9 Portuguese  1 
 Prussian 8 Danish 1 
 Malayan 4 
 
In general, the Asian oyatoi gaikokujin received lower wages than the Western oyatoi 
gaikokujin.  At its peak in 1875, the oyatoi gaikokujin employed by the Japanese 
government numbered as many as 527.200   
 The oyatoi gaikokujin played a crucial role in the modernization of political and 
economic institutions, industry, and art of Japan.  Therefore, they received consierably 
higher salaries compared with that of ordinary Japanese people.  While the oya oi 
gaikokujin earned minimum ¥100 to ¥300 per month, a Japanese commoner earned 
                                                
 197 Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 70; Uchida, “Chapter 3: Adoption of 
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 198 Hazel J. Jones, “The Formulation of the Meiji Government Policy Toward the 
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 200 G. C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 4th ed. (London: 
MacMillan, 1981), 34. 
 
 129
around ten yen on average in those days.201  One of the most renowned oyatoi gaikokujin, 
Guido Herman Fridolin Verbeck (1830–1898) who was a Dutch missionary and a 
principal of the Daigaku Nankō (大学南校, precursor of the Tokyo University) received 
a monthly salary of ¥600.202  The government spent indeed one-third of annual 
expenditure for hiring foreign experts.203  For instance, in 1872 alone the Japanese 
government paid the total $534,493 to the oyatoi gaikokujin.204  In short, the Meiji Japan 
could carry out the rapid industrialization because the government actively hired a g at 
number of highly paid oyatoi gaikokujin who facilitated the transfer of advanced 
technology to Japan.  When the private enterprises such as Mitsubishi began to hire the 
oyatoi gaikokujin, the process of industrialization further accelerated contributing to 
achieve fukoku kyōhei.  Meanwhile, the government sought to replace the expensive 
oyatoi gaikokujin with the Japanese staff once they learned enough knowledge of 
advanced techniques essential for the nation’s rapid modernization.  Rather than spendi g 
enormous sum of foreign currency for the payment of oyatoi gaikokujin, the government 
                                                
 201 In the early Meiji period, the conversion of dollar to yen was one dollar equaled to one 
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sought to invest more on the development of national ventures.  Therefore, in the early 
Meiji period, numbers of government-sponsored students who came from good families 
went to Europe or the United States (East Coast) to learn Western science and 
technology.  Between 1868 and 1871, 350 students went overseas; about 150 of them 
were funded by the governmental agencies; nearly 120 of them were funded by the 
domains; and the rest of them went at their own expense.205  The Meiji intellectuals who 
had studied abroad came to play an important role in backing up the government’s 
ultimate goal by publishing guidebooks to go to America.  These influential and 
enlightening publications effectively encouraged the young nationalist shizoku who had a 
strong interest in learning to study abroad while working.     
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
 In the first and second years of Meiji, some groups of Japanese left Japan—the 
Gannen-mono for contract labor, and the Wakamatsu Colony for establishing an 
agricultural colony of “political refugees” from Aizu.206   Yet, no emigration ventures 
brought desirable result.  Then, the Japanese government attempted to divert the former 
Tokugawa supporters and excess labor forces into Hokkaido’s colonization venture.  In 
the early Meiji period, a number of socioeconomic factors attributed to the beginning of 
Japanese overseas emigration.  In the process of modernization, the population of Japan 
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grew rapidly, and intellectuals of the time afraid of the coming of overpopulation 
problem enthusiastically called for the kaigai hatten.  In addition, the enactment of the 
Conscription Law of 1873 played a significant role in motivating the young Japanese for 
overseas emigration that exempted them from draft.   
 Meanwhile, the Meiji government spent tremendous money for hiring the oyatoi 
gaikokujin (foreign experts and engineers) for accelerating the modernization process t  
join the itto-koku.  Nevertheless, the salaries for the oyatoi gaikokujin became a heavy 
financial burden on the government, and the government determined to replace them by
raising domestic experts and engineers by sending them abroad for studying he Western 
expertise.  In order to maximize the effect, the Meiji leaders began to implant national 
consciousness through the creation of the emperor-centered states.  The Meiji 
government focused on the national policy of fukoku kyōhei in order to repeal the 
“unequal treaties” with the Western countries, and Japan’s victory over the Maria Luz 
Incident significantly improved its international status and reputation.   
On the other hand, the government, concerned about emigrants hurting the 
reputation of Japan, suspended the Japanese overseas emigration primarily to protect 
national prestige, not to protect emigrants.  However, as the Hawaiian Kingdom’s request 
for the Japanese emigration intensified as well as the “Matsukata Deflation” deteriorated 
the lives of the peasantry in rural areas, the Meiji government had no other choice but to 
allow overseas emigration in order to reduce the chance of uprising by the discontented 
shizoku and farmers.  The government was not strong enough to suppress all uprisings 
without negative impacts.  Therefore, the lifting a ban on overseas emigration, was 
indeed the government’s countermeasure against the social and political unrest within the 
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country.  At this point, the government played an important role in “pushing” the 











EARLY JAPANESE IMMIGRATION TO HAWAII 
 
 This chapter examines the early Japanese immigration to Hawaii and illustrates 
how the immigrant community has transformed from the one consisting of temporary 
laborers to the one consisting of permanent residents.  Japanese immigration to Hawaii is 
divided into four periods.  The initial period which the government was responsible for 
the conduct is called kanyaku imin jidai1 (官約移民時代, Government-Contracted 
Immigration Period 1885–1894).  The second period in which the Japanese government 
passed the immigration venture to the private companies is called shiyaku imin jidai2 (私
約移民時代, Self-Contracted Immigration Period 1894–1900).  The third period is called 
jiyū imin jidai 3 (自由移民時代, Free Immigration Period 1900–1907) in which the 
contract labor was prohibited due to the U.S. annexation of Hawaii.  During this period, 
many immigrants transmigrated to mainland United States.  The fourth period is called 
yobiyose imin jidai4  (呼び寄せ移民時代, Summoned Immigration Period 1908–1924) 
                                                
 1 “kan 官” means government; “yaku約” means contract;”imin 移民” means immigration 
or immigrants; and “jidai 時代” means period in Japanese. 
 
 2 “shi” means self or private and “yaku” means contract in Japanese. 
 
 3 “ jiyū” means free in Japanese. 
 
 4 “yobiyose” means to summon in Japanese. 
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in which the governments of the United States and Japan signed the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement that restricted Japanese labor immigration while allowing family unification.  
In less than forty years after the arrival of first group of kanyaku imin, approximately 43 
percent of Hawaii’s entire population was ethnic Japanese in 1920.5  This chapter also 
explores the intention of Japanese government for encouraging overseas emigration as 
well as sociocultural significance of the Japanese emigration to Hawaii and the United 
States. 
 
Kanyaku Imin Jidai (1885–1894) 
 In 1885, the Japanese government legalized emigration under the unavoidable 
state of affairs.  To summarize the major circumstances, the relationship between Japan 
and Hawaii had grown closer when Count Inoue Kaoru became Japan’s first Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Robert W. Irwin became Hawaii’s Consul General in Jpan.6  Then, 
as a demand for labor migration continued to increase, the governmental order of a peri d 
of labor contract to one year could no longer match the current conditions.  The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs came to consider the labor contract period could be extended as long 
as the rights and safety of Japanese laborers were guaranteed.7  Finally, the severe 
depression caused by the “Matsukata Deflation” produced a massive unemployment both 
in urban and rural areas of Japan.  Subsequently to the severe socioeconomic devastation, 
                                                
5 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population, 1970, vol. I, Characteristics of the 
Population (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pt. 13, Hawaii, table 17, pp. 
18–19. 
 
 6 Masaaki Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (An Introduction to the History of 
Japanese Immigration) (Hiroshima: Keisuisha, 1992), 9.  
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the jiyū minken undō (自由民権運動, “Freedom and People’s Rights Movement”) 
intensified in the late 1870s and the early 1880s.8  It was the first political and social 
movement by the Japanese that demanded democratic government in Japan.9 Initi lly led 
by the shizoku and soon developed into popular movement, it sought the establishment of 
the national assembly and the written constitution.  Especially, the shizoku in Tohoku 
region (former Tokugawa loyalists) felt suppressed after the Boshin Civil War because 
most of the important governmental positions had been taken by their enemy clans such 
as the former samurai of Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, and Hizen.10  Afraid of the growing 
glass-roots movement to be a possible threat to the authority of central government, the 
Meiji leaders seriously began to consider overseas emigration as an alternative option to 
suppress the movement.11  Although the Meiji leaders tended to hesitate sending the 
Japanese overseas, they came to conclude that nothing was more important than the 
establishment of strong centralized government for pursuing the fukoku kyōhei program. 
Appointed as the Special Commissioner and Special Agent of the Hawaiian 
                                                
8 Jiyū minken undo was initiated by Itagaki Taisuke in 1873 when the Meiji government 
was divided over the issue of military invasion of Korea.  While Itagaki Taisuke and Gotō Shōjirō 
(Tosa samurais) and Saigō Takamori (Satsuma) demanded military invasion of Korea in order to 
prevent the possible uprisings of shizoku, Okubo Toshimichi (Satsuma), Kido Takayoshi 
(Chōshū) and Iwakura Tomomi (court noble) opposed the invasion because they gave priorityto 
the establishment of the domestic politics.  Then, resigning from his post, Itagaki presented a 
petition to the government in 1874 that demanded the establishment of national assembly.     
 
 9 Kiichi Matsuoka, “Quickening of the People’s Rights Movement,” Journal of Atomi 
Gakuen Women’s College 28 (March 1995): 123–144. 
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Bureau of Immigration in 1884 due to his long business experience in Japan, Robert W. 
Irwin played a leading role in recruiting and sending the government-contrated l borers 
to Hawaii.  Eager to secure as many Japanese laborers as possible, the Hawaiian 
government allowed Irwin a commission of five dollars on each male emigrant brought 
into Hawaii.12  Thus, Irwin was able to make an enormous profit out of the semiofficial 
immigration business.  Initially, the number of people admitted to the contracted 
emigration was 600; however, there were over 28,000 applications that reflected terrible 
domestic situations at that time.13  It meant the competition to be a k nyaku imin was 
almost 50 to 1.  The flood of applicants caused Irwin to increase the number of emigrants 
to take to 945 people for the first passage.14  However, Irwin had no idea who to recruit 
for labor in Hawaii.  Therefore, Irwin decided to consult his friend Inoue Kaoru whom he 
had helped the establishment of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (三井物産会社, Mitsui 
Trading Company) in 1876. 
Being an advisor to the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha afterwards, Irwin had established a 
closer tie with Inoue.  Therefore, Irwin asked Inoue and Masuda Takashi (益田 孝, 1848–
1938, the first president of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha) from which prefectures to rcruit 
laborers.  Inoue and Masuda recommended laborers from Yamaguchi and Hiroshima 
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Present (New York: Facts on File, 1993), 179. 
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prefectures in southwest Japan since they considered people of Yamaguchi and 
Hiroshima with agricultural background “most suitable for emigration.”15  Partly due to 
Inoue himself coming from Yamaguchi prefecture and being aware of seriu  
socioeconomic problems there, about half of the first ship for Hawaii (420 people) was 
filled with people from Yamaguchi prefecture.16  They also recommended Hiroshima 
prefecture because the rural population there was suffering massive unemployment 
caused by the rapid industrialization.  According to Masuda’s knowledge, people from 
Hiroshima were believed to be moderate, based on the Hiroshima-han’s (feudal domain) 
Confucius scholars during the Tokugawa Shogunate.17  Evidently, the Mitsui Trading 
Company had actively participated in the initial phase of the immigration business.18 
The rapid industrialization and the development of right industry, producing 
excess labor forces in agricultural areas, “pushed” rural Japanese to emigrat  overseas for 
better opportunities.  Traditionally since the Tokugawa period, cotton was the most 
important cash crop in Hiroshima and the spinning of cotton yarn and the weaving of 
cotton cloth were important income sources for rural households.  For instance, 
Hiroshima produced 11.1 percent of all cotton commodities in 1877; however, the 
development of cotton industry in the cities deprived the rural population of their 
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supplementary income after 1883.19  In 1878, the Meiji government established two 
cotton-spinning mills—one in Aichi prefecture and the other in Hiroshima prefecture.  
These cotton-spinning mills, equipped with modern spinning machines imported from 
Manchester, stimulated the rapid growth of private cotton mills throughout the country.  
Subsequently, the Japan’s output of cotton products had continued to grow, and finally in 
1897 export of cotton products surpassed import levels.20  Although the cotton industry 
initially relied on the domestic raw cotton, it soon shifted to the foreign raw cotton as the 
industry developed.21  Moreover, the large spinning mills constructed near big cities with 
superior infrastructure for facilitating the cotton imports became the center of cotton 
industry.22  The Osaka Spinning Mill was the first successful modern factory as a result.  
In consequence of the growth of modern spinning mills and cotton imports, the area of 
cotton cultivation sharply decreased in Hiroshima between the years of 1879 and 1910.  
In 1879, Hiroshima cultivated 1,307,145 tan for cotton and marked 1,313,930 tan in 1882 
that shrunk to 907,847 tan in 1883.  Then, as clearly shown in Table 4.1, it further 
reduced to 57,821 tan in 1884, which meant the area of cotton cultivation was only 4.4 
percent of the 1879 figure.23 
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 20 Hiroshi Hazama, “Formation of the Management System in Meiji Japan: Personnel 
Management in Large Corporations,” The Developing Economies 15, no. 4 (December 1977): 
410. 
 
 21 Ibid., 410–411.  The large factories imported raw cotton from India, China, and the 
United States.  Initially, some factories were built in rural areas to recruit a large number of 
workers for large-scale operation. 
 
 22 Ibid., 411. 
 
23 1884 was the year when the Japanese government lifted a ban on overseas emigration 
after negotiations with the Kingdom of Hawaii that sought to bring Japanese laborers in numbers. 
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Table 4.1: Change in the Area of Cotton Cultivation in Hiroshima, 1879–1910 
 
Year Areas of Cultivation (tan*) Index (%) 
1879 1,307,145 100.0 
1884 57,821 4.4 
1889 51,264 3.9 
1894 30,524 2.3 
1899 18,743 1.4 
1904 10,175 0.8 
1910 1,548 0.1 
 
*1 tan equals to 0.2451 acres. 
 
Source: Hiroshima-ken Tōkeisho (Statistics of Hiroshima.), Agriculture, Cotton, 1879, 1884, 





 Under the circumstances, the first organized government-contracted immigrants 
called kanyaku imin left Nagaura (near Yokosuka) on January 28 and arrived at Honolulu 
on February 8, 1885.24  The City of Tokio transported a group of 945 people, including 
676 men, 159 women, and 110 children, accompanied by Irwin.25  Built by John Roach & 
Sons for the Pacific Mail Steamship Company in 1874, the City of Tokio and its sister 
ship City of Peking (5,000 tons each) were the largest iron steamships built in the United 
States when completed.26  These two innovative steamships drastically reduced the travel 
                                                
 24 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
hen, 359; Edward K. Strong, The Second Generation Japanese Problem (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1934), 37. The passengers were quarantined for a week to b vaccinated against 
smallpox that was prevalent in Kanto area. 
 
 25 Gaimushō Ryōji Ij ūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen, 128; Kaikoku 
Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen, 359–360. 
 
 26 Leonard Alexander Swann, John Roach, Maritime Entrepreneur (New York: Arno 




time across the Pacific from twenty-two days to sixteen days.27  Upon the arrival of the 
first kanyaku imin, Hawaiian King Kalakaua gave them a warm welcome.  Meanwhile 
Hawaiians welcomed them with hula dance.  In return for their warm reception, the 
Japanese emigrants performed sumō (相撲 Japanese wrestling), kendō (剣道 Japanese 
fencing), and buyō (舞踊 Japanese dancing).28   
 After landing at Honolulu, the Japanese emigrants were temporarily placed in an 
immigration detention center and then transported to various sugar plantations.  
Accustomed to the way of Japanese, Irwin advised the planters what to care for obtaining 
maximum efforts from the Japanese emigrants.29  Irwin described that Japanese would 
work overtime without a pay if the planters treated them kindly.  As long as the plant rs 
remained kind to them, no supervisor or luna (foremen) would be necessary.  If the 
planters showed their affection toward the children of the Japanese, they would be 
faithful to the planters.  Furthermore, Irwin recommended the planters to provide five 
gallons of hot water daily so that the emigrants could make themselves clean.30  Despite 
the friendly welcome, things went wrong in a short time because the planters neglected 
Irwin’s detailed advice on the treatment of Japanese.   
Contrary to the terms offered by Iaukea a year ago, the first group of the kanyaku 
                                                
England. 
 
 27 Michio Yamada, Fune ni Miru Nihonjin Iminshi: Kasato Maru kara Kurūzu Kyakusen 
e (History of Japanese Immigration through the ship: From Kasato Maru to Cruise Ship) (Tokyo: 
Chuo Kōronsha, 1998), 26. 
 
 28 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
hen, 360. 
 
 29 Irwin’s wife, Takechi Iki, was a retainer’s adopted daughter.  Iki was seventeen when 
she got married. 
 
 30 Gaimushō Ryōji Ij ūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen, 128–129. 
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imin was severely mistreated.  In fact, some kanyaku imin had no agricultural background 
and they were not suitable for labor in Hawaii from the outset.  In addition to the 
violation of contract by the planters, communication problems, and Hawaii’s intense heat 
attributed to the outbreak of small strikes in the plantations.  In 1885, Ōtsuki Kōnosuke 
(大槻 幸之助) and fifteen others went on strike in the Papaiko plantation in Hilo.  Some 
of the distressed kanyaku imin canceled their contract and returned home or others went 
Honolulu without a specific plan.31  Therefore, the first kanyaku imin gave the planters a 
lot of trouble.  In fact, some of the first kanyaku imin brought bad customs such as 
dirnking and gambling into Hawaii that brfore long came to affect the development of the 
Japanese immigrant community.32  Being rebellious due to the mistreatment, they came 
to neglect the Japanese governmental requirement of regular remittances and savings.33 
 Meanwhile in the Paia plantation on Maui, five kanyaku imin died after suffering 
from physical violence and disease in 1885.34  In response to the death of the Japanese 
laborers, Special Commissioner Inoue Katsunosuke (井上 勝之助, 1861–1929) who was 
the son of Inoue Kaoru left for Hawaii in June 1885 with the second group of 988 
kanyaku imin, including 930 men, thirty-four women, and fourteen children.35  Inoue 
                                                
 31 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
hen, 360–361. 
 
 32 Ibid., 361. 
 
33 Yukiko Kimura, Issei: Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1992), 6–7. 
 
 34 Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1953), 66–67; Odo and Shinoto, Zusetsu Hawai Nihonjinshi, 22. 
 
 35 Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo, ed., Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha Hyakunenshi (A 
Hundred-Year History of the Japan Mail Steamship Company) (Tokyo: Nihon Yūsen Kabushiki 
Kaisha, 1988), 70; Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu, 183. 
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sought to make an intensive investigation into the actual working environment in 
Hawaii’s sugar plantations.36  Then, based on his findings, Inoue demanded the Hawaiian 
officials to protect the Japanese who were working on the sugar plantations from future 
abuse.  His effort resulted in stimulating the conclusion of the Immigration Convention 
(布哇渡航條約, hawai tokō jōyaku) consisting of eleven articles between the 
governments of Japan and the Hawaiian Kingdom signed by Inoue Kaoru and Robert W. 
Irwin on January 28, 1886.37  
 The Immigration Convention had a great effect on motivating significant numbers 
of rural Japanese to leave their hometowns for Hawaii.  The convention limited boarding 
and entrance of immigrants to the ports of Yokohama and Honolulu only.38  According to 
the convention, the Hawaiian government guaranteed to treat the Japanese citizens fairly 
under three-year contracts with a salary of nine dollars a month for males and six dollars 
for female laborers.39  The provisions of the convention included that: 
All migrants were to be subject to the approval of the Kanagawa prefectural governor and 
free steerage passage was to be guaranteed.  Robert W. Irwin was designated as Special 
Agent of the Hawaii Bureau of Immigration.  The Hawaiian government was to provide 
inspectors, interpreters and doctors for the welfare of the laborers.  The convention even 
provided the Japanese immigrants the rights of suffrage and naturalization.  These 
provisions were to retroactively apply to all earlier shipments of Japanese laborers as 
                                                
 36 The Japanese government transported 988 Japanese emigrants to Hawaii for the f rst 
time using a Japanese ship, Yamashiro Maru, owned by the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha, according to 
Yoshiaki Nishimukai, “Transportation of Japanese Emigrants in the Pre-Wa  Period,” Keizai 
Keiei Kenkyū: Nenpō (Annual report on economics and business administration) 18, no. 1 
(December 1967): 71. 
 
 37 Gaimushō hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 19-kan (Documents on Japanese Foreign 
Policy, vol. 19 [1886]) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Ryōfukai, 1952), 461–471; Kaikoku 
Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen, 362–364. 
 
 38 Odo and Shinoto, Zusetsu Hawai Nihonjinshi, 22. 
 
 39 Suzuki, Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin, 52. In addition to their salary, men received six 





Meanwhile, the Immigration Convention failed to appease the Japanese in Hawaii, and 
the rebellions continued.  Moreover, “frustration led the immigrants into lives of 
dissipation and gambling.”41  Thereafter, the number of Japanese arrested for gambling 
increased.  For instance, the police officers captured eight Japanese for gamblin  and 
took them to the police station on June 5, 1887.42  By 1890, the leading Japanese 
emigrants started urging the Japanese Consul to expel those who could lower the “dignity 
of their race” by their habit of drinking and gambling.43  However, arrests of Japanese for 
gambling frequently took place.  In 1894, a judge fined two-hundred dollars each for a 
number of Japanese who were gambling in Kona in February.  Since judge demanded 
unreasonable fines, the press reported that “[t]his is not justice; it is robbery under the 
forms of justice.”44  The fine for gambling was usually around five to ten dollars. 
 Although recognizing that the kanyaku imin were dissatisfied with their working 
conditions, the Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru desired to continue the kanyaku imin for the 
development of the nation.  According to a Japanese historian Imaizumi Genkichi:  
“Foreign Minister Inouye and his supporters were very hopeful of the future role 
of emigration as a new phase of Japan’s overseas development.  It was also crucial time 
for Inouye in that he was doing everything possible to consummate a treaty revision with 
the Western nations to abolish the extraterritorial rights they enjoyed in Japan.  And it 
was face-losing as well as disadvantageous to have the Japanese indulg  i  loose living 
and gambling and conduct themselves in a disgraceful manner in Hawaii. 
“Inouye, an expert on finances, had hoped for the acquisition of foreign currency 
                                                
 40 Niiya, ed., Japanese American History, 173. 
 
41 United Japanese Society of Hawaii and James H. Okahata, A History of Japanese in 
Hawaii (Honolulu: The United Japanese Society of Hawaii, 1971), 103. 
 
42 The Daily Herald (Honolulu), June 6, 1887. 
 
43 The Daily Bulletin (Honolulu), June 20, 1890. 
 
44 “A Judicial Outrage,” The Hawaiian Gazette, February 23, 1894.   
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through emigration.  He calculated that an estimated 12 million yen (6 million in 
currency plus purchase of Japanese commodities) sent home annually by 100,000 
emigrants in the Pacific would be equivalent to 5% interest on a 250 million yen loan.  
This would certainly be a boom to Japan’s hard pressed economy.  He had therefore 
arranged for compulsory savings by the emigrants… 
“Inouye was also desirous of injecting a new atmosphere in the farming villa es 
by improving their irregular working habits.  He also envisioned that Japan’s olicy in 
the Pacific would be impeded should Hawaii ever become a territory of the United States.  
His far-reaching plan harbored the idea that it would be to Japan’s advant ge to place 
Hawaii under her influences as soon as possible.  And he was convinced that Taro Ando, 
renowned as the most brilliant diplomat in Japan, was the person to carry out this 
important role.45 
 
Utilizing the government-level contracts, Inoue expected a positive economic effect from 
overseas emigration.  Nevertheless, the haole46 rebels overthrew King Kalakaua in June 
1887 and made King revise the Hawaiian Constitution, and article 62 specifically granted 
suffrage to only Caucasian men of twenty years or over who were able to read and write 
Hawaiian, English, or other European language.47  The so-called Bayonet Convention of 
1887 repealed most of the provisions of the Immigration Convention including the rights 
of suffrage and naturalization.48  
Afraid of the growing Japanese influence in Hawaii, the provisional government 
revised the Immigration Convention in September abolishing citizenship for Japanese 
emigrants and no longer providing passage, inspectors, translators, and doctors for the 
                                                
45 Genkichi Imaizumi, Senku Kyujunen: Miyama Kanichi to Sono Jidai (Ninety Years of 
Pioneer: Kanichi Miyama and His Age) (Kanagawa: Mikunisha, 1942), 217–218, quoted in 
United Japanese Society of Hawaii and Okahata, A History of Japanese in Hawaii, 103–104. 
 
 46 Haole is a “white person of the dominant social and economic group in Hawaii,” 
according to Frederic G. Cassidy, ed., Dictionary of American Regional English, Volume 2, D–H 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 896. 
 
 47 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
hen, 368–369. 
 
 48 Gaimushō Ryōji Ij ūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen, 129–130. 
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Japanese laborers.49  Afterwards, the Japanese emigrants had to pay back seventy-five 
dollars for their passage fees, which the planters used to pay for them in the name of the 
Hawaiian government.  Therefore, the planters subtracted three dollars from each of their 
monthly salary for two years.  In addition, the Hawaiian Board of Immigration collected 
additional money from Japanese laborers to pay the salary of immigration officers, 
interpreters, and doctors.50  Moreover, the Hawaiian planters strategically segregated 
laborers by their ethnicities to prevent organized strikes, and distinguished the wages 
depending on their ethnicities.   
The following Table 4.2 illustrates the average monthly wages of plantation 
laborers in Hawaii based on their nationalities.   
 
 
Table 4.2: Average Monthly Wages of Plantation Laborers, January 1890 
 
Nationality Skilled Labor ($) Contract labor ($) 
Day Labor 
Men Women Nonage 
Hawaiian 54.67 18.58 20.64 12.47 – 
American 94.42 20.00 17.45 – – 
British 90.30 – 18.00 – – 
Portuguese 47.42 19.54 22.25 13.29 10.61 
Chinese 38.27 17.61 17.47 – – 
Japanese 41.17 15.58 18.84 10.45 – 
Polynesian – 15.82 18.56 12.37 – 
Others 75.50 17.02 35.02 – – 
Average $ 63.11 $ 17.74 $ 21.03 $ 12.15 $ 10.61 
                                                
 49 Odo and Shinoto, Zusetsu Hawai Nihonjinshi, 23; Niiya, ed., Japanese American 
History, 29. 
 
50 According to Yamato Shimbun (Yamato Daily) on April 23–June 19, 1913, each 
emigrant had to pay back seventy-five dollars (equivalent to ¥150); however, the actual passage 
fare that the Nippon Yusen Kaisha charged was on average twenty-five yen.  It means the 
emigrants paid six times as much as they needed to pay. 
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Source: Hawaii, Bureau of Public Instruction, Report of the General Superintendent of the 




According to the average wages of plantation laborers based on the Report of the 
General Superintendent of the Census, 1890, the Japanese skilled-, contract-, and day-
laborers (women) received the lowest wages, and the Japanese earned less than average 
in all types of labor.51  Regardless of earning the lowest, their salary was further reduced 
from fifteen dollars a month in 1887 to $12.50 a month in 1891.52  In addition, when they 
were sick and absent from work, they got neither pay nor food.  Despite the Hawaii’s 
racially motivated insult, the Japan’s then Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru neglect d it and 
took no action.  It was the next Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu who tried to 
negotiate with the Hawaiian government for regaining suffrage of the Japanese l borers 
in Hawaii.53  Although the kanyaku imin was supposed to be under governmental 
protection, they gradually lost their privilege in Hawaii after the haole rebels gaining 
control over Hawaii. 
Despite the reduction of salary, the Japanese immigrants still earned much more 
than their countrymen in Japan did.  For example, in 1889, their deposit reached over 
$25,121,54 and their remittance to Japan amounted to nearly $300,000 to in 1891, which 
                                                
51 Hawaii, Bureau of Public Instruction, Report of the General Superintendent of the 
Census, 1890 (Honolulu: R. Grieve, Steam Book and Job Printer, 1891), 67. 
 
 52 Odo and Shinoto, Zusetsu Hawaii Nihonjinshi, 23. 
 
 53 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
hen, 369. 
 
54 Ibid., 619. 
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further stimulated Japanese emigration to Hawaii.55  Although the majority of the 
Japanese labored diligently, some did not fulfill their contract.  According to 2,325 cases 
in the district court of Hilo between 1853 and 1903 recorded by Merry, all defendants of 
violations of work obligations were Japanese in 1893.  In addition, Japanese comprised 
26 percent of entire drug and alcohol defendants.  In terms of gambling, Japanese md  
up of 85 percent of defendants.56  Notwithstanding, Governor of Hiroshima Nabeshima 
Miki, in hope of obtaining foreign currency, further urged the emigrants from Hiroshima 
to behave decently as subjects of Japan, keep the terms of contract with the employers, 
never fight, never gamble, control drinking, and always save money and remit it to 
home.57    
Although generally called imin (移民, immigrants), those who left Japan before 
1894 were not settlers because they planned to go back to Japan when they made enough 
money after toiling three years on foreign soil.  Therefore, the ratio of male emigrants 
was significantly greater than that of female emigrants among the kanyaku imin.58  
According to Yoshida’s article in Takushoku Ronsō (Debate over Colonization), the 
percentage of male emigrants to Hawaii was 83 percent in 1885; 73 percent in 1886; 80 
                                                
 55 Teruko Kumei, Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi: Kindai Amerika to Nihonjin Imin (A 
Social History Concerning Foreigners: Modern America and Japanese Immigration) (Tokyo: 
Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1995), 29. 
 
56 Sally Engle Merry, “Crime and Criminality: Historical Differences in Hawaii,” The 
Contemporary Pacific 14, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 419–420. 
 
57 Sōen Yamashita, Nihonjin no Hawai (The Hawaii of Japanese) (Tokyo: Sekaidō 
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58 Alan Moriyama, “The Causes of Emigration: The Background of Japanese Emigration 
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percent in 1887; 82 percent in 1888; 82 percent in 1889; 81 percent in 1890; 73 percent in 
1891; and 87 percent in 1892.59  For the first eight years of the kanyaku imin jidai, the 
Japanese male emigrants numbered on average 80 percent of the entire Japanese laborer . 
Those dekasegi laborers always had three things in common; t shu kūken (徒手空拳, 
being penniless), ikkaku senkin (一攫千金, “dream of striking it rich overnight”), and 
kin’i kikyō (錦衣帰郷, returning home wealthy).60  Yuji Ichioka, a prominent Japanese 
American historian and the author of Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese 
Immigrants, 1885–1924 (1988) argues that these characteristics made the early Japanese 
immigrants distinctive from the majority of European immigrants who came to s t le 
permanently in America.61 
 During the kanyaku imin jidai (1885–1894), 29,069 Japanese emigrated to 
Hawaii, transported in twenty-six ships as seen in Table 4.3.62  According to Nihon 
Jinmin Hawai-koku e Dekasegi Ikken (A Case of Japanese Emigration to Hawaii) 
recorded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 38.2 percent of all k nyaku imin came from 
Hiroshima; 35.8 percent from Yamaguchi; 14.6 percent from Kumamoto; and 7.5 percent 
                                                
59 Hideo Yoshida, “Meiji Shoki no Hawai Dekasegi, part 1,” Takushoku Ronso 3, no.2 
(October 1941): 258–259. 
 
 60 Yuji Ichioka, Gordon H. Chang, and Eiichiro Azuma, Before Internment: Essays in 
Prewar Japanese American History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 11. 
 
 61 Ichioka, The Issei, 4. 
 
 62 Hawai Nihonjin Iminshi Kankō Iinkai, ed., Hawai Nihonjin Iminshi, 99–100; 
Gaimushō Ryōji Ij ūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten: Iju Hyakunen no Ayumi, Shiryō en, 
620; Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu, 138–140; Odo and Shinoto, Zusetsu Hawaii 
Nihonjinshi, 22.  The first governmental document stresses that the total number of kanyaku imin 
was 29,069; however, the report of Honolulu Consul General in December 1897 claims th t the 
number was 28,995, according to Gaimushō hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 35-kan 
(Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, vol. 35 [1902]) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Ryōfukai, 
1957), 828–831.  Meanwhile, Gaimushō’s Nihon Jinmin Hawai-koku e Dekasegi Ikken (A Case 
of Japanese Emigration to Hawaii) reported the number of kanyaku imin to be 29,084. 
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from Fukuoka. The sum of these four prefectures amounted to 96.1 percent.63   
 
 
Table 4.3: Prefectures that Sent Out Immigrants to Hawaii, 1885–1894 
 
        Year 
Prefecture 
1885 1886 1887 1988 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 Total % 
Hiroshima 612 351 762 1,647 1,919 694 1,941 1,021 1,578 597 11,122 38.2 
Yamaguchi 420 490 637 1,611 1,919 651 2,228 703 1,271 494 10,424 35.8 
Kumamoto 276 36 16 0 118 776 2,476 494 0 55 4,247 14.6 
Fukuoka 149 0 1 0 116 615 0 2 1,297 0 2,180 7.5 
Niigata 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 99 0 378 514 1.8 
Kanagawa 226 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 226 0.8 
Chiba 8 0 0 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 85 0.3 
Shiga 79 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 0.3 
Okayama 37 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 0.2 
Wakayama 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 0.2 
Others 35 0 3 28 0 0 1 21 0 0 88 0.3 
Total 1,934 877 1,446 3,286 4,072 2,736 6,723 2,340 4,146 1,524 29,084 100 
 
Source: Gaimushō, Nihon Jinmin Hawai-koku e Dekasegi Ikken (A Case of Japanese Emigration 
to Hawaii), cited in Masaaki Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (An Introduction to the 




 As Masaaki Kodama pointed out in Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (1992), 
prefectures sending out the emigrants varied until 1887; however, those became 
concentrated on several prefectures after 1888.64  It directly related to the undergoing 
socioeconomic conditions in the rural areas. 
The Hawaiian planters favored people from Hiroshima and Yamaguchi 
                                                
 63 Gaimushō, Nihon Jinmin Hawai-koku e Dekasegi Ikken (A Case of Japanese 
Emigration to Hawaii); Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu, 25. 
 
 64 Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu, 46. 
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prefectures particularly because they were hard workers and easily assimil ted into the 
local population.  These laborers from Hiroshima and Yamaguchi also reported back the 
advantage of dekasegi and encouraged their families and friends in Japan to work in 
Hawaii.  In addition, as Kodama pointed out, it was much easier and convenient for the 
government to recruit emigrants from certain prefectures in terms of communicatio  
methods.65  Unlike today, there were very limited numbers of communication methods in 
those days.  
 Working in the sugar plantations ten hours a day (twelve hours for sugar factory 
labor) and twenty-six days a month, the kanyaku imin could earn fifteen dollars 
(equivalent to thirty yen) a month.66  Therefore, it was practically possible for those who 
toiled for three years to save ¥400 to ¥500 (equivalent to $200 to $250).67  At that time, a 
Japanese farmer typically earned eleven to twelve sen a day, carpenter earned fifteen sen, 
and mason earned seventeen to eighteen sen, so on average one could make four yen 
(equivalent to two dollars) a month.  In general, those kanyaku imin could earn as much 
as five times more money than that of people working in Japan, which resulted in 
attracting many poor Japanese to Hawaii.68  In Wakayama, one of the immigrant-
producing prefectures located in the southwestern Japan, kanyaku imin’s monthly salary 
                                                
 65 Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu, 48. 
 
 66 According to the foreign exchange rate of that time, one yen was equivalent to fifty 
cents. 
 
 67 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
hen, 595. 
 




was equivalent to a tenant farmer’s annual salary.69   
Attracted to the higher wage, immigration applicants continued to grow that 
“pushed” the nation’s steamship companies such as the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and the 
Tōyō Kisen Kaisha to establish regular trans-Pacific lines.  In short, the more 
immigration took place, the more the nation’s maritime industry developed encouraged 
by the expansion of commercial activities.  As Table 4.4 shows, the amount of remittance 
by the Japanese emigrants continued to grow as the number of Japanese in Hawaii 
increased.   The Japanese emigrants doubled the amount of remittance between 1889 and 
1893 and nearly tripled by 1894. 
 
 
Table 4.4: Remittance of the Japanese in Hawaii, 1889–1894 
Year Remittance ($) Increase Rate (%) 
1889 159,709.30 100.0 
1890 233,960.20 116.5 
1891 298,425.55 186.9 
1892 338,456.45 211.9 
1893 319,476.17 200.0 
1894 459,978.71 288.0 
 
Source: Masaaki Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (An Introduction to the History of 




 Once their contracts ended, the Japanese in Hawaii could change jobs freely.  
Therefore, skilled workers such as carpenters and blacksmiths could earn higher wa es, 
                                                
 69 “Shokumin Kyōkai Hōkoku dai 40-go,” quoted in Wakayama-ken Imin shi 
(Immigration History of Wakayama Prefecture) (Wakayama: Wakay m -ken, 1957), 601. 
 
 152
and translators and engineers made between thirty and seventy dollars a month.70  Others 
became tenant farmers or small business owners.  Their standard of living improved 
considerably since they had worked hard.  As a result, the number of emigrants retur ing 
to Japan began to decrease gradually.  One of the causes for the kanyaku imin’s success 
was that the Hawaiian government paid for their round trip passages, which was 
equivalent to the kanyaku imin’s four-month worth of salary.71  The passage fare was 
extremely expensive then.  For instance, it required a man eighty-nine yen to go to 
America (equivalent to fifteen-month’s salary) and sixty-five yen to Hawaii (eleven-
month’s salary).72  The semiofficial Nippon Yusen Kaisha (Japan Mail Steamship 
Company) was responsible for the most times of the transportation of the kanyaku imin to 
Hawaii.73 
 Meanwhile, Table 4.5 illustrates how the plantation labor was severe even under 
the governmental protection.  A great number of the kanyaku imin died because of 
overworking, accidents, as well as illness.74  Significantly, due to the primitive living 
conditions in addition to overworking, the early kanyaku imin had recorded higher death 
rate than the later ones in general.  For instance, 19.5 percent of the 14th kanyaku imin 
had lost their lives.   
                                                
 70 Suzuki, Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin, 60. 
 
71 One-way trip cost about thirty dollars, and the kanyaku imin’s monthly salary was 
fifteen dollars. 
 
 72 Nishimukai, “Transportation of Japanese Emigrants in the Pre-War Period,” 106–107. 
 
73 “Japanese Coolies for Hawaii: A Treaty which Will Furnish Planters with Good 
Workmen,” The New York Times, May 19, 1891. 
 
 74 Yasuo Wakatsuki and Jōji Suzuki, Kaigai Iju Seisaku Shiron (Historical Survey of 
Emigration Policies) (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1975), 57–73.  
 
 153

















1st 2/8/1885 834 (158) 525 62.9 72 8.6 82 222 26.6 
2nd 6/17/1885 974 (35) 518 53.2 111 11.4 121 253 26.0 
3rd 2/14/1886 923 (230) 590 63.9 80 8.7 43 245 26.5 
4th 12/10/1887 1,441 (288) 763 52.9 150 10.4 89 484 33.6 
5th 6/1/1888 1,063 (198) 618 58.1 110 10.3 54 296 27.8 
6th 11/14/1888 1,081 (203) 632 58.5 101 9.3 69 305 28.2 
7th 12/26/1888 1,143 (203) 650 56.9 105 9.2 69 359 31.4 
8th 3/2/1889 957 (137) 512 53.5 90 9.4 83 288 30.1 
9th 10/1/1889 997 (198) 508 51.0 80 8.0 65 380 38.1 
10th 11/21/1889 1,050 (208) 537 51.1 92 8.8 34 415 39.5 
11th 1/9/1890 1,064 (200) 579 54.4 78 7.3 33 421 39.6 
12th 4/2/1890 1,071 (212) 557 52.0 85 7.9 20 446 41.6 
13th 5/22/1890 1,068 (190) 492 46.1 98 9.2 32 484 45.3 
14th 6/17/1890 596 (134) 342 57.4 116 19.5 3 240 40.3 
15th 3/11/1891 1,093 (310) 517 47.3 60 5.5 17 546 50.0 
16th 3/30/1891 1,081 (281) 508 47.0 63 5.8 10 547 50.6 
17th 4/28/1891 1,091 (290) 554 50.8 50 4.6 5 540 49.5 
18th 5/29/1891 1,488 (385) 696 46.8 102 6.9 14 755 50.7 
19th 6/18/1891 1,101 (286) 455 41.3 62 5.6 13 614 55.8 
20th 1/9/1892 1,098 (0) 522 47.5 56 5.1 10 522 47.5 
21st 6/25/1892 1,124 (234) 443 39.4 46 4.1 4 647 57.6 
22nd 
 
11/28/1892 988 (191) 478 48.4 43 4.4 2 499 50.5 
23rd 3/6/1893 733 (150) 249 34.0 43 5.9 3 463 63.2 
24th 6/6/1893* 1,771 (361) 732 41.3 97 5.5 1 998 56.4 
25th 10/9/1893* 1,642 (331) 582 35.4 92 5.6 1 1,025 62.4 
26th 6/15/1894* 1,524 (327) 302 19.8 32 2.1 – 1,237 81.2 
Total 28,996 13,861 47.8 2,034 7.0 877 13,231 45.6 




Sources: Based on December 1897. Report of Honolulu Consul General in Nihon Gaikō Bunsho 
Dai 35-kan (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, vol. 35 [1902]), 828–831; Masaaki Kodama, 
Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (An Introduction to the History of Japanese Immigration) 





 The average death rate of the 1st to 14th kanyaku imin was 9.9 percent while that 
of the 15th to 26th was 5.7 percent.  Nevertheless, toward the end of the kanyaku imin 
period, the numbers of returnees had gradually declined as the death rate dropped due to 
the slight improvement of the working conditions. 
The kanyaku imin ended when the treaty between Japan and the Kingdom of 
Hawaii expired in 1894 with the establishment of the Republic of Hawaii led by a son of 
Protestant missionaries from New England, Sanford Ballard Dole (1844–1926) as its 
president through the Hawaiian Revolution (1893–1894).75  With the support of the vast 
sugar plantation owners consisting of people of European or American origins, Dole 
successfully overthrew the Hawaiian Queen Liliuokalani (1838–1917, r. 1891–1893) and 
declared the independence of the Republic on July 4, 1894.  Afterwards, the Republic of 
Hawaii began preparing for the annexation of Hawaii to the United States.76  In fact, the 
Japanese emigrants, claiming that they had right to vote according to the Immigration 
                                                
 75 Helene Adeline Guerber, The Story of the Great Republic (New York: American Book 
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Convention, attempted to regain suffrage.77  Nevertheless, it ended in failure when the 
Hawaiian government recommended that they go back to Japan.78   
 Being dekasegi laborers, while some could manage to save enough money, others 
could not save as much as they had planned.  In reality, exploited by the planters who 
often violated contracts and by the inspector-in-chief of Japanese Immigrants, N kayama 
Jōji (中山 譲治, 1839–1911), it was almost impossible to return home with enough 
money within the three-year contract period.79  According to the minutes of the Hawaiian 
Board of Immigration, Nakayama initially received a monthly salary of $100 that rose to 
$250 a month and finally $6,000 a year, which was collected from the laborers’ salary.80  
In general, those who achieved their initial goal of accumulating wealth went back o 
Japan, while those who failed to do so tended to stay in Hawaii since they got used to the 
lifestyle in Hawaii or moved to the mainland United States for better opportunities.81   
Meanwhile, some young laborers preferred not to go back to Japan in order to 
dodge the draft.  In addition, Japan then was undergoing severe inflation that decrease 
the value of money; therefore, afraid of losing their hard-earned money, they hesitated to 
go back to Japan even after their contracts ended.  As a result, 61 percent of kanyaku imin 
determined to stay in Hawaii while 39 percent returned to Japan after the three-yea  
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Worcester Morning Daily Spy (Massachusetts), May 23, 1894. 
 
 78 Gaimushō Ryōji Ij ūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen, 130. 
 
 79 Ryūkichi Kihara, Hawaii Nipponjin Shi (History of the Japanese People in Hawaii) 
(Tokyo: Bunseisha, 1935), 470. 
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contract period.82  According to the Bureau of Immigration’s report in 1894, there were 
about 20,200 Japanese living in Hawaii, and only 8,502 of those were contracted 
laborers.83  Accordingly, the Japanese laborers numbered nearly 13,231, accounting for 
60 percent of all laborers in Hawaiian sugar plantations.84  
 The Japanese government’s view on the emigration to Hawaii began to change 
after the New York Times described the Japanese emigrants as “Japanese coolies” in 
reaction to the influx of the Japanese laborers in Hawaii.85  Undergoing the rapid 
modernization with the national slogans such as “fukoku kyōhei” and “Datum Nyūō,” 
Japan then sought to differentiate itself from other Asian countries by declaring its 
cultural supremacy.  By the time, the leaders of Japan became more interested in 
expanding its influence over Asia and determined to withdraw its active involvement in 
the venture of Japanese emigration to Hawaii. 
 
Shiyaku Imin Jidai (1894–1900) 
 The Hawaiian Revolution of 1893, which the republic (mainly consisting of 
wealthy white planters) overthrew the pro-Japanese Hawaiian Kingdom, peran ntly 
changed the course of the development of Japanese immigration pattern.  This social 
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upheaval eventually resulted in the annulment of the Immigration Convention because 
the new ruling class feared the continuously growing Japanese population and its 
influence in Hawaii.  The Honolulu Gazette reported that it would be dangerous to 
populate Hawaii only with Japanese.86  In March 1894, aiming at reducing the numbers 
of impoverished and undesirable Japanese immigrants to Hawaii, the provisional 
government established a law that required all Japanese non-contract laborers to present 
fifty dollars of misegane (見せ金, literary “show money”) before entry.87   
 Meanwhile, due to the troublesome and complicated immigration process along 
with the strong demand from the emigration companies, the Japanese government 
determined to pass down the management of immigration business to the private 
emigration companies through the enactment of the Imin Hogo Kisoku (移民保護規則, 
Emigrant Protection Ordinance) on April 12, 1894.88  Afterwards, acting as the agents of 
the Japanese laborers, the emigration companies took over the tasks previously performed 
by the government including the recruitment and transportation of laborers and findi g 
jobs for them.  They also lent misegane if asked by the emigrants.89  On June 29, 1894, 
managed by Ogura Shōkai founded by Ogura Kō (小倉 幸), a merchant in Osaka, Aikoku 
Maru 愛国丸 arrived at Honolulu conveying the first group of the shiyaku imin 
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consisting of 150 Japanese after the enactment of the Imin Hogo Kisoku.90  In fact, before 
the enactment of the Imin Hogo Kisoku, Ogura Shōkai had sent out 254 Japanese by 
Aikoku Maru that left Kobe and arrived at Hawaii on March 28, 1894.  These Japanese 
worked under a contract with salary of sixteen to eighteen dollars a monththat was higher than 
that of the kanyaku imin.91  It also indicated that the shiyaku imin had begun before the 
end of the kanyaku imin. 
 The outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in August 1894 further facilitated the 
transfer of the emigration business because the government had to give warfar the 
highest priority.92  Meanwhile, the end of the war and the subsequent influx of repatriated 
soldiers created an excess labor force in a small economy.  Acutely realizing the job 
market being saturated, numbers of repatriated soldiers and the existing unemployed 
sought emigration to make a living.  In fact, the annual remittance from the Japanese 
laborers in Hawaii during the kanyaku imin jidai had amounted to ¥2,000,000 that 
stimulated a large number of Japanese to seek emigration.93  For instance, 9,195 Japanese 
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had left for Hawaii between 1895 and 1896.94  Then, taking advantage of the high 
demands for overseas emigration, the emigration companies frequently engaged in 
fraudulent practices to make an enormous profit.  It was the period which numbers of the 
Japanese prostitutes entered Hawaii with the help of emigration companies.  As a 
countermeasure against such frauds, the government, revising the Imin Hogo Kisoku, 
enacted the Imin Hogo-ho (移民保護法, Emigrant Protection Act) in April 1896 that 
imposed legal controls on the practices of the emigration companies and agents for 
protecting the “interests of emigrants.”95   
 This period between the summer of 1894 and June 1900 in which the emigration 
companies were responsible for sending out emigrants is known as the shiyaku imin 
jidai.96  During the shiyaku imin jidai, about 40,000 Japanese emigrated to Hawaii.97  
Although the emigration companies took over the tasks previously carried out by the 
government, the Japanese emigrants had remained under the minimal governmental 
protection/supervision.  Therefore, this period, sought to protect emigrants from the 
exploitation of emigration companies and breach of contracts by employers, and to 
ensure that the Japanese emigrants to be treated equally with European counterparts, is 
also known as the hogo jidai (保護時代, literary “protective period”) in the history of 
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Japanese immigration.98   
 It is important to note that during the ogo jidai, the government did not actively 
urge the Japanese overseas emigration.99  As a newly established nation-state, the Meiji 
leaders needed to gain world recognition by demonstrating Japan as a country capable of 
protecting its subjects.  For example, the Japanese government dispatched a protective 
cruiser Naniwa 浪速 twice to Honolulu following the outbreak of the Hawaiian 
Revolution (1893–1894) in order to protect 22,000 Japanese laborers in Hawaii.100  
Arrived on February 23, 1893, Captain Togo Heihachiro who later became known as a 
hero of the Russo-Japanese War commanded Naniwa101 made a statement that: 
“Now that we have laid anchor in Honolulu, you will have to consider this ship an 
extension of our country.  Be careful in your actions as your every move will reflect on 
the honor of our nation.  Should occasion arise, we must be prepared to act decisively and 
with courage as befitting our nation’s warriors.”102 
 
Later in the same year, the government dispatched Naniwa to Honolulu in order to 
protect its subjects in case of the Hawaiian royalists raising a riot on the a niversary of 
the Hawaiian Revolution.  Then, the Provisional Government asked Captain Togo to fire 
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cannons for commemorating the anniversary; however, Togo rejected the request and 
British and American warships followed his precedent.  Togo’s decision impressed the 
Japanese living in Hawaii and stirred up their national pride.  Therefore, the many 
Japanese couples named their babies born in Hawaii either “Naniwa” or “Togo.”103   
Again commanded by Togo, Naniwa left Yokohama for Hawaii in May 1897 
when the Republic of Hawaii refused 713 out of 902 or nearly 80 percent of all Japanese 
immigrants’ entry into Hawaii based on the Act of 1894 that required jiyū imin (free 
immigrants) to show possession of misegane of fifty dollars in order to gain admission to 
the country.104  The reason for the denial was that the Hawaiian Bureau of Immigration 
viewed their misegane as irrational and acknowledged the Japanese as contract laborers 
although they claimed themselves to be free immigrants.  More specifically, 550 out of 
670 Japanese on board Shinshū Maru 神州丸 and 163 out of 232 Japanese on board 
Sakura Maru 佐倉丸 were denied their entry upon arrival at Honolulu on February 27 
and March 20 respectively.105  A few days after Sakura Maru, Kinai Maru 畿内丸 
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arrived at Honolulu with 682 Japanese emigrants, and 549 of them were denied entry as 
well.106  A series of the denial by the Hawaiian Bureau of Immigration caused a tension 
between Japan and Hawaii, and Japanese free immigration to Hawaii was suspended 
temporarily.107 
 After returning to Japan, Shinshū Maru’s ship owner Kishimoto Gohei turned in a 
report to the Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu on May 10, 1897, regarding the loss 
caused by the denial of entry of the Japanese emigrants.  Kishimoto petitioned the 
government to take measure so that he would receive compensation from the Hawaiian 
government for his loss.108  Meanwhile, as shown in Table 4.6, the denied Japanese 
emigrants from Hiroshima prefecture carefully estimated the average damage of 313 
individuals from Hiroshima on Shinshu Maru sent by the Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha 
(海外渡航株式会社 Overseas Company) and Kobe Tokō Gōshi Kaisha (神戸渡航合資
会社 Kobe Immigration Company).  On April 13, the representatives of the denied 
Japanese from Hiroshima prefecture demanded ¥312.76 for each person.109  Subsequently, 
on May 17, the representatives of the denied Japanese from Yamaguchi prefecture who 
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were on Kinai Maru petitioned for the compensation of ¥236.64 per person.110  In 
response to the petitions of the Japanese citizens for compensation, by sending 
Commissioner Akiyama on Naniwa and promoting Consul General Shimamura Hisashi 
to Minister, the Japanese government tried to solve the problem diplomatically.111   
 
 
Table 4.6: Estimates of Loss of Each Immigrant on Shinshu Maru 
 
Articles Amount (¥) 
Fees for filing an application for immigration (¥0.50  x 24 days) 12.00 
The loss due to sales of properties at a 30 percent lower than current price 
for raising the cost for going to America 
81.00 
Purchase of clothes and other necessities necessary for immigration and 
fumigation fee 
35.00 
Cost to invite relatives and friends before departure 35.00 
Travel expenses, passport fee, passage, commission, vaccination, and 
quarantine fee 
55.00 
Expenses during one’s stay in Kobe for seventeen days 13.60 
Spending money while on board 5.40 
Return passage fee and spending money 11.60 
Expenses during one’s stay in Kobe after return voyage (hotel charges nd 
spending money x 10 days) 
8.00 
Wage for 87 days from the departure to return home (¥0.60 per day) 52.20 
Transportation expenses from Kobe to home village 4.20 
Expenses for sending their representatives to Tokyo for petitioning a 




Source: Gaimushō hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Dai 30-kan (Documents on Japanese Foreign 
Policy, vol. 30 [1897]) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Ryōfukai, 1954), 744–745. 
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 Meanwhile, the Hawaiian government sought to compromise with Japan before 
its official annexation to the United States.  After a year and two months of negotiation 
with Hawaii through the arbitration of the U.S. government, the Japanese government 
obtained $75,000 as compensation.112  Consequently, these incidents resulted in 
accelerating the U.S. annexation of Hawaii because the provisional government was 
afraid of the “Japanization of Hawaii.”113  Meanwhile, according to Hilary Conroy the 
Japanese government did not intend the Japanese immigration to Hawaii to be a part of
the nation’s expansion policy.  Giving priority to the protection of its citizens and its 
national reputation, the Japanese government had no intention to colonize Hawaii, which 
would endanger friendly U.S.-Japan relations114.    
Contrary to the governmental policy, numbers of Japanese intellectuals and some 
government officials enthusiastically called for the Japan’s “peaceful expansion.  
However, the Japanese government dared not to take any action against the U.S. 
annexation of Hawaii because it considered the maintenance of a good U.S.-Japan 
relations were far more crucial for securing Japan’s status among the world powers.115   
 Nevertheless, motivated by the increasing enthusiastic publications on how to go 
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to America as well as news of how Japanese immigrants achieved great success in 
foreign lands continuously encouraged the rural Japanese to go to Hawaii and the United 
States in search of gold or a job.116  In 1899, the number of Japanese emigrants drastically 
increased in response to the U.S. annexation of Hawaii in 1898.117  They expected that 
when Hawaii became a territory of the United States before long, the U.S. government 
would restrict immigration of contracted laborers.118  As a result, in 1899 alone, Japan 
sent out total 31,354 Japanese overseas, including 22,973 to Hawaii and 3,140 to the 
United States.119  According to the U.S. Census of 1900, the Japanese population 
numbered 61,111, becoming the largest race in Hawaii as shown in Figure 4.1.     
 
 
Figure 4.1: Population in Hawaii, 1900 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Bulletin 127, Chinese and 




In 1900, the total population of Hawaii was 154,001, which included 29,799 native 
Hawaiians, 7,857 partly Hawaiians, 28,819 Caucasians, 25,767 Chinese, and 233 Blacks 
and 415 other races.  This meant that 39.7 percent of Hawaii’s total population was the 
Japanese.120   
As Table 4.7 shows, during the shiyaku imin jidai (1899–1903), the Japanese 
government issued a majority of passports to people living in Hiroshima, Kumamoto, and 
Yamaguchi prefectures because acreage of farmland per capita in these prefctures was 
too small to subsist.121  Clearly, the Japanese government issued a great number of 
passports to the Japanese in the southwestern prefectures who were living under severe 
poverty due to a series of famine and a serious agricultural depression caused by the 
“Matsukata Deflation” (1881–1884) that threw large numbers of people out of work.  In 
rural areas particularly, the peasantry were deeply in debt and barely had food to sustain 
their lives; therefore, those who were desperate to earn money in a short-term preferred 
emigration to Hawaii in which they expected to earn ten times more wages.122   
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Table 4.7: Passports Issued by the Japanese Government from 1899 to 1903 
 
     Prefecture Passports Issued Rate (%) 
Hiroshima 広島 21,871 25.9 
Kumamoto 熊本 12,149 14.4 
Yamaguchi 山口 11,219 13.3 
Fukuoka 福岡 7,698 9.1 
Niigata 新潟 6,698 7.9 
Wakayama 和歌山 3,750 4.4 
Nagasaki 長崎 3,548 4.2 
Hyogo 兵庫 3,532 4.2 
Okayama 岡山 2,176 2.6 
Miyagi 宮城 1,613 1.9 
Fukushima 福島 1,613 1.9 
Ehime 愛媛 948 1.1 
Aichi 愛知 767 0.9 
Fukui 福井 683 0.8 
Shiga 滋賀 646 0.8 
Saga 佐賀 624 0.7 
Rest of prefectures (27) 5,041 6.0 
     Total 84,576 100.0 
 
Source: Based on Yosaburo Yoshida, “Sources and Causes of Japanese Emigration,” Annals of 




In addition, the influx of repatriated soldiers into a small market after the First Sino-
Japanese War further aggravated the conditions.  Certainly, cities with industries could 
absorb increasing excess labor force; however, rural areas had no capacity of providing 
jobs for them.    
Simultaneously, during the shiyaku imin jidai, five major emigration companies in 
conjunction with the Keihin Ginkō (京浜銀行 Keihin Bank) came to monopolize the 
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immigration business to Hawaii and made a tremendous amount of profit by committing 
a various kind of fraud.123  Since the emigration companies had played leading roles in 
facilitating not only overseas emigration but also the development of the nation’s 
maritime industry by conveying thousands of Japanese laborers, I will examine these 
companies in detail in Chapter V.  
The plantation life of the early Japanese immigrant laborers in Hawaii appeared to 
be filled with disillusionment because the reality.  In order to relieve their sorrows, they 
sang ‘hole-hole’ bushi (“a name derived from combining the Hawaiian hole-hole (the 
work of stripping dried cane leaves) with the Japanese bu hi(“tune”).124  Gary Okihiro 
describes hole-hole bushi in the Cane Fires as “The music of the songs generally came 
from Japanese folksongs; the words were the spontaneous feelings and thoughts of 
workers engaged in plantation labor.  Indeed, many hole-hole bushi were composed by 
women and reflected their experiences and point of view.”125  For sustaining their life in 
Hawaii, the Japanese women worked in the sugar plantations as did men while 
performing domestic services such as cooking and cleaning for bachelor laborers.126  
Despite performing the same or more tasks than men did, they received lower wages.  
According to Article 3 of the terms of labor immigration contract submitted by Ogura 
Shōkai in 1894, the plantation owners promised to pay monthly salary of $12.50 for each 
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male laborer and $7.50 for each female laborer.127  The Japanese women received five 
dollars less than men did.  Meanwhile if a woman could not labor, fifty-five cents per day 
were subtracted from her salary and if a man could not, thirty-three cents.128  It was the 
period in which “men even sold their wives for money.”129  Many versions of hole-hole 
bushi exist, and the following song was one of the most famous h le-hole bushi 
translated by Eileen Tamura: 
Send us money, send us money! 
Is the usual note from home. 
But how can I do it 
In this plight? 
 
Two contract periods have gone by. 
We are still here. 
Destined to become fertilizer 
For sugarcane. 
 
My husband cuts the cane stalks. 
And I strip their leaves. 
With sweat and tears we both work 
For our means. 
 
Shall I go to America? 
Or shall I go home to Japan? 
I’m lost in thoughts  
Here in Hawaii. 
 
If I work at hole hole 
All I’ll earn in 35 cents. 
If I sleep with a Chinaman 
I’ll make $1.00! 
 
Tomorrow is Sunday. 
Come and visit me. 
My husband will be out watering the fields. 
I’ll be alone.130 
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The lyric of the hole-hole bushi delineates how much the Japanese immigrant women had 
hard time because they had to do extra work in addition to working in the plantation to 
sustain their life.  It also illustrates their consideration for going to America or returning 
home rather than staying in Hawaii.    
 Contrary to the kanyaku imin who were under the maximal governmental 
protection and sponsorship, the shiyaku imin had to endure harsher working conditions 
due to the abolishment of the Japan-Hawaii Immigration Convention of 1886 that had 
protected the Japanese emigrants from abuses.  According to A History of Japanese in 
Hawaii, numerous plantation workers had died of endemic, at least two to three laborers 
daily at the newly started Waipahu plantation.131  In addition, once emigration companies 
took over the immigration venture, the quality of laborers was not always as appropriate 
as the kanyaku imin whom the Japanese government was responsible for the recruitment 
of decent laborers.  During the shiyaku imin jidai, not only the impoverished Japanese but 
also a large number of hoodlums and the yakuza (Japanese gambler or gangster) entered 
Hawaii in hope of ikkaku senkin (striking it rich overnight).  In consequence, troubles 
relating to gambling, drinking, and prostitution drastically increased among the Japanese 
immigrant community in Hawaii, mainly composed of young bachelors.132  In fact, as 
Consul General Andō Tarō (安藤太郎, 1846–1924) indicated, these “social evils” had 
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existed since the kanyaku imin jidai.133  According to Andō’s report on April12, 1886: 
The inadequate identification procedures followed in handling emigrants h ve brought 
about consequences embarrassing to Japan… Some emigrants-to-be have been ‘selling’ 
their names to others desirous of coming to Hawaii.  This does not involve too many 
complications in the case of males… however, such is not the case with women, many of 
whom are forced to turn to prostitution to make a living.134 
 
Nevertheless, these social problems aggravated during the shiyaku imin jidai due to the 
entry of inappropriate and undesirable laborers into Hawaii that included a considerable 
number of the yakuza, hoodlums, and prostitutes.   
By 1900, dominated by the yakuza, downtown Honolulu became a dangerous 
place in which drinking, gambling, fighting, extortion, violence, including killing ad
wounding, were rampant.135  As early as 1898, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser 
reported criminal activities of the yakuza that thirty-three yakuza (twenty-two from one 
gang and eleven from the other gang) were captured by wounding and hospitalizing three 
Japanese men.  However, with the help of gangs, they were bailed out in no time.136   
According to the Report of the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, there were 
total 9,967 arrests in Hawaii in 1900, and Japanese, Chinese, and Hawaiian made up 
7,480, mostly charged with gambling, illegal liquor selling, and drunkenness.137  The 
following Table 4.8 illustrates the population of Japanese, Chinese, and Hawaiians in 
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1900 excluding Japanese and Chinese born in Hawaii, and the number of arrests relating 
to gambling, illegal liquor selling, and drunkenness with rates.  Comparing three types of 
arrests, one would easily notice that arrests relating to gambling amounted to a large 
portion among the Japanese and Chinese immigrants.  The arrests of Japanese numbered 
2,945, of which 1,138 or 38.7 percent was arrests for gambling.  Meanwhile, about 70 
percent of all Chinese arrests was for gambling.  
 
 















Japanese 56,234 2,945 5.2 1,138 2.0 66 0.1 157 0.2 
Chinese 27,741 2,300 8.0 1,618 5.8 70 0.25 3 0.01 
Hawaiian 29,799 2,235 7.5 227 0.7 16 0.05 650 2.1 
 
Source: Hawaii, Governor, Report of the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to the Secretary of 




To be more specific, on the Island of Kauai alone, there were 865 arrests, of 
which Chinese and Japanese plantation laborers were the majority charged with gambling 
and illegal sale of liquor in 1900.138  In addition, there were 29 Americans, 77 Puerto 
Ricans, 35 Portuguese, and 14 others arrested for gambling.  In terms of arrests fo  illegal 
liquor selling, there were 9 Americans, 6 Puerto Ricans, 20 Portuguese, and 6 others.  
Simultaneously, there were 343 Americans, 40 Puerto Ricans, 96 Portuguese and 293 
others who were arrested for drunkenness.139  Consequently, the more the Japanese 
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bachelor emigrants entered Hawaii, the more the number of offenses increased in the 
years before the prevalence of practice of “picture marriage” as shown in Table 4.9.   
 
 





1900 1,480 20.1 7,369 
1903 2,083 31.1 6,708 
1905 1,988 26.5 7,497 
1908 1,951 32.3 6,031 
1910 2,360 33.3 7,091 
1913 2,799 26.9 10,408 
1915 2,323 24.6 9,439 
1920 2,538 32.8 7,748 
1923 1,635 27.8 5,889 
1925 2,240 25.9 8,649 
1928 1,563 19.3 8,111 
 
Source: Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen 





According to the U.S. Census of 1900 and 1910, Japanese in Hawaii numbered 
61,111 (39.7% of total population of Hawaii) and 79,675 (41.5% of total population of 
Hawaii) respectively.140  Regarding the percentage of the Japanese population in Hawaii, 
the crime rate of Japanese was lower than the average.  Significantly, the crime rate 
gradually began to decline after 1920.   
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Within a section of Chinatown, a red-light district called Makutsu (魔窟, literary 
“devil’s den”) existed.  Located in the corner of Pauahi, Maunakea, and King Streets 
along River in Honolulu, “delinquency and shameless misconducts constantly took 
place” in the Makutsu and the Hawaiian polices tended to overlook the crimes within the 
Makutsu and never exercised strict control over the activities as long as they stay d in the 
district.  Consisting of pimps and gamblers, the yakuza organized the Hinode Club (日の
出クラブ, “Rising Sun Club”), the Yamato Club (大和クラブ, “Yamato Club”), and the 
Gikyō Club (義侠クラブ, “Chivalry Club”) that controlled prostitution business, 
drinking, and gambling, and made an enormous profit.141  A considerable number of the 
Japanese emigrants moved to Honolulu after the end of three-year labor contract.  While 
many got decent jobs with higher wages such as carpenters, gardeners, shopkeepers, and 
restaurant owners, some entered underworld.142   
 Having their own newspapers such as Hinode Shimbun (日の出新聞, “Sunrise 
Newspaper”), the yakuza was a tightly organized crime group with financial power that 
could easily shut down any forces that aimed to obstruct their activities.143  In fact, 
initiated by the Theodore Richards, there was a movement to get rid of the pimps and 
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prostitutes from downtown Honolulu in the early 1896 although it ended in failure, 
according to Reverend Takie Okumura (1865–1951), a Christian Minister on Oahu.144  
Along with the development of the yakuza, the Makutsu became a dangerous corner 
where traffic in human beings was officially carried out.  Therefore, the period between 
1892 and 1900 came to be known as the “Ankoku Jidai” (暗黒時代, literary “dark 
age”).145  It was a significant period in which the Japanese immigrants wavered whether 
they should permanently reside in Hawaii, return to Japan, or move to the mainland 
United States.146   
Two of the most important income sources for the yakuza were gambling and 
prostitution.  In general, the club members traveled to plantation camps on paydays and 
held all-night gambling sessions and squeezed out the hard-earned money of laborers.  
Controlled by the yakuza, a number of prostitutes accompanied the club members and 
practiced prostitution.  For example, on Saturday, March 17, 1900, the Hawaiian police 
officers arrested eight Japanese working in the Paauhau plantation for gambling.  Then, 
three of them, after bailing themselves out, sought money to bail out the rest.  On the
other hand, while they were detained, the Japanese plantation laborers stood together for 
rescuing their fellows.  “Between 100 and 200 Japanese, armed with cane knives and 
clubs, forced the police to free the prisoners and to return the bail money” as well  
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money on the gambling mat.147  A similar riot took place at Ewa plantation in 1904 when 
the Hawaiian police force consisting of five officers arrested about fifteen Japanese who 
were gambling in a house inside the camp.  When the police were about to leave the 
house, a gang of 200 Japanese came up against and threw stones at them.  Since the 
police were unarmed, they came again to arrest the Japanese who involved in the riot.148   
There were approximately two hundred professional gamblers and three hundred 
prostitutes in Hawaii, and most of them engaging in the prostitution business against their 
will. 149  Reverend Okumura claimed that about three hundred pimps depended their live 
on the earnings of prostitutes.  Shockingly, for the most part, pimps were the actual 
husbands of the prostitutes.  In other words, husbands made their wives prostitutes for 
their own profit.150  This kind of business practice, which husband being a pimp and wife 
being a prostitute, had never taken place in any part of Japan.151  In a bachelor-based 
immigrant society, prostitution appeared to be one of the most profitable businesses.   
Examining the wages and price of the time, the prostitution was indeed a 
profitable and promising business.  According to the wage comparison of 1899 listed in A 
History of Japanese in Hawaii, plantation contract laborer made fifteen dollars a month; 
free laborer made twenty-six dollar a month, salaried worker made over eighteen dollar a 
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month; carpenter, mason, and ironsmith made about fifty-two dollars a month; maid 
made eight to twelve dollars a month; and store clerk made twenty to fifty dollars a 
month if working for American companies, and seven to thirty dollars if working for 
Japanese companies.152  As a reference, in 1899, a pound of sugar cost four cents; a quart 
of milk cost ten cents; Hawaiian beef cost ten cents per pound and American beef cost 
sixty cents per pound; a handful of fish cost twenty-five cents; renting a cottage cost five 
to one hundred dollars a month; dinner at restaurant cost twenty-five cents; one-night stay 
at hotel cost one to five dollars; and set of working clothes cost one dollar and fifty 
cents.153 
Meanwhile, a typical prostitute earned four to five dollars a night (charging fifty 
cents to a dollar per customer), and some popular prostitutes could earn twenty dollars a 
night.  Therefore, prosperous prostitutes could save as much as two hundred dollars a 
month,154 equivalent to 13 months’ worth of a contract laborer’s salary.  Therefore, when 
Reverend Okumura tried to persuade a prostitute to quit such shady business to live a 
decent life, she told him; “Doesn’t a big, healthy man on the sugar plantation get only 
$14 a month?  I’m far better off, for in this work I can save up and send back $200 a 
month to my home in Japan.  Am I not a real patriot who enriches our country?”155  
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Meanwhile, the community leaders made efforts to restore the image of Japan.  
For example, Reverend Okumura risked his life to eradicate the yakuza’s illegal business 
saying that “I had to do something in order to preserve my country’s honor, and 
safeguard the trust and confidence of American people in my fellow countrymen.”156     
 Mostly managed by the yakuza, the widespread prostitution became a major social 
problem during the shiyaku imin jidai that would eventually develop into the nationwide 
anti-Japanese movement.  As the number of the Japanese emigrants grew in Hawaii, so 
did the prostitutes as shown in Table 4.10.   
 
 




Number Rate (%) Number Rate (%) 
Hawaiian 26 16.6 19 7.1 
Partly Hawaiian 5 3.2 0 0 
French 8 5.1 20 7.5 
British 2 1.3 2 0.7 
American 1 0.6 2 0.7 
Japanese 115 73.2 226 84.0 
Total 157 100.0 269 100.0 
 
Source: Based on Henry E. Cooper, Report of the Attorney General to the President of the 
Republic of Hawaii for the Biennial Period Ending December 31, 1899 (Honolulu: Hawaiian 
Gazette, 1900), 8–9, cited in Joan Hori, “Japanese Prostitution in Hawaii During the  Immigration 




According to Henry E. Cooper (1857–1929) who was a lawyer and served as the 
Attorney General of Hawaii from March 1899 to June 1900, the number of registered 
                                                




prostitutes in Honolulu strikingly increased within a year between 1898 and 1899, from 
157 to 269 prostitutes.   
As Table 4.10 illustrates, the Japanese prostitutes accounted for 73 percent of all 
prostitutes in Honolulu in 1898 and 84 percent in 1899 respectively.  In response to the 
growing demand on prostitution, wife selling became a common practice among the 
Japanese immigrants in Hawaii.  Some gambling-addicted husbands sold their wives in 
order to pay off their debts.157  As early as 1892, the sheriff of the Island of Hawaii E. G. 
Hitchcock who later became Circuit Court judge, reported that the practice of wife-
selling and mistress-selling was “more or less prevalent on this island.”158  Chief 
Inspector Nakamura was responsible for initiating the infamous wife-selling practice by 
forcing men with wives to deposit fifty dollars as her return passage.  However, 
sometimes disillusioned with her husband, wife had ran away with another man who, and 
in that case, husband demanded wife’s new husband to pay fifty dollars, which he had 
deposited with the immigration official for her return passage.159  Therefore, initially the 
wife’s market price was fifty dollars until some sought to make a profit frm selling a 
wife at $100 to $200.  The price went up to $1,000 when procurers purchased these wives 
to make them work in brothels.160   
 On January 20, 1900, the Hawaiian government set a fire on the house with a 
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bubonic plague patient for the eradication of the bubonic plague.  However, fanned by the 
strong wind, the flames spread in all directions, burning down the streets of Maunnakea, 
River, Smith, and Beretania to the ground including a densely build-up area of the 
Japanese.  The fire devastated both Chinese and Japanese quarters that produced nearly 
6,000 homeless, of which 3,500 were Japanese.161  According to a report of the chairman 
of the Japanese society, Dr. Katsunuma, total 3,380 Japanese residents of the district were 
quarantined, including 138 children and 150 adults from some other districts who 
happened to be there at the time of fire.162  Losing warehouses during the fire, businesses 
such as Ozaki Shōten and Asada Shōten suffered a great loss.  The government required 
all the victims of fire to remain in the detention centers set up in Kawaihao Church, old 
armory, and Kakaako and Kalihi districts until April 1, 1900.163  The yakuza were not 
exception, and the Pacific Commercial Advertiser headlined “Tough Japanese Gangs at 
Kalihi Detention Camp Have Been Reduced to Submission.”164  Meanwhile, fifty-four 
newly-arrived Japanese emigrants, having no place to stay due to the outbreak of fire, 
slept in the open and then moved to a Japanese school for a temporary shelter.165  In 
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response to a big fire producing numerous Japanese homeless and destroying 176 
establishments, the Japanese community installed the Japanese Emergency Committee 
that played a crucial role in obtaining $333,730.10 compensation from the government 
after a series of negotiations.166 
 In fact, the fire in Honolulu downtown had some socially positive aspects for the 
development of the Japanese community by destroying the Makutsu.  Losing its 
headquarters, some yakuza determined to quit the underworld and returned to decent 
works, others moved to other islands.  In May 1900, taking advantage of a state of 
confusion, the Hawaiian authorities tried to arrest thirty yakuza, charging them with 
“disturbance of the peace” and instigation of “gambling and drunkenness.”  Nevertheless, 
the Hawaiian authority could not arrest any yakuza because no Japanese would testify 
against them.167  In response to the widespread crimes of the yakuza, L. A. Andrews, a 
sheriff of the Island of Hawaii criticized in 1901 that “the Japanese secret soci ty, which 
levy blackmail on their own countrymen” posed a threat to the development of the 
peaceful Hawaiian community.  Andrew also indicated that it would be quite difficult “to 
get information or evidence to convict… because the Japanese are afraid to give 
evidence, and they well may be, for it is almost as good as a ticket to the next world o 
openly turn informer on any doing of their organization, as would be necessary in living 
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evidence before Court.”168   
In the wake of fire, another red-light district called Iwilei located n ar the 
Chinatown flourished.  Although the 1900 fire burnt down the Makutsu, prostitution was 
never eradicated in Honolulu.  While some prostitutes reformed themselves, others went 
back to the prostitution business.  According to a missionary W. K. Azbill’s 
investigation, a Japanese named Yoshiwara operated the dormitories accommodating 
about two hundred rooms in Iwilei used for “evil purpose.”  Declaring it “all too 
shameful,” Reverend Azbill observed that the patrons were “mostly Chinese and 
Europeans” as well as Japanese and “during the hours which the authorities have setapart 
for the evil business, crowds gather about the main entrance [of the dormitories], many of 
whom are the husbands of the women whom they have carried there to prostitute, or the 
owners of the prostitutes who are there to be bargained off to any comers to the sink of 
iniquity.”169   
Urged by Azbill, the two reporters of the Honolulu Republican made a visit to the 
place and found out that there were 214 rooms in the dormitories enclosed by 10-feet-
high fence; of which 162 women currently occupied these rooms about 10 x 20 feet with 
a rent of fifteen dollars per month.  Other than fourteen French, all occupants were 
Japanese and they had to be older than sixteen years old.  While the cost of the buildings 
should not be more than $5,000, the owners of the immoral dormitories earned $2,430 
dollars (162 women x $15) monthly.  The Honolulu Republican warned the public “the 
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statement of the Rev. W. K. Azbill… gives but faint idea of the terrible evils of this hell 
hole of iniquity that damns the social and official life of this city.”  A policemen on the 
watch for vice described that there were as many white patrons as Chinese and Japanese 
in Honolulu, and “some of the best citizens of the town” were among them.  In reaction 
to the prevalence of such immoral business, the devout Christian women of Honolulu 
called for eradicating social evils that disrupted family life, virtue, and honor f all 
households.170   
In December 1900, a Japanese prostitute in Iwilei named Tome was assaulted by a 
pimp and hospitalized, and then the Attorney General Dole ordered the court to arrest her 
for her own safety as well as to make her testify against the pimp.171  In 1901, 
approximately 200 prostitutes, most of them Japanese, worked at brothels in Iwilei, and 
the Hawaiians blamed the decline in “public and private morality” on these women.  
They succeeded in the segregation of prostitutes in a part of Iwilei in 1904.172  Although 
the Makutsu no longer existed, the number of Japanese prostitutes increased and recorded 
913 in 1910.  When the “picture brides” began entering Hawaii in a great number after 
1907, the bachelor-based immigrant society transformed to a stable community that 
gradually solved social problems relating to prostitution. 
 The practice of wife selling became more popular practice as a means to obtaining 
wives because it was faster and cheaper than bringing “picture brides” from their 
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homeland.173  In 1904, three Japanese men, charged with the sales of a wife at $225, were 
arrested.174  In fact, the Hawaii Shinpō described the “wife selling” practice as a method 
to bring Japanese women into Hawaii by intentionally arranging marriages for getting 
around the immigration law.175  Meanwhile, in 1905, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser 
reported that three Japanese men named Honda, Okata, and Kudo were in custody 
because Kudo helped Honda to sell his wife to Okata for $68.05.176   
 Importantly, the majority of the Japanese emigrants in Hawaii worked hard and 
saved money as Foreign Minister Inoue had envisioned.  Nevertheless, because of the 
activities of the yakuza and the presence of prostitutes, the image of Japan as a whole was 
at risk.  The emergence of “Ankoku Jidai” brought down the reputation of the Japanese 
and threatened not only the Japanese community but also the Hawaiian public.  
Significantly, the number of the yakuza was far less than the diligent Japanese laborers in 
Hawaii; however, the yakuza’s illegal operations began to irritate the Hawaiian public.  In 
response, the Hawaiian government came to seriously consider wiping out the social vils 
from the Iwilei, especially after receiving attention from the mainland’s newspapers.  
Simultaneously, it incited the rise of anti-Japanese feeling among the leading class of 
Hawaii similar to what happened to the Chinese immigrants a few decades ago.  Hori 
argues that California no longer appreciated the entry of the Japanese for fear f the 
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prevalence of Japanese working in prostitution.177  Particularly, after Japan’s victory of 
the First Sino-Japanese War, anti-Japanese sentiment in the Pacific Coast developed and 
subsequently a series of legislation passed that restricted the further Japanese 
immigration to Hawaii and the United States.178  In reaction to the increasing presence of 
the Japanese in the Pacific Coast and the passage of the Lodge Bill that required 
immigrants literacy test, Republican Senator George C. Perkins of Californi  suggested 
imposing a ten-dollar tax on Japanese immigrants arguing that “another dangemenaced 
the coast, for the Japanese ‘Yankees of Asia’ were coming in great numbers.”179   
Widespread Japanese exclusion resulted in changing the trend of the Japanese 
immigration.  For example, the first Japanese mass immigration to Peru took place in 
1899 carrying 790 the Japanese men and women, and to Brazil in 1908.180  Meanwhile, 
not many Japanese immigrated to Canada despite wages in Canada being close to that of 
the United States.  In addition, due to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (日英同盟) in 1902, it 
was not difficult for Japanese to immigrate to Canada.181  According to Imin Hogo 
Kyōkai (Association to Protect Emigrants), the Japanese hesitated to immigrate to 
Canada because the Canadian government required English language ability, of which the 
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Japanese emigrants were afraid.182   
 
Jiyū Imin Jidai (1900–1907)  
 In 1900, the U.S. government’s prohibition on the contract-labor immigration 
known as 1885 Contract Labor Law became effective in Hawaii and influenced the 
pattern of the Japanese overseas immigration.  Simultaneously, on August 2, the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry restricted the labor immigration by ceasing to issue passport  to those 
who sought to leave for America.  Indeed, the prohibition of the contract-labor 
immigration increased the demand for laborers among the planters that resulted in a wage 
increase.  In 1902, the restriction was slightly relaxed, and the rural Japanese paid th ir 
own passages, found their own jobs and established residence in Hawaii.  The years 
between 1900 and 1907 is called the jiyū imin jidai (free immigration period).  In this 
period, facilitated by the U.S. annexation of Hawaii, many Japanese who sought better-
paid jobs could emigrate to the United States by entering Hawaii first.183  In Hawaii, the 
Japanese plantation laborers earned eighteen dollars a month on average; whereas 
engaging in railroad, mining, and agricultural labor, one could earn about forty dollars in 
the United States.  The difference motivated many Japanese to come to the United States 
after 1900.184   
 During the jiyū imin jidai, the Japanese who emigrated to the United States had to 
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pay for their own passages, so did those to Hawaii after 1900.  In 1897, it cost eighty-nine 
yen to go the West Coast and sixty-five yen to Hawaii.185  In Japan, daily workers earned 
eighteen sen and carpenter twenty-five sen.  Assuming that an average daily wage at 
twenty sen, it required fifteen months’ worth of salary to go to the United States and 
eleven months’ to Hawaii.  As Nishimukai points out, compared with the wage of the 
time, the passage fare was extremely high.  Therefore, it became heavy burden on the 
impoverished Japanese households.  In some cases, the parents of emigrants mortgaged 
their houses to procure the passage fare for their sons.  Obviously, the bottom of the class 
structure could not manage to raise the money for emigration.186   
As Table 4.11 illustrates, despite the restriction on the entry of contract laborers, 
the number of Japanese emigrants had constantly grown until the signing of the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908  
 
 
Table 4.11: Number of Japanese Emigrants Entering Hawaii, 1901–1907 
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Source: Gaimushō Ryōji Ij ūbu (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consul, Division of 
Immigration), Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten: Ijū Hyakunen no Ayumi, Honpen (Overseas 
Development of the Japanese: the Record of a Hundred years of Immigration, Ma n Work) 




The increase in the number of Japanese emigrants to Hawaii was proportional to growth 
of the emigration companies, which made undue profits by exploiting the emigrants (See 
Chapter VII). 
One of the most insulting incidents took place in 1901 at the port of entry that 
came to unite the Japanese immigrants to protest against the racial discrimination.  Upon 
the arrival, every immigrant had to have a physical examination.  On July 25, four 
Japanese women arriving at Honolulu by America Maru (亜米利加丸, owned by Tōyō 
Kisen Kaisha) were stripped for the inspection of bubonic plague.  Regardless of being 
first- or second-class passengers, Japanese women were required to take off their clothes 
for the inspection while white passengers were exempted from the inspection for the most 
time.187  According to Ito’s account; 
When two girl students, along with Mrs. Saburō Okabe of the Japanese Consular Staff, 
and her maid, arrived in Honolulu, they were undressed by a male Inspector Koffa—‘a 
mean and unnecessary method.’  Though the Consulate General in Hawaii was reluctnt 
to take action, nevertheless the Japanese in Hawaii became indignant. They organized a 
Japanese-American Conference and sent a protest message to the then-Pr sident of the 
United States.  As a result the United States government reorganized the staff, removed 
Inspector Koffa, and began using women as inspectors.188 
 
One of the insulted Japanese women named Imai Tameko (今井為子, age 27) strongly 
demanded the Japanese Vice Consul Okabe to protest against Cofer’s (Koffa) acti n to 
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the Hawaiian government, arguing “it is your duty to protect the helpless countrymen.”189  
According to Imai’s affidavit, “First, [the inspector] checked crotch, armpits, abdominal 
region, and then carefully examined breasts.  Lastly, he checked the genitalarea….”190  
In response to the insulting conduct by the inspector, the Japanese leaders in Hawaii 
formed the Hawai Nihonjinkai (布哇日本人会, Japanese Association of Hawaii) for 
protecting the rights of immigrants since Okabe was not going to take a legal action 
against the insult on the Japanese women.191  Due to the effort of the Hawai Nihonjinkai, 
the Governor of Hawaii removed Cofer from the president of the Board of Health.192  
After the dissolution of the Hawai Nihonjinkai, leaders of the Japanese in Hawaii formed 
the Chūō Nihonjinkai.193 
Nevertheless, even after the replacement of the inspector, racial discriminatory 
practices continued.  A daughter of a farmer, Fuyo Nishiyori, who sailed to Honolulu by 
Shinano Maru (信濃丸, owned by Nippon Yusen Kaisha), recalled that the inspector told 
her not to come too close to him because she smelled bad.  She was very angry at “being
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treated like a dirty pig.”194  In 1905, aiming to carry out more radial social reform, the 
Kakushin Dōshikai, formed by members who were discontented with the C ūō 
Nihonjinkai neglecting to take appropriate measures, fought for the interest of the 
plantation laborers.195  When the Kakushin Dōshikai successfully replaced Saitō Miki and 
halted the operation of the notorious Keihin Ginkō and emigration companies, it 
dispersed in 1906.196 
 Regardless of the restrictions on immigration, the number of Japanese immigrants 
in Hawaii and the United States kept growing before 1907.  According to the recordof 
the Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between August of 1901 and 1907, in all 87,932 
Japanese entered Hawaii, and 38,036 of them transmigrated to the mainland United States 
between 1902 and 1907.197  In fact, beginning as early as 1888, the numbers of Japanese 
in Hawaii who had transmigrated to the United States reached 56,018 by 1905 and 75,146 
in 1906.198  Although the most Japanese who went to the United States were earnest 
dekasegi laborers, they were “uneducated rustics, poorly dressed due to low wages, 
pitiful in behavior and lifestyle, and not assimilated into American culture.”199  The San 
Francisco Chronicle, reporting “The Japanese Invasion: The Problem of the Hour,” 
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began a campaign to exclude Japanese from the West Coast.200  In he course of the 
passage of a resolution against unrestricted immigration, the California Leg slature 
considered the Japanese “undesirable immigrants because of their poverty and habits” 
who “cannot become citizens” and “show no desire to assimilate with the American 
people.”  Therefore, the government should adopt measures against the Japanese 
immigration “as it did against Chinese immigration, because the Japanese coolie is as 
deadly a competitor against the American laborer as the Chinese coolie.”201  The critics 
of Japanese declared that “He (Japanese) dresses in American garb, but he is as ali n in 
his thoughts, his religion and his methods of life as the Chinese.”  According to the critics,
Japanese students attended the Christian Sunday schools not for religious cause but for 
learning English.202  Consequently, the influx of such kind of Japanese laborers incited 
the Japanese exclusion movement in San Francisco characterized by the segregation of 
the Japanese schoolchildren in 1906.  This incident had more critical consequences on the 
course of the development of the U.S.-Japan diplomatic relations than previously thought.   
 Meanwhile, the Japanese laborers in the sugar plantations stood together and went 
on strikes in order to protest the violation of contracts as well as to request improvement 
in their treatment.  Taking place in May 1904, the strike in the Waipahu Estate in Oahu 
mobilized thirteen hundred Japanese who demanded the discharge of the notorious head 
luna, Patterson.  According to an interpreter who was at the plantation, despite the 
plantation had prohibited “lotteries and gambling, luna Patterson has conducted lotteries 
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of various kinds for his personal benefit, and in the event that Japanese laborers did not 
participate in them they were discharged on various pretexts.”   In addition, Patterson 
prohibited any outsider to come into the plantation to sell goods, the plantation laborers 
had to buy goods only offered by the plantation.203  When Patterson resigned, the 
Japanese strikers returned to work on May 5.  This strike lasted for only four days. 
 In general, the Japanese immigrants before 1907 were mostly single men with 
eighth-grade education and farming background, whose purpose was to accumulate 
wealth and return home to live comfortably.204  Initially, over 90 percent of those who 
left Japan were dekasegi-nin (出稼ぎ人 emigrant or sojourn laborer) who did not intend 
to reside in the United States permanently.205  In the first place, the Japanese government 
had restricted the period of labor contract to three years and expected them to return 
home with foreign currency and advanced farming techniques that could facilitate the 
nation’s industrialization.206  Since the Japanese were aliens “ineligible to citizenship,” 
the Japanese emigrants kept their Japanese way of life although they had lived in 
America for more than decades.207  They had it in mind to return home someday.  
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Therefore, the years between 1885 and 1907 or the period between the beginnings of the 
kanyaku imin to the end of jiyū imin is known as the dekasegi imin jidai (出稼移民時代, 
temporary emigrant period).208 
 
Yobiyose Imin Jidai (1908–1924) 
 As the Japanese mass immigration to the United States continued either directly
from Japan or by way of Hawaii, the Japanese exclusion movement among the working 
class further intensified, and there were indications that it would develop into a 
nationwide sentiment.  Ordered by the San Francisco Board of Education on October 11, 
1906, the segregation of Japanese schoolchildren from the public schools after the 1906 
earthquake well characterized the rise of a serious anti-Japanese sentiment in the West 
Coast region in which the majority of Japanese immigrants resided.  The Board’s 
decision for segregation attributed to the anti-Japanese agitators who argued that it was 
inappropriate to educate American children with Japanese and made negative propaganda 
against Japanese.  In fact, there were only ninety-three students, of whom only twelve 
were over seventeen years old, spread over twenty-three schools.209  The Japanese 
parents, arguing the racially insulting treatment of the Board of Education as a “violation 
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of the U.S.-Japan treaty,” did not send their children to the designated oriental school.210  
The Japanese Consul General in San Francisco Ueno Suesaburō (上野季三郎, 1864–
1933) immediately protested against the Board of Education by indicating three points:
First, it not only deprives the Japanese schoolchildren of educational opportunity but also 
causes them trouble attending a designated school because they were scatt ring over 
forty-two square miles of San Francisco.  Second, the decision is regarded as an act of 
insult by declaring the Japanese as inferior race and it brings disgrace on the Japanese 
subjects.  Third, in a city of the United States that advocates liberty, San Francisco 
citizens would not intend to publicize such narrow-minded restriction on education on the 
children of a friendly nation.211 
As a temporary relief to the problem, the U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, 
authorizing the Executive Order No. 589 on March 14, 1907, banned the further 
migration of Japanese laborers from Hawaii, Mexico, and Canada into the United 
States.212  In return, the Japanese schoolchildren were allowed to attend the American 
public schools.  Meanwhile, in response to the act, the Japanese residents in Hawai sent a 
telegram on February 19 for petitioning the Japanese government to protest against the 
Immigration Act of 1907.213  Subsequently, numbers of emigration companies and agents 
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went out of business when the labor immigration to the United States ended.214  
 The period between the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908 and the 
Immigration Act of 1924 is known as the yobiyose imin jidai.  Under the agreement, 
Japan agreed not to issue passports valid for the continental United States to laborers.  On 
the other hand, the United States allowed Japan to issue passports for the United States to 
“laborers who have already been in America and to the parents, wives, and children of 
laborers already resident there.”215  During this period, only those who were returning to 
America or were summoned by their relatives already residing in America were allowed 
to enter the country.  As a result, 62,277 Japanese entered Hawaii as the yobiyose imin.  
That included 26,506 males, 30,633 females, and 5,138 children.216  Subsequently, the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement facilitated the Japanese male emigrants to form families by 
calling their wives and brides and to establish permanent settlement in Hawaii or the 
United States.  According to the statistics of the United States Immigration Department, 
14,276 Japanese “picture brides” immigrated to Hawaii between the years 1907 and 
1923.217  Significantly, sharing the similar tradition and practices based on Confucianism, 
951 Korean “picture brides” entered Hawaii in the same period.  While the Japanese and 
Korean emigrants preferred to marry women of the same nationality, Chinese immigrants 
married native Hawaiians because virtually no Chinese women were allowed t  enter 
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Hawaii.218   
The influx of the Japanese “picture brides” alleviated the imbalanced gender ratio 
of Japanese males to females from 4 to 1 in the 1890s to 3 to 2 by 1920.219  The system of 
“picture marriage” gradually transformed the Japanese immigrant society from bachelor-
based dekasegi laborers to permanent residents with wives and children.220  They were 
“unconsciously Americanized to the point where they no longer desired to return to Japan 
permanently.”221  While residing in Hawaii for years, they came to favor life in Hawaii 
more than their life in Japan based on feudalistic customs and traditions.  Those who had 
children were likely to settle in Hawaii, and many of them moved to cities and 
established their own businesses.   
In the course of Americanization and the development of the Japanese community 
in Hawaii, the Japanese, calling for equality, carried out large-scale and well-organized 
plantation strikes in 1909 and 1920.  In the Oahu strike of 1909 that involved all major 
plantations and lasted for four months, the Japanese leaders petitioned the planters to 
raise wages and to abolish the wage system based on the ethnicity of the laborers.222  
Supported by the Japanese press in Hawaii, the Japanese strikers argued they needed 
higher wages to support their families and to provide better housing.  It involved 7,000 
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Japanese plantation laborers and their families.223  The prices of food and clothing in 
Hawaii had increased by 25 percent between 1905 and 1908 while their wage remained 
the same at eighteen dollars a month.  Therefore, the strikers demanded to raise wages to 
$22.50 or 25 percent increase in order to sustain the minimum standard of living.224  
After a raise, consuming the fine rice and soy sauce imported from Japan, their quality of 
food improved by 1912.225  Meanwhile, in the strike of 1920 that eventually involved 
8,300 plantation laborers (77 percent of labor force), Japanese in cooperation with 
Filipino laborers demanded higher wages.226  Due to the Issei’s efforts to establish the 
permanent settlement and the development of Japanese community in Hawaii, by 1920, 
the number of Japanese increased to 42 percent or 109,000 out of a total Hawaiian 
population of 256,000.227    
 
Issei in Hawaii—Cultural Identity 
 Culturally connected to Japan to a large degree, many Japanese immigrants were 
proud to be Japanese subjects, and they preferred to pursue the traditional Japanese way 
of life.  In terms of cultural values and practices, the early Japanese community in Hawaii 
was not so distinct from a small community in Japan.  Significantly, coming to Hawaii as 
                                                
223 Ronald Kotani, The Japanese in Hawaii: A Century of Struggle (Honolulu: Hochi, 
Ltd., 1985), 42–45. 
 
224 Takaki, Pau Hana, 156–157. 
 
225 “Hawai no Nihonjin: Ueno Soryoji-dan” (Japanese in Hawaii, according to Consul 
General Ueno), Chuo Shimbun (Central News) (Tokyo), June 6, 1912. 
  
226 Kotani, The Japanese in Hawaii, 48–49. 
 
 227 U.S. Congress, House, Labor Problems in Hawaii, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 1923, H.R. 
1717, pt. 1, 3. 
 
 198
temporary laborers, they had no intention or need to be a part of Hawaiian community.  
Rather than assimilating into the Hawaiian population, the Japanese immigrants fo med 
their own ethnic enclave and isolated themselves from the other ethnic groups due to the 
nature of plantation life.  Forming numbers of kenjinkai (県人会, Prefectural Club) 
mainly consisting of Issei, the Japanese in Hawaii further distinguished themselves by 
drawing members who came from the same prefecture in Japan.  The mission of the 
kenjinkai was primarily aiding new immigrants from Japan, helping them find jobs, 
forming consumer cooperatives, and financially stimulated the establishment of private 
businesses.228  The kenjinkai even promoted the marriage between the persons from the 
same prefecture.  In fact, the k njinkai were both socially and economically crucial 
associations for the development of the Japanese immigrant community in America.229 
 In 1892, Reverend Takie Okumura established Nihongo Shogakko (Japanese 
Elementary School), the first Japanese language school in Honolulu.  Meanwhile, Fukuda 
Seiji founded the first Japanese language school named Nihongo Gakkō (日本語学校, 
Japanese Language School) in Maui in 1895.230  The educational policy and curriculum 
of the Nihongo Gakkō was initially nothing different from that of schools in rural 
Japan.231  The school aimed to educate the Nisei (second-generation Japanese) to be 
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Japanese subjects.  Since the Issei (first-generation Japanese) did not intend to stay in 
Hawaii permanently, they wanted their children to learn the Japanese way, values, and 
discipline.  Under the school regulations proposed by Reverend Okumura in 1896, the 
Nihongo Gakkō was to educate schoolchildren in Japanese style and to educate them 
reading, writing, and composition based on the textbook approved by the Japanese 
Ministry of Education.  On the Japanese national holidays, the Japanese schoolchildren 
went to the Nihongo Gakkō that held a ceremony to worship emperor’s portrait, to sing 
kimigayo (君が代, national anthem), and to read the Imperial Rescript on Education 
aloud, instead of attending the public school.  It was merely an “extension of the Japan se 
national education into Hawaii.”232 
 The Japanese immigrant leaders in Hawaii concerned that many Nisei children, 
raised by uneducated parents in the undesirable learning environment, needed adjustment 
to be decent Japanese subjects by teaching them proper Japanese language and 
wholesome “Japanese spirit.”233  In fact, the planters initially supported the Nihongo 
Gakkō by providing a building site and maintenance fee; however, after 1907 many 
Americans came to think it was inappropriate to teach the Nisei loyalty and patriotism 
toward Japan.  Revised for several times, the new Japanese textbook finally completed in 
1937 emphasized educating the Nisei to be loyal American citizens.234  
As the number of Japanese working in Hawaii increased during the shiyaku imin 
jidai, missionary work became more active.  The Japanese immigrants brought not only 
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Buddhism but also Shinto into Hawaii.  Established as early as 1897 with two priests 
from the headquarters in Kyoto, the Japanese Buddhist missionaries began to propagate 
the Nishi Hongwanji (Jōdo Shin-shu, a sect popular in southern Japan).235  A year later, 
the first Shinto shrine, Yamato Jinja (大和神社) was built in Hilo, where the Japanese 
plantation laborers were concentrated.  Especially after the “picture mariage” began, the 
Shinto shrines provided wedding ceremonies, hatsu mairi (the newborn’s first visit to 
Shinto shrine for blessing) service, and amulets.  In addition, the shrines offered plac  for 
leisure such as umo (Japanese wrestling) matches and go (a strategy game similar to 
Chinese chess) tournaments.236   
In fact, before the arrival of a Buddhist and Shinto priest, Miyama Kan’ichi (美山
貫一, 1847–1936), the first Japanese-speaking evangelist of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church, came to Hawaii and engaged in missionary work.  Cooperating with Consul 
General Andō Tarō and inspector-in-chief of Japanese Immigrants Nakayama Jōji, 
Miyama organized the Mutual Assistance Society (precursor of the Japanese Benevolent 
Society) in 1887.  The Hawaiian press praised Miyama as “a man of rare natural abilities, 
of intense personal devotedness…. he had come to be a power for righteousness among 
the increasing numbers of his countrymen” in Hawaii.237  Japanese churches were 
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established in Hilo in 1888, and then in Nuuanu and Honomu in 1894.238  Although 
Miyama succeeded in converting Consul General Andō to Christianity, his sermons and 
the Christian doctrines failed to attract the Japanese laborers in Hawaiian plntations, 
mainly consisting of people from Hiroshima and Yamaguchi in which Buddhism 
flourished.239  Andō, quitting drinking and smoking, founded the Issei’s temperance 
society known as Japanese Blue Ribbon League for eradicating evils of drinking and 
gambling.  Christianizing his wife and consulate stuffs, Andō was a great supporter of 
Miyama.240  Christianity did not thrive among Issei because it “could not overcome the 
cultural and religious barriers posed by the unstable, amoral nature of the plantation 
community and the entrenched Buddhist beliefs and customs of the Issei.”241   
By 1908, the Japanese community supported as many as thirty-three temples and 
shrines in addition to twenty-six churches.242  In 1915, a year after Japan entered World 
War I, Maui Jinja (馬哇神社) was built which was the first Shinto shrine in Maui.  As 
Inoue argues, the prospectus of the construction of Maui Jinja stated the Japanese in 
Hawaii as the “subjects of the empire of Japan” and encouraged the Japanese immigrants 
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to preserve their “Japanese spirit.”243 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
 A great number of Japanese had immigrated to Hawaii since the beginning of the 
kanyaku imin jidai to the end of the yobiyose imin jidai through the enactment of the 
Immigration Act of 1924.  Nearly 30,000 Japanese entered Hawaii during the kanyaku 
imin jidai between 1885 and 1894.  Then, during the s iyaku imin and jiyū imin jidai 
between 1895 and 1908, roughly 100,000 Japanese landed on Hawaii, and during the 
yobiyose imin jidai between 1908 and 1924, approximately 60,000 Japanese entered 
Hawaii.244  According to the record of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about 190,000 
Japanese arrived in Hawaii between 1885 (the year the first kanyaku imin left Japan for 
Hawaii) and 1924 (when the Japanese immigration to the United States was banned).245  
Of all, about 100,000 Japanese settled in Hawaii; nearly 40,000 moved to the mainland 
U.S., and roughly 60,000 returned to Japan.246   
Initially, they came to Hawaii as dekasegi laborers in order to accumulate wealth 
and return home to live a better life.  Sponsored by the government, the kanyaku imin 
could make enormous remittance to Japan and their achievement paved the way for the 
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mass emigration to Hawaii thereafter.247  It is important to note that as clearly stated by 
the Japanese Foreign Minister, the government came to promote the Japanese overseas
emigration as a means of obtaining foreign currency, which was crucial in the course of 
Japan’s rapid modernization.  Therefore, not only socioeconomic conditions but also the 
national policies “pushed” the Japanese to immigrate to Hawaii.  By the time of th  First 
Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, considerable numbers of draft dodgers and 
hoodlums entered Hawaii in addition to dekasegi laborers.  Unlike the kanyaku imin who 
were under governmental protection and supervision, the shiyaku imin and jiyū imin had 
to start with huge debts because they depended on the services of the greedy emigration 
companies to go to Hawaii.    
Consequently, social evils such as drinking, gambling, and prostitution thrived in 
the bachelor-based immigrant community often referred to a “bachelor society,” in which 
the yakuza had significant influence.  Significantly, Japan’s victories over China and 
Russia bolstered the nationalism and made the Japanese emigrants further keep cultural 
ties with Japan.  Although not intending to settle permanently, in order to live as the 
subjects of the Japanese Empire, they had built numbers of Buddhist temples and Shinto 
shrines in addition to Christian churches on the islands of Hawaii.  Because of their 
strong cultural ties to Japan as well as their growing population in Hawaii, the 
newspapers headlined such as “The Japanese Are Taking Possession of Hawaii: The 
Little Brown Men of Nippon Are Overrunning the Islands—Place Becoming Oriental zed 
Instead of Americanized” and reported that “Yellow Peril” was no longer a myth in 
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 204
Hawaii.248  As Iga Mamoru interpreted, Japanese’ preservation of culture and tradition 
obstructed their process of assimilation into American way to a large degree.249  Unlike 
the mainland United States, the anti-Japanese sentiment in Hawaii never developed into a 
large-scale movement because Japanese immigrants by then played an important role in 
the growth of Hawaiian economy.  Moreover, they were too many to be excluded in 
Hawaii. 
Finally, after the end of labor immigration, the Japanese women arrived at Hawii 
as “picture brides” and played a significant role in developing the Japanese communities 
through the establishment of families.250  The Japanese laborers’ demand to summon 
wives acted as a catalyst for the immigration of Japanese women in numbers.  Aft years 
of living in Hawaii, the Japanese immigrants gradually came to think Hawaii s their 
“home,” especially, once they had children.  It was natural for the Japanese in Hawaii to 
determine to settle permanently because Hawaii, receiving immigrants f om many 
countries, offered multicultural ground, which the Japanese were culturally important 
component although the ruling class remained the white planters.  Japanese immigrants, 
accounting for nearly 70 percent of plantation labor at its peak, 251  were indispensable for 
the expansion of sugar industry as well as for the development of Hawaii as a territory of 
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the United States.   
As Table 4.12 illustrates, the Japanese laborers played a crucial role in the 
development of the sugar industry in Hawaii especially after the late nineteenth century.  




Table 4.12: Hawaii’s Sugar Output and Japanese Laborers, 1890–1933 
Year 
Sugar Production Laborers 
Output (ton) Increase (ton) Total Japanese % of Japanese 
1890 129,899 – 17,895 7,560 42.25 
1894 153,342 + 23,443 21,294 13,684 64.26 
1901 360,038 + 206,696 39,587 27,537 69.56 
1905 426,428 + 66,390 45,243 28,406 62.79 
1915 646,445 + 220,017 45,704 28,807 63.03 
1925 776,072 + 129,627 49,579 9,191 18.54 
1933 1,035,548 + 259,476 48,072 10,217 21.25 
 
Source: Nippu Jiji-sha, Hawaii Nenkan (Hawaii-Japanese Annual and Directory), vol. 1 
(Honolulu: Nippu Jiji, 1927); Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka 




As much as the Japanese sought to make money for the welfare of their families 
and the nation, the planters in Hawaii sought cheap and effective labor force for 
accumulating their wealth.  The socioeconomic conditions in Japan and Hawaii created 











DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY 
 
 This chapter examines the inseparable relationship between the growth of 
Japanese maritime industry and overseas emigration.  Pursuing modernization of military, 
the Meiji government put weight on the strengthening of the Imperial Japanese Navy to 
join the world powers.  The government cooperation with Mitsubishi was one of the 
major factors that facilitated Japan’s rapid modernization.  Meanwhile, by assisting the 
Japanese government, Mitsubishi (and later Nippon Yusen Kaisha) grew in size and came 
to dominate various industries in Meiji Japan.  The extensive government subsidies for 
navigation and shipbuilding encouraged the huge expansion of maritime industry.  In that 
process, transportation of emigrants in great numbers stimulated not only passenger 
service but also freight across the Pacific.  This chapter attempts to demonstrate that 
Japanese overseas emigration was indeed a byproduct of Japanese modernization policy 
that focused on controlling the sea.   
 
The Rise of Mitsubishi 
The founder of Mitsubishi, Iwasaki Yatarō once said, “Development of the 
shipping will make Japan affluent.”1  Known as a seishō (政商, businessman with  
                                                





of fukoku kyōhei and the development of industries by 
utilizing his tremendous financial power.  The 
cooperation of the Japanese government and 
Mitsubishi significantly influenced the course of the 
development of Japan in many aspects.  Beginning in 
the Taiwan Expedition of 1874, where Yatar
his patriotism, the government and Mitsubishi had 
mutually supported each other’s interests.  The growth 
of shipping industry was in proportion to the gr
emigration.  Once the kanyaku imin
Kingdom of Hawaii signed an agreement in 1884, the Japanese government actively 
stimulated the development of the nation’s shipping indust
Nippon Yusen Kaisha2) was designed to benefit from the deal.  Subsequently, the large
scale Japanese overseas emigration not only produced enormous pro
contributed to making Japan one of the dominant maritime powers 
Furthermore, Mitsubishi played a significant role in the rise of capitalism in Japan 
through the development of shipping industry at first.  The rise of modern Japan was 
deeply related to the growth of Mitsubishi which facilitated the establ
national prestige among the world powers.  Examining the Japanese overseas emigration 
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that intertwined with the Japanese government policies, the emigration could be 
interpreted as a byproduct of the rapid industrialization and modernization for the 
establishment of a nation-state. 
 Briefly, Iwasaki Yatarō was a powerful entrepreneur who was a student of 
Nakahama Manjirō (a castaway who had contributed to the modernization of Japan) as 
well as Yoshida Tōyō (a reformer of Tosa-han who advocated the opening of Japan).3  
Born into a peasant family in Tosa-han in 1834, Yatarō had a quite humble life in his 
childhood, and he was sick of being poor.4  Financially supported by his relatives, Yatarō 
could attend school and learn Chinese ethics and classics.  Considering the samurai title 
would be crucial for his success, when Yatarō became twenty years old, he bought a title 
of a lower-class samurai called gōshi (郷士) with the help of his relatives.  With a title of 
samurai, he was able to go to Edo as an attendant of daimyo.5  Although after the 
assassination of Yoshida, Yatarō followed his teacher’s view that Japan needed to 
promote industries, shipping, and international trade in order to survive the economic 
competition among the world powers.6   
 Yatarō wisely took advantage of a series of political events in the early Meiji 
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period and accumulated great assets by dominating the shipping industry.  After the 
dissolution of the Kaientai developing from the Kameyamashachu organized by 
Sakamoto Ryōma in which Yatarō served as an accountant, the Tosa-han appointed 
Yatarō to be a superintendent of the shipping firm Tsukumo Shōkai (九十九商会, 
Tsukumo Trading Company) in October 1870.  Then, informed by his close friend and a 
member of the House of Councilors Gotō Shōjirō (後藤 象二郎, 1838–1897) that the 
government would exchange domain scrip with new national currency (yen) in 1871, 
Yatarō made an enormous profit by buying up 100,000 ryō (両, gold coin) worth of 
nearly valueless scrip and exchanging them with the new currency.7  After the Meiji 
government carried out haihan-chiken in 1871 (廃藩置県, abolition of the han [domains] 
and the establishment of the k n [prefectures] under the centralized government), the 
Tsukumo Shōkai transformed from a “domain enterprise” to a “private company.”  
Thereafter, Yatarō became the owner of the Tsukumo Shōkai and renamed it the 
Mitsubishi Shōkai (三菱商会, Mitsubishi Trading Company) in 1873.8  The Mitsubishi 
Shōkai engaged in the maritime transportation and trading business that eventually 
developed into the leading Mitsubishi zaibatsu (財閥, business conglomerates) in Japan.9  
Mitsubishi means “three diamonds,” which became a company emblem derived from 
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Tosa-han’s three-leaf crest and Iwasaki family’s three-stacked rhombuses.10 
 Gaining extraordinary credit with the government, the Taiwan Expedition (台湾
出兵) was the turning point in the future of Mitsubishi.  Although Yatarō was often 
known as a notorious businessman, he gave priority to the official business rather than his 
own interests in time of the national emergency.11  In 1874, the Home Minister Ōkubo 
Toshimichi (大久保 利通, 1830–1878) and the Finance Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu (大
隈 重信, 1838–1922) initially planned to utilize the British and American steamships for 
transporting the Japanese troops and war supplies for the Taiwan Expedition.  However, 
both countries, interpreting the Taiwan Expedition as a dispute between Japan and China, 
declared their neutrality.12  After unsuccessful attempt to utilize foreign steamships, 
recommended by Gotō, Ōkuma asked Mitsubishi Shōkai to help the government for 
transferring troops, weapons, and food to Taiwan during the punitive Taiwan Expedition 
because the semiofficial enterprise, the Yūbin Jōkisen Kaisha13 (郵便蒸気船会社, Japan 
National Mail Steamship Company), had also turned down Ōkubo and Ōkuma’s request.  
The board of directors of the Yūbin Jōkisen Kaisha considered the mission “too 
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dangerous and less profitable.”14  They were indeed afraid of losing their customers to the 
Mitsubishi Shōkai while helping the government’s campaign.  On the other hand, Yatarō 
willingly agreed to Ōkuma’s request and promised to utilize all Mitsubishi ships for the 
campaign.15  Therefore, the Mitsubishi Shōkai could keep thirteen ships owned by the 
government at the end of expedition.16  In addition, the Mitsubishi Shōkai secured 
government subsides of ¥250,000 annually for the next fifteen years in exchange for the 
promise to serve the country in time of emergency.  Trusted by the Ōkubo-Ōkuma line of 
the government, the Mitsubishi Shōkai took over the facilities, including eighteen ships 
and workers, following the collapse of the Yūbin Jōkisen Kaisha, and moved its 
headquarters from Osaka to Tokyo in April 1874.17   
 Learning from the danger of relying on foreign freights during the Taiwan 
Expedition, the Japanese government realized that Japan needed to develop its own 
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shipping and navigation.18  In exchange for the annual subsidy of ¥15,000, Mitsubishi 
established the Mitsubishi Nautical School in November 1875 to train Japanese 
navigation officers and seamen.19  Thereafter, utilizing the government subsidy and profit 
from the Mitsubishi mining sector, the Mitsubishi Shōkai established the Yokohama-
Shanghai route in February 1875 to meet the government’s demand for importing raw 
cotton.20  As the government envisaged, the company rose to be a high competitor of the 
predominant Pacific Mail Steamship Company (U.S.) and the Peninsular and Oriental 
Steam Navigation Company (British).21  The Mitsubishi Shōkai changed the name of 
company to the Mitsubishi Kisen Kaisha (三菱汽船会社, Mitsubishi Steamship 
Company) in May, and to Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha (郵便汽船三菱会社, 
Mitsubishi Mail Steamship Company) in September 1875.22   
 By drastically lowering the passage and freight rates, the Mitsubishi drove the 
Pacific Mail Steamship Company in 1875 and the Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company in 1876 out of the profitable Shanghai route and succeeded in 
monopolizing the coastal trade.23  First, to compete with the Pacific Mail Steamship 
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Company, Mitsubishi reduced both passenger and freight rates by 25 percent to 33 
percent with the government subsidy.  Akebono newspaper listed first-class passage, 
steerage, and freight rates of both the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and Mitsubishi 
Shōkai as of February 1, 1875.24 
 
 
Table 5.1: Passenger & Freight of P.M.S.S. and Mitsubishi by Comparison, 1875 
Routes P.M.S.S. Mitsubishi Discount 
 
Yokohama-Kobe 
 First-class passage $10 $7.50  25% 
 Steerage $5 $3.50  30% 
 Freight (per ton) $1.50  $1   33% 
 
Yokohama-Nagasaki  
 First-class passage $15 $10  33% 
 Steerage $7 $5  29% 
 
Yokohama-Songhai 
 First-class passage $30 $20  33% 
 Steerage $10 $7.50  25% 
 Freight (per ton) $3 $2   33% 
 
 
Source: “Mitsubishi Shōkai Taiheiyo Yusen to Kyōsō: Shanghai Yokohama no Kōro o Hiraku” 
(Mitsubishi Competition with the Pacific Mai l: Establishing the Shanghai-Yokohama Line), 
Akebono (Tokyo), February 1, 1875, in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen 
Shi, dai 2-kan, Minron Bokko-ki (A Meiji Chronicle through Newspaper Sources, Vol. 2, Era of 




Then, in order to compete with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company, Mitsubishi not only lowered the passage and freight rates but also pressured 
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the government to force “Japanese passengers entering or leaving Japan on foreign ships 
to have a government pass or face arrest” so that Japanese would use Mitsubishi’s 
service.25   
 
 
Table 5.2: Mitsubishi’s New Passenger and Freight, 1876   (¥1 = $1) 
 
Routes First-class Steerage Freight (per ton) 
Yokohama-Kobe ¥4 ¥1.5 ¥0.50 
Yokohama-Nagasaki ¥10 ¥2.5 ¥0.75 
Yokohama-Shanghai ¥15 ¥3 ¥1.70 
 
Source: “Mitsubishi no Unchin Ō-nesage” (Mitsubishi’s Huge Cut in the Fare), Tokyo Nichi 
Nichi Shimbun (Tokyo), March 26, 1876, in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji 
Hennen Shi, dai 2-kan, Minron Bokko-ki (A Meiji Chronicle through Newspaper Sources, Vol. 2, 




Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun reported that “Under such extraordinary low passage, it is 
foolish not to take ship.… I am going to sail from Shimonoseki to Shanghai for a report 
on the exposition.”26  The report indicated that going abroad became affordable and it 
was no longer a privilege of the elite. 
Without Yatarō’s strong dedication, it was impossible to defeat the Peninsular and 
Oriental Steam Navigation Company—a powerful British enterprise.  Mitsubishi 
survived the critical moment by firing sixteen employees including the oyatoi gaikokujin, 
                                                
 25 William E. Biernatzki, Roots of Acceptance: The Intercultural Communication of 
Religious Meanings (Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1991), 114; Wray, 
Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 84–93.  
 
26 “Mitsubishi no Unchin O-nesage” (Mitsubishi’s Huge Cut in the Fare), Tokyo Nichi 
Nichi Shimbun, March 26, 1876, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 2-kan, 
Minron Bokko-ki, 506. 
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reducing Yatarō’s salary by half and the company directors’ salaries by one-third.27  
Yatarō stressed that the Japanese company must regain the coastal trade otherwise t  
government’s effort for revising the “unequal treaties” with the Western cou tries would 
come to nothing.  Receiving a great support from the government, Yatarō argued that 
Mitsubishi was the company responsible for the promotion of the “prestige of the 
Japanese Empire.”28  On July 14, 1876, the Yūbin Hōchi Shimbun proudly reported the 
Mitsubishi’s victory over the British navigation company as “a happy event takes place 
for the Japanese people” and indicated “Japanese Empire is facing an opportunity to 
expand its navigation rights.”29  Mitsubishi’s defeat of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company significantly promoted national prestige and after July 10, 1877, the 
Meiji government required all Japanese merchant ships regardless of their size to ail 
under the national flag.30   
 Once again, Yatarō came to distinguish himself as an able entrepreneur by his 
wise decision-making during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877.  Suspending its regular
services, Mitsubishi utilized thirty-eight ships for transferring troops and war supplies for 
                                                
 27 Tateishi, Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu, 241.  
 
28 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 89–90. 
 
29 “Kyōteki P. O. Kaisha no Kyōsō o dahashite: Mitsubishi Shanghai Kōro no Kaiken o 
Haaku” (Winning the competition with the formidable P. O. Company: Mitsubishi Gett ng hold 
of the Shanghai Route’s Navigation Rights), Yūbin Hōchi Shimbun (Postal News), July 14, 1876, 
in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 3-kan, Seisui Yuran-ki (A 
Meiji Chronicle through Newspaper Sources, Vol. 3, Era of Seisui Yuran) (Tokyo: Meiji Hennen 
Shi Ryōfukai, 1965), 10. 
 
30 “Gaikoku Tokō no Shōsen: Kokki Keiyo no Fukoku” (Merchant Ships Going 
Overseas: Proclaiming Flag Raising), Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, July 10, 1877, in Nakayama, 




the government and made a profit of ¥1,200,000.31  Taking advantage of the Satsuma 
Rebellion that gave the company access to $810,000 loan from the government, the 
Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha bought four steamers and warehouses of the Shanghai 
line of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company.32  Additionally, Mitsubishi would buy 
another seven steamers from the Great Britain and made a tremendous profit by 
monopolizing overseas routes.33   
 By this time, Mitsubishi had established mutual relations with the government in 
the course of modernization.  While Mitsubishi required the government subsidies to 
expand its business, the government also required Mitsubishi’s services for its intere ts.  
Through the enormous government subsidies for the military transportation during the 
Taiwan Expedition of 1874 and the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, the Yūbin Kisen 
Mitsubishi Kaisha came to dominate the nation’s shipping industry within a short period, 
and the company came to own sixty-one ships (total 35,467 ton), or 73 percent of all 
ships in Japan.34  According to the Ministry of Communications, there were 210 
steamships with gross tonnage of 664,760 in 1880, and Mitsubishi owned thirty-seven of 
                                                
 31 Tateishi, Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu, 291.  If 
converted into the current money, ¥1,200,000 of 1877 is equivalent to ¥40,000,000,000. 
 
 32 Tsuboya, Meiji Rekishi, 214; Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 84–86.  These four 
steamers were Golden Age (renamed Hiroshima Maru 廣島丸), Costa Rica (renamed Genkai 
Maru 玄海丸), Nevada (renamed Saikyō Maru 西京丸), and Oregonian (renamed Nagoya Maru
名護屋丸). 
 
 33 Rudlin, The History of Mitsubishi Corporation in London, 19. 
 
 34 “Iwasaki Yatarō den” (Biography of Iwasaki Yatarō), Tosa no Jinbutsu Den (The 





them with gross tonnage of 41,162.35  Accordingly, as shown in Table 5.3, Mitsubishi 
shipping industry created 64.2 percent of the company’s total revenue in 1879, which 
increased to 68.0 percent in 1880.36   
 
 
Table 5.3: Profits of Mitsubishi Shōkai, 1879–1885 (%) 






1879 64.2 23.8 – 36.7 124.7 
1880 68.0 18.5 – 24.6 111.1 
1881 40.5 18.2 15.0 17.3 91.0 
1882 42.9 5.9 31.7 21.3 101.8 
1883 – 13.3 54.6 40.3 108.2 
1884 – 23.5 87.0 55.3 165.8 
1885 – 12.1 91.6 36.7 140.4 
 
* Due to the uncategorized profits or deficits, the index marks above or below 100 %. 
  
Sources: Isao Hatate, Nihon no Zaibatsu to Mitsubishi: Zaibatsu Kigyō no Nihon-teki Fūdo 
(Japan’s Zaibatsu and Mitsubishi: The Japanese Features of Zaibatsu Enterprise) (Tokyo: Rakuyū 
Shobō, 1978), 28–29; William D. Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 1870–1914: Business 





In addition, seeking to open more overseas routes, Yatarō tried to establish a transpacific 
line to Canada with a Canadian government subsidy in 1879; however, his plan had to be 
called off when the severe competition with the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha began in 1882.37  
 Simultaneously, the government subsidies enabled the Mitsubishi to diversify into 
                                                
 35 Teishinshō, ed., Teishin Jigyō-shi dai 6-kan (History of Communications Business, vol. 
6) (Tokyo: Teishin Kyōkai, 1931), 932–933. 
 
 36 Hatate, Nihon no Zaibatsu to Mitsubishi, 28–29. 
 
 37 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 264. 
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copper and coal mining, banking, and shipbuilding.38  For example, Mitsubishi bought 
Yoshioka Copper Mine (吉岡銅山) in Okayama prefecture for ¥10,000 in 1873 and 
Takashima Coal Mine (高島鉱山) in 1881.39  Strongly urged by his friend and educator, 
Fukuzawa Yukichi, his pupil and Mitsubishi employee, Shōda Heigorō (荘田 平五郎, 
1847–1922)40, and Yanosuke, Yatarō finally determined to purchase the promising 
Takashima Coal Mine so that Gotō who was Yatarō’s old friend and Yanosuke’s father-
in-law would be free from a huge debt.41  In fact, the vise-president of Mitsubishi, 
Yanosuke had served concurrently as the president of Sōraisha (蓬来社), Gotō’s 
company, since 1876.42  Finally, Takashima Coal Mine was transferred to Mitsubishi 
when Mitsubishi paid Gotō’s debt, amounted to ¥900,000, to Jardine, Matheson & 
                                                
 38 Tsuboya, Meiji Rekishi, 216.   
 
 39 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 29, 41, 118–119. 
 
40 Recruited by Iwasaki Yatarō, Shōda was a leading figure of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu.  
Shōda played an important role in diversifying Mitsubishi into many areas including mining and 
shipbuilding.  He also drafted a “code of guidelines for operations, employee rights and job 
descriptions, and lines of command,” and it was crucial for the establishment of Mitsubishi as a 
well-structured corporation that could handle government contracts.  In fact, the government 
contacts became “indispensable” to the growth of the company, according to “Stories of Some 
Prominent Figures ‘Heigorō Shōda,’” Mitsubishi.com, http://www.mitsubishi.com/e/history/ 
series/heigoro/index.html (accessed December 6, 2009). 
 
 41 Gotō paid the Japanese government ¥550,000 to get Takashima Coal Mine in 1874 and 
established Sōraisha (蓬来社).  Gotō was indeed Yanosuke’s father-in-law because his eldest 
daughter Sanae and Yanosuke married in the fall of 1874.  Mitsubishi paid $200,000 in order to
take over the mine, according to Masaaki Kobayashi, “Gotō Shōjirō yori Baishū igo no 
Mitsubishi Takashima Tankō” (Mitsubishi’s Control of the Takashima Coal Mine, which was 
purchased from Gotō Shōjirō), Kanto Gakuin Daigaku Keizai-kei (Quarterly Journal of 
Economics), no. 215 (April 2003): 75; Tateishi, Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o 
kaerimizu, 294–295. 
 
42 “Iwasaki ga Sōraisha Shachō ni” (Iwasaki became the President of Sōraisha), Tokyo 
Akebono Shimbun (Tokyo), May 3, 1876, in in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji 
Hennen Shi, dai 2-kan, Minron Bokko-ki, 525–526. 
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Company.43  Since then, Mitsubishi exploited cheap labor and made an enormous profit 
from the mine, sufficient its shipping business during the fierce competition with the rival 
company.44  One of the main causes of Mitsubishi’s success was that the government 
permitted Mitsubishi to use convicts as mineworkers, which saved the company a 
tremendous expenditure.45  Moreover, in June 1884, Mitsubishi began the management of 
the state-operated Nagasaki Shipyard, in which Mitsubishi hired numbers of the Dutc 
engineers as the oyatoi gaikokujin and assigned them to utilize advanced technology for 
the development of shipping industry.46  As a result, Mitsubishi built the nation’s first 
iron steamship Yūgao Maru (夕顔丸) in 1885.  In April 1887, Iwasaki Yanosuke 
petitioned for the ownership of the shipyard and the government disposed of the Shipyard 
for ¥459,000 in June 1887, renamed the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard.47   
One of the characteristics of Mitsubishi was that Yatarō, inspired by Fukuzawa 
Yukichi, actively employed talented persons with high education, especially those w  
graduated from Keiō Gijuku and Tokyo University.48  For example, Fukuzawa introduced 
                                                
 43 Tateishi, Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu, 292–295.  
Tateishi argues that ¥900,000 in those days is equivalent to nearly ¥30,000,000,000 at present.
 
 44 Takashima Coal Mine had produced the most coal in Japan over ten years, according to 
Mikio Sumiya, Nihon Sekitan Sangyo Bunseki (An Analysis of the Japanese Coal-mining 
Industry) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), 131. 
 
 45 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 29. 
 
 46 Shoji Uemura, “Meiji Zenki Oyatoi Gaikokujin no Kyū o” (Salaries of Oyatoi (Japan’s 
Foreign Employees) in Early Meiji), Ryūtsū Kagaku Daigaku Ronshū, Ryūtsū• Keiei hen 21, no. 1 
(2008): 9. 
 
 47 “Nagasaki Zōsenjo” (Nagasaki Shipyard), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., 
http://www.mhi.co.jp/nsmw/introduction/history/archive/shiryou2.html (accessed November 12, 
2009). Stimulated by the arrival of the “black ships,” the Tokugawa Shogunate started building 
the shipyard with the assistance of the Dutch engineers in 1857, which was completed in 1861. 
 




numbers of his prominent pupils from Keiō Gijuku to Mitsubishi in the formative years 
of the company.  Importantly, many of them had studied abroad or traveled abroad 
previously; otherwise, Mitsubishi sent them abroad for studying.  The following table 
shows the Keiō Gijuku and Tokyo University graduates who contributed to consolidating 
the foundations of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Mitsubishi Directors Graduated from Keiō Gijuku & Tokyo University 
Mitsubishi Employees of Keiō Gijuku Graduates 
Name Year Position in 1885 Final Position 
Asada Masafumi 
(1854–1912) 
1874 Accountant, main office  Director, N.Y.K. 
Shōda Heigorō * 
(1847–1922) 
1875 General Manager, main office Top executive, Mitsubishi 
Yoshikawa Taijirō 
(1852–1895) 
1878 Manager, Kobe branch 





Executive, Mitsubishi (~1880) 
Official, Mitsui Bank (1892~) 











Assistant manager, Yokohama 
branch  
5th Governor, Bank of 
Japan (1898–1903) 
Iwanaga Shōichi * 
(1852–1913) 
1885 Manager, Kochi branch Director, N.Y.K. 
Mitsubishi Employees of Daigaku Nankō/Kaisei Gakkō (Tokyo University) Graduates 
Kondō Renpei * 
(1848–1921) 
1872 Manager, Yokohama branch 









1880 Manager, Tosa local office President, Tokyo Kaijō 
Maritime Insurance Company 
Nanbu Kyūgo * 
(1855–1928) 
1881 Chief, Takashima Coal Mine Administrator, Mitsubishi 
Ogawa Zenkichi * 
(1856–1919)  
1885 Assistant manager, Kobe branch Director, N.Y.K. 
Katō Takaaki * 
(1860–1926) 
1885 Assistant manager, Kobe branch 24th Prime Minister 
 
* = experience in studying abroad or traveling abroad. 
                                                
Hunter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 76. 
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Sources: created based on the information provided in Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo, ed., Nihon 
Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha Hyakunenshi (A Hundred-Year History of the Japan Mail Steamship 
Company) (Tokyo: Nihon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 1988); Asahi Shinbunsha, ed., Asahi Nihon 
Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten (Biographical Dictionary of Japanese Historical Figures) (Tokyo: Asahi 
Shinbunsha, 1994); Masaaki Ueda, et al., Kodansha Nihon Jinmei Daijiten (Kodansha Japanese 
Biographical Dictionary) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2001); “Mitsubishi Jinbutsu-den” (Biographies of 




 Although Yatarō himself had never received Western education, he realized based 
on his experience that the introduction of Western knowledge would be crucial for his 
company to achieve a great success.49  In 1880, Mitsubishi established the Mitsubishi 
Money Exchange House; however, it had to be closed down during the “Matsukata 
Deflation.”  Nevertheless, in 1885 Mitsubishi managed to start the banking business by 
merging the 119th and 149th National Banks in which Mitsubishi had all stocks.50  
Afterwards, the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha took over the management of the bank.  
In 1893, due to the Commercial Law, the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha changed the 
name to Mitsubishi Gōshi Kaisha (三菱合資会社), and all executives and employees of 
the 119th National Bank became employees of the Mitsubishi thereafter.51  Capitalized at 
¥1,000,000, the Mitsubishi Gōshi Kaisha officially established the Mitsubishi Gōshi 
Kaisha Ginkō-bu (三菱合資会社銀行部, Banking Department of the Mitsubishi 
                                                
 49 “Iwasaki Yatarō Monogatari: vol. 14 Fukuzawa Yukichi to Yatarō” (Story of Iwasaki 
Yatarō: vol. 14, Fukuzawa Yukichi and Yatarō), Mitsubishi.com, http:// www.mitsubishi.com/j/ 
history/series/yataro/yataro14.html (accessed January 5, 2010). 
 
 50 Mitsubishi Ginkōshi Hensan Iinkai, Mitsubishi Ginko Shi (History of Mitsubishi Bank) 
(Tokyo: Mitsubishi Ginko, 1954); Kiyoshi Tatematsu, “Nihon Shihon Shugi Kakuritsuki no 
Mitsubishi Zaibatsu” (The Mitsubishi Zaibatsu in the Formative Period of Japanese Capitalism), 
Hitotsubashi Kenkyū (Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Science) 25 (July 1973): 87.  Mitsubishi 
more actively diversified from shipping to mining, shipbuilding, banking, and financing, after the 
merger of the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha and the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha in 1885. 
 
 51 Mitsubishi Ginko Shi (A History of Mitsubishi Bank) (Tokyo: Mitsubishi Ginko Shi 
Hensan Iinkai, 1954). 
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Company) as its private bank in 1895.52  
 
The Establishment of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
 The monopoly of the shipping business by Mitsubishi became difficult when 
powerful supporters of Mitsubishi disappeared from the government office.  First, Ōkubo 
Toshimichi, commanding the Imperial Army against Satsuma during the Satsuma 
Rebellion of 1877, was assassinated in 1878 by the Satsuma samurai who regarded 
Ōkubo as a traitor.  Then, Ōkuma Shigenobu fell from power in 1881 because of his 
confrontation with the Satsuma-Chōshū faction over the issues such as the establishment 
of constitution, national assembly, foreign loans, and illegal disposal of property of the 
Kaitakushi (Colonization Board).  Ōkuma was a sympathizer of the jiyū minken undō.  
Therefore, the Ōkuma faction with the support of Keio Gijuku intellectuals conflicted 
with the Itō and Inoue faction, and the latter expelled the Ōkuma faction from the 
government.  While Ōkuma supported a British-style constitutional government, Itō and 
Inoue sought the establishment of the German-style constitutional monarchy.  Itō 
considered it necessary to place the emperor as the center of the state for promoting the 
establishment of the modern nation-state with a strong sense of nationalism.  The 1881 
Political Crisis called Meiji jūyonen no seihen (明治十四年の政変, “Political Change of 
the Fourteenth Year of Meiji”) negatively affected Mitsubishi because it indicated a shift 
from the pro-Mitsubishi to anti-Mitsubishi government. 53  
                                                
 52 “Mitsubishi ni Ginkō-bu Shinsetsu” (Mitsubishi’s Newly-Established Banking 
Department), Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, October 16, 1895, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji 
Hennen Shi, dai 9-kan, Nisshin Sensō, 307. 
 
 53 Ōkubo was a former Satsuma Samurai, however, during the Satsuma Rebellion he 




Yatarō, establishing close connections with Ōkuma, had to deal with numbers of 
difficulties coming unexpectedly afterwards.  The Satsuma-Chōshū faction of the 
government and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (三井物産, Mitsui Trading Company, 
established in 1876 backed by the powerful Chōshū politicians such as Inoue Kaoru and 
Shibusawa Eiichi), challenged Mitsubishi by setting up the semiofficial shipping 
company Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha (K.U.K. 共同運輸会社, Cooperative Transport Company) 
in July 1882 in order to interrupt “Mitsubishi’s increasing neglect of shipping in favor of 
outside investments, mostly in mining.”54  The Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha was “an amalgam of 
trading firms, local shipping enterprises, and government investment” in order to counter 
the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha’s diversification of business.55  After all, it was a 
competition between the later zaibatsu of Mitsubishi and Mitsui.  In reaction to the 
emergence of a mighty competitor consisting of anti-Mitsubishi groups, the Yūbin Kisen 
Mitsubishi Kaisha began a fierce price war that lasted for two years and nine mo ths.   
 As a result of the price war, both shipping companies charged almost nothing for 
                                                
old friend.  The defeated Satsuma samurai were resentful about Ōkubo being a traitor, and 
Shimada Ichiro from Kaga-han and six others assassinated Ōkubo on May 14, 1878.   
 
 54 “Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK),” in International Directory of Company 
Histories, Volume 72, ed. Tina N. Grant (Chicago: St. James Press, 2005), http://www. 
fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Nippon-Yūsen-Kabushiki-Kaisha-NYK-Company-
History.html (accessed July 7, 2009).  In short, the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha was a union of the 
Chōshū faction and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha against the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu’s monopoly, 
according to Masao Toyama, Nihon Keizai-ron: Shiteki Katei to Genjō Bunseki (A Theory of 
Japanese Economy: A Historical Course and Analysis of the Present Situation) (Tokyo: Kobundo 
Shuppansha, 1969), 70. 
 
 55 “Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK),” in International Directory of Company 
Histories, Volume 72, ed. Grant; Rudlin, The History of Mitsubishi Corporation in London, 20.  
The amalgamation of local shipping companies such as Tokyo Fuhansen Kaisha (東京風帆船会
社, 1880–1883), Ecchū Fuhansen Kaisha (越中風帆船会社, 1881–1883), and Hokkaido Unyu 
Kaisha (北海道運輸会社, 1882–1883) composed the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha, according to a chart 
provided in the Shibusawa Eiichi Memorial Foundation, http://www.shibusawa.or.jp/eiichi/ 
companyname/037.html (accessed January 3, 2010). 
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shipping.  As shown in Table 5.3 (p. 214), the shipping sector of the Mitsubishi had made 
a considerable profit from shipping between 1879 and 1882; however, it came to operate 
at a loss between 1883 and 1885 due to the severe competition with the Kyōdō Unyu 
Kaisha.  To attract more customers, Mitsubishi reduced the certain freight rates by 90 
percent.56  For example, the steerage freight between Yokohama and Kobe was lowered 
from 5 yen and 50 sen to merely 55 sen.57  Moreover, in order to attract more customers, 
Mitsubishi served a big sponge cake with Mitsubishi mark to passengers as a souvenir.58  
Simultaneously, the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha not only lowered the freight but also increased 
the amount of rebates.59  It seemed almost impossible for Mitsubishi to put the 
semiofficial Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha in financial difficulties; however, Yatarō never 
withdrew from the competition.  In order to compete with such a giant, Mitsubishi shut 
down unprofitable services to Ryukyu and Hong Kong, closed down the Mitsubishi 
Money Exchange House (established in 1880), and sold off superannuated ships.60  
Additionally, Mitsubishi had to shut down the Mitsubishi Commercial School (三菱商業
学校, Mitsubishi shōgyō gakkō) in the time of “Matsukata Deflation” to curtail 
expenditure. 61  The Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha survived the intense competition by 
                                                
 56 Weston, Giants of Japan, 17. 
 
 57 Gaku, Bakumatsu Ishin Eiketsutachi no Iibun, 56. 
 
 58 Toru Suzuki, Nihonshi Kawaraban: Rekishi Jiken o Tettei Kensho! (Reports on 
Japanese History: Through Examination of Historical Incidents!) (Tokyo: Sanshusha, 2006), 208. 
 
 59 “Iwasaki Yanosuke Monogatari: vol. 4 Nippon Yūsen no Tanjō” (Story of Yanosuke 
Iwasaki: vol. 4 the Birth of Nippon Yūsen), Mitsubishi.com, http://www. mitsubishi.com/j/ 
history/series/yanosuke/yanosuke04.html. 
 
 60 Gaku, Bakumatsu Ishin Eiketsutachi no Iibun, 56. 
 




utilizing the profit produced in the mining sector.  As shown in Table 5.3 (p. 214), in 
1881, 15.0 percent of total profits of Mitsubishi came from Takashima Coal Mine; 31.7 
percent in 1882; 54.6 percent in 1883; 87.0 percent in 1884; and 91.6 percent in 1885.62  
 Over two years of Mitsubishi and Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha’s die-hard competition 
resulted in drastically lowering shipping and passage fees.  Used to struggling against 
adverse circumstances from his childhood, Yatarō was not going to give up no matter 
how the shipping sector of Mitsubishi operated at a loss.  As was expected, because of the 
excessive competition, both enterprises were about to become bankrupt and the nation’s 
shipping industry was in great danger.63  Indeed, their rivalry even led to a collision when 
ships of two companies left port on the same day at the same time using the same sa 
route.64 
 Meanwhile, Yatarō contributed to the rise of nationalism in Japan.  Instead of 
looking to his own interests, Yatarō always gave priority to the official businesses based 
on the national policy of fukoku kyōhei.  Yatarō clearly had it in mind that achieving the 
                                                
Yatarō: vol. 15, Nautical School, Commercial School), Mitsubishi.com, http://www.mitsub shi. 
com/j/history/series/yataro/yataro15.html (accessed January 4, 2010).  In 1878, encouraged by a 
teacher of Keiō Gijuku, Morishita Iwakusu (森下岩楠, 1852–1917), Iwasaki Yatarō established a 
business school named the Mitsubishi Commercial School in Kanda, Tokyo at the expense of 
Mitsubishi.  Most teachers of the school were consisted of Keiō Gijuku graduates (pupils of 
Fukuzawa Yukichi).  Yatarō’s eldest son, Hisaya was the first student of the school while 
attending Keiō Gijuku.  The Mitsubishi Commercial School taught English, economics, 
arithmetic, bookkeeping, mathematics, Chinese classics, composition, history, and geography.  
The school was closed down in 1884 due to the “Matsukata Deflation.” 
 
 62 Hatate, Nihon no Zaibatsu to Mitsubishi, 28–29; Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 
121, 189. 
 
 63 Rudlin, The History of Mitsubishi Corporation in London, 20. 
 
 64 Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo, ed., Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha Hyakunenshi, 25; 
Weston, Giants of Japan, 25. 
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goals of state was more important that making his own profits.65  In order to keep the 
Westerners from monopolizing the Japanese coastal shipping, Yatarō finally began to 
consider the merger inevitable and thereafter started preparing for that day.  For securing 
the dominance of Mitsubishi over the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha after the merger, Yatarō, the 
shrewd businessman, had secretly bought the stocks of the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha in large 
quantities when he was informed about the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha marked a deficit of 
¥25,000 in 1884.66  However, two days after the first talks with the government and the 
Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha, Yatarō, at the age of fifty, died of stomach cancer on February 7, 
1885.  After the death of Yatarō, the vice-president and his younger brother, Iwasaki 
Yanosuke (岩崎 弥之助, 1851–1908) succeeded as the president of the Mitsubishi 
Kaisha on February 16, 1885.67   
In September of 1885, under the pressure of necessity, the Japanese government 
merged the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha and the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha, and created a 
joint-stock company called the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha (日本郵船会社, Japan Mail 
Shipping Line) in order to prevent further excessive competition between two 
enterprises.68  Minister of Agriculture and Commerce Saigō Tsugumichi (西郷 従道, 
                                                
 65 Tateishi, Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu, 215.  
 
 66 Hiromi Arisawa and Kazuo Yamaguchi, Nihon Sangyo Shi (A History of Japanese 
Industry) (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1994), 112. 
 
 67 “Iwasaki Yanosuke Shachō Shūnin” (Iwasaki Yanosuke Taking Office as President), 
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, February 16, 1885, in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei 
Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 6-kan, Oka Seiji-ki (A Meiji Chronicle through Newspaper Sources, Vol. 6, 
Era of Westernization Politics) (Tokyo: Meiji Hennen Shi Ryōfukai, 1965), 42; Nihon Keieishi 
Kenkyūjo, ed., Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha Hyakunenshi, 25. 
 
 68 The Nippon Yūsen Kaisha was initially a semiofficial company; however, it becam  
private enterprise with enormous Mitsubishi influence due to the Commercial Code of July 1893.  
Due to the Commercial Code, the company was renamed Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha. 
 
 227
1843–1902) who was a younger brother of Saigō Katamori was responsible for the 
adjustment.69  Subsequently, the second president of the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha, Morioka 
Masafumi (森岡 昌純, 1834–1898) was appointed as the first president of the Nippon 
Yusen Kaisha in October.70  Following the establishment of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 
Mitsubishi under the second and resourceful president Iwasaki Yanosuke decided to 
diversify the company’s interests “from the sea to the land” such as mining, shipbuilding, 
banking, financing, trading, insurance, and real estate.71 
 Capitalized at ¥11,000,000, of which Mitsubishi invested ¥5,000,000 (for 100,000 
stocks) and the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha invested ¥6,000,00072 (for 120,000 stocks), the 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha became the largest joint-stock company in Japan.73  Although the 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha had total 220,000 stocks, Mitsubishi had 100,000 stocks 
(equivalent to 45.5 percent), the government had 52,000 stocks (23.6 percent), and the 
                                                
69 Yoshio Sakata, Shikon Shōsai: Nihon Kindai Kigyō no Hassei (Samurai Spirit and 
Business Talent: Emergence of the Japanese Modern Corporations) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964), 68. 
 
 70 “Nippon Yūsen Kaisha: Shachō Riji no Ninmei” (Nippon Yūsen Kaisha: Appointment 
of President and Committee), Chōya Shimbun (Tokyo), October 1, 1885, in Nakayama, ed., 
Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 6-kan, Oka Seiji-ki, 163. 
 
 71 “Iwasaki Yanosuke Monogatari, vol. 5 Jigyō no Takakuka to Jinzai Tōyō” (Story of 
Iwasaki Yanosuke, vol. 5, Diversification of Industry and Employment of Talented Persons), 
Mitsubishi.com, http://www.mitsubishi.com/j/history/series/yanosuke/yanosuke05.html (accessed 
January 5, 2010). 
 
 72 “Mitsubishi to Kyōdō Unyu to Gappei shite Nippon Yūsen Kaisha Sōritsu saru: Shihon 
sōgaku wa 11,000,000 yen” (The Merger of Mitsubishi and Kyōdō Unyu creating Nippon Yūsen 
Kaisha: the Total Investment Amounted ¥11,000,000), Yūbin Hōchi Shimbun (Postal News) 
(Tokyo), September 17, 1885, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 6-kan, 
Oka Seiji-ki, 155.  For the establishment of the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha, the government invested 
¥2,600,000 while the rest of companies invested ¥3,400,000. 
 
 73 Sadao Matsuyoshi and Yoshio Ando, Nihon Yūsō Shi (A History of Japanese 
Transportation) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1971), 401; Suzuki, Nihonshi Kawaraban, 208.  
According to “Iwasaki Yanosuke Monogatari: vol. 4 Nippon Yūsen no Tanjō,” many 
stockholders of the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha were Mitsubishi-related persons.  Therefore, although 
renamed, the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha was in fact under the control of Mitsubishi.  
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rest of Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha had 68,000 stocks (30.9 percent).  Significantly, since the 
majority of Mitsubishi stocks were concentrated on the Iwasaki family, Mitsubishi 
became the largest stockholder of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and came to dominate the 
company and its management.74  According to William D. Wray’s study, the largest 
stockholder of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha in 1887 was Yatarō’s eldest son Hisaya who 
owned 16.6 percent of total; the second largest was the Imperial Household Ministry 
owning 14.2 percent; the third was Yanosuke owning 9.1 percent; and the fourth was the 
Finance Ministry owning 6.3 percent.75  Therefore, it was a nominal merger and more 
appropriate to describe as Mitsubishi merged the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha into the Yūbin 
Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha and created the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha.  
Significantly, the excessive competition of the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha 
and the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha greatly contributed to the rapid growth of the Japanese 
emigration to Hawaii in the late 1880s.76  Among the twenty-six shipments of the 
kanyaku imin, the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha carried out twenty-four times, conveying 27,189 
Japanese laborers to Hawaii.77  Of all, Yamashiro Maru entered service for twelve times, 
carrying 13,121 Japanese to Hawaii.78   
 
                                                
 74 Hisashi Masaki, Nihon no Kabushikigaisha Kinyū (Japanese Joint-Stock Companies, 
Financial Business) (Kyoto: Minerva Shobō, 1973), 44. 
 
 75 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 240–241. 
 
 76 Ibid., 263. 
 
 77 Yoshiaki Nishimukai, “Transportation of Japanese Emigrants in the Pre-Wa  Period,” 
Keizai Keiei Kenkyū: Nenpō (Annual report on economics and business administration) 18, no. 1 
(December 1967): 83. 
 
 78 Yamashiro Maru, built by Armstrong, Mitchell & Company for the Kyōdō Unyu 
Kaisha, was transferred to the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha in 1885 due to the merger.  
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Name of Ship Owner of Ship 




1st 2/8/1885 City of Tokio P.M.S.S. (US) 5,000 944 
2nd 6/17/1885 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 K.U.K.*(Japan) 2,527 988 
3rd 2/14/1886 City of Peking P.M.S.S. (US) 5,000 927 
4th 12/10/1887 Wakaura Maru 和歌浦丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,115 1,447 
5th 6/1/1888 Takasago Maru 高砂丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,121 1,063 
6th 11/14/1888 Takasago Maru 高砂丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,121 1,081 
7th 12/26/1888 Takasago Maru 高砂丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,121 1,143 
8th 3/2/1889 Ōmi Maru 近江丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,473 957 
9th 10/1/1889 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 997 
10th 11/21/1889 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 1,050 
11th 1/9/1890 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 1,064 
12th 4/2/1890 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 1,071 
13th 5/22/1890 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 1,068 
14th 6/17/1890 Sagami Maru 相模丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 1,885 596 
15th 3/11/1891 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 1,093 
16th 3/30/1891 Ōmi Maru 近江丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,473 1,081 
17th 4/28/1891 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 1,091 
18th 5/29/1891 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 1,488 
19th 6/18/1891 Miike Maru 三池丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 3,308 1,101 
20th 1/9/1892 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 1,098 
21st 6/25/1892 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 1,124 
22nd 11/28/1892 Yamashiro Maru 山城丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 2,527 989 
23rd 3/6/1893 Miike Maru 三池丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 3,308 729 
24th 6/6/1893* Miike Maru 三池丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 3,308 1,757 
25th 10/9/1893* Miike Maru 三池丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 3,308 1,631 
26th 6/15/1894* Miike Maru 三池丸 N.Y.K. (Japan) 3,308 1,491 
Total By Japanese ships = 27,198 By foreign ships = 1,871 29,069 
 
* K.U.K. = Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha (merged with Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha on September 29, 
1885 and became the Nippon Yusen Kaisha); P.M.S.S. = Pacific Mail Steamship Company; 
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N.Y.K. = Nippon Yūsen Kaisha 
 
Source: Based on Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha Gojūnenshi 
(A Fifty-Year History of the Japan Mail Steamship Company) (Tokyo: Nihon Yusen Kabushiki 
Kaisha, 1935); Hawai Nihonjin Iminshi Kanko Iinkai, Hawai Nihonjin Iminshi (A History of the 
Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii) (Honolulu: Hawaii Nikkeijin Rengo Kyōkai, 1964), 99–100.  




 In fact, those ships utilized for transporting the kanyaku imin were all foreign-
made because the shipyards in Japan did not have technology to build such large ships.  
For instance, while a foreign ship was capable of carrying about 2,000 gross tons on 
average, a domestic ship merely carried 250 gross tons in 1896.79  In order to stimulate 
the development of maritime industry and the promotion of the private shipbuilding, the 
Japanese government80 promulgated the Kōkai Shōrei Hō (航海奨励法, Navigation 
Promotion Law) and Zōsen Shōrei Hō (造船奨励法, Shipbuilding Promotion Law) on 
March 24, 1896.81  The Kōkai Shōrei Hō aimed to encourage the establishment of long-
distance routes by subsidizing 25 sen per mile of voyage for iron and steel ships of less 
than fifteen years old, and over 1,000 gross tons with a speed of minimum ten nautical 
miles per hour.82  Meanwhile, the Zōsen Shōrei Hō aimed to facilitate the development of 
shipbuilding industry by subsidizing twelve yen per ton for building iron and steel ships 
                                                
 79 Tomohei Chida and Peter N. Davies, The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding 
Industries: A History of Their Modern Growth (London: Athlone, 1990), 214.  The number of the 
domestic ships exceeded the foreign ships in the course of World War I.  
 
 80 The Japanese government was led by the 2nd Ito Cabinet, and Matsukata Masayoshi 
remained the Finance Minister. 
 
 81 “K ōkai Shōrei Hō kōfu” (Promulgation of Navigation Promotion Law) and “Zosen 
Shōrei Ho kōfu” (Promulgation of Shipbuilding Promotion Law), Kanpō (The Official Gazette), 
March 24, 1894, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 9-kan, Nisshin Sensō, 
387. 
 
 82 “K ōkai Shōrei Hō” (Navigation Promotion Law), Encyclopedia Mypedia (Tokyo: 
Hitachi Digital Heibonsha, 1998). 
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of 700 to 1,000 gross tons; twenty yen per ton for ships over 1,000 gross tons.  The 
government also provided subsidy of extra five yen per horsepower if these ships were 
powered by the engines made in Japan.83 
 Utilizing the profit made by monopolizing the shipment of the kanyaku imin, the 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha continued to expand its shipping business in the 1890s.  First, 
following the emergence of the cotton-spinning industry, demand for the imported raw 
cotton increased, resulting in the establishment of a regular service between Kob  and 
Bombay in November 1893.84  Significantly, due to the First Sino-Japanese War, the 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha mostly withdrew from the transportation of emigrants overseas 
because the company, giving priority to the nation, mobilized its big ships for the war 
efforts.85  Then, after the First Sino-Japanese War, receiving enormous indemnity from 
China based on the Shimonoseki jōyaku (下関条約, Treaty of Shimonoseki),86 the 
Japanese government assisted the Nippon Yusen Kaisha that had earnestly supported the 
                                                
 83 “Zōsen Shōrei Hō kōfu” (Promulgation of Shipbuilding Promotion Law), Kanpō (The 
Official Gazette), March 24, 1894, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 9-
kan, Nisshin Sensō, 387. 
 
 84 Ryōichi Furuta and Yoshikazu Hirai, A Short History of Japanese Merchant Shipping, 
trans. Duncan Macfarlane (Tokyo: New Service, 1967), 114; “Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha,” 
in International Directory of Company Histories, Volume 72, ed. Grant.  The Nippon Yūsen 
Kaisha was able to compete with the Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Company by 
making an alliance with the nation’s dominant spinning companies, according to Wray, 
Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 295–302.  
 
85 Yoshiaki Nishimukai, “Senzen no Imin Yusō to Waga Kuni no Kaiunngyō · Horon: 
Tokuni Hawai Imin Yusō ni Kanren site” (Transportation of Japanese Emigrants to Hawaii in the 
Pre-War Period), Keizai Keiei Kenkyū: Nenpō (Annual report on economics and business 
administration) 19, no. 1 (December 1968): 153. 
 
 86 Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895.  Signed between Japan and Qing China, the 
treaty ended the First Sino-Japanese War.  Japan was to receive 200,000,000 taels as indemnity in 
three years, which was equivalent to four years of the state budget.  Forcing China to pay the 
indemnity with the British pound, Japan established the gold standard by converting the British 
pound to gold.  From 1897 to 1917, two yen was equal to one dollar. 
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nation’s war effort by purveying the company’s ships.  Afterwards, allowed to retain the 
government’s fourteen ships for a nominal fee, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha came to 
dominate the nation’s shipping industry.  The gross tonnage of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
grew to 64,000 in 1894.87  Nevertheless, as Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun reported, the 
gross tonnage of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha reached 150,000 tons in 1895, entering its 
name in the world’s biggest shipping companies.88  As Japan’s trade expanding more 
than double in the years after the First Sino-Japanese War, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
established regular lines to Europe (Yokohama-London) in March, the United States 
(Seattle) in August, and Australia in October 1896, in addition to lines to China and 
Siberia.89  The establishment of the long-distance lines consequently stimulated the 
production of domestic large ships at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard.  Simultaneously, 
the increase in trade greatly contributed to the nation’s capitalistic development that 
enabled the establishment of regular long-distance overseas routes and new steamship 
companies, according to Tatematsu.90   
 As the nation’s maritime transportation developed through the enactment of the 
Kōkai Shōrei Hō and Zōsen Shōrei Hō in March 1896 as well as the creation of the 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha that transported majority of the kanyaku imin, demand for the 
                                                
87 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 303. 
 
88 “Yusen Kaisha wa – Sekai Yūsū no Kaisha” (Nippon Yusen Kaisha is the World’s 
Leading Companies), Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, May 12, 1895, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun 
Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 9-kan, Nisshin Sensō, 251. 
 
 89 Nihon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha, Golden Jubilee History of Nippon Yūsen Kaisha, 
1885–1935 (Tokyo: Nippon Yūsen Kaisha, 1935), 22–23.  A regular line to Europe produced 
approximately 40 percent of the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha’s revenue, according to “Nippon Yūsen 
Kabushiki Kaisha,” in International Directory of Company Histories, Volume 72, ed. Grant.   
 
 90 Tatematsu, “Nihon Shihon Shugi Kakuritsuki no Mitsubishi Zaibatsu,” 94. 
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overseas emigration continuously grew and numbers of publications on emigration 
circulated by the 1880s.91  According to William D. Wray, considerable numbers of 
intellectuals supported the Japanese emigration to Hawaii as a stepping-stone to Japan’s 
further expansion to Latin America and Australia.92  Pro-Mitsubishi politicians such as 
Ōishi Masami (大石正巳, 1855–1935) from Tosa analyzed the “relation between 
shipping, emigration, and the expansion of Japanese trade” and argued that the Meiji 
government should support the “peaceful emigration of Japanese overseas.”93  As Wray 
points out, the promotion on the Japanese emigration remained “semiofficial” during the 
Meiji Period.94  Unlike the emigration to Hokkaido that encouraged permanent settlemnt, 
emigration to Hawaii and the United States was completely different in nature because it 
was not for permanent settlement.  As the Foreign Minister Inoue stated, it was prim rily 
to obtain foreign currency for the national development and advanced farming 
technology for the development of the rural areas as well as to make a profit from trade.95 
 The number of Japanese immigrants to the mainland United States increased 
when the direct route to Seattle became available.  In 1896, largely owning to the Kōkai 
Shōrei Hō and Zōsen Shōrei Hō, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha established a regular service 
                                                
 91 See Chapter VII for details on publications that promoted overseas emigration. 
 
 92 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 263. 
 
 93 Ibid.; Akira Irie, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1879–1911 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 149.  Ōishi was a teacher at the Mitsubishi 
Commercial School founded in 1878. 
 
 94 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 263. 
 
95 Genkichi Imaizumi, Senku Kyūjūnen: Miyama Kanichi to Sono Jidai (Ninety Years of 
Pioneer: Kanichi Miyama and His Age) (Kamakura, Kanagawa: Mikunisha, 1942), 217–218, 




to Seattle when the Great Northern Railway offered Japan “to provide a docking area in 
Seattle and transportation for Japanese goods to the eastern United States.”96  The Nippon 
Yusen Kaisha provided a service per month, utilizing three steamships of Miike Maru, 
Yamaguchi Maru, and Kinshū Maru.  According to Kokumin Shimbun, the Nippon Yusen 
Kaisha would charge ¥240 for the first-class passage, 70 percent discount for the second-
class passage, and only ¥80 for the steerage class.97  In 1900, the gross carrying capacity 
of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha’s steamships reached 200,000 tons, and the company 
employed 1,200 officers with 3,500 sailors.  The third president of the Nippon Yusen 
Kaisha, Kondo Renpei (近藤 廉平, 1848–1921) advocated “a commercial compact” with 
the United States to “control the trade of China.”98  In 1901, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
increased the number of services to once every two weeks, utilizing six steamships of 
Shinano Maru, Kaga Maru, Iyo Maru, Kinshū Maru, Tosa Maru, and Ryojun Maru.  
Significantly, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha’s Ōno Natataro (大野 鉈太郎) became the first 
Japanese captain who navigated Ryojun Maru to Seattle in June 1901.99  In 1907–1908, 
five steamships of Shinano Maru, Kaga Maru, Iyo Maru, Aki Maru, and Tango Maru 
engaged in the service.  All ships except Shinano Maru were built at the Mitsubishi 
                                                
 96 E. Mowbray Tate, Transpacific Steam: The Story of Steam Navigation from the Pacific 
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98 “Comes to Study American Trade,” San Francisco Call, May 6, 1900. 
 
99 Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo, ed., Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha Hyakunenshi, 70; 
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Nagasaki Shipyard.100   
In addition, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha (東洋汽船会社, Oriental Steamship 
Company), a shipping company founded by Asano Sōichiro (浅野 総一郎, 1848–1930) 
in July 1896, came to contribute to the development of the nation’s shipping industry by 
establishing a San Francisco line in 1898 in cooperation with the Western Pacific 
Railroad Company.101  The Tōyō Kisen Kaisha utilized three large-class steamships; S.S. 
Hong Kong Maru (香港丸, 6,064 gross tons), S.S. Nippon Maru (日本丸, 6,048 gross 
tons), and S.S. America Maru (亜米利加丸, 6,210 gross tons).102  The Kaigai Dekasegi 
Annai, a guidebook to America, depicted the steamships of the Tōyō Kisen as “palaces 
floating on the ocean.”103  Considering the growing anti-Japanese sentiment in California, 
Asano’s decision to establish the San Francisco line seemed a risky attempt; however, 
Asano, like the most Japanese of the time, had never imagined that Japan would be a 
subject of exclusionism.104  Meanwhile, founded in 1884, the Osaka Shōsen Kaisha (大阪
                                                
100 Hayashi and Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo, Futatsu-hiki no Hata no motoni: Nihon Yusen 
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商船会社, Osaka Mercantile Steamship Company) began a service between Hong Kong 
and Tacoma in July 1906 in cooperation with Chicago, Milwaukee & Puget Sound 
Railroad Company.105  Simultaneously, these laws not only promoted the emergence of 
new shipping companies but also encouraged the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard to 
improve the performance of their ships to compete with the Western ships. In addition, 
the government subsidized the new service for importing raw cotton directly from the 
United States.106 
Indeed, during the early shiyaku imin jidai (self-contracted immigration period, 
1894–1900), the emigration companies depended on the foreign shipping companies such 
as the Pacific Mail Steamship Company (P.M.S.S.) and the Occidental and Oriental 
Steamship Company (O&O) to convey the emigrants because the Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
was busy serving for the nation.  However, after the Kōkai Shōrei Hō and Zōsen Shōrei 
Hō brought into effect, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha which had right to call at the port of 
Honolulu based on an agreement with P.M.S.S. and O&O in addition to owners of 
shagaisen (ships not owned by N.Y.K., T.K.K. or O.S.K.) played important roles in 
transporting emigrants to Hawaii.  Compared to shasen (ships owned by N.Y.K., T.K.K. 
and O.S.K.), shagaisen had relatively small capacity (about 1,500 to 3,770 tons); 
however, they conveyed as many emigrants as the hasen.107  As the domestic shipping 
companies grew, the dependence on the foreign shipping companies gradually decrease. 
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The prohibition of the contract-labor immigration in June 1900 had affected the 
development of the Japanese shipping companies.  Before resuming the transportation of 
emigrants, the Japanese government had to impose a series of restrictions in order to 
prevent the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States and to limit the number of 
emigrants by shutting down the shagaisen.108  In 1901, the transportation of emigrants 
resumed; however, the restriction on the number of emigrants obstructed the development 
of shipping companies.  Moreover, the government granted the right to convey emigrants 
to only those shipping companies that had established a regular line for two years that 
excluded the shagaisen from the emigration business.109  As a result, the shasen, in 
particular the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha and foreign companies such as P.M.S.S. and O&O 
dominated the shipping of emigrants during the jiyū imin jidai (1900–1907).  In all, the 
Tōyō Kisen Kaisha, utilizing its three big steamships (all ships over 6,000 gross tons), 
made total eighty-four shipments of the free immigrants to Hawaii between Jun  1900 
and 1907.110  Although being the only domestic company eligible for the shipment of 
emigrants, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha was not able to dominate the business due to the 
restriction on the numbers of emigrants to be sent every month.  In 1902, the Foreign 
Minister Komura Jutarō (小村 壽太郎, 1855–1911), seeking to mitigate the anti-Japanese 
sentiment in Hawaii, further reduced the number of the immigrants sent by each 
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emigration company from fifty to thirty monthly.111   
At the same time, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha had to compete with P.M.S.S. that 
began to utilize bigger and faster ships (S.S. Siberia and S.S. Korea, both over 18,000 
tons with speed of 18 knots and accommodation for 300 first-class passages)112, and the 
competition seemed disadvantageous to the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha was able to secure the 
decent numbers of passengers.  Nishimukai explains that the Japanese passengers 
preferred to use the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha because “the company had been receiving the 
national support.”  Therefore, although the P.S.M.M. offered better services, the Japanese 
people preferred to use the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha’s service, and surprisingly the number of 
Japanese passengers of the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha’s ships exceeded the passengers of both 
P.M.S.S. and O&O combined.113   The result indicated that the Meiji government’s 
implantation of “nationalism” through the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on 
Education (1890) was finally infiltrated into the Japanese mind.114  The Japanese 
passengers gave priority to the nation’s development rather than to their personal gain or 
interests, and the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha, taking advantage of “nationalism,” succeeded in 
securing enough Japanese passengers on the competitive route.  Meanwhile, in other 
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Hokushin Jihen, 405.  Graduated from Harvard Law School in 1878, Komura played an important 
role in repealing the “unconditional treaties” signed with the Western cou tries during the late 
Tokugawa Period. 
 
112 Walter Hines Page and Arthur Wilson Page, The World’s Work, vol. 4, May to 
October, 1902, A History of Our Time (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1902), 2130. 
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words, this institutionalized nationalism made the Japanese choose inferior services 
offered by the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha. 
During the Russo-Japanese War, most shasen were utilized for the nation’s war 
effort, and the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha’s Hong Kong Maru and Nippon Maru were not 
exception; consequently, the number of emigrants conveyed by the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha 
decreased.  Simultaneously, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha suffered a great loss from the war 
due to the requisition of all ships except nine with total tonnage of 13,594 and the 
suspension of overseas lines.  It took the company for years to recover to the 1895 profit 
level that marked the highest.115  In fact, the Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha (Oriental Trading 
Company) in Seattle, a leading labor contractor and import-export company that relied on 
the Nippon Yusen Kaisha’s trans-pacific service suffered financial difficulties.116  When 
the government allowed the conveyance of emigrants in July 1906, the shagaisen 
resumed their services.  However, the Immigration Act of 1907 and the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement of 1907–1908 that restricted the entry of labor immigrants significantly 
affected the course of the development of Japanese shipping industry.117   
While the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha and the Osaka Shōsen Kaisha became more 
competitive during the jiyū imin jidai, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha under strong influence 
of Mitsubishi continued to dominate the nation’s merchant shipping throughout the 
prewar era.  Particularly, in response to the Gentlemen’s Agreement that decreased the 
number of immigrants, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha determined to focus more on freight 
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rather than on the transportation of emigrants.  In September 1907, the Japanese firms 
including the Mitsui Company determined to utilize the Japanese vessels to carry freight 
due to the “unsatisfactory treatment” and “unfavorable attitude of foreign vessels.”  
Placing confidence in the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the Japanese firms boycotted the freight 
of the foreign steamship companies.  As a result, the freight of the foreign vessels 
decreased rapidly whereas the cargoes carried by the Nippon Yusen Kaisha drastic lly 
increased.118   
Meanwhile, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha introduced two large passenger liners for San 
Francisco line in 1908, the very year the Gentlemen’s Agreement was signed, which 
Japan agreed not to issue passports for the United States to laborers.119  When the 
transportation of immigrants took place actively, three shasen sent out total 7,000 to 
8,000 Japanese annually to the United States; however, the number of passengers reduced 
to 3,866 in 1920 and 3,393 in 1921.120  The Immigration Act of 1924 that completely shut 
down the Japanese immigration to the United States further put the shas ninto severe 
trouble.  According to Osaka Asahi Shimbun, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha lost about 70 
percent of passengers, transporting only 206 first-class passengers and 339 steerage 
passengers between July 1924 and June 1925.  The Tōyō Kisen Kaisha lost about half of 
passengers.  Meanwhile, the Osaka Shōsen Kaisha marked a sixty-percent decrease in the 
first half of the year 1925 compared with the same period of the previous year, and 
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transported 105 first-class passengers and 443 steerage passengers.121  In 1926, the 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha merged the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha’s trans-pacific operations including 
San Francisco line that suffered a business depression due to the enactment of the 
Immigration Act of 1924.122   
The prosperity of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha contributed to the expansion of 
Mitsubishi zaibatsu that successfully established its predominance over various sectors, 
including shipping, shipbuilding, insurance, and heavy industry.  Especially after the 
revision of the Kōkai Shōrei Hō (Navigation Promotion Law) and Zōsen Shōrei Hō 
(Shipbuilding Promotion Law) in 1900, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha’s purchase of large 
ships from Mitsubishi facilitated the diversification of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu.123  The 
Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard built 64.1 percent of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha’s total 
tonnage of 200,897.124  Utilizing a profit from sales of ships, Mitsubishi began to invest 
in metal mining, which came to produce as much as 38.2 percent of the company’s 
operation profits, if combined with coal mining, 55.2 percent, between 1894 and 1913.125   
Furthermore, Mitsubishi’s predominance was attainable through the propagation 
of its influence over the government.  To take an instance, the Finance Minister and the 
founder of the Bank of Japan, Matsukata Masayoshi, strongly recommended Kawada 
                                                
121 “Hokubei Kōro no Konjuku: Iminhō no Isshūnen o Mukaete; Fune Kaisha to 
Kankeisha wa Shiku-hakku” (Situations of the Trans-Pacific Line: A Year After the Enactment of 
the Immigration Act; Shipping Companies and Related Business in Great Trouble), Osaka Asahi 
Shimbun, July 1, 1925. 
 
122 Yamada, Fune ni Miru Nihonjin Iminshi, 59. 
 
123 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 291.  The Nippon Yusen Kaisha used to buy large 
ships from the British companies. 
 
124 Ibid., 458. 
 
125 Hatate, Nihon no Zaibatsu to Mitsubishi, 70–71, 109–111; Wray, Mitsubishi and the 
N.Y. K., 459. 
 
 242
Koichirō (川田 小一郎, 1836–1896) to be the third Governor of the Bank of Japan.126  
Kawada had worked under Iwasaki Yatarō since the time of Tsukumo Shōkai, and had 
established a strong connection with Mitsubishi.  In fact, when the government decided to 
subsidize the Nippon Yusen Kaisha for the establishment of the long-distance overseas 
routes, Kawada was serving as the third Governor of the Bank of Japan whose position 
had significant influence on the decision of the national economic policy.  Appointed by 
Prime Minister Matsukata Masayoshi, Iwasaki Yanosuke, a younger brother of Iwasaki 
Yatarō, became the fourth Governor of the Bank of Japan succeeding Kawada who 
passed away on November 7, 1896.127  Iwasaki family and Matsukata family was related 
by marriage because Yanosuke’s eldest daughter Shigeko (繁子) had married 
Matsukata’s second son Shōsaku (松方 正作).  The fifth Governor of the Bank of Japan, 
Yamamoto Tatsuo (山本 達雄, 1856–1947) had a close connection with Mitsubishi as 
well.  Yamamoto worked for the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha as an assistant manager 
of Yokohama branch after attending Keiō Gijuku and Mitsubishi Commercial School.  
Later appointed by Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi (西園寺 公望, 1849–1940), 
Yamamoto served as the Finance Minister during the second Saionji cabinet.128   
Iwasaki family had utilized a marriage of convenience for maintaining power.  
For example, Yatarō’s eldest daughter married Katō Takaaki (加藤 高明, 1860–1926) 
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and third daughter married Shidehara Kijūrō (幣原 喜重郎, 1872–1951), and both Katō 
and Shidehara later became Prime Ministers of Japan.  In addition to establishing family 
connections with politicians, Iwasaki and Fukuzawa family had maintained closer 
relations through the marriage between Iwasaki Yatarō’s granddaughter Ayako and 
Fukuzawa Yukichi’s grandson Kenji.  Furthermore, Yatarō’s another granddaughter 
Tokiko married Keizō, a grandson of the great financier Shibusawa Eiichi, who was the 
sixteenth Governor of the Bank of Japan and Finance Minister for Shidehara Cabinet.129  
The family tree of Iwasaki Yatarō illustrates how Mitsubishi successfully established 
closer relations with the key figures in the Japanese government through marriage of 
convenience.   
As shown in the family tree of Iwasaki Yatarō, it clearly indicated closer 
connections between the Japanese government and the Mitsubishi zaibatsu and illustrated 
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Iwasaki Yajirō (1808–1873): jige rōnin (former lower-ranked rural masterless samurai) 
of Tosa-han (present Kochi Prefecture). 
Iwasaki Yatarō (1835–1885): founder and the first president of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. 
Iwasaki Yanosuke (1851–1908): Yatarō’s younger brother, 2nd president of the 
Mitsubishi zaibatsu, 4th president of Bank of Japan, his wife Sanae was Gotō’
eldest daughter. 
Gotō Shōjirō (1838–1897): Communications Minister (Kuroda, Yamagata, and 
Matsukata Cabinets), Agriculture and Commerce Minister (2nd Itō Cabinet), 
advocate of jiyū minken undō (Freedom and People’s Rights Movement). 
Matsukata Masayoshi (1835–1924): statesman, founder of Bank of Japan, Finance 
Minister (1st Itō, Kuroda, 1st Yamagata, 2nd Itō, and 2nd Yamagata Cabinets), 4th 
and 6th Prime Minister. 
Iwasaki Hisaya (1865–1955): Yatarō’s eldest son, 3rd president of the Mitsubishi 
zaibatsu 
Katō Takaaki (1860–1926): diplomat, Foreign Minister (4th Itō,1st Saionji, 3rd Katsura, 
and 2nd Ōkuma Cabinets), president of Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 24th Prime 
Minister, his wife Haruji was Yatarō’s eldest daughter. 
Kiuchi Jūshirō (1866–1925): vice-Minister of Home Affairs, vice-Minister of 
Agriculture, member of the House of Peers, governor of Kyoto, his wife Isoji was 
Yatarō’s second daughter. 
Shidehara Kijūrō (1872–1951): Foreign Minister (Katō, Wakatsuki, Hamaguchi 
Cabinets), 44th Prime Minister, his wife Masako was Yatarō’s third daughter. 
Iwasaki Koyata (1879–1945): Yanosuke’s eldest son, 4th president of the Mitsubishi 
zaibatsu. 
Matsukata Shōsaku: Matsukata Masayoshi’s second son, his wife Shigeko was 
Yanosuke’s eldest daughter. 
Iwasaki Hikoyata (1895–1967): president of Mitsubishi Gōshi Kaisha, Hisaya’s eldest 
son.  
Fukuzawa Kenji: Fukuzawa Yukichi’s grandson, diplomat, his wife Ayako was Hisaya’s 
daughter. 
Shibusawa Keizō (1896–1963): Shibusawa Eiichi’s grandson, 16th president of Bank of 
Japan, Finance Minister (Shidehara Cabinet), his wife Tokiko was Yatarō’s 
granddaughter. 
Sources: created by the author based on the information provided in Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo, 
ed., Nihon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha Hyakunenshi (A Hundred-Year History of the Japan Mail 
Steamship Company) (Tokyo: Nihon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 1988); Asahi Shinbunsha, ed., 
Asahi Nihon Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten (Biographical Dictionary of Japanese Historical Figures) 
(Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1994); Masaaki Ueda, et al., Kodansha Nihon Jinmei Daijiten 
(Kodansha Japanese Biographical Dictionary) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2001); “Mitsubishi Jinbutsu-
den” (Biographies of Mitsubishi), Mitsubishi.com, http://www.mitsubishi.com/j/history/series. 
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*     *     *     *     * 
 
  Tracing the development of maritime industry and commerce in Japan, it became 
clear that the nation’s modernization process accompanied the growth of the Mitsubishi 
zaibatsu.  Japan then focused on achieving fukoku kyōhei to catch up the West, the Meiji 
leaders realized that nationalism as well as industrialization was essential for building a 
strong centralized nation-state.  In the circumstances, Iwasaki Yatarō had always 
demonstrated his strong sense of nationalism in time of emergency declaring “Kuni 
atteno Mitsubishi” (The nation is; therefore, Mitsubishi is).131  Therefore, Yatarō was one 
of the key figures who implanted the sense of nationalism into the Japanese people in the 
fledging nation-state.  Since the establishment of the company, successive pre id nts of 
Mitsubishi continued the policy of growing together with the state, and demonstrated 
their dedication to the nation’s achievement.132  Mitsubishi demonstrated that without 
abandoning Japan’s national identity and patriotism, the adoption of Western technology 
and practice was possible that was inevitable for the survival of Japan. 
 As examined earlier, although it could seriously risk his company’s management, 
Iwasaki willingly supported the causes of the government during the Taiwan Expedition 
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and the Satsuma Rebellion, and paved the way for the rise of nationalism in the formative 
phase of modern Japan.  In addition, replying the government disposal of thirteen ships to 
Mitsubishi at a nominal fee after the Taiwan Expedition, Iwasaki decided to pay 
¥300,000 by yearly installments over a period of fifty years although he had no obligati n 
to do so.133  Yatarō’s enormous monetary contribution drastically relieved the 
government exhausted from two campaigns in four years.  In many terms, the Meiji 
government was indebted to Mitsubishi; therefore, it was natural for the government 
(except Chōshū faction) to pass laws that would be advantageous to Mitsubishi.  In the 
Meiji period, the growth of Mitsubishi was indeed the barometer of the national prestige.  
In the circumstance, the Japanese maritime industry under the leadership of Mitsubishi 
expanded and the growing demand for overseas emigration resulted in the establishment 
of new long-distance lines.  The transportation of the kanyaku imin between 1886 and 
1894 became a landmark in the history of Japanese maritime industry that paved the way 
for the massive emigration.  Meanwhile, reviewing the Mitsubishi’s strategy for the 
expansion of business, Kobayashi Masaaki regarded Mitsubishi as “the large privat  
enterprise in Japan which adroitly utilized the ‘nationalism’ of the government.”134  
Although some scholars such as Kobayashi viewed Mitsubishi exploited the government, 
it is an undeniable fact that Mitsubishi played an indispensable role in the Japanese 
expansionism and significantly influenced the direction that the Meiji government was 
taking.  Therefore, regarding the contribution of Mitsubishi in the Meiji period, Yatarō’s 
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phrase “Kuni atteno Mitsubishi” (The nation is; therefore, Mitsubishi is)135 could be 
interchangeable with “Mitsubishi atteno Kuni” (Mitsubishi is; therefore, the nation is) in 
many aspects.  Significantly, as much as the nation benefitted from Mitsubishi, 
Mitsubishi took advantage of the government and steadily increased its company assets.
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 This chapter seeks to illustrate the influence of Meiji intellectuals and 
publications that motivated various classes of Japanese to go to America.  The first alf 
of the chapter deals with the pro-western intellectuals of the Meiji period.  Publishing 
numbers of books on the West, the intellectuals stimulated the elite class to go to 
America for studying so that they would learn Western science and technology, which 
was essential for pursuing Japan’s rapid modernization.  Relying on the power of writing, 
the Meiji government sought to achieve fukoku kyōhei by actively adopting and then 
modifying the Western models.  Meanwhile, the rise of nationalism following the First 
Sino-Japanese War brought about a change in immigration pattern in the 1890s as well as 
a change in attitude toward other Asian countries.  The latter half of the chapter deals 
with guidebooks that appealed to the mass for emigration to America.   
Focusing on the role played by prominent educators, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi 
and Muto Sanji, I will try to demonstrate how the Meiji intellectuals and their 
publications either directly or indirectly encouraged the Japanese emigration to he 
United States.  Then, examining the contents of guidebooks, I will analyze the reasons for 




Fukuzawa Yukichi—an advocate of Western liberalism for the rise of nationalism 
 Fukuzawa Yukichi was one of the most 
significant intellectuals in the nineteenth century 
Japan who advocated opening trade.  Following 
Fukuzawa’s manner, influential politicians such as 
Okuma Shigenobu and Ito Hirobumi promoted 
foreign trade.  Japan’s trade with the United States 
expanded with the emergence of entrepreneurs such 
as Iwasaki Yatarō and Shibusawa Eiichi.1  Visiting 
the United States in 1860 as a member of the first 
Japanese mission to the United States, Fukuzawa 
Yukichi played a crucial role in promoting Western 
civilization and motivating young Japanese to go to 
America.  Without Fukuzawa’s powerful publications that introduced things of the West, 
the Japanese overseas emigration would probably take place much later.   
Although Fukuzawa is regarded as the most prominent educator and writer in 
modern Japan, he had a quite humble start.  Born in Osaka on January 10, 1835, 
Fukuzawa was the second son of a lower-ranked samurai of the Okudaira Clan (奥平氏) 
of Nakatsu-han (中津藩) in Kyushu.2  Serving as an accountant of the clan, Fukuzawa’s 
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Fukuzawa Yukichi in London, 1862 
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father, Hyakusuke (百助) was a talented scholar of Chinese classics; however, he had 
never been promoted under the strict class hierarchy system of the Tokugawa Japan.  
Hyakusuke died when Fukuzawa was only three years old, and Fukuzawa family moved 
back to Nakatsu-han and thereafter lived in poverty.  The impoverished Fukuzawa family 
could not afford to send Fukuzawa to school and Fukuzawa himself had no interest in 
learning during his childhood.3  In fact, Fukuzawa’s dream was “to be the richest man in 
Japan and to spend as much money” as he wished.4  Despite passing way over schooling 
age, Fukuzawa determined to go to school.  In order to earn extra money for going to 
school, young Fukuzawa even had side jobs such as repairing sandals.5  At the age of 
fourteen, Fukuzawa was finally able to attend a school of Dutch Studies (蘭学) that 
taught western science and ideas.   
 In February 1854, pushed by his elder brother, nineteen-year-old Fukuzawa 
willingly left for Nagasaki to learn the Dutch language and gunnery in order to be a 
Western weaponry specialist.  Simultaneously, while attending school in Nagasaki, 
Fukuzawa was designated to serve Iki, a son of Okudaira Clan’s chancellor who went 
there for the same purpose.  In contrast to Iki, Fukuzawa was a quick learner and a bright 
student.  Thus, Iki came to resent Fukuzawa being the top student in the school.6  In rder 
to avoid a conflict with Iki, Fukuzawa decided to leave Nagasaki.  By the time, 
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Fukuzawa’s resentment toward the feudal system grew further due to the strict class 
hierarchy system that barred him from getting promotion, and the inequality th t 
prevented him from demonstrating his talent and skill.  By then, Fukuzawa swore 
vengeance against the unjust feudal system existed in Japan.7  Although planning to 
continue his study in Edo, Fukuzawa, persuaded by his brother, decided to stayed in 
Osaka for learning Dutch language and medicine at the Tekijuku school (適塾) run by 
Ogata Kōan (緒方洪庵, 1810–1863), a doctor and Dutch scholar.  Fukuzawa studied 
under the guidance of Ogata for three years.8     
 Fukuzawa’s career as an educator began when he was twenty-three years old.  In 
1858, appointed as a Dutch language teacher for the Nakatsu-han’s young samuraiat its 
headquarters, Fukuzawa moved to Edo and established a school.  Provided by the 
Nakatsu-han, his small apartment located in Teppozu (鉄砲洲) in the Tsukuji district 
became a school known as the Keiō Gijuku (慶應義塾).9   Initially, the number of 
students attending the school was around fifty, but it had increased to eighty by 1867.  
Teppozu was designated to be a foreign settlement; therefore, the Tokugawa Shogunate 
relocated his school to Shinsenza (新銭座 ) in Shiba in 1867.   
 In 1859, in order to test his Dutch language skill, Fukuzawa traveled to the newly 
opened port of Yokohama where foreign settlement were located according to terms of 
the Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed in 1858.10  Fukuzawa was surprised that no 
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foreigners in Yokohama understood Dutch and that most of them communicated in 
English.  Fukuzawa was deeply disappointed when he found out his years of intensive 
study of reading Dutch books appeared to be worthless.11  In fact, Fukuzawa soon figured 
out that English was the language used in the port city.  Thereafter, Fukuzawa 
concentrated his energies on studying English by himself.  Fukuzawa had to use a Dutch-
English dictionary because he could not find either a good English teacher or an English-
Japanese dictionary at any stores in Yokohama or Edo.12  In fact, there was no English-
Japanese dictionary or English studying materials available in Japan at that time.  In this 
circumstance, Fukuzawa volunteered to go to the United States in 1860 and Europe in 
1862 respectively. 
 Fukuzawa’s trip to the United States in 1860 completely changed the way 
Fukuzawa thought.  Informed about the Tokugawa Shogunate sending the Kanrin Maru 
to escort the U.S.S. Powhatan with Japanese ambassadors to San Francisco, Fukuzawa 
volunteered to accompany the first Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States in 
1860 as an attendant of Admiral Kimura Yoshitake (木村 嘉毅, 1830–1901).13  In order 
to get Kimura’s permission, Fukuzawa asked a Dutch scholar and physician, Dr. 
Katsuragawa, who was a close relative of Kimura, to write a letter of intr duction for 
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him.14  After obtaining the letter, Fukuzawa directly went to Kimura’s house and asked 
Kimura to take him as a servant.  Since many of Kimura’s ser
Fukuzawa’s offer was immediately taken.
 While in San Francisco, Fukuzawa, following Manjir
Webster’s Dictionary that would be the first English dictionary imported into Japan.
Fukuzawa also bought a Chinese
dictionary, Kaei Tsūgo (華英通語
English Conversation Book”), had been published by 
a Chinese author, Tzu-ch’ing (
 Fukuzawa also made a visit to the William 
Shew’s “daguerreian gallery” to take a photograph of 
himself.18  Right before taking a
Fukuzawa saw an American girl in the studio.  She 
was found out to be a daughter of Shew named 
Theodora Alice and was fifteen years old then.  
When Fukuzawa suggested her to take a picture 
together, Theodora Alice willingly accepted his offer 
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and stood next to him.19  In addition to the Webster’s Dictionary, Fukuzawa brought back 
a photograph of himself with Theodora Alice, which he had always treasured and made a 
display of.20  
 The first Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States had a significant 
influence on the development of Fukuzawa’s philosophy, Keiō Gijuku’s educational 
principles, as well as the concept of “civilization.”  It also influenced the course of the 
development of Meiji Japan that became inclined toward setting the American system as 
its model.   Thereafter, the Japanese government extensively promoted the adoption of 
practices and institutions based on American model, including “education, agriculture, 
mining, finance, jurisprudence, or diplomacy.”21  In his Autobiography, Fukuzawa 
repeatedly described how American hosts were hospitable to the Japanese visitors.  For 
example, the U.S. government paid for the delegates’ hotel expenses, repaired the Kanrin 
Maru free of charge, and sent five crews from Captain Brooke’s U.S.S. Fenimore Cooper 
to assist the homeward voyage of the Kanrin Maru.22  Chitoshi Yanaga argues in his 
article that “American hospitality and kindness left an indelible impression on the minds 
of the proud and sensitive Japanese, causing them in later years to turn to the Americans 
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for guidance and assistance in the development of their nation.”23  
 Returning home on November 9, 1860, Fukuzawa was officially employed as an 
interpreter of the Tokugawa Shogunate for translating official papers and diplomatic 
documents.24  Simultaneously, Fukuzawa, consulting the Webster’s Dictionary that he 
had brought back from America, continued to teach himself English as well as began to 
teach English at his school in place of Dutch.25  Finding the dictionary very valuable, 
Fukuzawa contentedly wrote down his feeling before leaving San Francisco for Japan in 
his Autobiography; “Once I had secured this valuable work, I felt no disappointment on 
leaving the new world and returning home again.”26 
 In the same year, Fukuzawa published the first English-Japanese dictionary called 
Zōtei Kaei Tsūgo (増訂華英通語, literally “Enlarged and Revised Chinese-English 
Conversation Book”), which was indeed a translation of original Kaei Tsūgo “with 
additional Japanese phonetic denotation of English pronunciation.”27  Consisting of two 
volumes, the Zōtei Kaei Tsūgo mostly dealt with English vocabulary and idioms.28  By 
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then, English became the most important foreign language. 
 In 1862, again Fukuzawa was a member of the first Japanese diplomatic mission 
to Europe as a translator, traveling through France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Prussia, Russia, and Portugal.  Deeply impressed with the western institutions durng the 
missions, Fukuzawa became extremely critical of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the
customs, ideas, and beliefs of the feudal system at large.  Then, enlightening western 
science, technology, and liberal thought, Fukuzawa started publishing Se yō Jijō (西洋事
情, “Conditions in the West”) to present the Western lifestyle and institutions.  Seiyō Jijō 
was composed of three influential volumes published in 1866, and its sequels in 1868 and 
1870.29  In other words, Seiyō Jijō was an “introductory book” describing the current 
state of affairs as well as history of the Western countries.30  Iwasaki Yatarō, founder of 
Mitsubishi who came to admire Fukuzawa, was indeed a reader of S iyō Jijō.31  
Published in 1866, the first volume of Seiyō Jijō mainly introduced his discoveries in the 
West with his own interpretation of Western civilization in fine detail including:  
the forms of government, methods of taxation, national debts, postal systems, paper 
money, firms, foreign intercourse, military system, literature and the arts, schools, 
libraries, newspapers, hospitals, poor-houses, asylums for mutes and for the blind, lunatic 
asylums, kindergartens, museums, exhibitions, steam engines, steamships, railways, 
telegraphs, and gas-lights… it contains much historical information about the 
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governments, armies, navies and finances of the chief Western countries.32 
 
In addition, Fukuzawa introduced the way Western women lived, which was completely 
different from that of Japanese women of the Tokugawa period.  Living under the strict 
Confucian society dominated by men, many literate Japanese women including some 
future “picture brides” came to dream of living in the Western countries. 
 Furthermore, Fukuzawa was the first Japanese to translate the Declaration of 
Independence and the U.S. Constitution into Japanese, which he introduced in Seiyō
Jijō.33  Particularly, the phrase of the Declaration of Independence reading, “all men are 
created equal,” moved Fukuzawa who had been always humiliated because of his 
hereditary status as a lower-rank samurai.  Fukuzawa’s translation of the Declaration of 
Independence eventually incited the jiyū minken undō (“Freedom and People’s Rights 
Movement”) in the late 1870s and the early 1880s, initially among the shizoku who felt 
antipathy to the new Meiji government.  This political and social movement also aimed to 
repeal the unequal treaties with the Western countries as well as to reduce the power of 
the central government for promoting a “true form” of democracy in Japan.34  In the 
1880s, the jiyū minken undō infiltrated into rural areas when the Land Tax Reform was 
brought into effect.  This popular movement resulted in facilitating the establishment of 
the Meiji Constitution in 1889 and the Diet in 1890.   
 Simultaneously, by translating many foreign publications, Fukuzawa gave an 
access to Western science, history, culture, art, as well as thought to the Japanese 
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public.35  Haga Tōru who is a scholar of comparative literature argues that the access to 
the Western literature fostered to fill both “cultural” and “psychological” g p between 
Japan and the Western countries.36  Fukuzawa was indeed not the first Japanese to write 
about what he saw in America.  As I discussed, two famous castaways, Nakahama 
Manjirō (John Mung) and Hamada Hikoz (Joseph Heco) had already introduced America 
to Japan before Fukuzawa.  However, the Japanese regard Fukuzawa as “the first person 
to comprehensively and systematically introduced western civilization, both of the United 
States and Europe, to the Japanese general public.”37  As Chitoshi Yanaga argues, Seiyō 
Jijō was exceedingly significant because it was the first volume published by a Japanese 
person who actually went to America and Europe and saw them with his own eyes.38  
Widely read by the general public, Seiyō Jijō stimulated the Japanese people to carry out 
drastic national reform based on the “principles of Western civilization.”39   
 Read by all classes of literate Japanese, Seiyō Jijō became a bestseller because 
Fukuzawa clearly and straightforwardly described the political, economic, and cultural 
institutions of the West.40  Unlike the previous writers who targeted certain groups of 
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educated people, Fukuzawa’s writings were readable and did not require higher 
educational background to understand his arguments.  Asataro Miyamori explains the 
strength of Fukuzawa’s writing style in A Life of Mr. Yukichi Fukuzawa (1902):  
Unlike most of his contemporaries, he wrote for the people in general and not chiefly for 
students and for the upper classes.  Such being his purpose, he created a style of hi  own 
which is singularly adapted to people of every class.  It combines in a most striking 
manner great lucidity and extreme simplicity…. In consequence of its simplic ty and 
clearness, its vigor and directness, its ease and charm, its imagery and elegance, the 
“Fukuzawa style” or “Mita style” is justly famed throughout the Empire.  Mr. Fukuzawa 
may therefore be truly designated the greatest Japanese writer of his time.41 
 
Particularly, portraying America as a “land of opportunity,” Seiyō Jijō greatly contributed 
to increasing the popularity of America among the Japanese public.42   
 The more Fukuzawa knew America, the more he was impressed by the way 
American practiced democracy.  In 1867, Fukuzawa once again visited the United States 
this time as an official interpreter of the Tokugawa Shogunate that planned to buy a 
warship from the American government.  After returning from the United States, 
Fukuzawa published Seiyō Tabi Annai (西洋旅案内, “A Travel Guide to the West”) in 
1867 consisting of two volumes, which was the first guidebook for travel.43  In Seiyō 
Tabi Annai, Fukuzawa described how not to be embarrassed while traveling in the West 
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including the proper way of using the western-style bathroom.44  Observing the basic 
behavior of both American and European passengers of an ocean liner, Fukuzawa found 
no intrinsic differences between the Japanese and the Westerners.45  Introducing liberal 
thought as well as the lifestyle of the West, these publications on the West further
motivated the young Japanese to travel and immigrate to America.46   
 Fukuzawa became one of the first advocates of the Japanese immigration to the 
United States.  Fukuzawa actually financed the establishment of an agricultural colony in 
Calaveras County in northern California.47  In June 1887, on the advice of Fukuzawa, 
Inoue Kakugorō (井上 角五郎, 1860–1938), one of his most trusted pupils, took more 
than thirty people mainly from Hiroshima to California as agricultural laborers.48  After 
purchasing land in Sierra Nevada, they built a house and bought farming tools for 
reclaiming land.  Afterwards, some of the colonists worked for the neighboring railroad 
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company while others went to San Francisco or Sacramento for getting jobs.49  In the 
1880s, there were some shosei in the mainland United States; however, the Japanese 
laborers numbered very few.  While staying in California until 1888, Inoue wrote for Jiji 
Shinpō (Current Events) about his experiences in America that further motivated the 
young readers of Jiji Shinpō to seek immigration.50 
 Fukuzawa devoted his energy to educating the young Japanese who would be the 
future leaders of modern Japan.  In order to enlighten his pupils, Fukuzawa brought back 
various kinds of English books for them during the second diplomatic mission to the 
United States.  In the late 1860s, Fukuzawa began to teach economics at Keiō Gijuku, 
and produced numbers of prominent politicians, journalists, and businessmen.51  In the 
Bakumatsu period, it was not safe at all to be pro-Western or to advocate Westernization 
of the nation before the anti-foreigners’ eyes.  Resenting the Western influence in Japan, 
anti-foreign samurai mercilessly killed anyone who seemed to be pro-Western.  
Especially because Fukuzawa pointed out the weakness of the Tokugawa Shogunate and 
encouraged learning from the Westerners, a group of anti-foreign samurai made several 
attempts to kill him and those who embraced Western ideals before the Meiji 
Restoration.52   
These advocates of Westernization frequently faced such life-threatening 
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experiences in the post-restoration era as well.  For example, a famous Confucian scholar 
of Higo Province (肥後国, present-day Kumamoto prefecture), Yokoi Shōnan (横井 小
楠, 1809–1869), was assassinated in 1869 by anti-foreign samurai who misunderstood 
him of being pro-Western and possibly Christian.53  Ōmura Masujirō (大村 益次郎, 
1824–1869), who was a Japanese military leader and developed a Western-style army in 
the Chōshū-han, was assassinated in the same year by two samurai who were patrons of 
sonnō jōi movement.54   
However, once the new Meiji government was established in 1868, Fukuzawa 
was able to improve his position in society as one of the most influential and respected 
intellectuals who contributed to the foundation of modern Japan.  Discovering his 
stupendous talent, the Meiji government tried to install Fukuzawa in a governmental post.  
Nevertheless, Fukuzawa preferred to stay out of the bureaucracy in order to focus n 
writing and educating the youth.  Fukuzawa indeed condemned the Meiji government for 
ruling the country by force just like the Shogunate.   
 In the decades following the opening of Japan and a subsequent encounter with 
the Western civilization, Fukuzawa and other Meiji intellectuals facilitted the 
widespread of bunmei kaika (文明開化, “civilization and enlightenment”) for the 
establishment of new social order, public education, conscription, and women’s rights.  
Emerging in the late nineteenth century, bunmei kaika stimulated the adoption of foreign 
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culture and subsequently influenced the way the Japanese people lived and thought.55   
In terms of the change in food culture, Kanagaki Robun (仮名垣 魯文, 1829–
1894), a writer of humorous fiction, stated in Aguranabe (1871; trans. The Beefeater, 
1956) that through eating beef, Japan was “steadily becoming a truly civilized country.”56  
Furthermore, newspaper articles reported that in foreigners’ opinion, “the Japanese 
people are intelligent and skillful but they are impatient because they do not eat meat.”  
Therefore, in order to meet western expectations, the Japanese tried to adopt the new
meat-eating habit, and sukiyaki (Japanese-style beef stew) became a symbol of bunmei 
kaika.57  As beef-eating became popular among the general public, 800 cattle were 
consumed monthly in Kobe, 600 in Yokohama, 500 in Tokyo, 300 in Osaka and Nagoya, 
and 100 to 200 in the rest of prefectures according to Yūbin Hōchi Shimbun.58  
 Encouraged by an active and radical Westernizer Mori Arinori (森 有礼, 1847–
1889) at the start, renowned Meiji intellectuals including Fukuzawa Yukichi established 
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the Meirokusha (明六社, “Meiji Six Society”) in June 1873.59  The founding members of 
the Meirokusha included; Mori Arinori, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Nakamura Masanao, 
Nishimura Shigeki, Tsuda Mamichi, Kato Hiroyuki, Mitsukuri Rinsho, Mitsukuri Shūhei, 
Sugi Kōji, and Nishi Amane.  Founded in the sixth year of Meiji, they named the society 
Meirokusha—“Mei” indicates Meiji, “roku” indicates six, and “sha” indicates society.  
The primary mission of the Meirokusha was the promotion of bunmei kaika through the 
introduction and popularization of the concepts of Western civilization to Japan.60  As 
Sandra T. W. Davis points out in I tellectual Change and Political Development in Early 
Modern Japan (1980), the Meirokusha also encouraged the “advancement of learning and 
the establishment of new norms of morality.”61  Most importantly, the members of 
Meirokusha believed firmly that not only fukoku kyōhei (enrich the nation and strengthen 
the military) but also bunmei kaika was essential for the survival of Japan as an 
independent nation in the face of Western imperialism in Asia.   
 In March 1874, the Meirokusha published its own journal named Meiroku Zasshi 
(明六雑誌, “Journal of the Japanese Enlightenment”), which sold 3,200 copies in the 
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first year.62  Meiroku Zasshi dealt with various issues such as women’s rights, 
philosophy, freedom of religion, social and economic problems, commerce as well as 
politics.  Publishing forty-three issues, Meiroku Zasshi only lasted for less than two years 
because the government, afraid of the popular movement, tightened the control over the 
press in 1875.  In addition, the development of Confucian and Western philosophy 
factions within the Meirokusha led to the discontinuance of their publication.  While the 
Confucian faction defined “morality” as the real strength of the Western countries, the 
Western philosophy faction defined “rationality” as the real strength of the Western 
countries.63  According to Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi’s Modern Japanese Thought 
(1998), in order to appease factionalism, Nishimura Shigeki (西村 茂樹, 1828–1902) 
suggested “a water-down Confucianism” for building “a new morality for modern Japan” 
derived from “the basic Confucian spirit and updating it with appropriate maxims fro  
Western philosophy” in his Nihon Dōtoku-ron (日本道徳論, “A Thesis on Japanese 
Moral Principles”) published in 1886.64 
 While popularizing the Western concept of freedom and rights, Fukuzawa began 
to place significant emphasis on the equality and on the education issue.  Through a wide 
circulation of his influential works including pamphlets, textbooks, editorials, articles, 
books, and public speech, Fukuzawa had constantly emphasized that “the adoption of 
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utilitarian, rational, scientific, and technological aspects of Western civilization” was 
essential to be strong and independent as well as to become a “fully civilized” nation like 
the United States and Western European countries.65  According to a prominent Japanese 
historian, Mikiso Hane, about 7.5 million copies of his publications had circulated in 
Japan between 1860 and 1893.66  Professor Nishikawa Shunsaku at Keiō University 
illustrates in his 1993 article that “independence” summarizes Fukuzawa’s main 
argument: 
[H]e believed that personal and national independence was the real foundati n of modern 
society in the West.  In order to achieve this self-independence, Fukuzawa advocated 
Western, or practical and scientific learning, instead of the traditional studies of the 
Chinese classics.  The more educated the people became, the better their national 
independence could be asserted, with a corresponding increase in public virtue and social 
morality.67 
 
 In the 1870s, Fukuzawa produced numbers of widely-read works.  Between the 
years 1872 and 1876, Fukuzawa published Gakumon no Susume (学問ノススメ, “An 
Encouragement of Learning”) consisting of seventeen volumes.  In the beginning of his 
first chapter, he proclaimed: “It is said that heaven does not create one man above or 
beneath another man.  This means that when men are born from heaven they all are equa.  
There is no innate distinction between high and low” and differences in education causes 
distinctions among them.68  Condemning the Japanese traditional school curriculm as 
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impractical, Fukuzawa placed an emphasis on the Western subjects which were 
previously less valued than the Chinese and Japanese Learning in Japan.   These subject  
included practical learning such as letter writing, accounting, abacus, and measurement, 
and new fields of study such as geography, physics, history, economics, and ethics.69   
 Significantly, Fukuzawa was not sympathetic to the poor people at all.  Without 
examining the causes for the poverty, Fukuzawa declared that there was nothing mre 
miserable and hateful than the illiterate people in the world and that they were poor 
because they were ignorant.  Fukuzawa considered being ignorant as the most shameful 
thing.  Therefore, Fukuzawa preached that people had to learn to be good citizens, and 
“there is a good government over good citizens” and “there is a harsh government over 
ignorant citizens.”  According to Fukuzawa, learning was the key to the improvement of 
society.70   
Meanwhile, in the volume eight of Gakumon no Susume published in 1874, 
Fukuzawa denounced the concubine system, which had been practiced in Japan for 
centuries, as “unhealthy custom.”71  Fukuzawa, believing that the concubine system 
would transform the Japanese family into “an inhumane institution where reciprocity and 
ethical responsibility were forgotten,” advocated monogamy.72  In addition to Fukuzawa, 
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members of the Meirokusha such as Mori Arinori and Nakamura Msaanao (中村 正直, 
1832–1891) acknowledged that the ill treatment of women in society kept Japan 
backward.  In order to accelerate the process of modernization, they began to call for the 
equal rights of men and women as well as the improvement of women’s status in the 
family.73  To begin with, they suggested the abolition of the concubine system which they 
considered “inhumane and immoral” for the modern society.74  They all agreed that the 
concubine system was barbaric and “uncivilized” if judging from the Westerners’ 
standpoint derived from Christian values.  Moreover, Fukuzawa insisted that the 
existence of concubine system would cause a disadvantage in the course of the revision 
of “unequal treaties” with the West, in which monogamy was traditionally practiced.   
 Then, debating from a people’s point of view, Fukuzawa’s Bunmeiron no 
Gairyaku (文明論之概略, “An Outline of a Theory of Civilization”) was published in 
1875, which further emphasized that “the attainment of civilization—which he identifies 
as the progress of man’s knowledge and virtue—was of the greatest importance to y 
country.”75  Clearly, Fukuzawa played a crucial role in initiating the “age of Westerni m” 
in Japan through promoting bunmei kaika.76  Meanwhile, Fukuzawa Japan in the 1880s 
became known as the peak of the bunmei kaika era, which encouraged Westernization 
through imitating the West without abandoning the Japanese traditions and cultural 
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identity.77  Emerging in the process of modernization, this ideology called Wakon Yōsai 
(和魂洋才, literary “Japanese Soul and Western Skill”) had a significant influence on the 
industrialization of Japan.78  In reaction to Westernization/modernization, what Harumi 
Befu called the “samuraization” took place, which meant the application of practices and 
values of the samurai class to all classes of Japanese.79  Especially, the “samuraization” 
of the Japanese family affected the women of all classes negatively.80  Furthermore, 
strongly supported by the elite shizoku “who led the country, a warrior-caste ideal of duty 
to superiors,” the “samuraization of society” became a major element of the “national 
ideology” in the Meiji Period.81  Without exception, Fukuzawa produced numbers of his 
works within this context. 
 In the early 1880s, Fukuzawa found his way into a newspaper venture.  In 1882, 
encouraged by his pupils including his nephew Nakamigawa Hikojirō (中上川 彦次郎), 
Fukuzawa established Jiji Shinpō (時事新報, “Current Events”), a major newspaper.  
Living by the editorial office of the Keiō Gijuku Publishing Company, Fukuzawa 
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devoted himself to writing newspaper editorials that aimed at promoting individual r ghts 
and democratic ideals.  Fukuzawa published most of his writings in Jiji Shinpō afterward.  
Accordingly, Jiji Shinpō came to serve as the advocate for the reform by producing many 
journalists and liberal politicians.   
 Generally considered as the most influential intellectual of the time, Fukuzawa 
consistently emphasized equal opportunity and stressed that radical changes in Japanese 
attitude and education were necessary for Japan’s progress.  Fukuzawa’s teaching and s 
over one hundred publications definitely paved the way for the young Japanese to go to 
America for liberty and independence.   Meanwhile, as a modernizer Fukuzawa had been 
distressed with the old system based on Confucianism and sought the new system based 
on Western ideas and values.   In this circumstance, Fukuzawa advocated “D tsua Nyūō” 
(脱亜入欧, literally “leave Asia and join the West”) or commonly known as “Datsua-
ron” (脱亜論, “On Leaving Asia”) in his Jiji Shinpō editorial on March 16, 1885.82  
Fukuzawa arguing that  
We do not have time to wait for the enlightenment of our neighbors so that we can ork 
together toward the development of Asia.  It is better for us to leave the ranks of Asian 
nations and cast our lot with civilized nations of the West.  As for the way of dealing with 
China and Korea, no special treatment is necessary just because they happen to be our 
neighbors.  We simply follow the manner of the Westerners in knowing how to treat 
them.  Any person who cherishes a bad friend cannot escape his bad notoriety.  We 
simply erase from our minds our bad friends in Asia.83 
 
Fukuzawa urged to eliminate the Chinese and Korean influences on Japanese that 
defended tradition.  Fukuzawa believed firmly that the pursuit of “Datsua-ron” was 
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essential to Japan’s advancement of civilization.84   
 Fukuzawa’s “Datsua-ron” completely changed the course of the development of 
modern Japan and the nature of the Japanese people at large.  “Datsua-ron” resulted in 
encouraging the rise of Japanese nationalism and imperialist expansionism as well as 
justified Japan’s subsequent colonization of Asian countries.  Feeling contempt for 
Japan’s neighbors as “hopelessly backward,” Fukuzawa urged the Japanese to cut cul ural 
ties with China and Korea, declaring that “those with bad companions cannot avoid bad 
reputations.” 85  Moreover, categorizing Japan as not a part of Asia, Fukuzawa asserted 
that Japan should deal with China and Korea exactly as the Westerners did.86  In his 1882 
writing, Fukuzawa stated that “one object of my life is to extend Japan’s national 
power…  Even if the government be autocratic in name and form, I shall be satisfied with 
it if it is strong enough to strengthen the country.”87  Switching his priority to the 
people’s right to the build-up of the nation, he clearly contradicted his earlier stat ments 
on liberalism.  Fukuzawa, utilizing his distinguished writing skill, was responsible for 
giving birth to the Japanese imperialism in the 1890s.88   
Meanwhile, Fukuzawa came to support the national policy of fukoku kyōhei and 
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national polity called kokutai (国体), declaring that the Westernization was only a means 
to achieve fukoku kyōhei.  In the afterwards of The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa, 
Albert Craig translated Fukuzawa’s interpretation of kokutai: 
“At this time the duty of the Japanese is solely the preservation of their national polity.  
By the preservation of their national polity I mean not losing their political ndependence.  
In order not to lose political independence, the intellectual powers of the people must be 
advanced.  This includes a great many items.  But for intellectual developm nt the first 
step that must be taken is to sweep away attachments to old customs and take i  the spirit 
of civilization current in the West.  If the attachment to yin, yang, and the five elements is 
not swept away, science cannot be adopted….  Western civilization will enabe us to 
consolidate our polity and at the same time increase the luster of our imperial line.”89 
 
Fukuzawa had raised and dispatched a great number of his pupils to intellectual, 
business, and political circles who distinguished themselves as leaders of modern Japan.  
As an influential educator, Fukuzawa significantly contributed to the emergence of 
nationalism and preservation of national identity.  Fukuzawa argued that it was essential 
to create a strong nation that would receive the respect of the Western countries by 
producing educated masses rather than by military power.  In his later years, Fukuzawa 
came to conclude that expansionism or imperialism was not an answer to equalize with 
the West.  Emphasizing “internationalism and civilization,” Fukuzawa promoted a 
“liberal nationalism” as a countermeasure against “authoritarianism” and “conservative 
nationalism” that sought to “reinvent the nation along traditional cultural lines and away 
from the internationalism of the Meiji state.”90 
 Compared to today’s liberals, Fukuzawa’s views on education, class system, 
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politics, and women’s rights were rather conservative.  However, living through the era 
of feudalism, the majority of Meiji people regarded Fukuzawa as unorthodox and 
astonishingly progressive in every aspect.  Others regarded Fukuzawa as “plain wrong” 
according to their standards derived from Confucian values and teaching.91  Although 
Fukuzawa never suggested the revision of the law, he was indeed one of the earliest and 
most influential advocates of women’s rights.  As Joyce Irene Ackroyd points out in
Women in Feudal Japan (1959), up until the early Meiji period, a husband could divorce 
his wife by writing a note called mikudarihan (三下り半, literary “three and a half 
lines”) which reflected his intention to divorce.  Meanwhile the law did not allow a wife 
to divorce her husband.92  Fukuzawa argued that the improvement of women’s status by 
liberating them from traditional values and practices of Japan would facilitate a creation 
of so-called civilized nation.93  In his article entitled “Fukuzawa Yukichi and Women’s 
Rights,” Hane introduces Fukuzawa’s 1870 writing that illustrate his views on the gender 
relations:  
“The great foundation of human relations consists of husband and wife.  The relationship 
between husband and wife emerged before that of parents and children or brothers and 
sisters.  From the beginning of time when Heaven created human beings there has been 
an equal number of men and women.  Many million years have passed but this ratio of 
one man to one woman has not changed.  Whether a person is a man or a woman he or 
she counts for only one between Heaven and Earth.  There is no justification for making 
distinctions of superior and inferior.”94 
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 Significantly, Fukuzawa contributed to change the way the Japanese women 
thought of themselves as an individual.  Published in 1885, another Fukuzawa’s 
important book, entitled Nihon Fujin-ron, Kōhen (日本婦人論·後編, “On Japanese 
Womanhood, Part II”), further advocated the improvement of women’s treatment in the 
family and the abolishment of the customary-practiced concubine system that would be 
critical in stimulating the Japanese women to prepare for their independence and 
liberation.95  In addition, Fukuzawa censured the male-centric Japanese society that 
treated women like “instruments” and portrayed women’s role as child bearers.96  
According to Fukuzawa’s Nihon Fujin-ron: 
From this attitude stems the saying so often heard that the womb is a “borrowed” thing.  
The meaning of this saying is that a child which is born into this world is its father’s child 
and not its mother’s—the rice that grew this year is born from the seed that was sworn 
last year and the soil has no relation to it.97   
 
Fukuzawa advocated the change in kinship relations would improve the status of women 
in Japan.  Arguing that men and women were equal except their reproductive organs, and 
that women should also have a right to own their property like men,98 Fukuzawa’s theory 
of womanhood eventually paved a way for women’s liberation movements in the late 
1960s and 1970s after which Japan had undergone rapid economic development and 
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urbanization in the post-World War II era.99   
 Fukuzawa directly called attention to the Japanese women in order to make a 
change.  Seeking as many women to read his Nihon Fujin-ron as possible, Fukuzawa 
purposely wrote the book in such plain Japanese using hira ana so that everyone could 
easily read.100  As a result, Fukuzawa’s Nihon Fujin-ron first inspired the educated 
Japanese women who sought women’s liberation from Japan’s old customs based on 
Confucianism.  Fukuzawa condemned Confucian teachings in Japan as the root of evil.101  
Excerpting certain teachings on the behavior of women, which was translated by male 
interpreters, Fukuzawa asserted that women’s rights could not be achieved under the 
current Confucian society.  Fukuzawa argued that these restrictions derived from 
Confucianism prevented Japan’s “advancement of civilization.”  Nevertheless, as the jiyū
minken undō declining with the enactment of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 and the 
Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, and the outbreak of the Fist Sino-Japanese War 
(1894–95), Fukuzawa’s writings began to place more emphasis on the nationalistic 
elements rather than liberalism modeled after the Western culture and practices.   
 Advocating fujin kaihō (婦人解放, “women’s liberation”), Fukuzawa initially 
supported the jiyū minken undo to a considerable degree; however, he became moderate 
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by the 1890s.102  For instance, staying outside the government, Fukuzawa never became a 
radical political activist.  As Sharon L. Sievers points out in her Flowers in Salt (1983), 
neither Fukuzawa nor Mori offered legal solutions to problems regarding treatment of 
women in the family.103  It is important to understand that the Meiji intellectuals, 
imitating the Western institutions, aimed at improving the women’s rights for promoting 
the nation’s reputation, not for the success of women.  Simultaneously, the Meiji 
intellectuals encouraged the education of women not for the sake of  their success but for 
providing them knowledge and skills to be ryōsai kenbo (良妻賢母, “Good Wives and 
Wise Mothers”) so that they had ability to raise children to be proper Japanese subjects.  
For Japan’s imperialism and expansionism, the government actively indoctrinated the 
ryōsai kenbo ideology that would produce wives who were efficient and subservient, and 
mothers who were capable of raising their children to be patriotic and loyal subjects of 
Japan.104  On March 16, 1875, Nakamura Masanao expressed that proper mothering was 
crucial for the creation of a strong nation:   
We must inevitably have fine mothers if we want effectively to advance the people to the 
area of enlightenment and to alter their customs and conditions for the good.  If the 
mothers are superb, they can have superb children, and Japan can become a splendid 
country in later generations.  We can have people trained in religious and moral 
education as well as in the sciences and arts whose intellects are adv nced, whose minds 
are elevated, and whose conduct is high.  Not having had adequate prenatal educational 
nourishment, I am at middle age unable sufficiently to realize my ambitions, only sadly 
languishing in shabby quarters [Japan] and envying the enlightenment of Europe and 
America.  I have a deep irrepressible desire that later generations shall be ready by fine 
mothers.105 
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Adopted as “a new prescription for Japanese womanhood” by the Ministry of Education 
after the First Sino-Japanese War, the ryōsai kenbo ideology defined the roles which 
women of the imperial Japan should play in their families.106  Forcing the Japanese 
women to be ryōsai kenbo, the Meiji government set up strict gender roles and women’s 
social status through the enactment of the Meiji Civil Code in 1898.  On that basis, 
Fukuzawa argued that in a male-dominated society, in which women had to depend on 
men due to lack of property rights, it was useless to educate women as much as men 
because they would not go beyond the domestic sphere after all.107 It was the reason 
Fukuzawa’s daughter had only received the minimum education designed for the 
samurai’s daughter.  Only difference between his daughter and other samurai’s daughters 
was that she had learned English.108 
Meanwhile, Fukuzawa, widely known as a liberal and a champion of women’s 
equality, showed no interest in improving the status of prostitutes, geisha, or concubines.  
Fukuzawa’s debate on women targeted only women from middle and upper class, not 
women from lower class.  Especially, Fukuzawa was furious with prostitutes for their 
sale of sex.  Disrespecting prostitution as “a necessary evil,” Fukuzawa even advocated 
the export of the Japanese prostitutes overseas as a solution to the overpopulation 
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problem in Japan.109  In Jiji Shinpō on January 18, 1896, Fukuzawa came up with three 
reasons to encourage overseas emigration of the Japanese prostitutes.  First, following the 
development of overseas Japanese and immigration business, prostitutes were necessary 
to pleasure men who went overseas without accompanying their families.  Second, they 
were necessary to comfort the Japanese army and soldiers stationed overseas.  Third, 
overseas emigration would facilitate the prostitutes to accumulate wealth, to remit money 
to their families in Japan, and to build a fine house.110  As Amanuma points out, 
Fukuzawa clearly looked down on both immigrants and prostitutes, while recognizing 
their necessity.  Giving priority to the development of the nation, Fukuzawa thought the 
mass emigration of the Japanese prostitutes would contribute to alleviate the social 
problems existing in the Japanese immigrant communities as well as help them 
economically independent.  Particularly, Fukuzawa encouraged the British immigration 
model for promoting Japan’s national prestige.111   
Consequently, Fukuzawa’s argument was interpreted as a recommendation for the 
overseas removal of underprivileged/illiterate Japanese to overseas.  In those days, the 
poor people who emigrated overseas were called kimin (棄民, literary “abandoned 
people”) because Japan’s domestic problems “pushed” them out of the country.  Indeed, 
these kimin were nothing but a nuisance for the Meiji government.  On the other hand, 
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exploiting the labor of kimin, the Meiji leaders and intellectuals aimed at national 
aggrandizement, and thus emigration became but in part a moneymaking tool that 
provided foreign currencies. 
 Although known as an advocate of Westernization, Fukuzawa became more 
nationalistic in nature toward his later years.  He encouraged the Japanese residing 
overseas to preserve Japanese culture, traditions, and lifestyle.112  Moreover, he urged the 
Japanese immigrants to live as if they were living in Japan by speaking Japanese, 
practicing Japanese religion, building Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples, and 
celebrating Japanese festivals.113  As Amanuma illustrates, Fukuzawa simply regarded 
the overseas colonies as an extension of Japan.  Therefore, it was partly Fukuzawa’s fault 
that many Issei immigrants did not try to assimilate into the American society.114   
 Importantly, Fukuzawa called for the promotion of the Japanese maritime 
industry for stimulating the transportation of the Japanese emigrants.  In order to send as 
many emigrants as possible, Fukuzawa argued, the Japanese domestic shipping services 
were more preferable than depending on the foreign services.  Fukuzawa also insisted
that the establishment of regular long-distance lines were urgent and that the p ssage of 
the emigrants should be free of charge.115  In a sense, Fukuzawa envisioned that 
immigration would be beneficial to the nation through the stimulation of commercial 
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activity.116  Protection of immigrants by the Japanese government, according to 
Fukuzawa, was a long-term investment for the further economic development and 
prosperity of Japan.  Obviously, it implied that Fukuzawa’s meaning of the governmental 
protection of immigrants was not based on humanitarian grounds.117  Therefore, 
Fukuzawa intended to promote the Japanese emigration for the sake of the national 
prestige, not for the wellbeing of the each immigrant.  Despite looking down immigrants 
and prostitutes, Fukuzawa demanded them to contribute to the national cause meanwhile 
motivating them to gain social status and economic powers to be independent.  
Whether Fukuzawa was liberal or conservative, it was true that he inspired the 
young Japanese women to go to America by encouraging them to gain economic power 
and like the Western women, to be independent for the creation of “civilized” society.118  
An article in the guide for going to America described the United States as “Joson Danhi 
no Kuni (女尊男卑の国),” a country that put women above men.119  In fact, a number of 
Japanese male immigrants and the s osei perceived the American society the same 
way.120  Accordingly, the Japanese woman of upper- and middle-classes who tended to 
have higher education background considered immigration to the United States as a 
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means to escape from the male-centered/feudalistic Japanese society.  On the other hand, 
the lower-class Japanese women including prostitutes determined to go to America for 
their survival or helping their families in Japan.  Especially after the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement which prohibited the labor immigration, the Japanese women, attracted to th  
United States for either social or economic reasons, became “picture brides” in order to 
be admitted into the United States, sometimes through the practice called kari fūfu 
(temporary spouse).121  In other words, desire for liberty “pushed” the elite women and 
desire for survival “pushed” the impoverished women out of the country.     
 
Tsuda Umeko (津田 梅子, 1864–1929) 
 While Fukuzawa called for the education of women for producing ryōsai kenbo,  
Tsuda Umeko “aimed at providing Japanese women with professional, academic training 
and helping them develop all-round personalities.”122  She was an educator and the 
founder of the Joshi Eigaku Juku (女子英学塾, Women’s English School, present Tsuda 
College) in Tokyo who openly supported the education as a means to achieve women’s 
independence.123  She was one of the first Japanese women who came to the United 
States for studying over a decade sponsored by the Japanese government that aimed to 
promote the national image in the wake of Mara Luz incident, which brought  
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eleven months old.126  Umeko received both primary and secondary education, learned 
the concept of independence, and converted to Christianity while she lived with Mr. 
Lanman (secretary of the Japanese legation) and Mrs. Lanman in the outskirts of 
Washington, D.C., Georgetown for eleven years.127  In 1882, at the age of seventeen, she 
returned to Japan, and recommended by Ito Hirobumi, she started teaching at the Kazoku 
Jogakkō (華族女学校, literary “Peers’ School for Girls”).128  
However, she realized before long that the school’s objectives of raising girls to 
be submissive wives were quite different from her teaching principles.  In fact, Umeko 
experience a “culture shock” when she observed how badly the Japanese women were 
treated.  Although the Meiji restoration had abolished feudalism in Japan, the societywas 
still based on feudal values; therefore, women remained submissive to men.  After 
resigning from the Kazoku Jogakko, she went to Philadelphia in 1889 to attend Bryn 
Mawr College to study biology.129  Upon her return in 1892, Umeko taught at both 
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Kazoku Jogakko and the Higher Normal School for Women.130  Enacting the Koto 
Jogakko Rei after the victory at the First Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese began to 
emphasize women’s education.  Allowed to resign her official post at the Kazoku 
Jogakko on July 27, 1900131, Umeko established an English school for Japanese women.  
The school named Joshi Eigaku Juku became today’s Tsuda College.  Known as the 
“pioneer of higher education for women,” Tsuda focused on education that emphasized 
individuality and the teaching of English.132 
Actually staying in the United States and studying for more than ten years, 
Umeko’s view on the women’s education was quite different from that of Fukuzawa 
Yukichi who merely visited the United States and Europe and had no experience in 
studying abroad.  Hara argued that “through Tsuda Umeko a new Western wave was 
introduced to innovate Japanese higher education for women.”133  Placing value on 
women’s individuality, her teaching philosophy separated from ryōsai kenbo ideology 
that deemphasized individuality.  Tsuda Umeko remained unmarried in her lifetime. 
In addition to Tsuda Umeko, being an active participant of the Popular Rights 
Movement and later becoming a socialist, Fukuda Hideko (福田 英子, 1865–1927) was a 
pioneer of women’s liberation movement in Japan.  Publishing an influential feminist 
newspaper, Sekai Fujin (世界婦人, “Women of the World”) in 1907, Fukuda sought to 
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improve the women’s status and gaining political participation through promoting 
education and economic independence.134   
 Therefore, introduction of the Western ideas and way of life by the intellectua  
women stimulated the elite Japanese women who were discontent with the domination of 
men over women to leave Japan by becoming “picture brides” in order to be eligible for 
the immigration to the United States.135  Since the mass immigration of Japanese women 
was crucial for the formation of Japanese communities in the United States as w ll  in 
Hawaii, I will examine the significance of “picture brides” and the system of “picture 
marriage” in the later chapter. 
 
Mutō Sanji (武藤 山治, 1867–1834) 
One of Fukuzawa’s pupils, Mutō Sanji further promoted the Japanese 
immigration to the United States in his Beikoku Ijū Ron (米国移住論, On Immigration to 
America) published in 1887.  Deeply impressed by the great success of the 104,000 
Chinese immigrants in California who earned ¥27,040,000 in 1884, Mutō wro e Beikoku 
Iju Ron to motivate the Japanese for overseas emigration.136  Emphasizing that 
“Americans were fond of the Japanese,” Mutō argued that the Japanese would achieve a  
                                                
134 Mioko Fujieda, “Japan’s First Phase of Feminism,” in Japanese Women: New 
Feminist Perspectives on the Past, Present, and Future, eds. Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow and 
Atsuko Kameda (New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 1995), 326; 
“Fukuda Hideko,” in Asahi Nihon Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten (Biographical Dictionary of Japanese 
Historical Figures). Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1994. 
 
 135 The U.S. government had banned the immigration of single Japanese women to the 
United States.  Therefore, women had to be officially married before the en ry.  
 
 136 Mutō Sanji, “Beikoku Ijū Ron” (On Immigration to America), in Mutō Sanji Zenshū, 
vol. 1 (The Complete Works of Mutō Sanji) (Tokyo: Shinjusha, 1966), 279–280, 292; Kumei, 
Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi, 29–30. 
 
 
greater success if they immigrated to the United States.
Giving examples of problems in Ireland and Russia caused 
by the excess population, Mut
of emigration companies for sending out the poor laborers to 
the United States in order to maintain a social order.
suggested the emigration should be the semiofficial venture 
like Britain that facilitated the export of the poor t  the 
United States.139  Mutō insisted that instead of being 
dekasegi-nin (temporary laborers) forever, the Japanese 
should assimilate into the America society, own lands, and 
permanently settle in there.
 Born in Aichi prefecture in 1867 and raised in Kaizu
prefecture, Mutō was a son of a wealthy villa
was enlightened by Fukuzawa Yukichi after reading 
first attended the Wadajuku
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Deflation” as well that economically devastated farmers and landlords.142  Since he was 
young, he had dreamed of studying literature in Cambridge University in England; 
therefore, his father had saved money for his educational expenses.  However, his relative, 
who borrowed money from Mutō’s father was bankrupted by the “Matsukata Deflation” 
and could no longer pay him back.143  Mutō had to give up going to England for study.   
In 1885, going aboard the City of Tokio with the first group of kanyaku imin, 
Mutō went to San Francisco to study at the age of nineteen.144  According to Nichibei 
Shimbun, Fukuzawa urged Mutō to go to the United States to be a pioneer of the 
development of the Japanese.145  Mutō was not a government-sponsored student; 
therefore, he consequently became a dekasegi-shosei or “school-boy” who covered his 
own tuition and living expense in the states for three years.  Indeed, Mutō worked in a 
cigarette factory and worked as a waiter at the dormitory of the University of the Pacific 
in San Jose, California, while attending school.146  In addition, requested by Takashima 
Kokinji of Ōkura-kumi who opened a store in San Francisco to extend the market of 
Kikkoman’s soy sauce, Mutō quit school and actively helped the marketing of soy sauce.  
Temporary hiring Americans, Mutō modified soy sauce by mixing vinegar and red 
pepper and created the Western-style sauce named Mikado Sauce (literary“Emperor’s 
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Sauce”).  Since American employees approved the taste, Mutō began to sell the Mikado 
Sauce in a triangle-shaped Japanese ceramic for thirty-five cents.  At first, the sales of 
Mikado Sauce prospered because Americans favored the ceramic.  However, the Mikado 
Sauce never won popular among the American consumers.  Therefore, Mutō closed down 
the store and went back to Japan after three years of residence in the United States.147   
 In 1887, based on his experiences as a “school-boy” in the United States, Mutō 
published Beikoku Iju Ron to encourage the Japanese immigration to the United States 
referring to the achievement of Chinese immigrants who engaged in railroad construction, 
reclamation, mining, agriculture, fruits farms, manufacturing industry, domestic work, 
and labor in the United States.148  Written by a person who actually lived there, Mutō’s 
Beikoku Ijū Ron encouraged the poor and the unemployed as well as students to embark 
on a new life in the United States.  Mutō informed his readers that the American families 
treated their domestic servants nicely, asked things politely, and never spoke in an 
authoritative tone.149  For the rural Japanese devastated by the “Matsukata Deflation,” 
emigration to the United States appeared to be an attractive option for making money.  
Mutō later encouraged that due to a shortage of laborers in developing California 
following the Gold Rush, one could earn three to five dollars a week and at the same time, 
one could go to school during the daytime.  In addition, room and board was included.  
Muto insisted that Japanese “school-boys” were in high demand because housemaids 
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would not work for cheap wages.150 
 Meanwhile, recruited by Fukuzawa’s nephew, Nakamigawa Hikojirō, Mutō 
worked for the Mitsui Bank and helped its financial reform in 1893.  Then, Mutō began 
working for the Mitsui’s subsidiary, Kanegafuchi Spinning Company (precursor of 
Kanebō) in 1894, and became its president in 1921.  According to Richard Mitchell, 
Kanegafuchi Spinning Company “paid the highest wages, provided the best working 
conditions, and gave the most extensive benefits in the nation.”151   Simultaneously, Mutō 
became a member of Diet in 1924.  After he resigned as the president of Kanebō in 1930, 
Mutō served as the president of Jiji Shinpō in 1932, a newspaper company founded by 
Fukuzawa Yukichi in 1882.152  On March 9, 1934, two weeks after Mutō launched a 
campaign against the corruption of the business and political circles, Mutō was shot by an 
assassin named Fukushima Shinkichi, who was forty-one years old and jobless.  
Fukushima killed himself immediately after he shot Mutō and his secretary.153 
 In the late Tokugawa to early Meiji period, it was extremely dangerous to be pro-
Western.  Those who were advocates of Westernization and suspected to be pro-western 
feared the assassination attempt by the anti-foreign samurai.  Japan’s ultra-nation lism 
emerged in reaction to Meiji government’s adoption of Western culture and practices and 
the forced Westernization measures that posed a threat to the preservation of national
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identity.  However, the anti-foreign sentiment and countermeasures against the Western 
imperialism significantly contributed to the formation of national polity and the rise of 
nationalism in all classes of Japanese.  In the early Meiji Japan, national polity and 
nationalism played an important role in the establishment of the centralized state.  Mutō 
was successful in motivating the youth that Japanese laborers would achieve a great 
success in America and that would eventually contribute to the development of the 
nation.  The young Japanese, being nationalistic after the victory over the Sino-Japa ese 
War, came to believe working in America and sending money to Japan as an act of 
patriotism.  The rapid modernization of the nation actually required not only drastic 
socioeconomic changes but also enormous capital for buying the advanced machinery 
and weaponry and for mobilizing the massive labor force.  Therefore, the Meiji 
intellectuals appealed to the youth who had strong will to study while working as servants 
or laborers.   
 
Publications for Guide to Go to America 
Contrary to the Meiji intellectuals such as Fukuzawa, Tsuda, and Muto who 
published works for the educated or elite readers, many guidebooks for going to America 
circulated for all classes of Japanese, including the uneducated masses.  Between 1883 
and 1911, at least twenty-four guidebooks for going to America were published in Japan.  
Kada Sadaichi was the first to write the guidebook, Yubei Jiji (News on Going to 
America), published in 1883.154  A great number of such guidebooks circulated between 
1883 and 1911, and especially between 1902 and 1906 when the Japanese immigration 
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reached its peak.  Guidebooks published during the years include:155   
1883 Sadaichi Kada Yubei Jiji (News on Going to America) 
1885 Tomita & Owada Beikokuyuki Hitori Annai (Going to America Alone) 
1886 Seichiro Akamine Beikoku Ima Fushigi (Mysterious America) 
1887 Sanji Muto Beikoku Ijū Ron (On Emigration to America) 
1887 Akira Fukuoka Kigyō Risshi no Kinmon (Setting Up Enterprise in Golden Gate) 
1887 Kumajiro Ishida Kitare Nihonjin (“Come, Japanese!”) 
1901 Sen Katayama Tobei Annai (Guide to America) 
1901 Shoansei Tobei no Shiori (Guide to America) 
1901 Hyodayu Shimanuki Tobei Annai (Guide to America) 
1902 Sen Katayama Zoku Tobei Annai (Guide to America: A Sequel)  
1902 Eitaro Iijima Beikoku Tokō Annai (A Guide to Going to America) 
1902 Kenjiro Watanabe Kaigai Dekasegi Annai (A Guide to Working Abroad) 
1902 Shiro Watanabe Kaigai Risshin no Tebiki (A Guide to Success Abroad) 
1903 Iozo Ishizuka Genkon Tobei Annai (A Current Guide to America) 
1903 Tsuruzaburo Shimizu Beikoku Rōdō Benran (Labor Handbook for America) 
1903 Daijiro Yoshimura Tobei Seigyō no Tebiki (Guide to Training in America) 
1904 Shuko Akihiro, ed. Kaigai Kugaku Annai (How a Poor Student Can Go Abroad) 
1904 Torasaburo Amano Kaigai Rashin (A Compass to Go to America) 
1904 Sen Katayama Shin Tobei (New Guide to America) 
1904 Hyodayu Shimanuki Saikin Tobei Saku (Current Ways of Going to America) 
1906 Sen Katayama Tobei no Hiketsu (Secrets on Going to America) 
1906 Kitazawa & Narizawa Shinsen Tobei Annai (New Guide to America) 
1906 Goichi Yamane Saishin Tobei Annai (Latet Guide to America) 
1911 Hyodayu Shimanuki Shin Tobei Hō (New Methods of Going to America) 
 
These guidebooks stimulated the Japanese for overseas emigration by providing pract cal 
information such as how to deal with emigration companies, how much to pay emigration 
companies, what to be careful on board, how to get passport, pass medical inspection, and 
avoid illegal agencies, and so on.156  They published tales of successful Japanese people 
in America.  Providing information on the overseas situations, these guidebooks played 
an important role in motivating the rural Japanese to emigrate overseas.  
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A leading Japanese Christian socialist who spent thirteen years in the United
States between 1884 and 1896, Katayama Sen (片山 潜, 1859–1933) continuously 
promoted the overseas emigration because he believed both emigration and a labor 
movement would contribute to the improvement of society and the standards of living.157  
Like Fukuzawa Yukichi, Katayama encouraged the Japanese to be ambitious like the
British, an island nation that sent out numerous immigrants who succeeded in the new 
world.  Born in 1859 in Okayama, Katayama went to America in 1884, took job as 
“school-boy” (student laborer), and obtained theology degree from Yale University in 
1894.158  After returning to Japan in 1896, Katayama, utilizing his experiences in the 
United States, published a small pamphlet called Tobei Annai (渡米案内, Guide to 
America) in 1901,159 which sold 2,000 copies in a week and became a best-seller of the 
time.  Seeking to bolster the Japanese nationalism, Tobei Annai advocated the creation of 
strong sovereign nation in Asia through promoting industries and trade.  A prominent 
writer of Japanese history, Duus Masayo translated a part of Tobei Annai that represented 
Katayama’s argument: “It is my deepest belief that our fellow Japanese who depart their 
country and brave the vast wild ocean to enter another land, engage in business abroad, 
and make themselves economically viable are the most loyal to the Emperor and patriotic 
among our countrymen.”160 
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Katayama established the Tobei Kyōkai (渡米協会, Association for the America-
Bound) in 1902 to encourage Japanese youth to go to America for better opportunities.161  
In 1905, the Tobei Kyōkai started publishing a monthly magazine, Tobei Zasshi (渡米雑
誌, America-Bound Magazine) that answered the questions from the readers for facilitate 
the overseas emigration.162  As the income from the sales of guidebooks and magazine 
made the Tobei Kyōkai profitable, a fellow socialist named Matsuzaki Genkichi 
criticized Katayama as being a “Tobei-ya” (渡米屋, “American travel agent”).163  
Although established for helping the youth to go to the United States for studying, it 
appeared to be a profitable business because Katayama could earn at least three to fou  
yen per member.  However, compared to the fraudulent practices of emigration 
companies, the Tobei Kyōkai provided more assistance and helped them find jobs.  In 
1904, Katayama once again went to America and purchased 160 acres of land in Texas to 
promote the Japanese immigration and to produce rice; however, his venture ended in 
failure, and he went back to Japan in 1907.164  It is important to notes as Duus pointed out 
that Katayama promoted emigration “within the bounds of a nationalist argument” and 
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expected them to return home.165 
Published by Imin Hogo Kyōkai (移民保護協会, Association to Protect 
Emigrants), Kaigai Dekasegi Annai (海外出稼案内, A Guide to Working Abroad), 
unlike traditional guidebooks, targeted those readers who were seriously thinking about 
emigrating to the United States by providing information on how to work overseas and 
how to avoid fraudulent practices of emigration companies.166  Therefore, it reported the 
real conditions in foreign countries, including Hawaii, the U.S., Canada, Peru, Korea, 
Siberia, and the Philippines, and instructed them exactly what to do to obtain passports.167  
Consisting of ten chapters, Kaigai Dekasegi Annai outlined what had to be done to 
emigrate.  That included advice about how to get a passport, how to get help from the 
emigration companies, what to avoid, what to do upon arrival, and how to get jobs 
overseas.  It introduced the Japanese labor contractors operating on the West Coast: 
 San Francisco, CA  Baba Tamakichi  
  Komai Kichizō  
  Kuranaga Shuzaburō (Southern Pacific Railroad) 
  Tamura Tokunosuke (Santa Fe Railway) 
 Sacramento, CA  Nihonjin Kangyōsha (later Nichibei Kangyōsha) 
  Ryoten Ujiya 
 Fresno, CA Wakamatsuya Tsukamoto Matsutarō 
 Portland, OR Ban Shinzaburō (Oregon Railway and Navigation Co.) 
 Tacoma, WA Kumamoto Jimusho (Southern Pacific Railroad) 
  Hiroshima-ya (railroad construction in Idaho, Montana) 
 Seattle, WA Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha 
  Tōyō Ryokan168 
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Moreover, Kaigai Dekasegi Annai instructed readers on what to wear and what to 
take with them.  For example, it advised the emigrants (1) to wear decent clothes in order 
not to be mistaken for laborers; (2) to wear derby hat or soft hat and to avoid brown hat 
because only rustics and the aged wear brown; (3) to take a couple of Japanese-style 
summer clothes; (4) to carry blankets and a pillow; (5) to take general goods such as a 
washbowl, teapot, pitcher, cup, Japanese sandals, towel, handkerchief, toothpick, soap, 
memo paper, pen, ink, letter paper, thread, needle, pocketknife, razor, whetstone, and so 
on; (6) to take food such as confectionery and canned beef and canned food; (7) to use a 
firm canvas suitcase.  For securing the passage, it also gave examples of the typical 
interrogation by the shipping companies and warned the emigrants not to answer the 
purpose of going to America contracted labor or the passage paid by Americans.169  It 
declared, “If one does not hesitate labor, one can make a living.” 
Kaigai Dekasegi Annai illustrated that in 1901, the Japanese laborers in the 
United States under the contract of Tōyō Bōeki remitted $432,000 to Japan.  More 
specifically speaking, $100,000 were remitted to Hiroshima; $80,000 to Wakayama; 
$70,000 to Okayama; $68,000 to Kumamoto and $124,000 to the rest of prefectures.170  
To the eyes of emigrants, the information on the Kaigai Dekasegi Annai seemed to 
confirm that America was a t kara no yama (mountain of treasure) for laborers.171   
Without a doubt, these publications motivated the young Japanese to emigrate for making 
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money.172  According to Itō Kazuo, there was a strange guidebook for going America 
published in 1907.  Written by Umeda Matajirō, Zaibei no Kugakusei oyobi Rōdōsha (在
米の苦学生および労働者, “Japanese Working Students and Laborers in the United 
States”) passively encouraged gambling as a way of earning its school and living 
expenses.173    
One of the first figures who strongly advocated the Japanese overseas expansion 
was Pastor Shimanuki Hyōdayū (島貫 兵太夫, 1866–1913), the founder and the 
president of the Japanese Christian organization, the Nippon Rikkokai (日本力行会, 
Japan Endeavor Society founded in 1897), initially founded to assist the poor students in 
Tokyo area.  Born in Miyagi prefecture, Shimanuki was a son of a samurai of the Sendai-
han.  Shimanuki became an elementary school teacher in 1882, and after converting 
Christianity, he entered the Sendai Religious School in 1886.  Then, as a man of religion, 
he engaged in social work and sought a way for the poor to improve their standard of 
living.174  Shimanuki himself traveled to the United States during the winter of 1897–
1898 to observe whether jobs were available, wages higher, and studying while working 
was doable.175  Shimazaki concluded that working students should go to the United 
States.176  Then, the Rikkokai began to educate the members in essential “business skills 
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and cooking” as well as American lifestyle.177  In addition, the Rikkokai published a 
popular guidebook called Tobei Annai (渡米案内, “Guide to America”) in 1901.178  In 
all, Rikkokai published three guidebooks for going to America, and one published in 
1904 was an innovative style—question and answer format—with a ticket for asking 
question.179  The Rikkokai also began to publish a monthly magazine, Tobei Shinpō (渡
米新報, “America-Bound News”) in June 1906, sold at 15 sen.180   
Largely owing to Shimanuki and the Nippon Rikkokai’s effort, many young 
Japanese were motivated to emigrate.  Unlike greedy emigration companies, the Nippon 
Rikkokai had no intention of making an enormous profit by sending emigrants.181  
Advocating the importance of Japanese overseas development called kaigai hatten, 
Shimanuki encouraged the youth (both working students and emigrants) to go overseas.  
Following Tobei Annai, Saishin Tobei Saku (最新渡米策, “Up-to-Date Policy for Going 
to America”) was published in 1904, sold at 35 sen.  Then, Shin Tobeihō (新渡米法, 
“The New Way to Go to America”) was published in 1911 at the price of 85 sen.182 
 Circulation of such guidebooks that tended to glorify the labor in the United 
States resulted in the increase in number of emigrants.  In reaction to the influx of 
Japanese emigrants into the United States, the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment was 
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inevitable especially among the labor class in the West Coast who believed the Japanese 
immigrants were taking their jobs.  However, the emigration-motivating intellectuals 
such as Katayama and Shimanuki did not consider racial discrimination as a serious 
problem.  Katayama even misinformed the emigrants that “American laborers are 
welcoming Japanese laborers” and “it is the best time to go to America, so don’t miss the 
chance.”183  Although some American laborers wanted the exclusion of Japanese, 
Katayama’s propaganda “pushed” the Japanese to emigrate to the United States.  
Simultaneously, Shimanuki was optimistic that only a small group of Americans 
attempted to exclude the Japanese immigrants, he believed.  The majority of Americans 
would welcome the Japanese.  Indeed, as Kumei pointed out most emigration promoters 
commonly shared Shimanuki’s view that if the Japanese emigrants were decent, they 
would not be excluded in America.  Japan’s victory over the Russo-Japanese War (1904–
1905) had a tremendous psychological effect on the formation of a sense of Japanese 
supremacy over other Asian countries.  Identifying themselves as subjects of the itto-koku 
(一等国, literary “first-rank nation”), the Japanese found no reason to be treated like 
citizens of “nito-koku” (“second-class nation”) or “santo-koku” (“third-class nation”).184  
Clearly, they did not interpret the Japanese exclusion as a racially motivated movement.  
Instead of criticizing the exclusionists, they blamed the Japanese emigrants for being 
treated badly. 
Significantly, as discussed earlier, one of the major goals of the Meiji leaders was 
the establishment of the strong central government in order to resist the Western 
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imperialism and then to carry out kaigai hatten for the territorial expansion.  In order to 
mobilize the citizens for the state affairs, the Meiji leaders had promoted the rise of 
Japanese national consciousness.  Through the promulgation of Imperial Rescript on 
Education in 1890, the Meiji government had made efforts to unite the Japanese people 
through the establishment of the emperor-centered state.  According to Jansen, while the 
Charter Oath in 1868 promoted the Westernization of the nation, the Imperial Rescript on 
Education was anti-foreign in nature in order “to create internal solidarity among the 
people by maintaining a common national morality and a consciousness of that morality 
as stemming from shared origins in Japan’s past.”185  In other words, the Imperial 
Rescript on Education enabled the rise of institutionalized nationalism in Meiji Japan by 
rejecting the Western values. 
By the time of the outbreak of a racially motivated incident, not only the U.S. 
government but also the Japanese government sought to restrict the Japanese immigration 
to the United States in order to maintain the national prestige.  Without exception, the 
Japanese in America including draft dodgers supported the war effort as subjects of the 
empire of Japan.  During the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1095), they promptly reported 
on the military situation as well as collected contributions for relief funds and the war 
bereaved in Japan.  Their contributions totaled ¥24,500, and the applications for public 
bonds amounted to ¥140,000.186  Partly collected by a leading labor contractor in Utah, 
Hashimoto Daigoro, the Japanese in Utah, mostly laborers, had sent as much as $10,000 
to the charitable organizations in Japan.  In addition, as the Salt Lake Herald reported on 
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February 5, 1905:  
Besides this sum considerable money has been sent direct to Japan to be credited 
to the governmental fund established by the emperor.  Fathers and brothers who are here 
have sent from month to month every dollar not necessary to the existence of themselves 
and their families while their male and even female relatives whom they left in Japan 
have been fighting their way across Manchuria.  The earnestness with which they have 
faced the pressing needs of their country is apparent in the way they have denied 
themselves everything but the humblest livelihood in order to give all they could to the 
relief funds… 
When the first call for reserves was made last September by the emperor, a wave 
of patriotism swept through the Japanese settlers in this state and twenty-t o Japs 
immediately enlisted and joined a number of their countrymen at San Francisco who had 
also decided to fight for their country.187   
 
After the defeat of Russia, Japanese nationalism reached its one of the prewar 
climaxes, and the Japanese naturally came to identify Japan with other Western pow s.  
Therefore, the Japanese government could not overlook the “unjust [racial] 
discrimination” against the Japanese subjects taken by the San Francisco Board of 
Education.188   
Contrary to the expectation of the Japanese, the Japan’s victory over Russia 
further stimulated the “Yellow Peril” scare among the Western nations because it was the 
first time in the modern history that non-western country defeated western country.  
Although Japan had carried out the modernization policies and imitated the Western 
model in order to join the West, the Western countries differentiated Japan from the 
Western civilization.  It was a great irony because the West forced Japan to modernize; 
however, it started bashing Japan once Japan established herself as a powerful modern 
nation.  Mori Ōgai (森 鷗外, 1862–1922), a leading novelist and army surgeon, put the 
Western perception of Japan this way: Kataba Oka, Makeba Yaban (勝たば黄禍、負け
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ば野蛮, “Win the war [against Russia], And Japan will be denounced as a Yellow Peril. 
Lose it, And she will be branded a barbaric land.”)189 
Propagating “Yellow Peril” scare, Westerners often expressed their fear of 
Japanese expansion after the Russo-Japanese War.  Evidently, an editorial in The Times 
on September 6, 1905 declared that “the rise of a nation whose civilization contains many 
elements which differ profoundly from those that go to make up the civilization of the 
West must exercise a new and powerful influence on the mind of the West as well as on 
the mind of East.”190  In reaction to the “Yellow Peril” scare, the Meiji leaders, afraid of 
ruining the relations with the Western countries, preferred not to protest loudly and at the 
same time to prevent the rise of anti-Western sentiment within Japan.191   
There was another irony that Japan advocated “Asia for the Asiatics” while 
emphasizing the Japanese superiority to other Asians.  Therefore, “Yellow Peril” idea 
gave an impulse to the nationalistic reaction, and eventually implanted a concept of the 
Dai Tōa Kyōeiken (大東亜共栄圏, “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”) during 
World War II.  According to Iikura Akira, Mori Ōgai censured the idea of “Yellow 
Peril,” but he was more furious about the West regarding Japan the same level as other
yellow races because many Japanese then believed they were distinct from other Asians 
and considered Japan more powerful country than China.  In other words, the Japanese, 
expressing their national pride, had a racially biased view against other Asian 
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countries.192  Indeed, not all intellectuals thought like Mori Ōgai did.  For example, a 
famous novelist, Natsume Sōseki insisted that “Chinese are more honorable citizens than 
Japanese are….  Prudent Japanese should be proud to be called Chinese rather than to be 
called Japanese.  Give some consideration that how long Japan was indebted to 
China.”193  Unfortunately, the slogan “Asia for the Asiatics” merely facilitated he 
Japanese colonialism in Asia. 
 The enthusiasm about going to America cooled down after the signing of the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908 that put an end to the Japanese labor migration to 
the United States.  Afterwards, the intellectuals promoted the mass immigration of 
Japanese women for the development of the Japanese immigrant community in the 
United States during the yobiyose imin jidai (1908–1924).  They aimed to stabilize the 
immigrant community undermined by social evils such as gambling, drinking, and 
prostitution, by marriage and establishing families.194  
 As a solution to social problems caused by poverty in Japan, the Nippon Rikkokai 
continuously attempted to send out the young Japanese emigrants to the United States 
even after the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement.195  Those who wished to go to 
America continued to increase, and some of them did not hesitate to enter the United 
States illegally.  Since the Rikkokai promoted the illegal immigration, it was called 
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“Mikko-kai” (密航会, literary “stowaway society.”196  Following the death of Shimanuki 
in 1913, Nagata Shigeshi (永田 稠, 1881–1973) became the second president of the 
Nippon Rikkokai after six years and eight months of residence in the United States.  
Nagata made every effort to rescue emigrants from the greedy imin- ado (emigration 
Inns) that sought to get all the money of emigrants in league with doctors and clerks.197  
Then, Nagata, complying with enthusiastic request from the youth, established a 
“stowaway training school” in the town of Misaki, Kanagawa prefecture in 1924.198  At 
the “stowaway training school,” the Japanese practiced swimming four kilometers to the 
shore with their clothes and shoes wrapped in oiled paper on their heads.199  Nagata 
descried the mission of the school: 
“It was a scheme that aimed at preparing men to jump off a boat and swim to shore.  A 
fellow who came from Shinshu, Nagano Prefecture, had never swam before in the ocean, 
but after our hard training program he was able to swim the 2.5 miles easily.  In order n t 
to be eaten by sharks, we swam with 13 or 14 feet of bleached cotton trailing out behind 
each one of us.  At first we went naked so that we could swim easily.  In a week we made 
remarkable progress.”200 
 
Despite the intensive training under the direction of the Rikkokai, not all of them 
succeeded in entering the United States safely due to a various reasons.  There was a 
tragic story about one of the first trainees.  Nagata continued: 
“One member of the first group trained here, Keisaku Suzuki, left for North America on a 
boat headed for Seattle via Tacoma.  At Puget Sound the shores are very near to each 
other.  Mr. Suzuki jumped into the water soon after the boat left Tacoma port, judging 
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that he could easily make it to shore.  However, the place he chose to jump was too clo e 
to the cargo space, and he was caught in the screw.  His body was chopped to pieces and 
he was of course killed instantly.  He was about 21 or 22, I presume, a youth who came 
from Shizuoka Prefecture.”201 
 
After this horrible accident, Nagata considered ending the preparatory training 
program but the enthusiasm of the young Japanese pushed Nagata to continue the training 
school.202  As a result, numbers of Japanese young men attempted to stow away 
thereafter; some succeeded but others did not.  According to an executive of Rikkokai, 
the society had sent as many as 7,000 Japanese emigrants to the United States.203   
In those days, the United States began to control the illegal immigration more 
strictly, and stowaways, possessing no passport, could be in a deep trouble, including 
deportation.  Therefore, stowaways had to live cautiously in order not to be caught by the 
authority.  Like in Hawaii, not all Japanese in the United States were succes ful in 
making money, and some committed an act of treachery.  For instance, some Issei 
reported these stowaways in exchange for reward of twenty-five dollars per fugitive.  
Suffering from the lowly immigrant life, they informed on the very compatriots f r 
money.  Otherwise, turning into hoodlums, they blackmailed the stowaways into paying 
them for keeping quiet.204  Meanwhile, the penalty for assisting stowaways into the 
United States was harsh after the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1917.  According 
to Ito’s Issei: 
One who helps or hides smugglers-in will be subject to “a fine of $2,000 plus up to 5 
years imprisonment…” and that was the penalty per hideaway, as provided for in Article 
8 of the Immigration Act of 1917. Also, according to Article 18 of the new Immigration 
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Act of 1924, if one transported immigrants illegally he was fined $10,000 per immigrant 
plus the boat fee from the port of departure in the U.S. to the port of arrival in Japan, to 
be paid to the Chief Customs Officer at the port of arrival.  According to Article 20 of the 
same act, in case a crewman jumped ship, the captain and all responsible personnel were 
fined $1,000 per ship-jumper.  Moreover, if the boat failed to take the appropriate 
measures to prevent ship-jumping in the manner prescribed by the Immigration Office, 
the captain and all responsible personnel were fined as much as $1,000, and never less 
than $200, or suffered imprisonment up to one year, or both.205 
 
Otherwise, entering the United States as tourist groups, some Japanese attempted group 
smuggling-in.206   
 Although it was not only risky but also expensive, the Japanese who failed legal 
immigration attempted illegal immigration.  Consequently, the influx of dekasegi laborers 
through legal and illegal immigration incited the anti-Japanese sentiment in California.  
The number of Japanese in the United States increased from 2,039 in 1890 to nearly 
24,000 in 1900, or over 11 fold in a decade.207  The emigration motivators and numbers 
of guidebooks for going to America that exaggerated the merit of dekasegi were largely 
responsible for this social phenomenon.  Dreaming of becoming rich in a short period, the 
Japanese emigrants entered the United States as legal immigrants, trans-mig ts from 
Hawaii, Mexico or Canada, or illegal immigrants during the jiyū imin jidai (1900–1907).   
In addition to the guidebooks and exaggerated advertises of emigration companies, 
there were other causes that motivated the Japanese for going to America.  The letters 
from the Japanese laborers in Hawaii and the United States significantly influenced the 
Japanese to work abroad.  Sometimes their success stories were over exaggerated, but 
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they were based on the fact that they could earn more money in America than in Japan.208  
For example, Murayama pointed out that Ehime prefecture sent out two to three times 
more emigrants than its neighboring prefectures because of a successful pioneer
immigrant named Nishii Hisahachi (西井久八).  Leaving for the United States around 
1880, Nishii worked in the Port Blakeley Sawmill, and then worked as a dishwasher 
before promoted to a cook in a hotel.  Making use of his cooking skill, Nishii opened a 
restaurant in Seattle in 1884 that was the first business established by Japanese in the 
Pacific Northwest.  “In addition to eight restaurants, Nishii extended his business to 
laundry, hotel, and a ranch in the suburb of Tacoma by the mid-1900s.”209  When Nishii 
returned home in 1889, he brought back many emigrants to the United States and helped 
them to establish their business.  Thereafter, a greater number of Japanese from Ehime 
prefecture emigrated to the United States.  Nishii donated money for the fellow Japanese 
emigrants as well as for the Ehime prefecture.  However, Nishii determin d to go back to 
Japan after the enactment of the Immigration Act.210   
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
Backed by the government that aimed to modernize the country and to catch up 
with the West, the Japanese elite and intellectuals were the core of emigration motivators.  
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Through the influential publications and information from families and friends overseas, 
the Japanese immigration pattern shifted its nature in the 1890s from study-base to 
labor-based.  Significantly, utilizing the rise of nationalism in the wake of the First Sino-
Japanese War, many intellectuals including Katayama Sen emphasized emigration as an 
act of patriotism.  Publishing numbers of influential works, Fukuzawa Yukichi was a 
powerful agent for motivating overseas emigration for bunmei kaika, and then for fukoku 
kyōhei.  Meanwhile, Fukuzawa shifted his stance in the 1880s and began to emphasize 
nationalistic elements.  The Japanese prejudice against China and Korea and the rise of 
the Japanese imperialism largely attributed to the ideology of Fukuzawa, namely, 
Datsua-ron.   
Simultaneously, the Japanese intellectual women influenced the educated 
Japanese girls and women to become “picture brides” to gain the rights to enter the 
United States for their individuality.  Nevertheless, numbers of publications for going to 
America in the turn of the century deemed to play a leading role in promoting the 
overseas emigration, especially to the United States.  The guidebooks instructig the 
emigrants what to do and advising relieved their fear for going to a foreign country 
thousands of miles away from home.  In other words, the intellectuals and their activities 
“pushed” many Japanese to go to America.  Since the craze for going to America became 
higher than ever, some did not hesitate to utilize illegal method in order to enter the 
United States.  Then, the high demand on emigration gave birth to the emergence of the 
emigration companies, illegal emigration agents, as well as inns and doctors who took 












EMIGRATION COMPANIES AND LABOR CONTRACTORS 
 
 As the demand for emigration continuously increased, various emigration 
businesses emerged.  The emigration companies and agents in addition to shipping 
industry played a key role in enabling the mass transportation of emigrants to Hawaii.  
After the prohibition on the contract-labor immigration due to the 1885 Contract Labor 
Law, the labor contractors or “bosses” came to dominate the supply of Japanese laborers
in the mainland United States.  This chapter examines the way the emigration businesse  
and labor contractors exploited the Japanese emigrants in Japan and the United States. 
 
Emigration Companies to Hawaii 
Following the end of kanyaku imin in 1894 due to the Hawaiian Revolution, 
which overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893, a great number of emigration 
companies emerged all over the country.  Fukuzawa Yukichi’s pupil, Mutō Sanji who 
had studied at Pacific University (1885–1887), was the first businessman to advocate the 
establishment of the emigration company for facilitating the transportation of lower-class 
laborers to America.1  The emigration companies were to take over the duties and tasks 
previously performed by the government during the kanyaku imin jidai (1885–1894) such 
                                                
 1 Mutō Sanji, “Beikoku Ijū Ron” (On Immigration to America), in Mutō Sanji Zenshū, 
vol. 1 (The Complete Works of Mutō Sanji) (Tokyo: Shinjusha, 1966), 287–288. 
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as arranging transportation and finding jobs for the Japanese emigrants.  Indeed, the 
emigration companies helped the Japanese to emigrate to all over the world including 
Hawaii, the United States, Canada, Peru, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, Korea, and Siberia 
from the last decade of the nineteenth century.  Simultaneously, with the help of 
emigration companies, many Japanese entered Hawaii as contract laborers, where the 
demand for labor was exceedingly high.  
 A great number of emigration companies established after the end of the kanyaku 
imin, especially concentrated on years between 1896 and 1903, in which 80 percent of 
emigration companies established as seen in Table 7.1.2  Before 1900, there were only 
fourteen emigration companies; however, by 1901–1902, at least twenty-eight such 
companies existed in twelve prefectures.3  They were located in Hiroshima, Kumamoto, 
Yamaguchi, Kochi, Wakayama, Okayama, Kobe, Tokyo, Yokohama, Chiba, Fukushima, 
and Sendai where the demand for emigration was higher than the rest of prefectures.  
There were seven such companies in Hiroshima and four in Kumamoto, which explains 
why these two prefectures sent out a large number of emigrants in this period.  In 1903, 
the number of the emigration companies reached as many as thirty-six (including nine in 
                                                
 2 Kenji Kimura, “Meiji chū kōki ni okeru Imingaisha no Setsuritsu Shutai” (Major 
Establishment of the Emigration Companies during mid- to late-Meiji Per od), Kingendaishi 
Kenkyūkai Kaihō 31 (1997), quoted in Kojiro Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka o Honkyo tosuru Imin 
Kaisha: Omotoshite Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha no baai” (Japanese Emigration Companies Located 
in Osaka at the Middle of Meiji Era: Mainly the Case of Japan Emigration Company), Shakai to 
Chiiki (Journal of Region and Society) 2 (October 1999):  69.  In order to establish an emigration 
company, a person(s) had to get permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by way of the 
Governor of a prefecture in which the business office would be located.  In addition, one had to 
provide detail information on the business office, capital, term of business, places to be sent, 
types of immigration, estimates of emigrants, method of emigration recruitment, as well as 
emigrants’ personal records and property, according to Kodama, “Imingaisha no Jittai,” 468–469. 
 
 3 Imin Hogo Kyōkai (Association to Protect Emigrants), Kaigai Dekasegi Annai (A 
Guide to Working Abroad) (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan Kyōkai, 1902), 30–32. 
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Hiroshima), capitalized at ¥20,000 to ¥1,000,000.4 
 
 
Table 7.1: Number of Emigration Companies by Prefecture 
Prefecture 
Number of Emigration Companies or Agencies 
1891–1900 1901–02 1903 1905 
Hiroshima 3 7 9 9 
Tokyo 3 6 8 8 
Kumamoto 2 4 3 3 
Yokohama 2 2 3 1 
Kobe 2 2 2 2 
Yamaguchi – 1 3 2 
Sendai – 1 3 1 
Kochi – 1 2 1 
Wakayama 1 1 1 – 
Okayama 1 1 1 1 
Chiba – 1 1 1 
Fukushima – 1 – – 
Total 14 28 36 29 
 
Sources: Imin Hogo Kyōkai (Association to Protect Emigrants), Kaigai Dekasegi Annai (A Guide 
to Working Abroad) (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan Kyōkai, 1902), 30–32; Hisashi Tsurutani, Amerika 
Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin (The Opening of the American West and the Japanese) (Tokyo: Nihon 
Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1997), 61–62; Takamitsu Okawahira, Nihon Iminron, quoted in 
Hiroshima Shigaku Kenkyūkai, ed., Shigaku Kenkyū Gojisshuunen Kinen Ronsō: Nihon hen 




In the short period, the emigration companies sent out more than 57,000 Japanese 
to Hawaii by 1907.5  Therefore, as Kodama declared, the s iyaku imin jidai (self-
contracted immigration period, 1894–1900) was the “golden age” of the emigration to 
                                                
 4 Hisashi Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin (The Opening of the American 
West and the Japanese) (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1997), 61–62. 
 
 5  Michio Yamada, Fune ni Miru Nihonjin Iminshi: Kasato Maru kara Kurūzu Kyakusen 
e (History of Japanese Immigration through the Ship: From Kasato Maru to Cruise Ship) (Tokyo: 
Chuo Kōronsha, 1998), 31. 
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Hawaii.6  As the number of immigrants decreased after the signing of the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement, the emigration business started declining.  The majority of the emigration 
companies either closed down or merged and only nine such companies still were 
engaged in business by 1909.  In 1917, there were two such companies left after 
mergers.7  In November 1920, merging the Morioka Shōkai (森岡商会, Morioka Trading 
Firm), the Kaigai Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (海外興業株式会社, “Overseas 
Development Company”) was the only emigration company existed in Japan.8 
 Until the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, the majority of Japanese 
emigrants went to America with the help of emigration companies.  For instance, in th  
wake of the First Sino-Japanese War, these companies sent out 72 percent or 22,515 out 
of 31,354 emigrants in 1899, and after the Russo-Japanese War, they sent out 86 percent 
or 31,241 out of 36,124 emigrants in 1906.9  According to Oshimoto, between 1898 and 
1907, the 140,955 Japanese emigrated overseas through the emigration companies 
whereas only 47,560 emigrated without the help of emigration companies.  That indicated 
nearly 75 percent of the Japanese emigrated overseas through the emigration compa ies.  
The ratio went down to about 34 percent in the years between 1908 and 1918.10  For 
                                                
6 Masaaki Kodama, “Imingaisha no Jittai” (The True Facts of the Emigration 
Companies), in Shigaku Kenkyū Gojisshuunen Kinen Ronso: Nihon hen, d. Hiroshima Shigaku 
Kankōkai  (Okayama: Fukutake Shoten, 1980), 463.  
 
7 Naomasa Oshimoto, “Imingaisha to Funegaisha: Imin Yusō ni kansuru Keiyaku  nado 
no Shiryo” (Immigration Companies and Shipping Companies: Materials relating to the Contract 
of the Transportation of Emigrants), Iju Kenkyū (Studies on Immigration), no. 18 (1981): 76.  
 
8 Kodama, “Imingaisha no Jittai,” 460, 464. 
 
9 Ibid., 461. 
 




recruiting more emigrants, most emigration companies dispatched agencies or set up 
branch offices in Hiroshima since it sent out the potential emigrants.  For exampl, there 
were at least 128 agencies and branch offices in Hiroshima and 43,940 Hiroshima people 
emigrated overseas between 1899 and 1910.11   
In fact, an emigration company existed before the s iyaku imin jidai.  The founder 
of Shūeisha Publishing Office, Sakuma Teiichi (佐久間 貞一, 1846–1898), and the 
second president of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Yoshikawa Taijirō (吉川 泰二郎, 1852–
1895), established the nation’s first emigration company, the Nippon Yoshisa Imin 
Kaisha (日本吉佐移民会社), in Tokyo on December 7, 1891.12  A former employee of 
Mitsubishi, Yoshikawa aimed to expand the overseas routes through encouraging 
immigration.  Recruiting applicants for emigration, the company provided works ab oad 
depending on the demands of each overseas country.13  According to Yuji Ichioka, the 
Nippon Yoshisa Imin Kaisha was the first venture that made a profit out of sending 
emigrants overseas.14   
                                                
11 Kodama, “Imingaisha no Jittai,” 469–470. 
 
 12 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 61.  Yoshikawa studied English 
linguistics at Keio Gijuku, taught English at the English School in Aichi prefecture, joined the 
Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha in 1878, shifted to the Nippon Yusen Kaisha in 1885, and became 
the president of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha in 1894, according to “Yoshikawa Taijirō,” in Masaaki 
Ueda, et al., Kodansha Nihon Jinmei Daijiten (Kodansha Japanese Biographical Dictionary) 
(Tokyo: Kodansha, 2001).  Meanwhile, Sakuma was one of the most prominent Meiji 
entrepreneurs.  Since he made a great effort to deal with labor problem and social welfare, he 
became known as “Japan’s Robert Owen,” according to “Sakuma Teiichi,” in Asahi Nihon 
Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten (Biographical Dictionary of Japanese Historical Figures). Tokyo: Asahi 
Shinbunsha, 1994. 
 
 13 Yatsuo Yoshida, Meiji Kosho Jiten (Encyclopedia of the Meiji Study). (Tokyo: Shin 
Jinbutsu Oraisha, 1975), 50. 
 
 14 Yuji Ichioka, The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 
1885–1924 (New York: Free Press, 1988), 47. 
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The Nippon Yoshisa Imin Kaisha was indeed a nominal company because the 
entire business operation was managed by the Nippon Yusen Kaisha.  Naturally, the 
Nippon Yoshisa Imin Kaisha utilized the services of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha for 
conveying the Japanese immigrants.15  In other words, the emigrants had no choice of 
their shipping companies because the Nippon Yoshisa Imin Kaisha forced the emigrants 
to use the service of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha.16  Therefore, the Nippon Yoshisa Imin 
Kaisha functioned as the “Emigration Department of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha.”17  As 
the demand for emigration increased following the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) 
that caused the influx of thousands of demobilized soldiers into the job market, the 
number of emigration companies continued to increase and their business flourished.18  
Accordingly, the mass transportation of emigrants facilitated the development of 
maritime industry and encouraged Japan’s commercial activity as Yoshikawa envisioned.   
During the shiyaku imin jidai, the Japanese emigrants clearly became the 
commodities of the emigration companies in collusion with politicians.  In 1896, Imin 
Hogo Ho (Emigrant Protection Law) was enacted for protecting emigrants; however, it 
turned out to restrict emigration by imposing strict financial requirements for emigrants.    
Meanwhile, the law required the emigration companies to get a business license from the 
                                                
 15 Yoshiaki Nishimukai, “Transportation of Japanese Emigrants in the Pre-Wa  Period,” 
Keizai Keiei Kenkyū: Nenpō (Annual report on economics and business administration) 18, no. 1 
(December 1967): 88. 
 
16 Kodama, “Imingaisha no Jittai,” 476. 
 
 17 Yamada, Fune ni Miru Nihonjin Iminshi, 46. 
 
18 Gennosuke Yokoyama, Yokoyama Gennosuke Zenshū, dai 7-kan Shokumin (1) 
(Complete Works of Yokoyama Gennosuke, vol. 7 Colonization), ed. Yuichi Tachibana (Tokyo: 
Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 2005), http://210.128.252.171/brasil/text/t013.html (accessed 
November 2, 2009). 
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prefecture administration and to deposit ¥10,000 for safeguarding emigrants against
nonfulfillment of terms of contract.19  Kimura Kenji, an expert on the Japanese 
immigration study, categorized the founders of emigration companies into four groups.  
According to Kimura’s analysis, they were either persons related to zaibatsu; 
businessmen (non-zaibatsu related); local men of high repute; or members of a political
party.20  Meanwhile, a prominent immigration historian, Kodama Masaaki pointed out 
three characteristics of emigration companies: (1) the involvement of members of the 
House of Councilors and prefectural assembly in the management of companies, (2) the 
central role in the management of companies played by the wealthy persons who were in 
the locations of emigration companies, and (3) the management of companies through co-
investment of politicians and wealthy persons.21   
The five major emigration companies monopolized the Japanese immigration to 
Hawaii.  They were Hiroshima Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha (Overseas Company), 
Tokyo Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Tokyo Immigration Company), Morioka Shōkai (Morioka 
Immigration Agency), Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Japan Immigration Company), and 
Kumamoto Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Kumamoto Immigration Company).   
In order to stimulate their business, Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha, Morioka 
Shōkai, and Kumamoto Imin Gōshi Kaisha established their branches in Honolulu in 
                                                
19 Mitziko Sawada, “Culprits and Gentlemen: Meiji Japan’s Restrictions of Emigrants to 
the United States, 1891–1909,” The Pacific Historical Review 60, no. 3 (August 1991): 345–346. 
 
20 Kenji Kimura, “Meiji chū kōki ni okeru Imingaisha no Setsuritsu Shutai,” quoted in 
Kojiro Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka Shōnin ni yoru Imin Assengyō: Ogura Shōkai oyobi Nanyū 
Shōsha ni yoru Sōsōki Hawai Imin no baai” (Japanese Emigration Agency by the Merchants of 
Osaka at the Middle of Meiji Era: The Case of Emigrants to Hawaii by Ogura Shokai and Nan-
Yu Shōsha), Shakai to Chiiki (Journal of Region and Society) 1 (February 1999): 60. 
 
21 Kodama, “Imingaisha no Jittai,” 473–474. 
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1896 and then set up the Honolulu branch of the Keihin Ginkō in 1897.22  The Bank had 
four branch offices; two in other districts of Tokyo, one in Yokohama, and one in 
Honolulu.  In fact, the president of the Keihin Ginkō, Morioka Makoto (森岡 真), was 
the one who had founded the Morioka Shōkai in 1894.23  As shown in the Table 7.2, 
these five major emigration companies dominated over 90 percent of the immigration 
business to Hawaii.   
 
 
Table 7.2: Emigration to Hawaii through Emigration Companies up to 1899 
 
Emigration Companies Capital (¥) 
Number of 
Emigrants  
Rate of Total 
Emigrants (%) 
Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha (Hiroshima)  
海外渡航株式会社 (established in 1894) 
60,000 11,731 29.54 
Morioka Shōkai (Tokyo) 
森岡商会 (established in Nov. 1894) 
250,000 8,148 20.52 
Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Osaka Kobe)  
日本移民合資会社 (established in 1896) 
50,000 5,300 13.35 
Tokyo Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Tokyo) 
東京移民合資会社 (established in 1897) 
100,000 3,382 8.52 
Kumamoto Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Kumamoto)  
熊本移民合資会社 (established in 1898) 
60,000 7,738 19.49 
Ogura Shōkai (Osaka)  
小倉商会 (established in 1894)   
– 2,500 6.29 
Kobe Tokō Gōshi Kaisha (Kobe) 
神戸渡航合資会社 (established in 1894) 
30,000 909 2.29 
Total   39,708 100.00 
                                                
 22 Yukiko Kimura, Issei: Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1992), 175; United Japanese Society of Hawaii and James H. Okahata, A History of 
Japanese in Hawaii (Honolulu: The United Japanese Society of Hawaii, 1971), 142–143. 
 
 23 Iminsakigotono Shusshinken no Tokuchō (Characteristics of the destination of 
emigration and the origins of emigrants), National Diet Library, Japan. http://www.ndl.go.jp/ 
brasil/text/t013.html (accessed May 24, 2009). 
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Source: Hawai Nihonjin Iminshi Kanko Iinkai, Hawai Nihonjin Imin Shi (Honolulu: Hawai 
Nikkeijin Rengo Kyōkai, 1964), 147; Hiroshima Shigaku Kenkyū ai, ed., Shigaku Kenkyū 
Gojisshuunen Kinen Ronso: Nihon hen (Okayama: Fukutake Shoten, 1980), 20; Kaikoku 
Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen (Tokyo: Yōyōsha, 
1955), 367; Hisashi Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin (The Opening of the American 




In particular, the number of emigrants to Hawaii through the emigration companies 
peaked in 1899 in response to the U.S. annexation of Hawaii.  The planters sought to 
secure as many Japanese emigrants as possible before the application of the U.S. law in 
1900 that prohibited the labor immigration.  According to Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku 
(Commercial section in the Foreign Ministry), more than 90 percent of the Japanese 
emigrated to Hawaii through the service of emigration companies between 1900 and 
1907.24  For instance, since the establishment of company in 1896 to the close down in 
1908, the Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha sent out 8,223 Japanese emigrants to Hawaii, of 
whom, 3,295 (40 percent) left Japan in 1899 alone.25   
The emigration companies, virtually commercializing emigrants, exploited the 
countrymen for their business interests.  Among the executives of the Kaigai Tokō 
Kabushiki Kaisha, considerable numbers were non-Hiroshima natives such as Hinata 
Terutake (Gunma), Sugawara Den (Miyagi), Watanabe Kanjurō (Saga), who were 
patrons of the Jiyūto (自由党, Liberal Party) and later obtained seats in the House as 
members of the Rikken Seiyūkai (立憲政友会, Friends of Constitutional Government), a 
dominant political party founded by Ito Hirobumi in 1900.  All of them, utilizing their 
                                                
24 Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku-hen, Ryoken kafusū oyobi Imin Tokei (Statistics of Passports 
Issued and Immigrants) (Tokyo: Tsūshōkyoku, 1921), 146–161. 
 
25 Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka o Honkyo tosuru Imin Kaisha: Omotoshite Nihon Imin Gōshi 
Kaisha no baai,” 82. 
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experience in the United States, served as the Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha’s agents of 
Honolulu branches for a while.  Interestingly, Hinata and Sugawara were managing 
directors of the infamous and corrupted Keihin Ginkō while serving for the Kaigai Tokō 
Kabushiki Kaisha.26  In fact, before working for the Kumamoto Imin Gōshi Kaisha, 
Yamaguchi Shunta published newspaper called Shin Nippon (新日本, New Japan) that 
advocated the jiyū minken ron (自由民権論, freedom and people’s rights argument).  
Then, Sugawara, Hinata, and Yamaguchi formed a political society called Nihonjin 
Aikoku Yūshi Dōmei (日本人愛国有志同盟, Japanese Patriotic League, later renamed 
Aikoku Dōmei) in San Francisco in 1888 and published monthly magazine, Jukyuseiki (十
九世紀, Nineteenth Century).  They went to the United States to advocate the jiyū minken 
ron because the Japanese government strictly controlled the press.27  Additionally, 
Kodama illustrated that there were fifteen managers of Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha in 
Hiroshima, of whom four were members of the House of Representatives, five were 
members of a prefectural assembly, and three were either presidents or executiv s of 
banks.28 
Simultaneously, the officers of the Nippon Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Japan Immigration 
Company) indicated their close affiliation with the financial and political circ es highly 
                                                
26 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 77–78.  They all belonged to the Rikken 
Seiyūkai.  Sugawara studied at Pacific University in San Francisco, Hinata went to the United 
States and later founded Tairiku Imin Kaisha, and Watanabe went to the United States and later 
founded the Kaigai Toko Kabushiki Kaisha.  
 
27 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
hen (History of Japanese-American Cultural Relations, vol. 5: Immigration Edition) (Tokyo: 
Yōyōsha, 1955), 56. 
 
28 Masaaki Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (An Introduction to the History of 
Japanese Immigration) (Hiroshima: Keisuisha, 1992), 270. 
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recognized by the government.  According to the Hawaiian Gazette on November 10, 
1896 and Kojiro Iida (1999), the Nippon Imin Gōshi Kaisha was composed of the 
following businessmen and investors that included prominent minister, owners of 
steamships, executives of banks, and merchant as shown in Table 7.3:29 
 
 
Table 7.3: Officers of the Nippon Imin Gōshi Kaisha 
Name From Occupation 
Tateno Gōzō Fukuoka Former Minister to the United States 
Hamanaka Hachisaburō Ishikawa Owner of S.S. Tōyō Maru & Nanyō Maru 
Hamanaka Hachitarō Ishikawa Owner of S.S. Tōyō Maru & Nanyō Maru 
Kagawa Shinichi Okayama President of Twenty-Second National Bank 
Suzuki Katsuo Okayama Businessman of Osaka/Manager of Okayama Bank 
Fujimoto Seibei Osaka Merchant of Osaka 
Matsushima Hisajirō Osaka Clerk of Osaka Forty-Second Bank 
Shimauchi Yoshio Ehime Merchant of Osaka 
 
Source: The Hawaiian Gazette, November 10, 1896; Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka o Honkyo tosuru 




Capitalized at ¥50,000, businessmen in Osaka established the Nippon Imin Gōsh  
Kaisha in 1896 in Osaka.30  The share of each investor was ¥6,250.  Born in Ogura-han 
(present Fukuoka prefecture in Kyushu), Tateno Gōzō (建野 郷三, 1842–1908) left for 
England for study in 1870 and became the Governor of Osaka in 1880.  In 1889, Tateno 
                                                
29 “Japanese Labor: New Company Started with G. E. Boardman as Agent,” The 
Hawaiian Gazette, November 10, 1896; Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka o Honkyo tosuru Imin Kaisha: 
Omotoshite Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha no baai,” 71–72.  Before serving for the Nippon Imin 
Kaisha as a foreign agent, Boardman worked for the Ogura Shōkai, founded by the Osaka 
merchant, Ogura Kō. 
 
30 The company’s headquarters moved to Kobe in 1898. 
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held the post of the Japanese Minister to the United States, and resigned the post in 1894.  
Then, serving as the president of the Kobe Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Tateno 
played an active part in the business circles.31  A shipping agent, Hamanaka Hachisaburō 
(濱中八三郎) was the owner of Tōyō Maru and Nanyō Maru and served as the director 
of the Japan Maritime Insurance Company.  Meanwhile, Kagawa Shinichi (香川 真一, 
1835–1920) was Okayama retainer who went to Edo in 1835 to study the Western 
technology.  Kagawa was a member of the Iwakura Mission to visit Europe and the 
United States in 1872.  Then, Kagawa served as the president of the Okayama Chamber 
of Commerce and the Twenty-Second National Bank, the director of the Kyoritsu Cotton 
Yarn Spinning Company and the Okayama Rice Mill Company, and an auditor of the 
Chugoku Railroad Company.32   Suzuki Katsuo (鈴木 勝夫) from Okayama prefecture 
was the managing director of the Asahi Trading Company and the head of the 
transportation department of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce.  Suzuki also served as 
the manager of the Osaka branch office of the Okayama Twenty-Second National Bank.  
A prominent businessman in Osaka, Fujimoto Seibei (藤本 清兵衛, 1870–1949) 
established the Fujimoto Bank in 1896 and became the president of the Fukushima 
Spinning Company,  Osaka Joint Spinning Company, the director of the Japan Savings 
Bank, and an auditor of the Osaka Life Insurance Company.  Although the hometowns of 
                                                
31 “Tateno Gōzō,” in Asahi Nihon Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten (Biographical Dictionary of 
Japanese Historical Figures). Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1994. 
 
32 Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka o Honkyo tosuru Imin Kaisha: Omotoshite Nihon Imin Gōshi 
Kaisha no baai,” 72; “Kagawa Shinichi,” in Masaaki Ueda, et al., Kodansha Nihon Jinmei 
Daijiten (Kodansha Japanese Biographical Dictionary) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2001); Constantine 
Nomikos Vaporis, Tour of Duty: Samurai, Military Service in Edo, and the Culture of Early 
Modern Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 229. 
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the officers varied, their businesses centered in or near Osaka.33 
In addition to the Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha and the Nihon Imin Gōshi 
Kaisha, the Morioka Shōkai’s Morioka Makoto, the Tokyo Imin Gōshi Kaisha’s Saito 
Chutarō, and the Kumamoto Imin Gōshi Kaisha’s Inoue Keijirō and Yamaguchi Shunta 
had close relations with political and business circles.34  The executives of emigration 
companies, utilizing tremendous profits made in Hawaii as political funds, later 
established themselves as politicians of the Rikken Seiyūkai.  Their remittance financially 
strengthened the Rikken Seiyūkai.35  Due to their closer associations with the influential 
politicians, the numbers of fraudulent activities by the emigration companies wer  
overlooked. 
 As the demand for the immigration increased, a growing number of fraudulent 
practices became a serious issue.  According to Kaigai Dekasegi Annai (1902), an 
emigrant should expect to procure: 
 Commission  ¥20  
 Passage fare  ¥60  
 Misegane36  ¥91  
        Total  ¥171  
                                                
33 Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka o Honkyo tosuru Imin Kaisha: Omotoshite Nihon Imin Gōshi 
Kaisha no baai,” 72. 
 
34 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 77.  Yamaguchi was a stowaway to the 
United States and a member of the Rikken Seiyūkai.   
 
35 Keiho Soga, Gojūnenkan no Hawai Kaisō (Reflections on Fifty Years in Hawaii) 
(Honolulu: Hawaii, Gojūnenkan no Hawai Kaisō Kankōkai, 1953), 101; Tsurutani, Amerika 
Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 77–79. 
 
36 Misegane, 見せ金, literary “show money.”  Beginning in 1894, the Hawaiian 
government required the Japanese emigrants to present a labor contract or misegane of fifty 
dollars at the port of entry to be admitted to Hawaii.  Aiming to deny the entry of the 
impoverished people, it was the Hawaiian government’s countermeasure against the rapidly 
increasing Japanese labor migration into Hawaii.   
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An emigrant needed total ¥171 to go to Hawaii; however, if one had ¥80 (commission 
and passage fee) available, the emigration company would lend ¥91 with extraordinary 
high interest of twelve dollars and fifty cents.37  Additionally, emigrants should prepare 
for three to four days of lodging charges.  Based on the Imin Hogo Ho (Emigrant 
Protection Law), the emigration companies were not supposed to collect money from the 
immigrants except the set-amount of commission, usually ten to twenty yen.  
Nevertheless, as Tobei no Shirube (渡米のしるべ, “Guide to America”), a guidebook for 
going to America, pointed out, the emigration companies, making all kind of excuses, 
would not help emigrants go to America unless they bribe them.38   
In those days, a farmer made three to four yen per month without board or 
lodging, thus earning fifty to sixty yen a year.39  That meant three-years worth of salary 
had to be raised for emigrating to the United States.  In order to raise money, the 
emigrants sold off their farms and properties, borrowed from their relatives, or 
cooperated with other villagers for collecting funds for sending emigrants by turns.  
Otherwise, they borrowed money from wealthy persons of their villages and later 
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returned the money with extremely high interest.40  Accordingly, conspiring with the 
Keihin Ginkō, these emigration companies made an enormous profit by charging the 
emigrants high commissions, getting rebates from the shipping companies for each 
passenger, and charging the employers a commission for bringing laborers.41  Because of 
the emigration companies collecting rebates, the shipping companies tended not to reduce 
the passage fares. 
Founded by Ogura Kō in 1894, a merchant in Osaka, the Ogura Shōkai was 
indeed the first emigration company that sent out the first group of shiyaku imin to 
Hawaii in June 1894.42  Ogura made an enormous profit not only by collecting a large 
sum of money from the emigrants but also by receiving passage fares from the planters in 
Hawaii for each laborer he sent.  These planters paid Ogura $30 for passage of a male 
laborer and $20 for a female laborer.  In addition, Ogura drew terms of labor immigration 
contract in 1894 that required each emigrant to deposit ¥50 for men and ¥25 for women 
that would be returned to them or their designated persons when they fulfill the fifteen-
month labor contract period (Article 5).  Moreover, Ogura Shōkai subtracted two dollars 
for each emigrant and three dollars and fifty cents for each married couple from their 
salary for fifteen months that would be paid back to emigrants with interest when their 
contract ended (Article 6).  Ogura Shokai collected ¥10 for commission, half-price for 
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children between the age of six and fifteen, and free for children under the age of five 
(Article 7).43  In the circumstances, Ogura Shōkai could gain about ¥120 yen [$30 
(passage) + ¥50 (deposit) + ¥10 (commission)] from a male emigrant and about ¥75 [$20 
(passage) + ¥25 (deposit) + ¥10 (commission)] from a female emigrant.  In 1895, as the 
competition among the Japanese emigration companies intensified, Ogura Shōkai no 
longer paid passages for emigrants because the planters sought to import emigrants 
without paying their passages.  In order to attract more emigrants, Ogura Shōkai not only 
abolished the security deposit but also reduced the mandatory monthly deposit to one 
dollar thereafter, according to Iida’s study.44  
Ogura Shōkai’s fraudulent practices further escalated, and the president of the 
company Ogura Kō was prosecuted and taken into custody for a violation of the Imin 
Hogo Kisoku (Emigrant Protection Ordinance) enacted in 1894.  The Article 17 of the 
Imin Hogo Kisoku had prohibited the emigration companies collecting money from 
emigrants other than the listed commission of ¥10.  While Ogura could obtain a passage 
for Honolulu for only ¥18 including meals, he charged ¥35 for a passage of contract-
laborer and ¥52 for a free-laborer.  The contract-laborer ended up paying nearly twice 
and the free-laborer three times as much as it cost.  Losing business license, Ogura 
Shōkai went out of business in May 1896.45 
Ogura Shōkai was not the only corrupt emigration company.  In 1904, Governor 
of Wakayama reported that Kōkoku Shokumin Kaisha (Kokoku Colonization Company) 
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had forced emigrants who possessed enough savings to loan ¥100 for misegane and 
demanded to pay ¥12.5 or 12.5% as interest.46  Many emigration companies had 
committed fraud in conspiracy with local shops, hotels, and steamship companies.  
Supervised by the emigration companies, the emigrants had no choice but to buy their 
clothing and necessities at the designated tailors and general stores, which tended to sell 
goods of poor quality at high price.47  These emigration companies often took a bribe of 
ten to twenty yen from the emigrants, who were eager to go to the United States as soon 
as possible, under the pretext of the ship filled to capacity.48   
As the Japanese government imposed further restrictions on immigration, the 
emigration companies instructed the Japanese to obtain passports to Latin American 
countries, Mexico in particular, as a means by which to enter the United States through 
the indirect channel.  A considerable number of Japanese entered the United States by 
crossing the Mexican border.  While some Japanese planned to stow away to the United 
States immediately after their arrival at Mexico, others determined to work in Mexico for 
a while and then left for the United States.  Dale Ann Sato illustrated that “Issei entered 
from Mexico to the United States through the southern border towns of California, 
Arizona, and Texas.  In 1901, Japanese emigration companies attracted 8,706 Japanese to 
work in Baja’s copper mines, railroads in Jalisco, sugar cane fields in Vera Cruz, and coal 
mines in Coahuila.  Some 5,000, including 473 Okinawans, crossed into the United States 
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to escape the severe working conditions.”49  According to Kitamura, Wada Sam from 
Kagoshima had a similar experience.  Obtaining passport for Argentine, Wada went 
ashore at Mexico, then walking three days, he finally entered the United States wi hout 
captured.50  Inspector Braun reported that in 1906 and 1907, the emigration companies 
transported more than 10,000 Japanese into Mexico as contract laborers; however, most 
of them had left their jobs to migrate to the United States and only 1,000 Japanese had 
remained in Mexico in June 1907.51   
In response to the high-handed practices that lined the pockets of the emigration 
companies, Osaka Asahi Shimbun called for the protection of the ignorant emigrants.52  
Furthermore, the emigration companies, violating the Immigration Convention of 1886, 
conveyed numbers of prostitutes as the wives of bachelor emigrants that led to their 
undoing.53  The influx of prostitutes not only damaged the national image but also paved 
the way for the emergence of anti-Japanese movement in America.   
Consequently, criticism of the emigration companies arose in the turn of the 
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century because of their heavy exploitation of their fellow Japanese.  Practically, if each 
emigration company sent fifty emigrants each, they could send as many as seven hundred 
emigrants monthly on average.  However, concerned that the drastic increase of J panese 
immigrants would cause diplomatic problems between Japan and Hawaii, the Foreign 
Minister Komura limited the number of jiyū imin (free immigrants) to Hawaii sent by 
each emigration company from fifty to thirty emigrants per month after May 1, 1902.54  
These emigration companies sent out emigrants anywhere in the world as long athey
could make an enormous profit although they knew some places were clearly 
disadvantageous to the emigrants.55  At one point, Secretary Hanihara Masanao (埴原 正
直, 1876–1934) was surprised at the way the Japanese emigrants were “living like cattle,” 
and criticized the emigration companies that made profits by making promises to 
innocent country people who knew nothing about the conditions in foreign lands and 
helped them obtain passports.56  In fact, before Hanihara raised an issue of the terrible 
practices of the emigration companies, O aka Asahi Shimbun had already reported the 
reality of these companies: 
“The emigration business is well-known for profiteering.  Japanese immigrants now in 
Hawaii, the North America continent and other foreign countries total about 100,000 
persons.  There are differences in income according to land and profession, but their 
average saving is 100 yen a year, and they send the money back to Japan.  In other words, 
the sweat of 100,000 emigrants is condensed into a gold-piece worth ten millio yen, 
which is consolidating our national power.  On the other hand, however, when we look at 
what the emigration companies are doing, we cannot dismiss the hundreds of bad results: 
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Each emigration company takes advantage of the naives of emigrants, charges 
unreasonably high commissions, robs emigrants of their savings, and  is only interested in 
its own self-entered profit-making.  It is too harsh to submerge all the good things they 
have done under the mountain of crimes of which they are guilty; however, it is nece sary 
now to devise some means to correct the bad policies such as: domestically, to have the 
police department control the soliciting of emigrants more severely and prevent lapses in 
legality; and abroad, to have the Consulates watch the behavior of agentsof the 
emigration companies more closely and see that the savings of emigrants are deposited in 
more reliable banks. We wish this kind of reform would be carried out…  Now there are 
27 emigration companies in Japan, and the number of prospective emigrants is about 
14,100 each year.  Therefore the number of emigrants per company per month is limited 
to 45, and the commission is 20 yen per emigrant.  Out of this revenue the emigration 
company must pay their employees both in Japan and abroad, and all their other 
expenses.  Therefore it is quite understandable why they all try to go beyond the legal 
regulations…”57 
 
Unfortunately, these proposals by the major Japanese newspaper did not restrict 
the fraudulent practices of emigration companies at all because the media was rather 
sympathetic to these companies.  Some prospective emigrants, according to Itō, paid as 
much as fifty yen for commission.58  It was equivalent to the annual salary of farmers, 
earning between fifty and sixty yen.59  These companies exploited the rural Japanese who 
were ignorant about the price.  Considering the income of a Japanese of the time, their 
commission was extremely high that closed the door for the poorest group of Japanese to 
emigrate overseas.60   
In 1902, the Imin Hogo Kyōkai (Association to Protect Emigrants) was 
established “to encourage emigration, to eliminate the malpractices of emigration 
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companies, and to work for free, unrestricted emigration.”61  The Imin Hogo Kyōkai 
advised the emigrants to ask the Japanese agents in Hawaii such as Ozawa Jimusho to 
find jobs for them, and warned them not to rely on the emigration companies, which, 
aiming to get commission from both emigrants and employers, would wait emigrants 
spending all their money and then “sell them off” to undesirable occupations.62  While 
the Imin Hogo Kyōkai kept the name of corrupted emigration companies’ secret, the 
Tobei Kyōkai’s (founded by Katayama Sen) monthly magazine called Tobei Zasshi 
(America-Bound Magazine, later renamed Amerika) carried the names of corrupt 
emigration companies and agencies so that emigrants could avoid crooked businesses.63  
Tsurutani found out that April 1906 issue of Tobei Zasshi reported that Kansai Imin 
Gōshi Kaisha in Hiroshima and Nankai Imin Kabushiki Kaisha in Kochi were order to 
suspend businesses due to the acquisition of excessive commissions from emigrants.  In 
addition, in February 1907 issue, an emigration companies in Nagasaki conspired with 
imin-yado recruited emigrants by making a false announcement that an extra ship would 
leave for Hawaii with discount passage rate of sixty yen.  Those emigrants w ited for as 
long as three months to up to six months, and spent all they had.64   
In the early twentieth century, desire to go to America was greater than ever.  It 
indicated that a series of Meiji reforms left heavy burden on Japanese, and Jap  was not 
wealthy enough to support all their citizens.  Therefore, such crooked businesses had a 
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chance to thrive all over the country. 
  
Keihin Ginkō 
Meanwhile, the Keihin Ginkō was renowned for its unscrupulous quest for profit.  
The Bank continued to exploit the immigrants by forcing them to loan misegane (見せ金, 
literary “show money”) at an extortionate rate of interest or to deposit in the Keihin 
Ginkō.  To go into details, the Act of 1894 required all Japanese immigrants to show 
possession of misegane of ¥91 (equivalent to $50) in order to gain admission to the 
country.  Therefore, they loaned misegane in Yokohama right before leaving.  To loan 
misegane, one had to have a co-signer so that the Bank could secure payment.  Although 
they loaned for merely ten days, they had to pay back ¥91 upon their arrival in Honolulu 
and ¥12.5 was subtracted from their salary as interest.65  In other words, the Keihin Ginkō 
collected a 12.5 percent interest on loans, which was exceedingly high for a short-term 
loan.66  What was worse, the Keihin Ginkō demanded more than a thousand co-signers to 
pay back misegane although the emigrants had already returned misegane to the bank 
immediately after their entry to Hawaii.67   
The Keihin Ginkō’s unscrupulous practice was beyond one’s imagination.  The 
Bank coerced the immigrants to deposit between $90 to $100 in the Keihin Ginkō so that 
the immigrants could use it for their return passage in case of failing the physical 
examination upon the arrival.  Once allowed to enter, the immigrants tried to withdra 
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their deposit; however, the Keihin Ginkō occasionally did not release the money from 
their banking accounts arguing that the fixed deposit could not be withdrawn for three 
years.  Additionally, the Keihin Ginkō collected four dollars and fifty cents from the 
immigrants for their life insurance premiums.  Moreover, the Keihin Ginkō compelled the 
immigrants to deposit 15 percent of their monthly wages as savings, and two dollars and 
fifty cents for their return passages when their contracts ended or in case of sickness.68  
To put it simply, the immigrants had no access to their deposits in the Keihin Ginkō and 
emergency was not an exception.  According to a story of an Issei immigrant n Hawaii 
published in Odo and Shinoto’s A Pictorial History of Japanese in Hawaii, 1885–1924 
(1985), one of his friends died and he went to the Keihin Ginkō with his friend’s dead 
body in order to withdraw his money for the funeral expense.69  In fact, he was not the 
only one who carried corpses to the Bank for withdrawing deposits.  Clearly, the 
Japanese laborers in Hawaii were quite discontented with a fraudulent practice of the 
Keihin Ginkō cooperating with emigration companies.  Typically, the Japanese emigrants 
in Hawaii, working to pay off their debts to the Keihin Ginkō or the emigration 
companies, could not accumulate money in their first contract period.70  Their life in 
Hawaii in the first three years was quite similar to indentured servitude. 
 At the turn of the century, the Japanese in Hawaii began to organize themselves to 
protect their interests.  The Chūō Nihonjinkai (中央日本人会, Central Japanese League) 
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was the first of its kind established in November 1903.  Founded by Saitō Mik  (Consul 
General in Hawaii from March 1903 to July 1908), the Chūō Nihonjinkai was initiated to 
represent all Japanese people living in Hawaii regardless of their class.  Nevertheless, the 
Chuo Nihonjinkai only focused on protecting the interests of the elite class (e.g. consulate, 
representatives of the Keihin Ginkō, emigration companies, and other business groups).  
The Chuo Nihonjinkai did nothing to protect the interests of the Japanese plantation 
laborers.  Instead, taking advantage of the fellow compatriots who were illiterate in 
English, the Chuo Nihonjinkai prevented the Japanese laborers from organizing 
plantation strikes and migrating to the mainland United States for higher wag s.71 
In May 1905, in reaction against the Chuo Nihonjinkai consisting of officials of 
the Keihin Ginkō and emigration companies, the Japanese plantation workers who 
withdrew from the Chuo Nihonjinkai organized the Kakushin Dōshikai (革新同志会, 
Japanese Reform Association) in order to represent their standpoint to the Japanese 
government.  As a result of long years of harsh exploitation by the Keihin Ginkō and 
emigration companies, especially after the Keihin Ginkō’s refusal to repay the deposits of 
the Japanese workers until after they came back to Japan, the Japanese workers 
concluded that they need their own association to protect their rights.72   
The Kakushin Dōshikai made a thorough investigation into the emigration 
companies and the Keihin Ginkō and reported them to the government for fraud.  In 
addition, the Japanese American newspaper companies such as Haw ii Nichi Nichi 
Shimbun, Shin Nippon, and Hawaii Shinpō played a leading role in protesting against the 
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corrupt Keihin Ginkō and emigration companies.  Due to the efforts of the Kakushin 
Dōshikai along with the Japanese American newspapers, the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs imposed restrictions on the activities of emigration companies d 
banned all the forced deposits of the Keihin Ginkō.  In 1900, Hawaii adapted the law of 
the United States that prohibited the entry of contract-laborers.73  In response, a series of 
Japanese governmental restrictions urged the Keihin Ginkō to suspend its business, and 
the emigration companies closed down one after another.74  Finally, the notorious Keihin 
Ginkō was closed down in 1905.  Most staffs of the Keihin Ginkō and emigration 
companies withdrew from Hawaii for good in the spring of 1906.75  Before withdrawing 
from Hawaii, they contributed $10,000 and their properties to the Japanese community in 
Hawaii.  The Kakushin Dōshikai, accomplishing their major goal, dissolved the 
association at their discretion in September 1906.  This class-conscious dispute 
characterized the early split that had developed between the Central Japanese Le gue and 
the Kakushin Dōshikai.  In the end, it developed into an economic conflict between the 
upper and the lower classes.76   
 
Imin-yado (Emigration Inns) 
 In general, located near ports, imin-yado (移民宿, literary “emigration inn”) were 
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considerably profitable businesses that emerged around the beginning of the shiyaku imin 
jidai.  The imin-yado were the Japanese inns with licenses for lodging and handling 
boarding tickets.  According to the Statistic of Kanagawa, there were thirty-two such 
imin-yado running businesses in Yokohama in 1891.77  The Fukuiya Ryokan (福井屋旅
館), Jōshū-ya (上州屋), Taisei-ya (大勢屋), Ōmori-ya (大森屋), and Kumamoto-ya (熊
本屋) were such inns in Yokohama.  As examined earlier, the majority of the Japanese 
who planned to emigrate came from rural areas, and they needed to stay in the imi -yado 
unless they had a relative or friend who would provide them room and board before their 
departure.78  Taking advantage of these innocent fellows, the imin-yado served low 
quality meals and bad services, yet they charged the emigrants far more than they 
deserved.  Clearly, there were numbers of imin-yado in port cities of Yokohama and 
Kobe in which the emigrants waited for some days before their departure.  While staying 
at the imin-yado, they usually took medical examinations because they had to pass stricter 
inspections for trachoma, hookworm, and syphilis upon their arrival in America.79  Afraid 
of failing the hookworm examination, an emigrant smuggled someone’s stool for passing 
the examination.  Another emigrant utilized eye medication to conceal the eye disease 
temporarily; however, the examiner immediately detected both cases.80  
Utilizing scare tactics, the imin-yado in conspiracy with doctors ripped off the 
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innocent Japanese by urging them to take medical examinations for several times.  Wh n 
things came to the worst, they had no money to go to America because of spending all 
their money for staying in the expensive min-yado.  In other cases, the unprosperous 
imin-yado that had very few customers intentionally served food such as salted salmon 
that would negatively affect the result of their eye exam so that customers had to st y
longer.81  Harry S. Kawabe of Seattle was a serious victim of an imi -yado in Yokohama: 
“It was 1906 when I came to the U.S.  Born as the fourth son of a farmer in 
Maibara, Shiga Prefecture, while doing farming I saved money assiduously.  I 
accumulated 120 yen in the days when a bushel sack of rice cost 5 yen.  Chuzaburo 
Kawabe from my village had emigrated to San Francisco.  I was in touch with him and I 
obtained my passport from Shiga Prefectural Office in preparation for going to the States, 
but the great earthquake in San Francisco interrupted our correspondence.” 
“I had no other contact there, but I thought that anyplace in the U.S. was fine, and 
so I waited in an emigrant house in Kobe, hoping to make some connection.  But there 
were hardly any ships.  Many youngsters like myself were waiting for boats he ded for 
the U.S.  During that period I heard that Yokohama was an easier boarding place than 
Kobe, so I went to Yokohama and again lodged at an emigrant house.  A worker at this 
emigrant house took me frequently for trachoma and hookworm examinations, but as for 
the most important thing—he wouldn’t let me board.  Presumably they were calculating 
to prolong my stay at the lodging house day by day.  I was kept there for three weeks.  I 
spent all my travel money there, and so I went back home, managed to get the necessary 
money one more, came back to Yokohama and again stayed at an emigrant house.” 82 
 
In collusion with the emigration companies, the imin-yado prevented emigrants from 
leaving with various plausible excuses.83  Undergoing eye operations as many as twelve 
times, Tamie Tsuboi of Seattle was also a victim of an imi -yado.  Ito introduced 
Tsuboi’s experience in Issei: 
“I married my husband, Kakichi Tsuboi, in Japan when he came back from America with 
the Ajisaka Tour Group.  He went back to the U.S. in 1920, and I was to follow him, but 
when I took my physical examination at the emigrant house in Kobe, the doctorsaid I 
had trachoma.  Therefore I had twelve eye operations.  Looking back on it now, I suspect 
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that the operations, instead of curing me, made it worse.  I was afraid that the doctor, 
shaking hands with the operators of the lodging houses, was deliberately delaying me, 
whereupon I went to Nagasaki, took the examination and passed it at once.  Even now I 
still think it was an incredible business.”84 
 
In fact, during the late Meiji to the early Taisho periods, a number of imin-yado 
ran business in Kobe, another port city that sent out many emigrants overseas.  According 
to Yamada, there were eight imin-yado (emigration inns) in Kobe;  
 Sakaemachi Boulevard Yamazaki Ryokan (山崎旅館) 
  Takaya Ryokan (高谷旅館) 
  Kobe-kan (神戸館) 
 Kaigan Boulevard Jiyū-kan (自由館) 
  Imaizumi Ryokan (今泉旅館) 
  Satsuma-ya (薩摩屋) 
 Motomachi Boulevard Iwakuniya Ryokan (岩国屋旅館) 
 Kita Nagasa Boulevard Ebisu-ya (戎屋)85 
 
The imin-yado were usually wooden two- or three-storied houses that accommodated 
about 100 guests.  The imin-yado charged ¥1.5 to ¥3 depending on the services, and they 
served meals three-time a day.86  Converting to today’s value (x 3000), it cost them 
¥4,500 to ¥9,000 per night.  The imin-yado made profits by exploiting the prospective 
emigrants. 
 Along with the shipping companies such as the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Tōyō 
Kisen Kaisha, and Osaka Shōsen Kaisha that transported the immigrants to the United 
States, the imin-yado suffered a severe blow due to the enactment of the Immigration Act 
of 1924 that virtually ended the Japanese immigration to the United States.  According t  
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Osaka Asahi Shimbun, the imin-yado and gift shops located near the port of Yokohama 
were in great trouble due to a steep decline of guests and customers.87   
 
Illegal Emigration Agents 
Not only the emigration companies, but also the illegal emigration agents 
probably made excessive profits from the emigrants.  In response to the further res riction 
of the Japanese government on immigration in 1900 in order to alleviate the anti-
Japanese sentiment in the United States, it became difficult to get passports through the 
formal procedure.  Enacted in 1897, Gaikoku Ryoken Kisoku (外国旅券規則, Passport 
Regulations for Travel Abroad) authorized each prefecture to review passport ap licants.  
According to the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the number of 
passports issued for the United States and Canada between September 1902 and 
September 1903, approximately 40 percent of applicants could obtain their passports.88  
As shown in the table, Wakayama prefecture, which the government warned to restrict 
labor migration to the United States, showed low rate of approval.  In general, prefectur s 
in southwestern Japan that had sent out majority of emigrants tended to have lower 
approval rate following the governmental policy.  Therefore, the Japanese coming from 
southwestern prefectures changed their domiciles to prefectures, in which obtaining 
passports were relatively easy.89 
                                                
87 “Hokubei Kōro no Konjuku: Iminhō no Isshūnen o Mukaete; Fune Kaisha to 
Kankeisha wa Shiku-hakku” (Situations of the Trans-Pacific Line: A Year After the Enactment of 
the Immigration Act; Shipping Companies and Related Business in Great Trouble), Osaka Asahi 
Shimbun, July 1, 1925. 
 
88 Gaimushō hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 37-kan dai 2-satsu (1904), 275. 
 
89 Imin Hogo Kyōkai, Kaigai Dekasegi Annai, appendix, 9–15.  
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Table 7.4: Number of Passports Issued and Disapproved, Sep. 1902–Sep. 1903 
Prefecture Applicants Issued Disapproved Approval Rate 
Wakayama 2,033 646 1,416 31.8% 
Kyoto 167 107 68 64.1% 
Osaka 1,121 596 618 53.2% 
Kanagawa 421 213 242 50.6% 
Hyogo 286 99 187 34.6% 
Niigata 48 43 5 89.9% 
Okayama 541 242 306 44.7% 
Yamaguchi 1,482 597 996 40.3% 
Tokushima 65 27 38 41.5% 
Ehime 1,373 437 957 31.8% 
Kochi 144 54 90 37.5% 
Fukuoka 663 234 429 35.3% 
Nagasaki 136 106 30 77.9% 
Kumamoto 548 336 269 61.3% 
Total 9,028 3,737 5,651 41.4% 
 
Source: Created based on Gaimushō ensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Dai 37-kan, Dai 2-satsu 
(Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, vol. 37, no. 2 [1904]) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho 




Despite the restrictive immigration policy, the craze for going to America 
remained high, encouraged by a great number of guidebooks that exaggerated the 
achievement of immigrants, and this gave rise to the illegal emigration agents in Japan.  
The agents, going to the ports or imin-yado, recruited those who failed to pass the 
medical examination (usually trachoma or hookworm) but still desired to go to America.  
They often made the emigrants use expired passports and passports to Mexico or other 
South American countries, diverted somebody else’s passports who did not go to 
America for some reasons, or provided Seamen’s registrations as passports.  Otherwise, 
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they instructed the emigrants how to smuggling-in.90  Under the circumstance, illegal 
passports were in high demand.  In Yokohama and Kobe, the price of a passport at a 
black market was ¥100.91  As a result, the number of Japanese that entered the United 
States reached 65,915 between 1900 and 1910 although the Japanese government issued 
only 16,148 passports to the United States at the same period.92  Moreover, the agents of 
shipping companies sold passage tickets without verifying whether the emigrants had 
passports or not.93   
Otherwise, the illegal emigration agents urged emigrants to enter Victoria, Canada, 
first in which the entry was comparatively easier, and then taking foreign ships to 
smuggle into the United States.  The Japanese Consul at Seattle, Hisamizu Saburō (久水 
三郎), reported to the Foreign Minister Komura on May 12, 1904 that at least thirty-one 
Japanese, including twelve women, entered the United States with this met od.  However, 
this method was so costly that not many Japanese could afford to do that.  They needed to 
pay about eighty yen for passage; seventy to eighty yen for the crew; forty to fifty dollars 
for an official in charge of disembarkation; and fifty to sixty dollars for the American 
illegal emigration agent.  Consul Hisamizu, concerned about the resurgence of anti-
Japanese sentiment, called for the regulation of such illegal immigration as well as better 
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91 Imin Hogo Kyōkai, Kaigai Dekasegi Annai, 37; Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to 
Nihonjin, 53. 
 
92 Tomonori Ishikawa, “Tokei yori mita Nihon Shutsu-Imin, dai 2-ho” (A Statistical 
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protection of the Japanese immigrants in the United States.94 
 
Labor Contractor System (“Boss System”) in the United States 
Meanwhile, the labor contractor system (also known as “boss system”) played a 
leading role in providing jobs to a large number of Japanese laborers coming to the 
United States between 1891 and 1907 while the emigration companies played a dominant 
role in the Japanese emigration to Hawaii.95  Due to the 1885 Contract Labor Law that 
prohibited the “importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or 
agreement to perform labor in the United States, its territories, and the District of 
Columbia,”96 the Japanese entering the United States were supposed to be jiyū imin (free 
immigrants).  Therefore, the emigration companies could not expand their businesses i to 
the United States.  Between 1894 and 1898, the emigration companies transported only 
165 Japanese emigrants to the United States.97  Published in the Reports of the Industrial 
Commission in 1901, the following is the exact translation of the contract signed between 
one of jiyū imin and the Nippon Imin Gōshi Kaisha in January 1898 prior to the foreign 
ministry’s prohibition of the transportation of any emigrant to the United States by the 
emigration companies: 
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95 Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku-hen, Ryoken kafusū oyobi Imin Tokei, 146–161.  While over 
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The Nippon Imin Gōshi Company will contract, accepting the request for 
transportation of Yoshida Ichitaro, who is a free emigrant, having the purpose of land in 
San Francisco, North America, and to secure for him work there, within the limitations 
prescribed by the immigration laws. 
1. The emigrant shall perform everything that is needed for getting the passport and 
must be responsible for all expense needed for the voyage, and should have the 
money which is necessary when landing. 
2. The maturity of the contract is three years from the date that the emigrant starts. 
3. If the emigrant gets sick, or loses the means to get along, Narita Toyashira, gent, 
will help him and provide him means to get back to Japan in case it is necessary. 
4. If the emigrant is sent back at the expense of the Japanese Government the company 
shall pay all the expenses for the emigrant. 
5. The emigrant shall pay 10 yen to the company as its fee.  If the emigrant has a child 
who does not exceed the age of 15 years, the charge for it will be half price, and if the 
child is not exceeding 10 years of age, he will be carried free of charge. 
6. The immigrant shall provide two securities to the company according to acts 3 nd 4 
hereof, and they will be responsible to pay all of the expenses that have been paid by 
the company under the provisions of sections 3 and 4. 
7. The two securities are responsible in all the matters pertaining to the emigrant. 
This contract is made in duplicate, one to the emigrant and one to the company.   
Meiji, 31st year (1898), 1st month (January), 31st day. 
   HAMANAKA HACHITARO, 
Special manager Japan United Immigration Company. 
Emigrant: YOSHIDA ICHITARO 
Securities: YOSHIDA YOHEI 
 YAMAMOTO KUSU.98 
 
This contract indicated that the emigration company had procured misegane of thirty 
dollars in which an immigrant required to present to the Immigration officials for gaining 
admission to the United States.  Clearly, it was a violation of 1885 Contract Labor Law.  
The rise of the labor contractors or “bosses” initiated the Japanese mass 
immigration to the United States in the late nineteenth century.  Usually educat  in the 
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United States or residing here for a while, the labor contractors were initially dekasegi-
shosei (student laborers) who had a good command of English.99  On the other hand, 
majority of Japanese laborers arrived on the West Coast regions without English-
language skill did not know how to get jobs.  Therefore, the labor contractors or bosses 
acted as intermediaries “who often housed and fed the workers and assigned them work 
in exchange for an often hefty portion of their wages.”100  In addition, they helped the 
laborers to remit money to their families in Japan.  The labor contractors contributed to 
stimulating the companies in the American West to hire more Japanese laborers s a 
replacement of Chinese laborers whose efforts had been crucial for the development f 
industries in the West.   
The Japanese immigration to the United States took place intensively after the 
1890s largely due to the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 that banned the 
Chinese immigration to the United States and the Geary Act of 1892 that extended the 
exclusion act for ten more years.  The Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited the entry 
of “skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining,” was significant 
because it was the first restriction on free immigration in American history.101  
Especially, after the completion of the transcontinental railroad, anti-Chinese sentiment 
gained intensity in the West.  For instance, in Los Angeles, the Chinese Massacre took 
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place on October 24, 1871, when a racially motivated mob killed and pilloried nineteen 
Chinese and attacked other Chinese residents of the Chinatown in the city.102 Then, the 
Union Pacific’s white coal miners at Rock Springs, Wyoming territory, who had a hatred 
for Chinese laborers working as strikebreakers with low wages, attacked the local 
Chinatown, murdered twenty-eight Chinese and injured fifteen on September 2, 1885.  In 
the Rock Springs Massacre, the loss of Chinese amounted to $148,000; however, no 
offender was punished.103   
While some Americans in the West sought to prevent the Chinese from 
populating the United States, developing industries such as railroad, mining, lumber, 
fishing, and agriculture required cheap and effective labor force for the development of 
the Western and Rocky Mountain States; therefore, the number of Cheese immigrants 
continued to grow.  According to the Historical Statistics, only thirty-five Chinese 
entered the United States in the 1840s, then 41,397 in the 1850s, 64,301 in the 1860s, and 
123,201 in the 1870s.104  In 1881 and 1882 alone, 51,469 Chinese entered the United 
States.  Nevertheless, the Chinese Exclusion Act resulted in drastic decrease in number of 
Chinese laborers.  Between 1882 and 1892, only 13,078 Chinese were admitted to the 
United States.105  In 1890, 107,488 Chinese resided in the United States while 2,039 
Japanese did.  In 1900, the number of Chinese reduced to 88,869 and Japanese increased 
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to 24,326, and in 1910, Japanese surpassed the Chinese in the United States; there were 
72,157 Japanese and 71,531 Chinese.106   It seems it was the growing labor shortage 
caused by the Chinese Exclusion Act that “pulled” the Japanese laborers to emigrat  to 
the United States as substitutes.   
The labor contractors played an important role in providing a large number of 
cheap laborers to a variety of industries in the United States.107  For the rural Japanese 
emigrants who possessed neither skills nor ability in English, only unskilled labor such a  
railroad construction, mining, logging, canning, and day-work was available.  As long as 
they could work effectively, the American employers did not mind whether the Japanese 
laborers could speak English or not because the Japanese were dekas gi (temporary) 
laborers not permanent residents.  Unlike Hawaii that allowed the entry of contract 
laborers for operating the vast sugar plantations, the United States had banned the entry 
of contract laborers.  Therefore, most Japanese who entered the United States were free 
immigrants and sought the help of the labor contractors and Japanese employment 
agencies located in America who could find jobs for them.  According to Tobei Annai 
(1901), a free immigrant needed to raise ¥150 to go to the United States that included: 
Passage fare  ¥50  
  Misegane  ¥60  
  Western Clothing ¥30 (western clothes, shoes, hat, etc.) 
 Spending Money ¥10 (lodging and incidental expenses)108 
         Total  ¥150  
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In general, to raise ¥150, a farmer who made fifty to sixty yen per year had to ve three-
years worth of salary to emigrate.109    
 The labor contractors collected the Japanese laborers in several methods.  While 
some directly recruited the emigrants for work, others recruited through advertisement.  
In some cases, they sent agents to the British Columbia and furnished the emigrants who 
sought to enter the United States with misegane and travel expenses.  Once these 
emigrants successfully entered the United States, the agents sent them the railroads.110  
Nevertheless, the labor contractors mostly collected the Japanese laborers thr ugh the 
boarding houses.  Located in the port cities of San Francisco and Seattle, the large 
boarding houses were operated either by the major Japanese labor contractors o  in 
cooperation with the labor contractors.  The hotelkeepers’ organization managed 
incoming emigrants, and the labor contractors paid the hotelkeepers the fee of thr 
dollars for each emigrant obtained in San Francisco and one dollar and fifty cents in 
Seattle.111  Significantly, the boarding houses made enormous profits by the quite similar 
method utilized by the imin-yado that conspired with the emigration companies in Japan. 
Before 1890, there were no Japanese working for the railroads in the West.  
However, the end of Chinese immigration to the United States caused labor shortage and 
                                                
109 Matsuji Umemura et al., Chōki Keizai Tokei, 9: Nōrin-gyō (Long-Term Economic 
Statistics: Agriculture and Forestry) (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1966), 220; Yūzō 
Murayama, Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin: Nikkei Issei no Hikari to Kage (Japanese Immigrants 
Who Lived in America: Japanese American Issei’s Light and Shadow) (Tokyo: Keizai Shinpōsha, 
1989), 47.  
 
110 Gaimushō hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 31-kan dai 2-satsu (Documents on 
Japanese Foreign Policy, vol. 31, no. 2 [1898]) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Ryōfukai, 1954), 
29–32. 
 
111Reports of the Immigration Commission, Part 25, vol. I (S. Doc. No. 633, 61st Cong., 
2d sess.), 45. 
 
 346
American businessmen in conspiracy with Japanese labor contractors successfully 
brought cheap laborers into the United States.  By 1900, the Japanese laborers numbered 
6,351 or 20.3 percent of all the foreign-born railroad workers.112  
 Tanaka Chūshichi (田中 忠七), a former seaman and notorious pimp, established 
himself as a labor contractor by utilizing the profit made by the prostitution.  In 1891, 
Tanaka, providing forty Japanese laborers for the Oregon Short Line Railway, a 
subsidiary of the Union Pacific Railroad, was the first Japanese railroad labor contractor 
in the United States.113  According to Yuji Ichioka’s study: 
In Seattle he teamed up with one of the Japanese prostitutes and took her to Ogden, Utah, 
where he put her to work.  In 1891 the Chinese subcontractor took a fancy to the woman 
while visiting Ogden, and persuaded Tanaka to let him take her back to Rock Springs as 
his mistress.  Then Tanaka had the woman prevail upon the Chinese to permit him to 
become his subcontractor.  Illustrated but shrewd, he set up his office in Nampa, Idaho, 
and staffed it with student-laborers drawn from San Francisco… By September 1892 he 
had 500 workers employed on the Oregon Short Line, 150 of whom were from 
Hiroshima Prefecture.114 
 
These Japanese laborers recruited by Tanaka get a monthly pay of thirty dolla s in 1891.  
Compared with the average daily wage of the Japanese in the Pacific Coast regions who 
got sixty to seventy cents a day, the railroad workers drew a high pay.115  However, 
Tanaka extracted ten cents from each laborer’s daily wage as commission. 
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Tanaka, arguing that the Japanese laborers were “different from Chinese,” forc d 
them to “live like Americans,” and prohibited them from using the Japanese food such 
miso (soybean paste), soy sauce as well as rice.116  Therefore, the principal food of the 
railroad section workers was so-called “dango jiru,” dumpling soup made of chopped 
bacon, potatoes, onions, seasoned by salt and pepper.  The Japanese workers suffered 
from not only heavy labor but also unpleasant and unhealthy meals.  Since vegetables 
were not available, they picked weeds by the railroad and ate with dango jiru.117  Due to 
malnutrition, many workers suffered from a night blindness.  According to Natsuhara Sen 
of Auburn who described the lives of section workers in Ito’s Issei:   
After working as a houseboy, and then at the sugar beet farm, I worked as a section 
worker on the railroad at Newport, Idaho.  I worked for one dollar a day and spent 25 to 
30 cents for food.  We mainly ate dried strips of radish, dried burdock, dried lotus roots, 
kelp, and so on.  Since we did not have miso for soup, we used salt instead.  Since we 
were ill-fed, we became night blind in short order.  I did not notice but I had to feel my 
way in the dark.118 
 
 In addition, working in the railroad section was both physically and mentally 
severe for the laborers.  Especially, the intense heat in the summer enervat d workers 
who lacked appropriate housing, balanced diet, medical care, or sanitation.  They had to 
find their own ways for survival when working in isolated sections.  In order to avoid 
fierce heat, some Japanese workers lived in holes, according to Koyama Kei, staff of 
Ōshu Nippō (Oregon Daily).  Koyama described that “The cave was 16’ or 17’ square 
and about 7’ or 8’ high.  On the ceiling—in other words, on the ground—they had put 
boards with canvas stretched over them, and on the top of that, hay.  They had two bunk 
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beds….”119  The Japanese laborers sang a song such as “If a railroad worker was a human 
being—Then dragonflies and butterflies would also be birds.”120 
In 1892, Tanaka’s frequent embezzlement of the wages of the Japanese laborers 
came to light.  Taking advantage of the emigrants who had no command of English and 
depended on Tanaka to remit money to their families in Japan, Tanaka embezzled the 
laborers’ savings as well.  Managing about 400 Japanese laborers, Tanaka had made 
enormous profit by appropriate the laborers’ wages to his own use.  Exploiting their toil, 
Tanaka bought seventy-five acres of land, built a house like a palace, and lived a 
luxurious and immoral life.  One of his anguished employee exposed Tanaka’s misdeeds 
to the San Francisco’s Kinmon Nippō (金門日報, Golden Gate Daily) that the Japanese 
laborers engaged in the construction were “exploited like slaves.”121  Attacked by his 
employees, Tanaka fled to Salt Lake City for his safety; however, he aimed to go back to 
his old life.  Contributing enormous money to Aikoku Dōmei led by Sugawara and Hinata 
in San Francisco, Tanaka tried to make the Soko Shimbun (桑港新聞, San Francisco 
News) fight for his interests.  The Soko Shimbun entered a severe controversy with the 
Kinmon Nippō, which came to resort to force.  Finally, the Japanese Consul General at 
San Francisco Chinda Sutemi (珍田捨巳, 1856–1929) went to Idaho to investigate.122  
Tanaka admitted his misdeeds and promised to pay off a debt.  This series of events, 
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known as “Idaho Anti-Corruption Incident,” characterized the reality of the relations 
between the labor contractors and political figures in the 1890s.123  It also illustrated that 
the Japanese emigrants were more profitable than previously estimated. 
Hasegawa Genji (長谷川 源司), the labor contractor in California and Nevada 
who provided seventy to eighty Japanese for the Southern Pacific Railroad, was an 
infamous pimp in San Francisco who utilized profits from his brothels to enter the labor-
contracting business.124  Hasegawa was probably the most vicious pimp, referred to as 
amegoro (American thug).  A leading Issei writer named Okina Kyūin gave a good 
picture of amegoro quoted in Ichioka’s “Ameyuki-san” (1977): 
“Amegoro were behind the women, men who had been in abject poverty in Japan or who 
had come to America with ambitions, but abhorred honest work and had gone the 
wayward path.  To carouse and gamble, they duped women and forced them into 
prostitution.  The worse ones fraudulently married several women and sold them off to 
the Chinese.”125 
 
Consul Chinda again played an active part to dissuade Hasegawa from engaging in 
prostitution business and urged him to start a decent business.126 
As the demand for cheap labor increased, three major labor-contracting 
companies emerged in the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain states.  Ban Shinzaburō 
(1854–1926) of Portland, Oregon provided the Japanese laborers for the railroad 
companies in 1892.  Born into a family of the Tokugawa retainer in Tokyo, Ban studied 
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English at Kaisei Gakkō and Daigaku Nankō and served in the Foreign Ministry as a 
secretary of Consul General Andō Tarō in Honolulu in 1885 due to his friendly terms 
with Enomoto Takeaki and Hoshi Tōru (星 亨, 1850–1901).127  While residing in Hawaii 
and observing the kanyaku imin, Ban saw the emigration business as having great 
promise.  Therefore, Ban participated in the establishment of the Kobe Imin Kaisha 
(Kobe Emigration Company) after resigning from the consulate in 1891.  Working as a 
employee assigned to the Oregon office of the Kobe Imin Kaisha, Ban helped the 
Japanese emigrants find jobs.128   
In 1892, Ban established his own labor-contracting company named S. Ban 
Shōten in Portland, Oregon, which turned out to be profitable as he had envisioned.  
Beginning with supplying section workers for the Southern Pacific Railway, Ban 
provided the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, the Astoria and Columbia River 
Railway, the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railway with the Japanese laborers.129  
Ban sent the Japanese railroad laborers to Washington, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, 
                                                
127 Shiro Fujioka, Ayumi no Ato: Hokubei Tairiku Nihonjin Kaitaku Monogatari (A Trail 
of Footprints) (Los Angeles: Ayumi no Ato Kanko Koenkai, 1957), 352–356.  Hoshi Toru went 
to Britain to study law at Middle Temple Law School, and became the first Japanese lawyer who 
would qualify to practice in Britain.  In 1882, Hoshi became a member of the Liberal Party and 
along with Ito Hirobumi, he became an influential figure in the Rikken Seiyūkai.  Hoshi was 
assassinated in 1901 while serving as a chair of the Tokyo City Assembly, according to “Hoshi 
Toru,” Portraits of Modern Japanese Historical Figures, National Diet Library, Japan, http://210. 
128.252.171/portrait/datas/190.html?c=6 (accessed January 20, 2010). 
 
128 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 134.  Matsuoka Yōsuke (松岡 洋右, 
1880–1946), the Japanese Foreign Minister during World War II, used to work for the S. Ban 
Shoten while attending law school at the University of Oregon at night. 
 
129 Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free Labor: Padrones and Immigrant Workers in the 
North American West, 1880–1930 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 56–57; 
Ichioka, The Issei, 58. 
 
 351
North Dakota, Nebraska, as well as Oregon.130  Establishing branch offices in Denver and 
Cheyenne, the S. Ban Shōten became the largest labor-contracting company in Oregon, 
taking in five million dollars a year.131  The S. Ban Shōten had three departments; first, 
the construction department (dealing with railroad companies and providing laborers 
based on contracts); second, the business department (running stores); and third, the 
lumber department (operating a sawmill in Quincy, a dairy farm, and a sugar beet farm 
that hired section workers during winter).132  According to the Reports of the Immigration 
Commission, S. Ban Shōten supplied about 40 percent of the maintenance laborers 
between 1905 and 1907.133  At its peak, over 3,000 Japanese laborers worked under the S. 
Ban Shōten.134  These Japanese laborers engaged in railroad, mining, and agricultural 
industries.  In addition to finding jobs for emigrants, Ban operated a mercantile shop that 
sold Japanese food and sundries, which had branches in Denver, Colorado, Sheridan and 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Pocatello, Idaho as well as in Tokyo and Kobe.135  Ban played 
a leading role in the development of the Japanese community in Oregon.  Ban served as 
the president of the Nihonjinkai in Portland for ten years, helped to establish Portland 
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Japanese Methodist Church in 1893, and founded the Japanese-language newspaper Ōshu 
Nippō (Oregon Daily News) in 1906 that provided information, which helped the laborers 
to live in isolated areas.136  In 1924, the S. Ban Shōten bankrupted because the Japanese 
suddenly withdrew their money in response to a rumor that the S. Ban Shōten would go 
bankrupt.137  The Teikoku Shōkai (帝国商会, Imperial Trading Company) founded by 
Matsushima Mosaburō took over the management of the company, and Ban went back to 
Japan in 1926.138 
Meanwhile, Yamaoka Ototaka (山岡 音高, 1862–1924) and Takahashi Tetsuo     
(高橋 徹夫) established the Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha (東洋貿易会社, Oriental Trading 
Company) in Seattle, Washington in 1898,139 which rose to be the largest labor-
contracting company in the United States.  Originally starting as a partnership of 
Takahashi Tetsuo with Yamaoka Ototaka, Tsukuno Matajirō (筑野 又次郎) joined the 
partnership in 1899.  Then Yamaoka became the president of the company, Takahashi 
vice president, and Tsukuno treasurer.140  The Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha was the first company 
                                                
136 Murayama, Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin, 73–74; George Katagiri, “Ōshu Nippō,” 
The Oregon Encyclopedia, 2008–2010, http://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/entry/view/oshu_ 
nippo/ (accessed January 4, 2010). 
 
137 Ito, Issei, 791. 
 
138 Ibid., 344. 
 
139 Ibid., 85. 
 
140 Tsukuno Matajirō then president of the Tōyō Bōeki and president of the Oriental 
American Bank and “one of the best known and wealthiest and most influential Japanese 
residents of Seattle, was instantly killed” yesterday morning “by being hit by a Great Northern 
switch engine in front of the Great Northern dock at Smith cove,” according to Los Angeles 




directly contracted with railroad companies.141   
The president of the company, Yamaoka, a radical advocate of the jiyū minken 
ron (freedom and people’s rights argument), had quite a unique background as well.  
Born into a family of the vassal of the Shogun in 1862 in Hokkaido, Yamaoka studied 
law in Tokyo, became a lawyer at the age of twenty-two, formed the Gakunan Jiyūto (岳
南自由党, Gakunan Liberal Party) in Shizuoka prefecture, schemed for the overthrow of 
the government, and attempted assassination of several ministers with a bomb.142  
According to Fujioka Shirō’s Ayumi no Ato, the plotters intentionally committed a 
burglary afterwards to prevent betrayal.  However, there was an informer among them 
and about two hundred were arrested, of whom forty-nine, including Yamaoka, were 
imprisoned and sent to Hokkaido’s coal mine.  Ten years later, Yamaoka was released 
from prison under a general amnesty, and he sought a new life in the United States.143  
Then, Yamaoka went to the United States in the hope of getting help from his political 
friend, Hoshi Toru; however, he could not meet Hoshi.  Settling down in Seattle, 
Yamaoka determined to establish himself as a labor contractor with the help of Takahashi 
Tetsuo who was a dekasegi-shosei, studied law in Puget Sound University in Tacoma 
after working in a butter factory for a year and half.  Then, Takahashi taught En lish to 
the Japanese young immigrants at the church run by the Japanese.144   
The Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha began to provide the Japanese laborers to the Great 
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Northern, Northern Pacific, and other local railroad companies in 1898.  At its peak, over 
6,000 Japanese laborers worked under the Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha.  The company also 
engaged in import-export business for supplying the Japanese food and goods to the 
laborers, and the business extended to banking and farming.145  Dispatching the 
company’s agents to the Japanese laborers in the camps, the company sold Japanese 
vegetables, toasted seaweed, taros, bamboo shoot, pickled radish, tofu, dried gourd 
shavings, miso, soy sauce, rice, as well as shoes, shoe polish, and tabi (Japanese socks) 
with high commission.146  The Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha set up the Oriental American Bank (米
国東洋銀行) capitalized at $40,000 in 1905.  Located at Main Street and Fifth Avenue in 
Seattle, the Bank was the first Japanese bank “owned and operated by Japanese in their 
own premises.”147   
Simultaneously in Seattle, Furuya Masajirō (古屋 政次郎, 1862–1938), 
established the Furuya Shōten (Furuya Company), a grocery store, in 1892.148  Furuya 
made enormous profits by dispatching the agents and selling the Japanese consumer 
goods to the laborers in remote areas with high commissions.  As his business flourihed, 
Furuya expanded into import-export businesses and set up branches in Tacoma, Portland, 
Vancouver, Yokohama, Yokosuka, Kobe, and Tokyo.149  Furuya Shōten extended his 
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interest to construction, real estate, mailing, printing, and banking.  At first, Furuya began 
supplying the Japanese laborers to the Chicago-Milwaukee Railway.  Furuya later joined 
Kumamoto Hifumi who established the Tacoma Koji Kaisha (Tacoma Contracting nd 
Maintenance Company) with William H. Remington in 1898 for supplying the Japanese 
laborers for the Northern Pacific Railway.150  From 1905, the two major labor-contracting 
companies in Washington, namely, Furuya Shōten and Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha, began a 
fierce competition to recruit more Japanese laborers because the railroad company paid 
two dollars for every worker they brought in.151     
Meanwhile, playing an important role in the development of the early Japanese 
community, Furuya rose to be an influential business leader in the Pacific Northwest.  In 
1907, he established the Japanese Commercial Bank, capitalized at $25,000, in the back 
of the Furuya Shōten and became its president.  Then, Furuya gained control of the 
Oriental American Bank in 1914, merged the Seattle Species Bank in 1923, and finally 
created the Pacific Commercial Bank by merging the Japanese Commercial Bank with 
the Oriental American Bank in 1928.  The former Governor of Saitama, Okada Tadahiko 
who went on a tour of inspection, proudly reported the great success of Furuya in 
Seattle.152  When the Pacific Commercial Bank was bankrupt in 1931 due to the Great 
Depression, many Japanese living in Seattle lost their saving and businesses.153 
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In California, the founder of the Nichibei Shimbun (Japanese American News) 
and a leading member of the Fukuin-kai (Gospel Society), Abiko Kyūtaro (我孫子 久太
郎, 1865–1936) established a labor-contracting company, the Nihonjin Kangyosha 日本
人勧業社 (later renamed Nichibei Kangyosha 日米勧業社, literary Japanese American 
Industrial Company) in 1902.  The company provided Japanese laborers to not only the 
railroad but also mining and farming industries in many states in the West.154  Abiko rose 
to be an influential Japanese leader in California and played an important role in 
promoting the stabilization of community through “picture marriage.”  
By the turn of the century, Japanese labor contractors in the West played leading 
roles in supplying laborers to states including California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho
Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas and alleviated the labor 
shortage caused by the Chinese exclusion laws.  As shown in Table 7.5, the Great 
Northern, Northern Pacific, Southern Pacific, and Union Pacific Railroads were th  major 
employers of Japanese laborers, mostly as section hands.155  Katayama Sen’s Tobei 
Zasshi reported in the April 1906 issue that 11,683 Japanese worked in the railroads in 
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the United States.156  Meanwhile, the Reports of the Immigration Commission recorded 
the number of the Japanese laborers as over 13,000 and Nichibei Nenkan (Japanese 
American Yearbook) reported the number to be 13,716 in 1906.157  Based on the 
available records and data, Nichibei Nenkan’s number seems to be accurate. 
 
 
Table 7.5: Labor Contractors, Number of Laborers, and Railroads, 1905–06 
Labor Contractor Laborers Railroads 
Tōyō Bōeki 3,037 Great Northern Railway 
Ban Shinzaburō 1,000 Southern Pacific Railway 
Nichibei Kangyōsha 1,266 Union Pacific Railroad 
Hashimoto Daigorō 1,350 San Pedro Railway 
Nishimura Unryu/Nishimoto Kumi 1,530 Union Pacific Rail (Eastern) 
Inukai Saburō 1,200 Oregon Short Line Railway (Northern) 
Kuranaga Terusaburō 1,500 Southern Pacific Railroad 
Kumamoto Hifumi 2,000          
(as of 1900) Northern Pacific Railway  
Mitsuze Kosaku 300 Western Pacific Railroad 
Kiyama/Takatzuka Kumi 500 Denver & Rio Grande Railway 
 
Source: Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan, 70; 




Although the exact number of employees was unclear, there were quite a number 
of labor contractors operating in the U.S. West supplying the Japanese laborers to 
railroads, mining, logging, lumbering, canning, and agricultural industries.  For example, 
Furuya Shōten supplied the Japanese laborers to the Chicago-Milwaukee Railway, Arai 
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Jimusho to the Western Pacific Railroad, Miura Kumi to the Rock Island, Colorado 
Southern, Moffett Railroad, Wakimoto Tsutomu to the Santa Fe Railway, Nishiyama 
Hajime to the Rock Springs Coal Mine in Wyoming, Oka Hayato to the Bingham Copper 
Mine in Utah, Toyota Seitarō to the Rush Copper Mine and McGill Smelter, and 
Hokazono Naoichi to a sugar beet venture in Greely, Colorado.158  Like the railroad 
industry, the mining industry suffered from the shortage of labor after the Chinese 
Exclusion Act.  For the mining industry, Nishimoto Hajime was the first labor contractor 
to supply the Japanese laborers to the coal mine in Rock Springs in 1898 owned by the 
Pacific Union.159 
Like the emigration companies, the labor contractors commercialized Japanese 
labor and made excessive profits by exploiting their countrymen.  The labor contract rs 
took a commission of 5 to 10 percent from their laborers’ wages and charged other fees 
including “office fees” and “hospital fees.”  For example, in 1899 the Tōyō Bōeki 
charged one dollar a month for “office fees” and fifty cents a month for “hospital fees” 
and then took off ten cents as commission from daily wage of $1.05.160  Therefore, after 
paying all fees and commission, a laborer could receive only $23.20 a month (26 days).  
Additionally, the Tōyō Bōeki received a commission from the railroad companies, 
usually paid in the form of free transportation of Japanese food and goods for laborers.161  
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Some labor contractors charged less commission but required higher “interpreter’s fe ,” 
and others charged higher commissions but required no “interpreter’s fee.”  In general, 
the labor contractors deducted two dollars from laborer’s monthly salary.162 
In those days, the labor contractors became extraordinary influential and 
financially powerful by the laborers’ toil.  According to Maruyama’s calcul tion when 
the Tōyō Bōeki hired 1,500 Japanese laborers, the yearly income of Yamaoka, Takahashi, 
and Tsukuno should be at least $3,000—ten times more income than a laborer.163  When 
the Tōyō Bōeki hired 3,000 laborers, the company made $300 a day (3,000 laborers x 10 
cents); $7,800 a month ($300 x 26 days); and $93,600 a year ($7,800 x 12).  At its peak, 
the company had 6,000 laborers, making $187,200 a year.  Meanwhile, Kumamoto 
Hifumi earned as much as $2,500 a month, according to Ōtsuka Shunichi.164  It indicated 
that Kumamoto’s annual salary was $30,000—100 times more income than a laborer. 
 However, as the numbers of labor contractors increased, they had to reduce the 
amount of the commission in order to secure the Japanese laborers as well as to make a 
contract with the railroad companies.  Especially after 1900, it became difficult to secure 
the Japanese laborers due to the governmental restriction on labor migration to the United 
States.  The founder of the Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha, Yamaoka went back to Japan and set up a 
branch office to facilitate the recruitment of laborers.165  Yamaoka made approaches to 
officers of the passport issuing authorities in Shizuoka and Niigata prefectures whom he 
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had connections in his Jiyūtō days to issue counterfeit passports.166  The passports of that 
time did not require photographs, which enabled hundreds of Japanese to enter the United 
States with illegal passports.  Yamaoka supported the using of counterfeit passports to 
bring a great number of Japanese laborers for the railroad construction.  According to one 
estimate, three to four thousand deemed to Japanese entered the United States with 
“Yamaoka passports.”167  Then, Yamaoka, cooperating with a leading emigration 
company Morioka Shōkai, attempted to bring more laborers; however, the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry, afraid of violating the U.S. Immigration law, refused to issue 
passports.168   
 By 1904, the shortage of Japanese labor reached a serious level for the labor 
contractors as well as for the railroads.  It was partly due to the restrictive immigration 
policy of Japan and partly due to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.  The war 
devastated the Tōyō Bōeki’s business operation for several ways.  First, the Nippon 
Yusen Kaisha that the company had relied on stopped its trans-pacific service; therefore, 
the Tōyō Bōeki could not export the flour to Japan.  Second, following the outbreak of 
war, many Japanese laborers who worked for the railroads under the contract with the 
Tōyō Bōeki returned to Japan.  Takahashi described that “With the prospect of hostilities 
the patriotic boys who were working at good wages in America gave up their 
opportunities and hastened back to Japan to fight for their country.”  As a result, laborers 
working under the Tōyō Bōeki had reduced to merely 300 to 400 laborers in 1904 
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compared to 1,800 in the previous year of 1903.169  
In April 1905, the Tōyō Bōeki, realizing that obtaining laborers from Japan was 
troublesome, chartered Olympia and sent it to Honolulu to recruit Japanese laborers in 
Hawaii to the United States.  By placing prominent advertisements on Hawaii’s Japanese 
newspapers, Tōyō Bōeki successfully brought back six hundred laborers.  Their 
advertisement on the Hawaii Shinpō on February 27 headlined “Steamship Olympia.  
Accommodates 500 passengers.  Fare, including commissions, $28.  Sails April 18, 
1905…”170  The Japanese laborers preferred to immigrate to the United States where they 
could obtain higher wages since their goal was to accumulate money as much as 
possible.171  Urged by vice-president of the Tōyō Bōeki, Takahashi Tetsuo, president of 
the Great Northern Railroad, James Hill wrote a letter to the Japanese ambass dor 
Takahira Kogorō (高平 小五郎, 1854–1926) on March 26, 1906 that expressed his desire 
to hire three to five thousand Japanese laborers permanently on the Great Northern and 
Northern Pacific Railroads.  Nevertheless, the ambassador rejected Hill’s request to 
maintain and improve “good relations” with the United States.172  In 1906, the Tōyō 
Bōeki attempted to recruit 1,800 Japanese laborers from Hawaii; however, because of the 
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strong opposition from the Hawaiian government and the owners of sugar plantations as 
well as competition from other labor contractors, the company could only bring some 600 
Japanese.173  Taking advantage of Japanese who sought to work in the United States, the 
owner of the Kanjio Hotel in Honolulu charged as high as ten dollars to secure tickets for 
the Japanese laborers and hotelkeepers got two dollars per capita for securing tickets for 
them.174 
 The labor contracting system declined sharply especially when President 
Theodore Roosevelt authorized the Executive Order No. 589 on March 14, 1907 that 
prohibited the immigration of Japanese laborers to the United States by way of Hawaii, 
Mexico, and Canada into the United States.175  The labor contractors suffered a severe 
blow because they could no longer transport their commodities (Japanese laborers in 
Hawaii) to the United States.  After the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–
1908 that virtually ended the Japanese labor immigration to the United States, the only 
way to obtain the laborers was to poach from other labor-contracting companies.  In so 
doing, the labor contractors began to reduce the amount of commission to attract more 
Japanese to their companies.  For example, as Murayama pointed out the Tōyō Bōeki 
removed the commission for the year 1904 to compete with the rival company of Tacoma 
Koji Kaisha, and sought to make profits by the sales of Japanese food and goods to the 
emigrants.176  In fact, the Japanese laborers in the remote areas consumed more Japanese 
food than American food, and the labor contractors made undue profits by supplying 
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Japanese items to them.177  Regardless of their effort to keep the Japanese laborers under 
their companies, the Japanese laborers began to make a contract directly with the 
railroads as their English-language skills improved, and many laborers sought t  shift to 
agricultural labor that generally offered stable and relatively high wages year-round.178  
Those who succeeded in saving enough money began to purchase or lease land for 
establishing their economic foundation based on agriculture.179  Accordingly, the number 
of Japanese laborers engaged in railroad work continued to decline and there were about 
10,000 Japanese railroad workers in 1909, to 4,553 in 1913, 4,300 in 1920, and 2,148 in 
1930, respectively.180 
The Tōyō Bōeki determined to diversify the business in response to the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement.  In 1909, utilizing $45,000 from the Oriental American Bank, 
Takahashi Tetsuo (president of the Oriental American Bank) started a prostituti n 
business by constructing a large-scale brothel; however, three months after the opening of 
the brothel, Takahashi had to close it down because the designated area for the 
prostitution business was changed.  Since the law no longer allowed the brothel to 
operate there, Takahashi converted it to a theater.  The failure of the prostitution bus ness 
financially devastated the Tōyō Bōeki, and Furuya Shoten, the long-standing rival of the 
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Tōyō Bōeki, took over the management of the company.181  The co-founder of the Tōyō 
Bōeki, Yamaoka Ototaka came to engage in agriculture on the farm owned by Furuya.  
He died of heart attack in 1924.182  The prime of the labor contractors did not last long 
due to the emergence of anti-Japanese immigration.  Significantly, the labor contractors 
came to decline as the Japanese immigrants settled in American society.183 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
During the Meiji and Taisho period, taking advantage of the high demand on 
overseas emigration, the emigration companies, the Keihin Ginkō, a d imin-yado, illegal 
emigration agents, and labor contractors had exploited the ignorant Japanese emigrants 
who simply sought to make money for helping their families or establishing their own 
families after returning to Japan.  The executives of emigration companies and labor-
contracting companies were for the most part educated in the United States and had  
good command of English.  In addition, advocating the jiyū minken ron (freedom and 
people’s rights argument), they tended to associate with the Jiyūto (Liberal Party) and the 
Rikken Seiyūkai (Friends of Constitutional Government). 
 Although the Imin Hogo Ho (Emigrant Protection Law) had existed to protect the 
Japanese from greedy emigration companies since 1896, it was not able to regulate the 
unreasonable and sometimes inhumane practices of emigration agencies that enjoyed 
enormous profit by sending emigrants and finding them jobs in either Hawaii or the 
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United States.  In consequence, the influx of the Japanese laborers, including significant 
numbers of stowaways, instigated anti-Japanese sentiment in the mainland United States 
during the 1900 Presidential campaign.184  The Japanese Charge d’Affaires, Nabeshima 
Keijirō expressed to Foreign Minister Aoki Shuzo (青木周蔵, 1844–1914) in his report 
on April 30, entitled “About the Restriction of the Japanese Emigration” that the 
emigration of Japanese into the United States was not socially beneficial to the Japanese 
emigrants who had to engage in the lowest kinds of labor and had to endure being hated.  
Nabeshima emphasized that the Japanese emigrants were merely victims of the 
emigration companies and only these companies profited by sending out the emigrants.185   
  The practices of emigration companies were nothing but a commercialization of 
emigrants.  However, the Japanese government under the control of Rikken Seiyūkai, 
which received tremendous money from the emigration companies, could not regulate the 
activities of these companies.  Additionally, the Japanese desire for emigration w s 
growing higher due to the positive information given by guidebooks and the increase in 
the number of draft dodgers.  Ironically, these emigrants were the ones who were 
desperate to get the emigration companies’ assistance for going to America because they 
had no command of English.  After all, the majority of emigrants, receiving minimum 
education, were not good at the paper work required for formal procedures such as 
applying for passports and so on; therefore, the notorious emigration companies 
continued their business.  Simultaneously, the rapid growth of sugar industry creaed 
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large labor demand that strongly “pulled” the Japanese to Hawaii. 
On the other hand, the labor contractors, “pulling” over the Japanese in Japan or 
Hawaii to the United States, prospered for a ten-year period between 1898 and 1907.186  
They had enjoyed enormous profits by extracting high commissions from the Japanese 
laborers daily.  Although the labor contractors profited from the toil of laborers, the 
American companies benefitted the most because they could gain access to th  Japanese 
laborers with lower wages after the exclusion of Chinese laborers.  For instance, the 
Japanese laborers earned $1.10 per day while other groups (Mexican, Indian, and white) 
received $1.25.  Despite offering the lowest pay, the railroad companies had allocated the 
Japanese laborers to “those divisions where the conditions of work and living were least 
desirable.”187  Nevertheless, it turned out to be a difficult situation in the early 1900s 
because while the American industries sought to obtain more Japanese laborers wh  
performed undesirable tasks with low wages, American laborers in the West, California 
in particular, desired to restrict further Japanese immigration to the United States.  The 
laborers worried that the influx of Japanese unskilled laborers would take jobs from white 
Americans and bring down the standards of living.  In addition, while more Japanese 
desired to go to the United States for accumulating wealth, the Japanese government 
determined to restrict the immigration of the lowly Japanese in order to keep up Jaan’s 
reputation.   
The Gentlemen’s Agreement virtually disabled the emigration companies and 
labor contractors from conducting their businesses in Hawaii and the United States.  By 
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the time, the Japanese government placed more emphasis on the maintenance of the 
friendly U.S.-Japan relations than on securing foreign currency through the remittance of 
the Japanese immigrants.  Signed only a few years after Japan’s victory in the Russo-
Japanese War, the Gentlemen’s Agreement was a significant turning point not only for 
the Japanese immigrants who were transformed from dekasegi laborers to permanent 
settlers in the United States188 but also for the Japanese government that gave priority to 
the enhancement of the national prestige of Japan among world powers.  Therefore, the 
fate of the Japanese immigrants had always depended on the course of national policies 
that the Japanese government was taking.  The more the Japanese government displayed 
herself as itto-koku, the more the life of the Japanese immigrants became miserable and 
depressed. 
In addition, the Japanese immigration to the United States signified the 
government’s interest clashed with the businesses’ interest in the process of 
modernization.  As Tsurutani pointed out, both the Japanese and American governments 
regarded the Japanese immigrants as a tool for the national development.  On one hand, 
the Japanese used to rely on their remittance for pursuing fukoku kyōhei policy.  On the 
other hand, the Japanese government came to treat the immigrants as kimin (abandoned 
people).  Although encouraging emigration, the government provided no aftercare or 
backup plan for them.189  Simultaneously, Americans regarded them not as members of 
their society but as “temporary laborers” who were supposed to go back to Japan when 
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they fulfilled their duty.190  Regardless of their toil, they turned out to be unwanted group 
of people in both Japan and in the United States.
                                                













Macroscopic Analysis—Immigration as a National Project 
 Beginning with the Meiji Restoration, the modernization process characterized in 
the policy of fukoku kyōhei (enrich the nation and strengthen the military), was the 
“pushes” or the major causes of the Japanese mass immigration.  Unlike some European 
counterparts that aimed permanent settlement in the United States from the star , the 
nature of the Japanese immigration was quite different in many aspects.  While dekasegi-
nin (temporary laborers) occupied small portion of immigrants in other countries, in the 
case of Japanese, dekasegi-nin comprised most Japanese immigrants who came to 
America.1  The active involvement of the Japanese government, intellectuals, and the 
business/industry created a unique immigration pattern in the Meiji and Taisho Periods.  
First, the government promoted modernization for achieving fukoku kyōhei through 
social, economic, and political reforms in order to be equal with the West and to be the 
itto-koku, the first-rank nation.  Then, numbers of intellectuals, including famous 
educator and founder of Keiō Gijuku, Fukuzawa Yukichi, culturally promoted the 
Westernization as a way of achieving fukoku kyōhei.  Especially, Fukuzawa’s ideology 
called Datsua Nyūō (literally “leave Asia and join the West”) stimulated Japanese 
                                                
1 “Imin no Shokumin-ka” (Transformation of Emigrants into Permanent Resident ), 
Tokyo Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo Daily News), May 7, 1912. 
 
 370
colonial expansion but also justified the direction that the Meiji government was taking, 
namely imperialism.2  Japan had to carry out modernization as soon as possible to 
achieve fukoku kyōhei to distinguish herself from the rest of Asia and to repeal unequal 
treaties with the Western countries.  The Japanese leaders recognized that only the 
establishment of a modern nation would equalize Japan with the West.   
Although neglected from the historical context, a castaway Nakahama Manjirō’s 
influence on the nation’s modernization process with bewildering rapidity was more 
significant than previously thought.  In fact, he was the first Japanese to study in he 
United States and advocated the urgency of the Westernization/modernization as a means 
of defending the country against the Western imperialism.  Rescued by a New England 
whaler and then learning navigation in the United States, Manjirō contributed to the 
development of Japan’s maritime industry.  Another castaway, Hamada Hikozō wh  was 
the first Japanese to become a naturalized U.S. citizen played an important role u der the 
Meiji government for the establishment of the new political and economic institutions 
modeled after the West.  Meanwhile, business/industry, particularly the Mitsubishi 
zaibatsu, contributed to achieving fukoku kyōhei through promoting the large-scale 
industrialization in shipping, mining, shipbuilding as well as banking and financing.   
 The cooperation of three modernizing agents (government, intellectuals, and 
business/industry) enabled the beginning of the large-scale Japanese overseas emigration 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  In other words, the Japanese immigration w s 
a byproduct of the nation’s modernization process that aimed at repealing the unequal 
treaties signed with the West following the opening of Japan.  That is to say, the Japanese 
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immigration to Hawaii and the United States was initiated and then terminated within the 
national policy.   
 The Japanese overseas emigration began in reaction to the domestic problems 
caused in the process of modernization promoted by the government, intellectuals, and 
the business/industry.  Japan in the late Tokugawa to Meiji period was undergoing a 
drastic transformation from a feudal society to a modernizing nation.  Besides 
modernization, the emigration became inevitable for Japan to achieve the centralization 
of power in an effective and timely manner.  The Meiji leaders played crucial oles in 
setting up the conditions that would facilitate the process of centralization in the face of 
powerful Western imperialism in the nineteenth century.   
   In order to carry out the centralization of power in a short period, the Japanese 
government had to overcome the domestic problems first.  The shizoku (former samurai 
class) that supported the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin Civil War had a huge 
potential for obstructing the process of centralization under the Meiji leaders.  Those 
leaders were mainly the former young samurai from Satsuma and Chōshū as well as Tosa 
and Hizen domains who played major roles in overthrowing the Tokugawa Shogunate.  
As a means of reducing the influence of the s izoku from the center of the political 
affairs, the Meiji leaders began to promote emigration to the northern island of Hokkaido 
and then to Hawaii.  In so doing, the Meiji intellectuals (including some government 
officials), acting as propagandists, contributed to paving the way for mass emigration of 
the shizoku and the lower class through a number of influential publications that 
advocated advantages of going overseas.  After all, the course of the Japanese 
immigration was initially a temporary solution for the relocation of the s izoku and 
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excess rural population in order to prevent uprisings and social unrests within Japan for 
the achievement of fukoku kyōhei. 
 Until the 1890s, both government-sponsored and private students went to 
America for study to acquire Western science and technology.  Significantly, the 
knowledge brought by these students contributed to accelerating the industrialization and 
consolidated the foundations of carrying out modernization.  At the same time, the 
enormous amount of remittance made by the Japanese emigrants in Hawaii encouraged 
the Meiji leaders to promote the overseas emigration for obtaining foreign curren ies.  
For instance, the remittances from the Japanese in Hawaii amounted to nearly $300,000 
in 1891.3  Recognizing the acquisition of huge capital essential for the process of 
modernization such as hiring foreign experts and purchasing modern ships, the Meiji 
government actively supported sending emigrants overseas for obtaining foreign 
knowledge.  Although initially reluctant to send emigrants, the Meiji government soon 
came to envisage that the Japanese mass emigration would contribute to expand the 
nation’s maritime industry through promoting the commercial activity betwe n two 
countries.4   
 The large-scale industrialization was essential in the process of modernizatio .  
Therefore, the Meiji government sent the government-sponsored students to the Wes ern 
countries to acquire knowledge and skills required for improving machinery and 
equipment in Japan.  Meanwhile, the Japanese emigrants either sent or brought back vast 
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foreign currencies that would facilitate the burgeoning industry in Japan.  
 Additionally, the increasing demand on the overseas emigration came to stimulate 
industries such as shipping and banking, and created emigration companies and the imin-
yado (inns for emigrants).  Regarding the “overseas development” as an essential st p 
toward the establishment of national prestige, the Japanese government strongly
supported the growth of shipping industry through a series of extended subsidies.  
Meanwhile, a considerable number of the young males determined to emigrate simply for 
evading the conscription.   
Following the development of the shipping industry, the emigration-related 
businesses flourished in the port cities such as Yokohama and Kobe as well as in 
prefectures such as Hiroshima, Kumamoto, Yamaguchi, and Wakayama.  The emigration 
companies, being responsible for arranging the transportation of immigrants and helpi g
them find jobs in Hawaii, made an enormous profit by a commission.  The emigration 
companies commercialized the Japanese laborers and so did the labor contractors or 
“bosses.”  Like the emigration companies, the labor contractors made excess profit by 
getting a commission of 10 percent per daily wage.  In so doing, before the restriction on 
labor migration, those companies could make a tremendous fortune, and financially 
supported the Rikken Seiyūkai, a dominant political party founded by Ito Hirobumi.  In 
addition, the fortune later enabled some executives of the emigration companies establi h 
themselves as politicians.  
In this context, the development of Japanese overseas emigration had intertwined 
with the nation’s process of modernization for surviving as a sovereign nation.  The 
emergence of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (Japan Mail Steamship Company) was cruci l 
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for facilitating overseas emigration as well as for developing the Imperial Japanese Navy 
and industries.  In fact, Japan’s victory over China largely attributed to the effective 
transportation of troops, horses, weapons and food provided by the Nippon Yusen 
Kaisha, the nation’s first joint-stock company.  The development of maritime industry 
and competitions illustrated the modern Japan’s capitalistic development as well. 
A leading Japanese intellectual and communist, Katayama Sen advocated that 
there was a slight chance to be successful in Japan under current situation due to the post-
war depression.  Therefore, he argued that following the successful British immigration 
model, one should immigrate to the United States as a solution to overpopulation problem 
and start its own enterprise, and those who emigrated should be considered the “most 
loyal and patriotic subject.”5  Katayama encouraged the young Japanese men to go to the 
United States for receiving education and to contribute for the nation’s development 
rather than serving in the military.6  Utilizing their power of writing, numbers of the 
intellectuals who had visited or studied abroad assisted the Meiji government to mobilize 
the displaced and impoverished population for securing the nation’s economic and 
diplomatic interests through the propagation of nationalism. 
 Japan’s victory of the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War 
demonstrated that Japan now became a fully modernized nation at least in militaryterms.  
Although Japan rose to be the dominant power of Asia, not all Western imperialists were 
favorable toward her advancement.  Japan’s military advance negatively affected the 
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status of the Japanese immigrants in the United States.  For example, the anti-Jap ese 
sentiment became apparent as early as May 1892 in California when an immigration 
officer refused the entry of the Japanese whom he regarded as contract laborers.  
Subsequently, the major American presses such as San Francisco Bulletin and Morning 
Call reported the Japanese immigrants as a threat to the United States.7   
Indeed, from the beginning to the end of the Japanese immigration to the United 
States, the government protected the Japanese immigrants only if there was a chance of 
damaging the national prestige.  Although the remittance from the emigrants w s an 
important source of foreign currencies, which Japan could utilize for its fukoku kyōhei 
program, the government was less concerned about the welfare of the Japanese 
immigrants.  From the Japanese government’s point of view, the overseas emigration was 
merely a phase of Japan’s modernization, and the emigrants were nothing but financial 
resources for the establishment of the strong economy and military.   
As the immigration issues clearly becoming a tool for the US-Japan diplomacy, 
the Japanese government concerned that the lowly emigrants would ruin Japan’s 
reputation.  Although the government initially tended to place great emphasis on securi g 
the protection of its citizens overseas, it came to give the diplomatic relations priority 
over the protection of emigrants.  Accordingly, the government restricted the number of 
Japanese going to the United States in order to keep good relations with the United 
States.  Particularly after her victories over China and Russia, nationalistic sentiment 
strongly influenced the policy-making of Japan.  Imposed from above, Japan’s 
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institutionalized nationalism gave rise to ideology such as the Datsua-ron (“On Leaving 
Asia”) that stimulated the Japanese prejudice against China and Korea.  Justifying the 
Japanese domination over Asia, this peculiar nationalism would last until the end of 
World War II.  
Finally, for the sake of the national prestige, the government determined to issue 
passports to only decent Japanese subjects who would make a favorable impression on 
Americans.  The stricter qualifications for obtaining passports motivated a considerable 
number of Japanese to enter the United States by illegal methods.  By then, the Japanese 
government was no longer enthusiastic about sending out Japanese laborers to the United 
States.  Considering that they had already acquired all knowledge required for the 
nation’s modernization and attained their international recognition through the victories 
over China and Russia, the leaders of Japan preferred to enforce conscription for building 
a stronger standing army by reducing the number of exemption, including a considerable 
number of overseas emigrants.   
Meanwhile, in the United States, derived from a fear that the Japanese laborers 
would take over the jobs of American laborers, the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment urged 
the end of Japanese immigration.  Propagating the “Yellow Peril” scare, the xclusionists 
successfully ended the Japanese labor migration through the Gentlemen’s Agreement.  
Then, the next target of the exclusionists was the restriction on the landownership of 
Japanese immigrants and the termination of “picture marriage” system.  The anti-
Japanese movement would continue until the government completely shut down the 
Japanese immigration to the United States in 1924 by the Immigration Act.  Interestingly, 
as much as the American laborers wanted to exclude the Japanese competitors, the 
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 Examining the causes of the Japanese immigration from socioeconomic point of 
view, the rapid modernization resulted in creating a situation that “pushed” many 
Japanese out of their country.  Significantly, the early Japanese mass emigration seemed 
to take place for the benefit of the individuals in the politically, socially, and 
economically turbulent years, and it was not intended to be permanent settlement.8  Th  
higher wages offered in America “pushed” the Japanese in number and the labor shortage 
in the West “pulled” the Japanese emigrants to the United States.  Approximately 82 
percent of those who left Japan for the United States between the years 1885 and 1903 
were male emigrants while female emigrants amounted to 17 percent on average.9  
Thousands of Japanese left the country for their survival, for paying off their family debt, 
or for supporting their families living in poverty.  Accordingly, there were numbers of 
driving forces that “pushed” the Japanese out of the country to the unknown distant 
places.  
The early Meiji financial policy and land reform produced a large number of the 
unemployed samurai and landless farmers in the rice-growing prefectures.  In 1876, the 
Meiji government carried out the program called Chitsuroku Shobun (commutation of 
feudal stipends) that commutated the feudal stipends for government bonds for dissolving 
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the samurai class.  In addition, the enactment of Conscription Law that drafted 
commoners made the samurai both economically and socially displaced in the Meiji 
institution that resulted in “pushing” the distressed samurai to emigrate overseas.  
Meanwhile, having not enough money, the farmers sold their lands to pay their land 
taxes.  Such socioeconomic problems of the early Meiji period initiated the emigration 
for improving the standards of living as well as for alleviating population problems 
caused by the rapid industrialization (Appendix A).   
After the First Sino-Japanese War, emigration grew to be a profitable venture as a 
greater number of draft dodgers from rural areas sought to go to Hawaii.  Subsequently, 
the Japanese population in Hawaii continued to grow and the immigrants began to form 
their community with cultural ties with Japan.  Before the arrival of “picture brides” in 
the early 1900s, the Hawaii’s Japanese community was “bachelor society” in which 
gambling, drunkenness, and prostitution widely prevailed.  Due to the lack of Japanese 
women, wife-selling practice sometimes took place and numbers of Japanese immigrants 
were arrested for gambling before the yobiyose imin jidai (1908–1924).  The arrival of 
“picture brides” and the formation of kenjinkai (Prefectural Clubs) contributed to 
eradicating the social evil from the growing Japanese community in Hawaii.  As shown 
in Appendix B, the Japanese living in Hawaii increased from 61,111 in 1900 to 129,901 
in 1926.10  
 Meanwhile, the early Japanese immigrants, becoming dekasegi-shosei (student 
laborers) known as “school-boys,” came to the United States for studying and obtaining 
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skills that would facilitate Japan’s modernization.  Then, after the 1890s, the shortage of 
labor caused by the Chinese Exclusion Acts “pulled” the Japanese laborers into the 
United States in great numbers.  Subsequently, the Japanese laborers quickly surpassed 
the “school-boys,” whose goal was not for study but for accumulating wealth for their 
better living in Japan.  The labor contractors or “bosses” played an important role i 
supplying the Japanese laborers in large numbers to the industries in the West.  They 
were previous “school-boys” who voluntarily came to the United States for studying 
while performing domestic services at the American homes for room and board.  
Utilizing appealing advertisement, the labor contractors “pulled” numbers of lab rers 
from Japan and Hawaii.  The fate of the Japanese laborers in America was unfortunately 
not much different from that of Chinese in America.  Since they were dekasegi-nin, they 
tended to engage in the most dangerous and undesirable jobs with cheaper wages. 
Unlike the majority of European counterparts, a significant percentage of th
Japanese emigrants did not intend to reside in the United States permanently.  As Fujii
Yoshito from Hiroshima prefecture emphasized, the Japanese emigrants simply sought to 
accumulate wealth and return home in order to live happily with their families in Japan, 
and there were virtually nobody who came to the United States exclusively for studying.  
It was not much different from the emigration to Hokkaido except they could make more 
money.  Working in America for five to ten years to make $1,000 to $2,000 enabled them 
to build a nice house in Japan.11  In fact, $1,000 dollars (equivalent to ¥2,000) were 
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enough to buy a decent farmland and build a big house in Japan then.12   
From the Japanese laborers’ point of view, socioeconomic pressure was the major 
“push” for emigration.  Following the drastic increase in population in the early Meiji 
period, many farming families could no longer practice their subsistent farming.  
Especially, the rural areas, having more births than cities, showed a marked increase in 
population; however, the land was limited and second or third sons of farmers had to find 
their own way to survive in the capitalist society.13  The number of passports issued in the 
prefectures mainly consisting of the peasantry reflected the urgent socioeconomi  
conditions.  The higher wages offered in America “pushed” the Japanese in number 
whereas the labor shortage in the West “pulled” the Japanese emigrants to the United 
States.   
 The Gentlemen’s Agreement significantly changed the pattern of Japanese 
immigration to the United States, transforming them from temporary laborers into 
permanent residents.14  While the United States sought to limit the number of Japanese 
living in the United States, the agreement actually “pulled” a great number of “picture 
brides” and provided the immigrants opportunities to establish families for perman nt 
settlement that resulted in a greater birth rate.  Like the earlier immigrants, many 
Japanese women left the country either for survival or for escaping from a conventi al 
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life in search of independence and liberty, which the Meiji intellectuals had propagated.  
Ironically, these “picture brides” ended up with living more conventional life as the 
ryōsai kenbo (good wives and wise mothers).  In 1900, there were 24,326 Japanese in the 
mainland United States that increased to 111,010 in 1920, which indicated the Japanese 
population had quadrupled in twenty years.15  The world of scholars and journalists 
interpreted the prevalence of the “picture marriage” as an evidence of Japanese emigrants 
becoming permanent residents.16   
 
Cultural Analysis 
 It was the emergence of nationalism in the Meiji period that psychologically 
bypassed all classes of Japanese for the sake of national prestige.  To some degree, th y 
were united under the Meiji Spirit that emphasized national consciousness to attain 
success by raising competent citizens.  It did not matter whether they were the 
impoverished people, educators, intellectuals, socialists, businessmen, or even the yakuza 
and prostitutes, they all contributed to the nation’s development under the system of 
highly-institutionalized nationalism.  Okuni no Tame ni (“For the sake of the nation.”) 
became Meiji people’s common slogan.   
Many Issei, instead of assimilating into the American society, chose to remain the 
Japanese subjects and kept their Japanese cultural identity.  In order to demonstrate their 
patriotism, they contributed to Japan’s war effort by sending money or necessities during 
the Sino-Japanese and Russo Japanese Wars.  As a Japanese prostitute in Hawaii once 
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commented, the Japanese emigrants made tremendous efforts to enrich the country by 
remitting money.  Regardless of their earnings, the Japanese emigrants lived a frugal life 
so that they could send every penny to their families in Japan. 
The Japanese emigrants strongly kept their Japanese identity and cultural bonding
to their homeland.  Simultaneously, the Japanese considered these emigrants as the 
“Japanese” living abroad.  In this context, the Japanese people felt insulted when the 
Japanese schoolchildren were segregated from the public school in San Francisco.  
Furthermore, the Gentlemen’s Agreement and the California Alien Land Laws of 1913 
and 1920 that categorized the Japanese with other Asian groups severely hurt their 
national pride.  These incidents in addition to Wilson’s denial of “racial equality clause” 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 would 
give rise to a strong anti-American sentiment in prewar Japan.  After all, the Japanese 
government stood up not for the protection of its subjects but for the improvement of the 
national reputation.  Published in 1907, the illustrations in Appendix C well portrayed 
how Americans perceived the attitude of the Japanese government as well as the mle 
emigrants. 
 Ironically, the Japanese who had abhorred the “unequal treaties” and racial 
discrimination indeed came to practice harsher racial prejudice against its eighboring 
countries, namely China and Korea, which would continue until the end of World War II.  
The rapid institutionalization of nationalism had harmful effects.  In order to diffuse a 
concept of nation and nationalism, the intellectuals implanted a sense of Japan’s 
superiority over China and Korea and emphasized Japan as an entity out of Asia.  Such 
fledging nationalism consequently led Japan to overvalue itself and underestimat  the 
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mighty United States.   
In the course of building a nation-state, Japan’s nationalism crashed with the U.S. 
nativism, and the relations between two countries deteriorated after the Immigration Act 
of 1924.  The Japanese immigrants were merely victims of the “grave consequences,” 
and they had no means to protect themselves from the fierce diplomatic conflict.  After 
all, the Japanese immigration took place within a framework of the national scheme, and 
the Japanese immigrants who simply sought to make money and to live happily were 
affected by the developing nationalism and capitalism in Japan and the United States.  
Meanwhile, becoming “aliens ineligible for citizenship,” the Japanese immigrants tended 
to maintain their cultural ties with Japan where their nationality belonged.   
In conclusion, the Japanese immigration for the most time had taken place of the 
nation, by the nation, and for the nation.  In the name of the “nation,” the government and 
emigration businesses had exploited the Japanese emigrants.  Despite keeping th  
Japanese cultural identity and always serving for the development of their nation, the 
Japanese immigrants were abandoned by their government that gave priority to keeping 
up the status of itto-koku (“first-rank nation”).  Being oversensitive about keeping up 
appearances, the Japanese government virtually gave up helping the development of 
Japanese immigrant communities in the United States.  The Japanese immigrants bec me 
the real kimin (literally “abandoned people”) or “stateless” until they gained the right to 
be naturalized through the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
(also known as McCarran-Walter Act).17 
Meanwhile, as the Japanese immigration to the United State banned in 1924, the 
                                                
17 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (also known as Hart-Celler Act) 
reopened the door for the Asian immigration. 
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number of Japanese immigrating to South America increased drastically.  By 1935, there 
were close to 200,000 Japanese in South America.  Especially after the Manchurian 
Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo, the large-scale Japanese immigration took 
place and the Japanese in Manchuria reached half a million by 1937.18  As illustrated 
throughout the chapters, the Japanese government, intellectuals, and businesses/industri  
actively involved in the course of the development of the Japanese overseas emigration.  
From the beginning of the organized immigration to Hawaii in 1868 to the abolishment of 
the Japanese immigration to the United States in 1924, the Japanese government played a 
crucial role in initiating and then regulating the Japanese overseas emigration, and the 
process of modernization shaped the emigration pattern.   
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Estimates of Japanese Population, Population Increase, 






Population Sex Ratio Population 









1872  34,806 17,666 17,140 – – – 103.1 91.2 
1873  34,985 17,755 17,230 179 174 0.51 103.0 91.6 
1874  35,154 17,835 17,319 169 167 0.48 103.0 92.1 
1875  35,316 17,913 17,403 162 245 0.46 102.9 92.5 
1876  35,555 18,030 17,525 239 323 0.68 102.9 93.1 
1877  35,870 18,187 17,683 315 304 0.89 102.9 93.9 
1878  36,166 18,327 17,839 296 307 0.83 102.7 94.7 
1879  36,464 18,472 17,992 298 196 0.82 102.7 95.5 
1880  36,649 18,559 18,090 185 326 0.51 102.6 96.0 
1881  36,965 18,712 18,253 316 304 0.86 102.5 96.8 
1882  37,259 18,854 18,405 294 320 0.80 102.4 97.6 
1883  37,569 19,006 18,563 310 409 0.83 102.4 98.4 
1884  37,962 19,199 18,763 393 360 1.05 102.3 99.4 
1885  38,313 19,368 18,945 351 241 0.92 102.2 100.3 
1886  38,541 19,480 19,061 228 174 0.60 102.2 100.9 
1887  38,703 19,554 19,149 162 340 0.42 102.1 101.4 
1888  39,029 19,716 19,313 326 457 0.84 102.1 102.2 
1889  39,473 19,940 19,533 444 440 1.14 102.1 103.4 
1890  39,902 20,153 19,749 429 361 1.09 102.0 104.5 
1891  40,251 20,322 19,929 349 273 0.87 102.0 105.4 
1892  40,508 20,443 20,065 257 368 0.64 101.9 106.1 
1893  40,860 20,616 20,244 352 292 0.87 101.8 107.0 
 
 439
1894  41,142 20,755 20,387 282 424 0.69 101.8 107.8 
1895  41,557 20,960 20,597 415 448 1.01 101.8 108.8 
1896  41,992 21,164 20,828 435 427 1.05 101.6 110.0 
1897  42,400 21,356 21,044 408 515 0.97 101.5 111.1 
1898  42,886 21,590 21,296 486 550 1.15 101.4 112.3 
1899  43,404 21,836 21,568 518 487 1.21 101.2 113.7 
1900  43,847 22,051 21,796 443 554 1.02 101.2 114.8 
1901  44,359 22,298 22,061 512 626 1.17 101.1 116.2 
1902  44,964 22,606 22,358 605 604 1.36 101.1 117.8 
1903  45,546 22,901 22,645 582 615 1.29 101.1 119.3 
1904  46,135 23,195 22,940 589 495 1.29 101.1 120.8 
1905  46,620 23,421 23,199 485 469 1.05 101.0 122.1 
1906  47,038 23,599 23,439 418 499 0.90 100.7 123.2 
1907  47,416 23,786 23,630 378 660 0.80 100.7 124.2 
1908  47,965 24,041 23,924 549 697 1.16 100.5 125.6 
1909  48,554 24,326 24,228 589 668 1.23 100.4 127.2 
1910  49,184 24,650 24,534 630 711 1.30 100.5 128.8 
1911  49,852 24,993 24,859 668 771 1.36 100.5 130.6 
1912  50,577 25,365 25,212 725 773 1.45 100.6 132.5 
1913  51,305 25,737 25,568 728 800 1.44 100.7 134.4 
1914  52,039 26,105 25,934 734 773 1.43 100.7 136.3 
1915  52,752 26,465 26,287 713 771 1.37 100.7 138.2 
1916  53,496 26,841 26,655 744 678 1.41 100.7 140.1 
1917  54,134 27,158 26,976 638 675 1.19 100.7 141.8 
1918  54,739 27,453 27,286 605 354 1.12 100.6 143.4 
1919  55,033 27,602 27,431 294 559 0.54 100.6 144.1 
1920  55,473 27,812 27,661 440 673 0.80 100.5 145.3 
 
Source: Naikaku Tokei-kyoku (Cabinet Statistical Bureau). Meiji Gonen iko Waga Kuni no Jinko 
(Japanese Population after 1872). Tokyo: Tokyo Tokei Kyōkai, 1930.  Estimated population at 
the beginning of the year.  Including the Japanese in Okinawa, Ogasawara, Chishima a  well as 
forty-seven prefectures.  Not including foreigners in Japan.  However, includ ng the soldiers and 
civilian war workers overseas.  According to the 1920 national census, there were 42,492 







Population Estimates of the Japanese and the Japanese Americans in Hawaii from 
the Beginning of Meiji to the End of Taisho Periods 
  
Year Population Increase/Decrease 
1868 153  
1884 116 – 37 
1885 2039 + 1923 
1890 12,360 + 10,321 
1896 22,329 + 9,969 
1900 61,115 + 38,786 
1906 64,319 + 3,204 
1910 79,674 + 15,355 
1913 83,100 + 21,985 
1915 91,490 + 8,390 
1916 97,000 + 5,510 
1917 102,479 + 5,479 
1918 106,800 + 4,321 
1919 110,000 + 3,200 
1920 112,221 + 2,221 
1921 113,339 + 1,178 
1922 115,967 + 2,568 
1923 118,832 + 2,865 
1924 125,368 + 6,536 
1925 128,068 + 2,700 
1926 129,901 + 1,833 
 
Source: Sakae Morita, Hawai Nihonjin Hatten Shi (History of Japanese Development in Hawaii) 
(Waipahu, Hawaii, 1921); Sōen Yamashita, Nihon Hawai Koryu-shi (History of Relations 
between Japan and Hawaii) (Tokyo: Daitō Shuppansha, 1943), in Gaimushō Ryōji Ij ūbu (The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consul, Division of Immigration), Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten: 
Ijū Hyakunen no Ayumi, Honpen (Overseas Development of the Japanese: the Record of a 





Image of the Japanese, 1907.  
 
“Learnin’ Mary Had a Little Lamb.” 
 


































“He’s a Live Wire.” 
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